Results for “Risk Analyses” — Page 6

NASA NTRS1998

Methods and Techniques for Risk Prediction of Space Shuttle Upgrades

Since the Space Shuttle Accident in 1986, NASA has been trying to incorporate probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in decisions concerning the Space Shuttle and other NASA projects. One major study NASA is currently conducting is in the PRA area in establishing an overall risk model for the Space Shuttle System. The model is intended to provide a tool to predict the Shuttle risk and to perform sensitivity analyses and trade studies including evaluation of upgrades. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and its prime contractors including Pratt and Whitney (P&W) are part of the NASA team conducting the PRA study. MSFC responsibility involves modeling the External Tank (ET), the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), the Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). A major challenge that faced the PRA team is modeling the shuttle upgrades. This mainly includes the P&W High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) and the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP). The purpose of this paper is to discuss the various methods and techniques used for predicting the risk of the P&W redesigned HPFTP and HPOTP.

Hoffman, Chad R.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRS2020

Changes in Frequency of the Severity and Type of Aviation Accidents (1987 to 2016)

This document reports the fourth analysis to identify the types of accidents with the greatest impact on the overall safety risk in U.S. civil aviation. The first three analyses examined accidents in 1997-20061, in 2001-20102 and in 2005-20143. The safety risks herein are defined to include four elements: (1) the number of total accidents; (2) the number of fatal accidents; (3) the number of total injuries; (4) the number of fatal injuries. Two of the previous analyses also included the number of incidents, but incident data since 2007 are difficult to separate by flight operation. Other incident details are no longer recorded as well. Due to these changes, the author’s working copy of the incident data has not been updated since 2011 (for incidents through 2010), and the incident data were not included in this analysis. Powerplant and non-powerplant system component failures were the only categories with a greater contribution to the overall safety risk from incidents than from accidents. Accident types, as well as accident rates, have been shown to vary considerably among different flight operations (e.g., large air carriers versus general aviation). For this reason, all analyses were done separately for four types of flight operations (Part 121, Scheduled Part 135, Non- Scheduled Part 135 and Part 91).

Evans, Joni K.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Risk Assessment of Cassini Sun Sensor Integrity Due to Hypervelocity Impact of Saturn Dust Particles

A sophisticated interplanetary spacecraft, Cassini is one of the heaviest and most sophisticated interplanetary spacecraft humans have ever built and launched. Since achieving orbit at Saturn in 2004, Cassini has collected science data throughout its four-year prime mission (2004-08), and has since been approved for first and second extended missions through September 2017. In late 2016, the Cassini spacecraft will begin a daring set of ballistic orbits that will hop the rings and dive between the upper atmosphere of Saturn and its innermost D-ring twenty-two times. The "dusty" environment of the inner D-ring region the spacecraft must fly through is hazardous because of the possible damage that dust particles, travelling at speeds as high as 31.4 km/s, can do to spacecraft hardware. During hazardous proximal ring-plane crossings, the Cassini mission operation team plans to point the high-gain antenna to the RAM vector in order to protect most of spacecraft instruments from the incoming energetic ring dust particles. However, this particular spacecraft attitude will expose two Sun sensors (that are mounted on the antenna dish) to the incoming dust particles. High-velocity impacts on the Sun sensor cover glass might penetrate the 2.54-mm glass cover of the Sun sensor. Even without penetration damage, craters created by these impacts on the surface of the cover glass will degrade the transmissibility of light through it. Apart from being directly impacted by the dust particles, the Sun sensors are also threatened by some fraction of ricochet ejecta that are produced by dust particle impacts on the large antenna dish (made of graphite fiber epoxy composite material). Finally, the spacecraft attitude control system must cope with disturbances due to both the translational and angular impulses imparted on the large antenna dish and the long magnetometer boom by the incoming high-velocity projectiles. Analyses performed to quantify the risks the Sun sensors must contend with during these hazardous ring-plane crossings are given in this paper

Lee, Allan Y.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Characterizing Fractures Across the Astronaut Corps: Preliminary Findings from Population-Level Analysis

Despite evidence of bone loss during spaceflight and operational countermeasures to mitigate this loss, the subsequent risk of fracture among astronauts is not known. The physiologic process of diminished bone density and bone recovery during or following spaceflight is multifactorial. Such factors as age, sex, fracture history, and others may combine to increase fracture risk among astronauts. As part of the 2016 Bone Research and Clinical Advisory Panel (RCAP), the authors analyzed data collected on 338 NASA astronauts to describe the demographics, bone-relevant characteristics, and fracture history of the astronaut population. The majority of the population are male (n=286, 84.6%), have flown at least one mission (n=306, 90.5%), and were between the ages of 30 and 49 at first mission (n=296, 96.7% of those with at least one mission). Of the 338 astronauts, 241 (71.3%) experienced a fracture over the course of their lifetime. One hundred and five (43.5%) of these 241 astronauts only experienced a fracture prior to being selected into the Astronaut Corps, whereas 53 (22.0%) only experienced a fracture after selection as an astronaut. An additional 80 astronauts (33.2%) had both pre- and post-selection fractures. The remaining 3 astronauts had a fracture of unknown date, which could not be categorized as pre- or post-selection. Among the 133 astronauts with at least one post-selection fracture, males comprised 90.2% (n=120) compared to 84.5% of the entire Corps, and females accounted for 9.8% (n=13) compared to 15.4% of the Corps. Ninety-seven of the 133 astronauts with post-selection fractures (72.9%) had one fracture event, 22 (16.5%) had two fractures, and 14 (10.5%) had three or more fractures. Some astronauts with multiple fractures suffered these in a single event, such as an automobile accident. The 133 astronauts with a post-selection fracture accounted for a total of 188 fracture events. One hundred and four (78.2%) of astronauts with post-selection fractures experienced those fractures following their first mission (mean 12.7 +/- 11.1 years following first mission; range 14.0 days - 50.6 years). Additional analyses are ongoing and include examination of fracture history, skeletal site, mechanism, and type of fracture, age at time of fracture, time from spaceflight to fracture, as well as multivariable analysis comparing fracture events to non-events. The results of such analyses may reveal trends in risk factors for fracture among the astronaut corps that have yet to be systematically described through a corps-wide approach.

Rossi, Meredith M.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS1992

Space Station Freedom Environmental Health Care Program

The paper discusses the environmental planning and monitoring aspects of the Space Station Freedom (SSF) Environmental Health Care Program, which encompasses all phases of the SSF assembly and operation from the first element entry at MB-6 through the Permanent Manned Capability and beyond. Environmental planning involves the definition of acceptability limits and monitoring requirements for the radiation dose barothermal parameters and potential contaminants in the SSF air and water and on internal surfaces. Inflight monitoring will be implemented through the Environmental Health System, which consists of five subsystems: Microbiology, Toxicology, Water Quality, Radiation, and Barothermal Physiology. In addition to the environmental data interpretation and analysis conducted after each mission, the new data will be compared to archived data for statistical and long-term trend analysis and determination of risk exposures. Results of these analyses will be used to modify the acceptability limits and monitoring requirements for the future.

Richard, Elizabeth E.↗

NASA NTRS2016

NASA Space Flight Vehicle Fault Isolation Challenges

The Space Launch System (SLS) is the new NASA heavy lift launch vehicle in development and is scheduled for its first mission in 2018.SLS has many of the same logistics challenges as any other large scale program. However, SLS also faces unique challenges related to testability. This presentation will address the SLS challenges for diagnostics and fault isolation, along with the analyses and decisions to mitigate risk..

Neeley, James R.↗

NASA NTRS2016

NASA Space Flight Vehicle Fault Isolation Challenges

The Space Launch System (SLS) is the new NASA heavy lift launch vehicle in development and is scheduled for its first mission in 2018. SLS has many of the same logistics challenges as any other large scale program. However, SLS also faces unique challenges related to testability. This presentation will address the SLS challenges for diagnostics and fault isolation, along with the analyses and decisions to mitigate risk.

Bramon, Chris↗

NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play Together

Since the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, NASA has extensively used probabilistic analysis methods to assess, understand, and communicate the risk of space launch vehicles. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), used in the nuclear industry, is one of the probabilistic analysis methods NASA utilizes to assess Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) risk for launch vehicles. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and probability distributions to analyze the risk of a system, a process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three basic questions: 1) what can go wrong that would lead to loss or degraded performance (i.e., scenarios involving undesired consequences of interest), 2) how likely is it (probabilities), and 3) what is the severity of the degradation (consequences). Since the Challenger accident, PRA has been used in supporting decisions regarding safety upgrades for launch vehicles. Another area that was given a lot of emphasis at NASA after the Challenger accident is reliability engineering. Reliability engineering has been a critical design function at NASA since the early Apollo days. However, after the Challenger accident, quantitative reliability analysis and reliability predictions were given more scrutiny because of their importance in understanding failure mechanism and quantifying the probability of failure, which are key elements in resolving technical issues, performing design trades, and implementing design improvements. Although PRA and reliability are both probabilistic in nature and, in some cases, use the same tools, they are two different activities. Specifically, reliability engineering is a broad design discipline that deals with loss of function and helps understand failure mechanism and improve component and system design. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment process intended to assess the risk scenarios that could lead to a major/top undesirable system event, and to identify those scenarios that are high-risk drivers. PRA output is critical to support risk informed decisions concerning system design. This paper describes the PRA process and the reliability engineering discipline in detail. It discusses their differences and similarities and how they work together as complementary analyses to support the design and risk assessment processes. Lessons learned, applications, and case studies in both areas are also discussed in the paper to demonstrate and explain these differences and similarities.

Safie, Fayssal↗

NASA NTRS2011

Ares I-X Separation and Reentry Trajectory Analyses

The Ares I-X Flight Test Vehicle was launched on October 28, 2009 and was the first and only test flight of NASA s two-stage Ares I launch vehicle design. The launch was successful and the flight test met all of its primary and secondary objectives. This paper discusses the stage separation and reentry trajectory analysis that was performed in support of the Ares I-X test flight. Pre-flight analyses were conducted to assess the risk of stage recontact during separation, to evaluate the first stage flight dynamics during reentry, and to define the range safety impact ellipses of both stages. The results of these pre-flight analyses were compared with available flight data. On-board video taken during flight showed that the flight test vehicle successfully separated without any recontact. Reconstructed trajectory data also showed that first stage flight dynamics were well characterized by pre-flight Monte Carlo results. In addition, comparisons with flight data indicated that the complex interference aerodynamic models employed in the reentry simulation were effective in capturing the flight dynamics during separation. Finally, the splash-down locations of both stages were well within predicted impact ellipses.

Tartabini, Paul V.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Orbital Debris Shape and Orientation Effects on Impact Damage to Shuttle Tiles

Taking the damage results from a previous paper as a guide, and using a tile model created for the STS-107 accident investigation, we used the SPHC hydrodynamic code to evaluate the probable worst-case impact effects of flat, rectangular, "flake-shaped," orbital debris particles on Space Shuttle thermal tiles. We compared the damage from flakes with that produced by spheres. The flakes and spheres were sized according to a "characteristic length" (Lc) derived from radar cross-section measurements, and embodied in the NASA Standard Breakup Model (SBM). Impacts were simulated at near-normal obliquity, at 12 km/sec. We modeled the worst-case flake orientation: a corner-on impact, an orientation we term a "Face A-B" impact. Results of our simulations indicate that flake impactors are less damaging than spheres of the same Lc. Since spherical impactors have been assumed in analyses of shuttle orbital debris impact risk, we find that these risks may have been overestimated. This work represents a preliminary second step, i.e., a follow-on to [1], in developing a sensitivity analysis for the expected range of effects on damage considering spherical vs. non-spherical impactors, as recommended by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) report to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Evans, Steven W.↗

NASA NTRS2022

Commercial fishery bycatch risk for large juvenile and adult smalltooth sawfish (Pristis pectinata) in Florida waters

1.Incidental catch of marine species can create ecological and economic issues, particularly for endangered species. The smalltooth sawfish (Pristis pectinata) is endemic to the Atlantic Ocean and listed as Endangered in the US Endangered Species Act. One of its major threats is bycatch mortality in commercial fisheries. 2.Despite the protection afforded by the US Endangered Species Act, smalltooth sawfish are still captured as bycatch in commercial fisheries. Acoustic and satellite tag data collected on 59 sawfish between 2011 and 2019 were analysed to assess commercial fishery bycatch risk for large juveniles and adults off Florida. This study focused on shrimp trawl, south-east coastal gillnet, and shark bottom longline fisheries, as these were identified in the recovery plan as having the greatest potential threats to recovery. 3.Bycatch risk associated with the shrimp trawl fishery was significantly higher than the other fisheries, indicating that this fishery currently poses the greatest threat to recovery. 4.Bycatch risk was concentrated in all seasons in the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the lower Florida Keys for the shrimp trawl fishery, off Cape Canaveral in the south-east coastal gillnet fishery, and in the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to the Florida Keys in the shark bottom longline fishery. 5.Tagging location and sex were predictors of bycatch risk. Individuals tagged in Charlotte Harbor had the highest shrimp trawl bycatch risk. Females tagged in south Florida tended to reside in the deepest water, which is where shrimp trawl effort is highest. Therefore, females may be at more risk in these deeper waters. 6.Results from this study indicate a year-round closure of waters off south-west Florida to the shrimp trawl fishery between Charlotte Harbor and the western Florida Keys would reduce sawfish bycatch, and thus mortality, which is in line with recovery plan goals.

acoustic monitoring, bycatch, commercial fisheries↗

NASA NTRS2020

Electromagnetic Compatibility Test and Analysis Campaign of NASA's Mars 2020 Rover Final Submission

NASA's Mars 2020 Perseverance Rover—with a launch window opening July 2020, and landing expected February 2021—has mission objectives to look for evidence of habitability, seek biosignatures of past life, collect and cache samples for possible future return to Earth, and prepare for future human missions to Mars. The Rover platform is similar to the previous Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) “Curiosity” rover that landed in 2012 but contains a new suite of scientific instruments and upgrades to existing functionality: seven new and/or upgraded scientific payloads, an upgraded arm and sampling system, and a Helicopter demonstration. These changes—along with new efficiency goals to operate more Rover subsystems concurrently and thus collect more science—presented new electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) challenges. In this paper, we will describe the campaign to ensure Mars 2020 mission success from an electromagnetic environment perspective: 1) confirming existing MSL heritage subsystems and EMC requirements were compatible with the new Mars 2020 mission objectives, 2) engaging with engineers and scientists early in the project to identify and evaluate risks before hardware assembly and performing ambitious risk reduction tests, 3) undertaking a comprehensive subsystem qualification test program based on tailored MIL-STD-461F requirements, occasionally leading to redesign, 4) synthesizing the data collected to perform detailed analyses toward the goal of making risk-informed decisions at a system level. The spacecraft successfully completed all three planned system level tests, demonstrating self-compatibility with minimal impact to operations from electromagn

Gonzales, Edward C↗

NASA NTRS2020

Electromagnetic Compatibility Test and Analysis Campaign of NASA's Mars 2020 Rover

NASA's Mars 2020 Rover—with a launch window opening July 2020, and landing expected February 2021—has mission objectives to look for evidence of habitability, seek biosignatures of past life, collect and cache samples for possible future return to Earth, and prepare for future human missions. The Rover platform is similar to the previous Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) “Curiosity” rover that landed in 2012 but contains a new suite of scientific instruments and upgrades to existing functionality. The scientific payload includes a trio of chemical analysis tools (PIXL, SHERLOC, SuperCam), a ground penetrating radar (RIMFAX), an upgraded weather station (MEDA), upgraded high resolution camera (MastCam-Z), and an oxygen-producing experiment (MOXIE). These changes—along with new efficiency goals to operate more Rover subsystems concurrently and thus collect more science—presented new electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) challenges. In this paper, we will describe the campaign to ensure Mars 2020 mission success from an electromagnetic environment perspective: 1) confirming existing MSL heritage subsystems and EMC requirements were compatible with the new Mars 2020 mission objectives, 2) engaging with engineers and scientists early in the project to identify and evaluate risks before hardware assembly and performing ambitious risk reduction tests, 3) undertaking a comprehensive subsystem qualification test program based on tailored MIL-STD-461F requirements, occasionally leading to redesign, 4) synthesizing the data collected to perform detailed analyses toward the goal of making risk-informed decisions at a system level. The spacecraft has successfully completed all three planned system level tests, demonstrating self-compatibility with minimal impact to operations from electromagnetic interference in all mission phases.

Gonzales, Edward C↗

NASA NTRS1989

Recent developments in deployment analysis simulation using a multi-body computer code

Deployment is a candidate mode for construction of structural space systems components. By its very nature, deployment is a dynamic event, often involving large angle unfolding of flexible beam members. Validation of proposed designs and conceptual deployment mechanisms is enhanced through analysis. Analysis may be used to determine member loads thus helping to establish deployment rates and deployment control requirements for a given concept. Futhermore, member flexibility, joint free-play, manufacturing tolerances, and imperfections can affect the reliability of deployment. Analyses which include these effects can aid in reducing risks associated with a particular concept. Ground tests which can play a similar role to that of analyses are difficult and expensive to perform. Suspension systems just for vibration ground tests of large space structures in a 1 g environment present many challenges. Suspension of a structure which spatially expands is even more challenging. Analysis validation through experimental confirmation on relatively small simple models would permit analytical extrapolation to larger more complex space structures.

Housner, Jerrold M.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Improvements to the Ionizing Radiation Risk Assessment Program for NASA Astronauts

To perform dosimetry and risk assessment, NASA collects astronaut ionizing radiation exposure data from space flight, medical imaging and therapy, aviation training activities and prior occupational exposure histories. Career risk of exposure induced death (REID) from radiation is limited to 3 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. The Radiation Health Office at Johnson Space Center (JSC) is implementing a program to integrate the gathering, storage, analysis and reporting of astronaut ionizing radiation dose and risk data and records. This work has several motivations, including more efficient analyses and greater flexibility in testing and adopting new methods for evaluating risks. The foundation for these improvements is a set of software tools called the Astronaut Radiation Exposure Analysis System (AREAS). AREAS is a series of MATLAB(Registered TradeMark)-based dose and risk analysis modules that interface with an enterprise level SQL Server database by means of a secure web service. It communicates with other JSC medical and space weather databases to maintain data integrity and consistency across systems. AREAS is part of a larger NASA Space Medicine effort, the Mission Medical Integration Strategy, with the goal of collecting accurate, high-quality and detailed astronaut health data, and then securely, timely and reliably presenting it to medical support personnel. The modular approach to the AREAS design accommodates past, current, and future sources of data from active and passive detectors, space radiation transport algorithms, computational phantoms and cancer risk models. Revisions of the cancer risk model, new radiation detection equipment and improved anthropomorphic computational phantoms can be incorporated. Notable hardware updates include the Radiation Environment Monitor (which uses Medipix technology to report real-time, on-board dosimetry measurements), an updated Tissue-Equivalent Proportional Counter, and the Southwest Research Institute Radiation Assessment Detector. Also, the University of Florida hybrid phantoms, which are flexible in morphometry and positioning, are being explored as alternatives to the current NASA computational phantoms.

Semones, E. J.↗