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DOE OSTI2025

Evaluation of Cross-Protection of African Swine Fever Vaccine ASFV-G-ΔI177L Between ASFV Biotypes

Background/Objectives: Vaccine development for the prevention of ASF has been very challenging due to the extensive genetic and largely unknown antigenic diversity. Inactivated vaccines, using different inactivation methods and a variety of adjuvants, have been consistently inefficacious. Historically, animals recovering from an infection with an attenuated virus became protected from the development of a clinical disease caused by an antigenically related strain. Therefore, immunization of susceptible animals with attenuathe ted virus strains has become a common method of vaccination with the first two commercially available vaccines based on recombinant live-attenuated viruses (LAVs). An important limitation is that the efficacy of the LAV is restricted to those strains that are antigenically related and, in most cases, only provide protection against homologous strains. Due to the unknown antigenic heterogeneity among all ASFV field isolates, the development of broad-spectrum vaccines is a challenge. Besides the anecdotal data, there is not a large amount of information describing patterns of cross-protection between different ASFV strains. Methods: We evaluated the cross-protection induced by the ASFV live-attenuated vaccine ASFV-G-ΔI177L against different biotypes of ASFV and compared their genomic sequences to determine potential genetic mutations that could cause the lack of cross-protection. Results: Results presented here demonstrate different patterns of protection when ASFV-G-ΔI177L vaccinated pigs were challenged with six different ASFV field isolates belonging to different biotypes. Conclusions: The presence of cross-protection cannot be predicted solely by the classical methodology for genotyping-based B646L ORF only. Biotyping, considering the entire virus proteome, appears to be a more promising prediction tool, although additional gathering of experimental data will be necessary to fully validate it; until then, the presence of cross-protection needs to be confirmed in efficacy trials challenging vaccinated animals.

Immunology↗

NASA NTRS1951

NACA Investigations of Icing-Protection Systems for Turbojet-Engine Installations

Investigations have been made in flight and in wind tunnels to determine which components of turbojet installations are most critical in icing conditions, and to evaluate several methods of icing protection. From these studies, the requirements necessary for adequate icing protection and the consequent penalties on engine performance can be estimated. Because investigations have indicated that the compressor-inlet screen constitutes the greatest icing hazard and is difficult to protect, complete removal or retraction of the screen upon encountering an icing condition is recommended. In the absence of the screen, the inlet guide vanes of an axial-flow-type turbojet engine constitute the greatest danger to engine operation in an icing condition; a centrifugal-type engine, on the other hand, is relatively unsusceptible to icing once the screen has been removed. Of the three icing-protection systems investigated, surface heating, hot-gas bleedback, and inertia-separation inlets, only the first two offer an acceptable solution to the problem of engine icing protection. Surface heating, either by gas heating or electrical means, appears to be the most acceptable icing-protection method with regard to performance losses. Hot-gas bleedback, although causing undesirable thrust losses, offers an easy means of obtaining icing protection for some installations. The final choice of an icing-protection system depends, however, on the supply of heated gas and electrical power available and on the allowable performance and. weight penalties associated with each system.

VonGlahn, Uwe↗

NASA NTRS1993

Lightning protection technology for small general aviation composite material aircraft

An on going NASA (Small Business Innovative Research) SBIR Phase II design and development program will produce the first lightning protected, fiberglass, General Aviation aircraft that is available as a kit. The results obtained so far in development testing of typical components of the aircraft kit, such as the wing and fuselage panels indicate that the lightning protection design methodology and materials chosen are capable of protecting such small composite airframes from lightning puncture and structural damage associated with severe threat lightning strikes. The primary objective of the program has been to develop a lightening protection design for full scale test airframe and verify its adequacy with full scale laboratory testing, thus enabling production and sale of owner-built, lightning-protected, Stoddard-Hamilton Aircraft, Inc. Glasair II airplanes. A second objective has been to provide lightning protection design guidelines for the General Aviation industry, and to enable these airplanes to meet lightening protection requirements for certification of small airplanes. This paper describes the protection design approaches and development testing results obtained thus far in the program, together with design methodology which can achieve the design goals listed above. The presentation of this paper will also include results of some of the full scale verification tests, which will have been completed by the time of this conference.

Plumer, J. A.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Structural Analysis of Lightning Protection System for New Launch Vehicle

This project includes the design and specification of a lightning protection system for Launch Complex 39 B (LC39B) at Kennedy Space Center, FL in support of the Constellation Program. The purpose of the lightning protection system is to protect the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) or Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) and associated launch equipment from direct lightning strikes during launch processing and other activities prior to flight. The design includes a three-tower, overhead catenary wire system to protect the vehicle and equipment on LC39B as described in the study that preceded this design effort: KSC-DX-8234 "Study: Construct Lightning Protection System LC3 9B". The study was a collaborative effort between Reynolds, Smith, and Hills (RS&H) and ASRC Aerospace (ASRC), where ASRC was responsible for the theoretical design and risk analysis of the lightning protection system and RS&H was responsible for the development of the civil and structural components; the mechanical systems; the electrical and grounding systems; and the siting of the lightning protection system. The study determined that a triangular network of overhead catenary cables and down conductors supported by three triangular free-standing towers approximately 594 ft tall (each equipped with a man lift, ladder, electrical systems, and communications systems) would provide a level of lightning protection for the Constellation Program CLV and CaLV on Launch Pad 39B that exceeds the design requirements.

Cope, Anne↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA’s planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective’s NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientiﬁc consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle. Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientiﬁc consensus, and to identify and ﬁll in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

James Benardini↗

NASA NTRS2022

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportuni-ties for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamina-tion, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR com-munity will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Elaine Seasly↗

NASA NTRS2022

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportunities for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamination, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR community will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Elaine Seasly↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What You Need to Know about Planetary Protection Categorization for Your Mission

Planetary protection mission categorization helps to define the risk posture for requirements definition and implementation practices on space flight projects with planetary protection considerations. NASA has recently updated it’s planetary protection policy (NPR 8715.24), and with the update comes a major change in how the planetary protection categorization process is performed for NASA missions. Previously, projects would request the NASA Planetary Protection Officer (PPO) provide a categorization letter documenting the planetary protection category assigned to the proposed mission. Under the new policy the project manager (PM) proposes the planetary protection category for their mission. Depending on the level of the category, the PPO either concurs or recommends concurrence to the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) before forwarding to the Mission Directorate Associate Administrator (MDAA) for final approval prior to the system requirements review (SRR). But what topics must be considered for categorization? This presentation will provide key considerations for planetary protection mission categorization including the target solar system body to be explored, the trajectory to get to the target body, and the operations to be performed at the target body. Additional unique scenarios such as secondary and auxiliary payloads, encountering other solar system bodies on the way to the target body, and sample return missions will also be discussed to share lessons learned from missions that have been through the new categorization process.

Elaine Seasly↗

DOE OSTI2022

New data-driven approach to bridging power system protection gaps with deep learning

Protection is a critical function in power systems to avoid equipment damage, maintain personnel safety, and support system reliability. However, current protective relay technology cannot adequately protect equipment and personnel from effects of some events; these deficiencies are termed protection gaps. In this paper, a data-driven approach is proposed to complement traditional protection technology and distinguish fault conditions from transients caused by normal operations. A combined convolutional neural network and long short-term memory (CNN-LSTM) network is implemented to achieve data translation invariance and capture the temporal correlation of the time-series input data. As a result, the data-driven method can accurately detect system faults despite variation and noise in the input data. In addition, using the CNN-LSTM--based method avoids the complicated, manual feature extraction procedure required by many traditional data-driven methods. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is tested on two kinds of protection gaps: high-impedance faults and transformer inter-turn faults. Lastly, a transfer learning method is also proposed to address the common issue of data-driven methods for which real-world training data are scarce. Extensive study results demonstrate that the proposed approach can accurately bridge power system protection gaps.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Design of Zone-Based Hierarchical Protection System for 100% Renewable Microgrids

Design of a reliable and secure protection system for a 100% renewable microgrid with only inverter-based resources (IBRs), is quite challenging. Most of the existing protection schemes in the state-of-the-art are suitable for microgrids with mixed-type of distributed energy resources (DERs) that covers both rotating machine-based DERs as well as IBR-based DERs, where the fault current level is moderately high. Due to drastic reduction in fault current level based on mode of operation and the variation of the low fault current level based on the operating level of the IBRs, the existing protection schemes face critical challenges, in case of a 100% renewable microgrid. This article proposes a zone-based hierarchical protection scheme that partitions a microgrid into various zones-of-protection and assigns speed-based hierarchical protection schemes in order to address the fundamental challenges of such microgrids. The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated using time-domain simulation study on a microgrid test system. The results corroborates that the proposed hierarchical zone-based protection scheme exhibits enhanced reliability, security and dependability while tested with various fault cases (fault types, locations, and impedances), and non-fault cases during both grid-tied and islanded mode.

grid-forming inverter↗

DOE OSTI2022

Doubling protected land area may be inefficient at preserving the extent of undeveloped land and could cause substantial regional shifts in land use

Abstract Projection of land use and land‐cover change is highly uncertain yet drives critical estimates of carbon emissions, climate change, and food and bioenergy production. We use new, spatially explicit land availability data in conjunction with a model sensitivity analysis to estimate the effects of additional land protection on land use and land cover. The land availability data include protected land and agricultural suitability and is incorporated into the Moirai land data system for initializing the Global Change Analysis Model. Overall, decreasing land availability is relatively inefficient at preserving undeveloped land while having considerable regional land‐use impacts. Current amounts of protected area have little effect on land and crop production estimates, but including the spatial distribution of unsuitable (i.e., unavailable) land dramatically shifts bioenergy production from high northern latitudes to the rest of the world, compared with uniform availability. This highlights the importance of spatial heterogeneity in understanding and managing land change. Approximately doubling the current protected area to emulate a 30% protected area target may avoid land conversion by 2050 of less than half the newly protected extent while reducing bioenergy feedstock land by 10.4% and cropland and grazed pasture by over 3%. Regional bioenergy land may be reduced (increased) by up to 46% (36%), cropland reduced by up to 61%, pasture reduced by up to 100%, and harvested forest reduced by up to 35%. Only a few regions show notable gains in some undeveloped land types of up to 36%. Half of the regions can reach the target using only unsuitable land, which would minimize impacts on agriculture but may not meet conservation goals. Rather than focusing on an area target, a more robust approach may be to carefully select newly protected land to meet well‐defined conservation goals while minimizing impacts to agriculture.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Utility Experience with Inverter Based Resource Impacts on Transmission Protection

High penetration of inverter-based resources (IBR) can adversely affect the transmission protection schemes in the area. With the proliferation of IBRs, utilities are finding out that conventional protection schemes are not adequately equipped to protect the electric systems because the existing system has been designed based on the fault current response of conventional rotating-machine-based generators. In several cases, the available literature does not provide any clear solution for the issues when the protection scheme does not operate properly near IBRs. This report identifies various protection challenges due to IBRs that industry is facing, from the utility perspective. It includes a broad review of all challenges that system protection has experienced so far with high penetration of IBRs. Key issues have been identified based on a survey of different utility protection engineers. Finally, fault event recordings are shown to demonstrate some actual cases of mis-operations of relays near IBRs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Design of Zone-Based Hierarchical Protection System for 100% Renewable Microgrids: Preprint

grid-forming inverter↗

DOE OSTI2025

Persistence of bacterial-mediated anti-rotifer protection in preliminary outdoor cultivation trial for Microchloropsis salina

Outdoor algal cultivation systems are susceptible to a wide variety of deleterious species. In previously published studies, we observed protection using microbial consortia at laboratory scale cultures; Microchloropsis salina in the presence of microbial consortia were protected from grazing from the marine rotifer, Brachionus plicatilis. Our objective for the present work was to determine if this protection conferred by microbial consortia in controlled laboratory experiments would persist in an open, outdoor multi-liter cultivation system. We found that algal protection did persist as evidenced by the presence of fewer motile rotifers and decreased rotifer-associated egg counts for the consortia-treated outdoor cultures. Due to the low temperature and light conditions that reduced growth of the algae outdoors, we performed an indoor laboratory assay which also confirmed the persistence of algal protection. Lastly, the lower numbers of motile rotifers and fewer rotifer-associated eggs in the consortia-treated algal cultures suggests a possible protective mechanism by the consortia through interfering with the rotifer lifecycle or reproduction. Finally, these initial results support the possibility that low cost, prophylactic treatments with microbial consortia can protect algae from deleterious species in outdoor cultivation systems.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Background Information on the Protection Requirements in IEEE Std 1547-2018

As the DER penetration level has risen significantly in recent times, parameter settings and configuration of installed DERs are having direct impact on local electric distribution utilities as well as bulk power systems during normal and abnormal grid conditions. On the other hand, all grid-connected DERs in the United States of America must conform to the interconnection requirements prescribed in the IEEE Std 1547-2018. Because of these reasons, it is crucial to understand the expected DER performance during abnormal grid conditions considering the requirements of the IEEE Std 1547-2018. The aim of this document is twofold: (1) to summarize requirements in IEEE Std 1547-2018 having direct implications in distribution network protection, and (2) to provide the reader with knowledge and information that will be required for users to apply the requirements specified. Since the focus of this document is on distribution network protection in the presence of DERs, it is assumed that the readers have basic understanding of distribution network protection as well as working principles of DERs. This document starts with a brief introduction on protection systems for distribution network followed by a discussion on the impact of DER on the protection systems. Current practices to provide network protection in the presence of DER is briefly discussed. The document then explores the DER performance requirements in IEEE Std. 1547-2018; especially on those related to distribution network protection. Section 6.1 in IEEE Std. 1547-2018 provides an overview of capabilities and control requirements for DER under abnormal operating conditions. This section also introduces abnormal operating performance categories I, II, III. The DER response to various types of faults and grid conditions such as short-circuit faults and open phase conditions are discussed in section 6.2 in the standard while requirements for coordination with the Area EPS reclosing scheme are provided in section 6.3. Section 6.4 in the IEEE Std 1547-2018 specifies requirements for mandatory voltage tripping and ride-through requirements during low and high voltage disturbances and section 6.5 specifies similar requirements for low and high frequency disturbances. IEEE Std. 1547 requires that the conformance of the DERs to IEEE Std 1547-2018 requirements should be verified in accordance with IEEE Std. 1547. 1. There are several parameters and settings of DERs that need to be properly selected for reliable operation during abnormal grid condition while applying the requirements of IEEE Std 1547-2018. Key decisions for proper selections of parameter and settings are: 1. Determination of required DER abnormal operating performance category, 2. Determination of DER response (shall trip) to abnormal voltages and 3. Determination of DER response (shall trip) to abnormal frequency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

The Systems of Radiological Protection for Ionizing and Non-Ionizing Radiation

This paper summarizes the presentations and panel discussion held at Plenary Session 1 of the 16th IRPA International Congress/69th Health Physics Society Annual Meeting, in Orlando, FL, in July 2024. Plenary Session 1 discussed the basics of the systems of radiological protection (RP) for ionizing radiation (IR) and non-ionizing radiation (NIR) and included five presentations and a panel discussion. Rodney Croft, Chair of the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP), delivered the first presentation. Croft introduced the System of RP for NIR and provided an overview of ICNIRP’s coverage and current areas of work. Werner Rühm, Chair of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), delivered the second presentation. He gave an overview of the System of RP for IR and covered the key principles of justification, optimization, and dose limitation, including the current plans of ICRP toward the envisaged revision of the System of RP. The third speaker, Sigurður Magnús Magnússon, from the International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA), provided the perspective of the RP professionals on the development of the Systems of RP for IR and NIR. Emilie van Deventer, from the World Health Organization (WHO), presented WHO’s views of both Systems of RP and discussed the relevant current activities of WHO with regard to IR and NIR. Kathryn Higley, President of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), delivered the final presentation. Higley outlined the history of NCRP, the differences between ICRP and NCRP, and discussed the role of the NCRP in the System of RP, including NCRP’s role to analyze mechanisms of interaction of NIR with biological systems, including humans. The session concluded with a fruitful panel discussion, where the audience had the opportunity to ask the five invited speakers questions.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2021

National variability in Americans’ COVID-19 protective behaviors: Implications for vaccine roll-out

Protective behaviors such as mask wearing and physical distancing are critical to slow the spread of COVID-19, even in the context of vaccine scale-up. Understanding the variation in self-reported COVID-19 protective behaviors is critical to developing public health messaging. The purpose of the study is to provide nationally representative estimates of five self-reported COVID-19 protective behaviors and correlates of such behaviors. In this cross-sectional survey study of US adults, surveys were administered via internet and telephone. Adults were surveyed from April 30-May 4, 2020, a time of peaking COVID-19 incidence within the US. Participants were recruited from the probability-based AmeriSpeak® national panel. Brief surveys were completed by 994 adults, with 73.0% of respondents reported mask wearing, 82.7% reported physical distancing, 75.1% reported crowd avoidance, 89.8% reported increased hand-washing, and 7.7% reported having prior COVID-19 testing. Multivariate analysis (p critical value .05) indicates that women were more likely to report protective behaviors than men, as were those over age 60. Respondents who self-identified as having low incomes, histories of criminal justice involvement, and Republican Party affiliation, were less likely to report four protective behaviors, though Republicans and individuals with criminal justice histories were more likely to report having received COVID-19 testing. The majority of Americans engaged in COVID-19 protective behaviors, with low-income Americans, those with histories of criminal justice involvement, and self-identified Republicans less likely to engage in these preventive behaviors. Culturally competent public health messaging and interventions might focus on these latter groups to prevent future infections. These findings will remain highly relevant even with vaccines widely available, given the complementarities between vaccines and protective behaviors, as well as the many challenges in delivering vaccines.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗