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Criticality Safety and Fuel Performance Considerations for Enrichment Above 5 Weight Percent in the Uranium Dioxide Fuel Cycle

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is preparing for anticipated licensing applications requesting fuel enrichments of UO 2 ceramic fuels enriched in excess of 5 weight percent (w/o) 235 U for commercial light-water reactors (LWRs). PNNL has been tasked with providing technical assistance to the NRC related to the review and approval of requests for enrichment increases above the current 5 w/o 235 U enrichment limit. This report will provide the agency with technical assistance to enhance the staff’s knowledge base and to identify developmental needs required to support the licensing of greater than 5 w/o UO 2 ceramic fuels. This report provides a background on increasing enrichment of UO 2 LWR fuel beyond 5 w/o 235 U. The primary concern of increasing enrichment is the impacts to criticality safety. This report will focus on criticality safety as it relates to enrichment, conversion of uranium hexafluoride to UO 2 , fuel assembly fabrication, transportation of fresh/spent fuel assemblies, reactor operations, and storage of fresh/spent fuel assemblies. The report provides a general summary of each of the steps in the UO 2 fuel cycle starting from transportation of enriched UF 6 through dry cask storage of spent fuel assemblies. This report also discusses other impacts of increased enrichment during reactor operation and the surrounding fuel cycle activities. Current needs regarding both data and analytical codes to support the increase above 5 w/o 235 U are identified and discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nitrous oxide reduction by two partial denitrifying bacteria requires denitrification intermediates that cannot be respired

ABSTRACT Denitrification is a form of anaerobic respiration wherein nitrate (NO 3 − ) is sequentially reduced via nitrite (NO 2 − ), nitric oxide, and nitrous oxide (N 2 O) to dinitrogen gas (N 2 ) by four reductase enzymes. Partial denitrifying bacteria possess only one or some of these four reductases and use them as independent respiratory modules. However, it is unclear if partial denitrifiers sense and respond to denitrification intermediates outside of their reductase repertoire. Here, we tested the denitrifying capabilities of two purple nonsulfur bacteria,Rhodopseudomonas palustrisCGA0092 andRhodobacter capsulatusSB1003. Each had denitrifying capabilities that matched their genome annotation; CGA0092 reduced NO 2 − to N 2 , and SB1003 reduced N 2 O to N 2 . For each bacterium, N 2 O reduction could be used both for electron balance during growth on electron-rich organic compounds in light and for energy transformation via respiration in darkness. However, N 2 O reduction required supplementation with a denitrification intermediate, including those for which there was no associated denitrification enzyme. For CGA0092, NO 3 − served as a stable, non-catalyzable molecule that was sufficient to activate N 2 O reduction. Using a β-galactosidase reporter, we found that NO 3 − acted, at least in part, by stimulating N 2 O reductase gene expression. In SB1003, NO 2 − but not NO 3 − activated N 2 O reduction, but NO 2 − was slowly removed, likely by a promiscuous enzyme activity. Our findings reveal that partial denitrifiers can still be subject to regulation by denitrification intermediates that they cannot use. IMPORTANCE Denitrification is a form of microbial respiration wherein nitrate is converted via several nitrogen oxide intermediates into harmless dinitrogen gas. Partial denitrifying bacteria, which individually have some but not all denitrifying enzymes, can achieve complete denitrification as a community by cross-feeding nitrogen oxide intermediates. However, the last intermediate, nitrous oxide (N2O), is a potent greenhouse gas that often escapes, motivating efforts to understand and improve the efficiency of denitrification. Here, we found that at least some partial denitrifying N2O reducers can sense and respond to nitrogen oxide intermediates that they cannot otherwise use. The regulatory effects of nitrogen oxides on partial denitrifiers are thus an important consideration in understanding and applying denitrifying bacterial communities to combat greenhouse gas emissions.

Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology↗

Technical Assessment of Off-Gas System Technologies for Potential Use in Molten Salt Reactors

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are a class of Generation IV advanced reactor technologies aimed to enhance and improve the safety, fuel utilization and cost-effectiveness of nuclear power generation. MSR concepts are based on using a molten salt mixture as a primary nuclear reactor coolant, while the fuel can be either directly dissolved in the coolant (i.e., fluid-fueled) or can be in a separate solid form (i.e., salt-cooled solid-fueled). MSRs can be operated in either thermal or fast neutron spectra, as simple fissile convertors, or breeder reactors (e.g., utilizing both fissile and fertile fuels), as well as accelerator-driven sub-critical reactors or transuranic element burners. Operation of MSRs will necessitate management and treatment of the off-gas streams released to the headspace of the reactor where, in some designs, a cover gas can be circulated to remove certain fission products and maintain an inert atmosphere. An inert MSR cover gas swept over or sparged into the salt will confine radionuclides emerging from the free surface, including radioactive noble and non-noble gases, aerosols, and volatile species. The elements and compounds of these species will have a wide range of thermochemical and physical properties, some of which will decay to different products in the off-gas stream. Therefore, system components used to manage and treat MSR off-gas streams will need to be robust under dynamic reactor and chemistry conditions to support adequate reactor performance by managing the composition and species in the salt coolant and cover gas space. Off-gas system components would perform as a radionuclide boundary to the reactor vessel and a primary means for preventing radionuclide release; therefore, they are of high safety significance for MSR operations. This report reviews various technologies and materials for potential implementation in the design of an MSR off-gas system per a general conceptual framework. The reviewed technologies operate based on scrubbing, capture, delay, or separation of species in the off-gas stream. These include molten hydroxide scrubbers, solid sorbents, delay off-gas systems, particle traps, and cryogenic distillation. Since aspects of an off-gas system will be design-specific, the approach is to provide general discussions on attributes of these technologies and materials, including target off-gas stream species, operational parameters and conditions of importance to decontamination factors, implementation maturity, system component monitoring, potential off-normal conditions and considerations for waste products. The information aims to support the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in their safety evaluations for MSR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Basin-Wide Approaches to Hydropower Licensing

This presentation summarizes findings from a 2020 NREL technical report including the FERC relicensing process for non-federal hydropower projects, analyzes FERC-licensed projects with license expiration dates from 2018-2037, discusses FERC's authority to coordinate license terms of hydropower projects within a shared river basin and provides basin-wide case studies and considerations to hydropower relicensing. In the United States there are 1,043 active FERC-licensed hydroelectric projects with a total capacity of 56,097 MW. Of those, 647 with a total capacity of 21,870 MW have license expiration dates from 2018-2037. The expected workload in conjunction with the time, cost, and complexity associated with issuing a single new license has led to initiatives that aim to increase the efficiency of the relicensing process. Federal and state regulators and licensees in California, Maine, New York, and Wisconsin have begun to develop approaches to look at hydropower relicensing as part of a larger system - a river basin. These basin-wide approaches seek to coordinate different stages of the relicensing process for multiple projects at the same time. The goal of these basin-wide approaches is to increase the efficiency of the relicensing process and allow for a more comprehensive analysis of the cumulative impacts of the projects within the basin. These innovative approaches to relicensing could also reduce the workload for regulators and costs associated with relicensing. This presentation discusses some of the findings from the Basin-wide Approaches to Hydropower Relicensing: Case Studies and Considerations including a summary of the key considerations for the FERC relicensing process for non-federal hydropower projects, key findings from the analysis of FERC-licensed projects with license expiration dates from 2018-2037, discusses FERC's authority to coordinate license terms of hydropower projects within a shared river basin and provides basin-wide case studies and considerations to hydropower relicensing.

basin-wide↗

Packaging and Transportation Regulatory Inconsistencies and Challenges - 20485

This paper presents regulatory inconsistencies within and between various regulatory agencies. These inconsistencies relate to the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials typically encountered during decommissioning including mixed wastes that are required to be compliant with more than one regulatory agency during shipment. At least one possible solution is presented for consideration. The following four examples are presented: - Packaging discrepancies for radioactive material meeting the DOT definition of Radioactive LSA-I that also contain lead may be compliant when shipped unpackaged per Department of Transportation (DOT) rules in 173.427 paragraph C. However, since they contain lead, they are required to be shipped in a package per the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Waste Manifest (HWM) instructions. - The difference between the units of measure used in 49 CFR Part 172.101 Appendix A and 40 CFR, Part 355, Appendices A and B. - The requirement for outer packaging for radioactive gauges meeting all other requirements of 49 CFR 173.424 and 173.425. - E-Manifesting EPA system difficult for waste materials containing both radioactive class 7 and PCBs. (authors)

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Idaho National Laboratory Integrated Multisite SSHAC Level 3: Probabilistic Volcanic Hazards Assessment

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) resides on the eastern Snake River Plain (ESRP), part of the Snake River Plain (SRP) with a complex origin and geologic history of volcanism. Much of the Quaternary (last 2.58 million years) volcanism within 400 km of INL is genetically associated with a major thermal anomaly referred to as the Yellowstone hotspot, which is currently located more than 180 km northeast of INL. Near INL, local volcanic sources include silicic domes near its southern border, and numerous dike-fed basaltic vents of the ESRP, some of which are near or within the INL boundaries. Quantitative probabilistic assessments of screened-in volcanic hazardous phenomena for nine different facility complexes at the INL are presented for a Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 3 (SL3) study. The comprehensive, integrated multisite SSHAC study consists of a single regional Probabilistic Volcanic Hazards Assessment (PVHA) that pertains to all nine INL facility complexes, with site-specific information developed at each respective area of interest (AOI), referred to as the "INL facility AOI" (Figure ES-1). Hazard products are generated for specified INL facility AOIs for use by multiple stakeholders from different agencies in risk-informed decision-making regarding site selection, operations, and design of nuclear facilities at INL, consistent with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulatory guidance. The study also serves as the basis for future periodic safety assessments required for existing DOE facilities, such as 10-year evaluations of natural-phenomena hazards. Elements of the INL PVHA including initial characterization, screening, quantitative assessments of eruption and hazard potential, and consideration of facility needs are conducted using the three phases of the SSHAC process: evaluation, integration, and documentation. As per regulatory guidance, the SSHAC framework provided the necessary processes and procedures for the PVHA Technical Integration (TI) team, at three workshops, five formal working meetings and many TI team remote meetings, to conduct initial characterization, screen the volcanic hazards, create PVHA model inputs, exercise those models in the PVHA, consider facility-specific volcanic hazard needs, and perform final hazard calculations. The Participatory Peer Review Panel (PPRP) provided independent oversight and performed process and technical reviews of the PVHA throughout its duration. The study included an extensive New Data Collection and Analyses (NDCA) program developed by the PVHA TI team to reduce uncertainties in hazard-significant elements in the PVHA model. NDCA activities generated 20 reports providing important contributory datasets and results to the project database for characterizing the ESRP. For example, a report compiling the dimensions of ESRP shield volcanoes and lava fields was used to construct volcanic footprints (areas of impact), was compared with data from INL subsurface cores, and was used to validate the results of lava-flow inundation modeling on the contemporary terrain. Another example is the acquisition of aeromagnetic data over INL and its surrounding area, with maps of buried magmatic features (e.g., subsurface volcanoes and swarms of feeder dikes) that informed the PVHA conceptual model of volcanism. The SSHAC evaluation process was used to conduct all elements of the PVHA including initial characterization and screening. Existing data and NDCA activities provided the foundation to develop the tectonomagmatic conceptual model of volcanism for the region of geographical interest in the SRP and Yellowstone hotspot volcanic system, and for considering volcanoes in the western US. Considering Quaternary volcanic sources active during this period, the screening approach identified and evaluated magma compositions, types of eruptive and intrusive phenomena, types of hazardous phenomena, and proximity of sources to INL. The PVHA TI team evaluated 18 types of magmatic sources in terms of 20 potentially hazardous phenomena, resulting in 360 screening decisions. The screening process resulted in 140 screened-in hazardous volcanic phenomena for Quaternary volcanic sources 1) proximal to INL facility complexes in the ESRP (64 basaltic and 54 silicic), 2) regional sources associated with the Yellowstone caldera system and Blackfoot Reservoir volcanic field (7), and 3) more distal sources from thirteen Cascade volcanoes and two volcanoes at Long Valley caldera (CA).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

When Every Drum is a Win - Tackling a Thirty-Five Thousand Drum Legacy - 20064

Cameco Corporation's (Cameco) Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) was previously owned by the federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear, which held a significant inventory of legacy waste material at the time Cameco was formed in 1988. As a result, Cameco was granted an allocation of 150,000 cubic metres of space in the Long-Term Waste Management Facility (LTWMF) located in the Municipality of Port Hope (MPH), which opened to the receipt of Cameco material in June 2018. Cameco is currently undertaking a major site cleanup and renewal of its Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) which is known as the Vision in Motion (VIM) project. Over its operating history, Eldorado accumulated an inventory of over 35,000 drums of accumulated waste that was primarily stored at two offside warehouse locations. In 2017 and 2018, the project focused on repackaging two well characterized legacy wastes (magnesium fluoride slag and depleted uranium titanium oxide) from one of the two offsite locations. At the conclusion of this work, approximately 15,000 drums of these wastes had been repackaged and disposed of at the LTWMF. There remained approximately 1000 drums from this location that either could not be repackaged safely or were different waste types and required further verification and/or processing. The buildings at this location were scheduled for demolition in early 2019, which triggered the development of a process for triaging legacy drums in August 2018, which allowed for preparation and shipment of approximately half of these drums to the LTWMF by March 2019, with the remainder moved to the second offsite warehouse location in February 2019 for further characterization which is ongoing. This paper will discuss key lessons learned as the drummed legacy waste disposal inventory has been reduced to approximately half of the initial inventory. This will include the development of an alternate packaging process; prioritization of characterization activities and selection of techniques where minimal inventory information is available; determination of next step(s) for each drum as it is assessed; key safety considerations; and how to make inroads into an overwhelming task while under public and regulatory scrutiny. In a relatively short period of time, significant progress has been made to organize and gather information about the legacy waste, update the inventory records and determine the most appropriate pathways (i.e. LTWMF disposal, disposal at another appropriate facility, site storage until future processing and/or disposal). Since 2017 the volume of the decades-old legacy waste inventory has decreased significantly. With the majority of the known materials safely disposed of at the LTWMF, every drum removed from the endless rows of 20,000 pyramidally-stacked waste drums with limited history that is safely characterized, prepared and shipped is considered a win. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Comparison of Geochemical Reactivity of Marcellus and Caney Shale Based on Effluent Analysis

ABSTRACT: In this comparative study, we analyzed the changes in elemental concentrations of hydraulic fracturing fluids after interaction with the Marcellus and Caney Shale formations. The focus was on assessing the inherent risks and environmental implications associated with flowback waters, including their impact on soil, ground, and drinking water quality, and human health safety. The chemical compositions of effluents were determined through Inductively Coupled Plasma Optical Emission Spectroscopy (ICP-OES) and Mass spectrometry (ICP-MS). The Marcellus Shale, showed concentrations of Cd, averaging 0.380 ppm far exceeding safe water thresholds. Significant levels of As, Se, B, and Pb were detected in both shales, raising concerns about soil and water contamination. Analyzing the effluents from representative samples of sections of the Marcellus (S2 and S7) and Caney (R1 and R2) indicates different geochemical responses over 4 weeks of experiments. This comparison underscores the chemical changes and environmental considerations linked to hydraulic fracturing across shale formations, suggesting the value of tailored monitoring and regulatory measures for each type. 1. INTRODUCTION The Caney and Marcellus shales, differing in geology and geochemistry, represent distinct unconventional reservoirs. The Caney shale, is more ductile, with higher produced water volumes, (Smith et al., 2022) contrasts with the brittle Marcellus shale known for lower brine production but significant data availability. This study aims to elucidate the possible environmental health and safety issues that may arise from the hydraulic fracturing processes. The interaction between fracturing fluids and clays presents a significant challenge. The primary base of these fluids is water, which, when introduced to clay, can induce swelling and constrict flow pathways. This phenomenon is attributed to water molecules infiltrating the layers of clay, particularly in 2:1-type clays, leading to an increased distance between layers. To counteract this, clay stabilizers are employed (Awejori et al., 2021). Despite their effectiveness, these stabilizers are considered temporary solutions. Upon completion of the fracturing process, a concomitant amount of contaminated waters (flow back), with varied content is collected at the surface. From these, we can infer the geochemical reactions and the environmental challenges associated with these waters. Flowback waters can be reinjected or used for other purposes such as irrigation. This requires adequate screening and treatment for safe use.

Dje, L. B.↗

Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology has significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change, particularly in hard to decarbonize industrial and commercial sectors. CCUS involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from industrial processes or power generation and utilizing it for other purposes, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or storing the captured CO 2 underground. CCUS technology can reduce the environmental impact of continued fossil fuel use while smoothing the transition to a low-carbon economy. CCUS can create new economic opportunities, such as the development of new industries and job creation, and can enhance energy security by diversifying energy sources. For these reasons, enabling CCUS has become a key objective of the Biden-Harris administration’s clean energy policy and has received bipartisan support. Despite its environmental and economic potential, CCUS faces multiple barriers to widespread deployment. One of the main challenges is the high cost and technical difficulty of implementing and operating large-scale CCUS infrastructure. CCUS remains a relatively expensive way to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., compared to solar photovoltaic technology’s displacement of coal generation). Additionally, financial incentives and supportive policies like those enacted to support solar photovoltaic development, especially at the state level, are inconsistent or nonexistent, which can discourage investment in CCUS projects. There are also technical challenges associated with safe and secure underground CO 2 storage and the development of new carbon utilization technologies. Public opposition to various aspects of CCUS technologies, ranging from concerns that CCUS will extend reliance on fossil fuels to CCUS infrastructure being sited in disadvantaged communities, is a growing challenge. This paper focuses on another significant barrier to broad CCUS deployment: the need for considerable expansion of the dedicated land-based CO 2 pipeline network in the United States to meet CCUS goals and the unique regulatory challenges to its development. To reach carbon emissions targets in the United States by 2050, CCUS technology will need to be supported by tens of thousands of miles of CO 2 pipelines. Estimates range from a minimum of roughly 29,000 pipeline miles (according to a 2020 Great Plains Institute study) to 66,000 pipeline miles (as per a 2021 Princeton University–led study). As of October 2022, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) reports fewer than 5,400 miles of U.S. pipelines carrying CO 2 . This deficit—and what it means for the prospect of moving substantially larger quantities of CO 2 from source to use or storage—threatens to stifle the development of CCUS projects and technologies identified as an important tool to meet emissions targets. The current regulatory landscape facing CO 2 pipeline development can best be described as uncertain. At the federal level, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees safety regulation of pipelines transporting hazardous materials, including CO 2 upon commencement of operation. However, PHMSA’s definition of CO 2 as “a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent CO 2 molecules compressed to a supercritical state” has not been updated since its 1991 addition to the Federal Register. Because CO 2 can be transported in a gaseous, liquid, or supercritical state (indeed, the physical state of CO 2 can fluctuate within a single pipeline due to environmental changes), doubts persist about the extent of PHMSA’s purview—and raise questions about what, if anything, states should do to address this apparent gap. PHMSA has begun a major revision of its existing rules, but the agency does not expect a first draft before 2024. Economic oversight of CO 2 pipelines is even less clear. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Surface Transportation Board (STB)—which regulate the rates of interstate oil/natural gas and non-energy pipelines, respectively—have both declined jurisdiction over interstate CO 2 pipelines. This presumably leaves economic regulation to state and/or local governments, but few if any states have the laws or resources in place to oversee just and reasonable rates. Further, the interstate nature of CO 2 pipeline development creates questions around how different states should align their rate-making decisions. Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation Currently, regulatory responsibilities regarding CO 2 pipeline siting and permitting fall to state and local governments. The variety of laws and regulations across the country, however, creates a maze of requirements for pipeline developers to navigate. To secure necessary permits, most states require pipeline companies to be “common carriers” that provide transport service to the public at uniform rates. However, the specific definition of that term varies. Some states require clear evidence that a pipeline services the public, while others automatically deem any pipeline company transporting energy products or hazardous materials to be a “common carrier”—with little consideration for accessibility to third parties. Other states have eschewed common-carrier terminology entirely, placing private and publicly accessible pipelines on equal footing. Much like the variation in common-carrier requirements, laws governing eminent domain authority to secure rights-of-way (ROW) to commence construction on a planned pipeline route differ by state. Several states have no laws or rules governing CO 2 pipelines. In addition to creating questions about whether long-standing rules for other pipelines (e.g., natural gas or petroleum products) apply to CO 2 , this policy vacuum leaves local governments as the sole authority over sections of pipe within their boundaries. With dozens of counties along a given route, the probability of inconsistent regulation of the same pipeline is significant. Even in states with CO 2 pipeline laws in place, local regulatory attempts to address rising concerns over pipeline routing and safety have triggered lawsuits by pipeline companies seeking to delimit areas of federal, state, and local government responsibility. Meanwhile, legislators across the country have introduced bills to restrict the application of eminent domain to CO 2 pipeline projects, which could threaten a key means of securing ROW that companies cannot secure through negotiation with landowners. Taken separately, any of these regulatory issues—the narrow federal definition of CO 2 , FERC’s and STB’s decisions that CO 2 pipelines are not within their jurisdiction, and the considerable variation in state and local governments’ laws regulating CO 2 pipeline technologies—are extremely difficult to resolve. Adding the required scale of CO 2 pipeline expansion and the currently identified narrow window of time in which to reach climate target goals, the task becomes even more difficult—and raises a host of urgent questions for regulators. How should CO 2 be defined in federal regulations to ensure consistent safety standards across the country? What is the potential impact radius of a CO 2 pipeline rupture, and how should that inform local emergency response? In the absence of centralized federal oversight, what should state legislatures do to increase alignment for interstate CO 2 pipeline projects? This paper intends to serve as a primer for regulators and stakeholders who seek to better understand the regulatory challenges and opportunities facing this critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Considerations for Regulation and Practical Implementation of Analyses of Inadvertent Human Intrusion - 20169

Recommendations from the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identify the need to consider potential inadvertent human intrusion into a near-surface radioactive waste disposal facility when developing limits for radionuclide concentrations that can be disposed. The recommendations also provide perspective on expectations for performance criteria and general assumptions for such analyses. Inadvertent human intrusion analyses are conducted to address the potential failure of institutional controls and loss of memory of a disposal facility. The analyses consider potential consequences of human actions that result in unknowingly bringing waste to the surface. Inadvertent human intrusion scenarios consider potential impacts to someone involved in an activity that actually disturbs the waste (e.g., drilling or excavation of a basement) or that exposes the person to emanations from the waste (e.g., radioactive gases) and also for the case where there may be longer term exposures to waste that has been brought to the surface. In practice, inadvertent human intrusion analyses have proven to be a critical consideration for the development of waste classification systems and for the determination of disposal requirements and limitations on wastes that can be disposed at shallow depths. The IAEA implemented a project on Human Intrusion in the context of Disposal of Radioactive waste (HIDRA) to further explore the regulatory expectations and practical implementation of analyses of potential inadvertent human intrusion. The paper begins with a discussion of international recommendations related to consideration of inadvertent human intrusion and then summarizes examples of some topical considerations related to addressing inadvertent human intrusion that are being discussed as part of the second phase of the HIDRA project. The topical considerations are planned to be addressed in a formal IAEA publication. All information in this paper simply reflects on-going project discussions and no formal recommendations are implied for these topical considerations at this time. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Topics and Considerations for Developing State Geothermal Regulations

The intent of this document is to provide guidance to states for developing geothermal regulations that would be inclusive of all geothermal technologies (e.g., conventional and non-conventional power production and direct-use applications) with applicability in all states. As part of this project, the NREL project team reviewed and catalogued existing state and federal geothermal regulations, compiled best practices from geothermal and other extractive industries, and established a Geothermal Regulatory Stakeholder Working Group (SWG) to advise and review the geothermal regulatory guidance. The SWG met approximately monthly over the course of one year to review and discuss specific topics as relevant to this geothermal regulatory guidance. This report is broken into five main sections, which were identified in coordination with the SWG as the main topics for inclusion. Within these sections, a list of considerations within each category were identified and, in some cases, relevant examples from existing state and federal geothermal regulations are included to further illustrate the proposed considerations. This report includes the following topics: 1) Geothermal Resource Definition; 2) Leasing process; 3) Exploration approval process; 4) Drilling/wellfield development approval process; 5) Underground injection control process In addition, a list of 'key considerations' summarized from this report are included below. This list is not meant to be exhaustive as each state's regulatory landscape is unique, rather these are meant to be concepts that can be considered when developing and/or updating existing geothermal regulations.

drilling↗

Risk-Informed Approach for Event Selection and Component Classification

Develop a report summarizing a structured approach for the incorporation of risk insights when making facility safety assessments and regulatory decisions is proposed to supplement the deterministic approach, with the following expected benefits: Increased confidence that key safety issues have been fully identified and addressed Better understanding of safety margins Facilitates more structured dialogue among international regulators Reduced reliance on “expert judgement” through a rigorous, pre-defined process with more predictable outcomes Proposed outcome is development of a report summarizing the structure and key considerations for applying this approach that: Is inclusive of advanced reactor technologies Provides for flexible implementation recognizing unique and varying sovereign regulatory structures Builds upon existing/current GIF safety approaches (e.g., GIF Basic Safety Approach, Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Air Pollutant Emissions and Regulatory Implications of Co-Processing Raw Bio-Oil in U.S. Petroleum Refineries

Pyrolysis oil, often referred as bio-oil or biocrude, has attracted considerable attention because it has higher energy density and carbon content compared to the raw biomass. Using pyrolysis oil derived from low cost and underutilized biomass to produce renewable hydrocarbon fuels provides a viable link between the agriculture/forestry and (petro-) chemical industry. Co-processing bio-oil with vacuum gas oil (VGO) in petroleum refinery is appealing due to the relatively low capital requirement to retrofit refinery and the compatibility of fuel products with existing infrastructure. In order to implement co-processing, a petroleum refinery would need to consider several process modifications and therefore could be subject to varying levels of air permitting requirements based on bio-oil co-processing ratio, co-processing capacity in existing units, the amount of regulated pollutants expected to be emitted, among other factors. This analysis considers co-processing 5% (by weight) of raw bio-oil with VGO in the fluidized catalytic cracking (FCC) unit(s) in a petroleum refinery. We estimate the potential increase in emissions of regulated air pollutants resulting from the modifications required to implement bio-oil co-processing and evaluate the regulatory and permitting implications for three FCC size categories in the U.S. refineries, which could co-processes raw bio-oil to produce partially renewable transportation fuels. We also assess technically feasible emission control options petroleum refineries could adopt to avoid being subject to major source permitting requirements if the estimated increase in regulated air pollutant emission exceeds the applicable threshold for major modifications. Insights from our analysis can help overcome challenges and risks associated with timely obtaining air permits required to implement bio-oil co-processing in existing refineries. Our analysis also provides needed information for decision makers (e.g., local air quality agencies) to understand the potential air quality implications for retrofitting refineries to co-process bio-oil, particularly in areas with high concentration of petroleum refineries.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Safety Considerations for Advanced Material Irradiation at the ATR

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a light water reactor with aluminum-clad driver fuel. A primary mission of the ATR is to support the next generation of nuclear reactors. This support necessarily requires irradiation of advanced materials such as sodium, fuel salts, and metal eutectics. Irradiation of advanced materials in the ATR environment presents a challenge when completing accident analyses and demonstrating compliance to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Many advanced materials have the possibility to react with the ATR protective barriers such as the cladding or primary coolant system (PCS) boundary during postulated accident scenarios. Further, molten fuel experiments fall outside of the standard regulatory framework for dose consequence analyses. ATR is currently developing new safety analysis methods to support irradiation of advanced materials. The primary considerations for this development are 1) experiment containment design requirements, 2) primary coolant system response to an experiment containment failure, and 3) dose analyses for molten fuels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety Considerations for Advanced Material Irradiation at the Advanced Test Reactor

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a light water reactor with aluminum-clad driver fuel. A primary mission of the ATR is to support the next generation of nuclear reactors. This support necessarily requires irradiation of advanced materials such as sodium, fuel salts, and metal eutectics. Irradiation of advanced materials in the ATR environment presents a challenge when completing accident analyses and demonstrating compliance to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Many advanced materials have the possibility to react with the ATR protective barriers such as the cladding or primary coolant system (PCS) boundary during postulated accident scenarios. Further, molten fuel experiments fall outside of the standard regulatory framework for dose consequence analyses. ATR is currently developing new safety analysis methods to support irradiation of advanced materials. The primary considerations for this development are 1) experiment containment design requirements, 2) primary coolant system response to an experiment containment failure, and 3) dose analyses for molten fuels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Topics and Considerations for Developing State Geothermal Regulations

The intent of this document is to provide guidance to states for developing geothermal regulations that would be inclusive of all geothermal technologies (e.g., conventional and non-conventional power production and direct-use applications) with applicability in all states. As part of this project, the NREL project team reviewed and catalogued existing state and federal geothermal regulations, compiled best practices from geothermal and other extractive industries, and established a Geothermal Regulatory Stakeholder Working Group (SWG) to advise and review the geothermal regulatory guidance. The SWG met approximately monthly over the course of one year to review and discuss specific topics as relevant to this geothermal regulatory guidance. This report is broken into five main sections, which were identified in coordination with the SWG as the main topics for inclusion. Within these sections, a list of considerations within each category were identified and, in some cases, relevant examples from existing state and federal geothermal regulations are included to further illustrate the proposed considerations. This report includes the following topics: geothermal resource definition; leasing process; exploration approval process; drilling/wellfield development approval process; and underground injection control process.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗