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At least 109 records · Page 6

Human reliability analysis for NMSS P-406

The PRA Technology Training Program was established in 1982 to formulate a curriculum for training NRC staff members in the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques. Use of these techniques enables the employee to evaluate risks associated with various safety issues, and to apply the results in the process of regulating and inspecting nuclear systems. The training materials are periodically reviewed and revised to incorporate the latest information available, and as needs change, new courses and workshops are added to the curriculum. Course instructors are PRA experts employed in private industry and at the national laboratories.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Bridging the Engineering and Medicine Gap

A primary challenge NASA faces is communication between the disparate entities of engineers and human system experts in life sciences. Clear communication is critical for exploration mission success from the perspective of both risk analysis and data handling. The engineering community uses probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models to inform their own risk analysis and has extensive experience managing mission data, but does not always fully consider human systems integration (HSI). The medical community, as a part of HSI, has been working 1) to develop a suite of tools to express medical risk in quantitative terms that are relatable to the engineering approaches commonly in use, and 2) to manage and integrate HSI data with engineering data. This talk will review the development of the Integrated Medical Model as an early attempt to bridge the communication gap between the medical and engineering communities in the language of PRA. This will also address data communication between the two entities in the context of data management considerations of the Medical Data Architecture. Lessons learned from these processes will help identify important elements to consider in future communication and integration of these two groups.

Walton, M.↗

Applying AI/ML Techniques to U.S. Nuclear Operating Experience Program

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has provided technical assistance to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in reliability and risk analysis including the operating experience (OpE) program since the 1980s. The U.S. nuclear OpE program provides input parameters to the NRC Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models and the industry probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. While earlier PRA focuses were on at-power, internal event analysis, the risks from external hazards and during low power shutdown (LPSD) operation could be significant and the needs to develop LPSD PRA and external hazards PRA are on the rise. One issue in developing LPSD PRA is the reasonable estimation of shutdown initiative event (SDIE) frequencies. INL has developed and is maintaining an SDIE database for the NRC. However, this database is based on the reviewing of Licensee Event Reports (LERs), which is believed to be only a subset of “actual” shutdown initiating events occurred in the industry. This paper investigates a new approach to identify and characterize shutdown initiating events from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) industry database using machine learning techniques. The main process in this approach is to find out the relationship between key words in event descriptions and the SDIE categories as in the NRC SDIE database. The relationship can then be applied to the INPO database and search for SDIEs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Accident Consequence Analysis P-301

? Discuss the 3 levels of PRA (PSA) and how Level 3 fits in ? Learn the relationship between consequence and risk ? Discover the characteristics of consequence analysis ? Discuss the overall course scope ? Consider some applications of consequence modeling ? Summarize the course schedule

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Seismic Fragility Analysis of a Condensate Storage Tank with Age-Related Degradations

The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is conducting a five-year research project to develop a realistic seismic risk evaluation system which includes the consideration of aging of structures and components in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The KAERI research project includes three specific areas that are essential to seismic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA): (1) probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, (2) seismic fragility analysis including the effects of aging, and (3) a plant seismic risk analysis. Since 2007, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has entered into a collaboration agreement with KAERI to support its development of seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures and components. The collaborative research effort is intended to continue over a five year period. The goal of this collaboration endeavor is to assist KAERI to develop seismic fragility analysis methods that consider the potential effects of age-related degradation of structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The research results of this multi-year collaboration will be utilized as input to seismic PRAs. This report describes the research effort performed by BNL for the Year 4 scope of work. This report was developed as an update to the Year 3 report by incorporating a major supplement to the Year 3 fragility analysis. In the Year 4 research scope, an additional study was carried out to consider an additional degradation scenario, in which the three basic degradation scenarios, i.e., degraded tank shell, degraded anchor bolts, and cracked anchorage concrete, are combined in a non-perfect correlation manner. A representative operational water level is used for this effort. Building on the same CDFM procedure implemented for the Year 3 Tasks, a simulation method was applied using optimum Latin Hypercube samples to characterize the deterioration behavior of the fragility capacity as a function of age-related degradations. The results are summarized in Section 5 and Appendices G through I.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Drilling and Production Testing the Methane Hydrate Resource Potential Associated with the Barrow Gas Fields

In November of 2008, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the North Slope Borough (NSB) committed funding to develop a drilling plan to test the presence of hydrates in the producing formation of at least one of the Barrow Gas Fields, and to develop a production surveillance plan to monitor the behavior of hydrates as dissociation occurs. This drilling and surveillance plan was supported by earlier studies in Phase 1 of the project, including hydrate stability zone modeling, material balance modeling, and full-field history-matched reservoir simulation, all of which support the presence of methane hydrate in association with the Barrow Gas Fields. This Phase 2 of the project, conducted over the past twelve months focused on selecting an optimal location for a hydrate test well; design of a logistics, drilling, completion and testing plan; and estimating costs for the activities. As originally proposed, the project was anticipated to benefit from industry activity in northwest Alaska, with opportunities to share equipment, personnel, services and mobilization and demobilization costs with one of the then-active exploration operators. The activity level dropped off, and this benefit evaporated, although plans for drilling of development wells in the BGF's matured, offering significant synergies and cost savings over a remote stand-alone drilling project. An optimal well location was chosen at the East Barrow No.18 well pad, and a vertical pilot/monitoring well and horizontal production test/surveillance well were engineered for drilling from this location. Both wells were designed with Distributed Temperature Survey (DTS) apparatus for monitoring of the hydrate-free gas interface. Once project scope was developed, a procurement process was implemented to engage the necessary service and equipment providers, and finalize project cost estimates. Based on cost proposals from vendors, total project estimated cost is $17.88 million dollars, inclusive of design work, permitting, barging, ice road/pad construction, drilling, completion, tie-in, long-term production testing and surveillance, data analysis and technology transfer. The PRA project team and North Slope have recommended moving forward to the execution phase of this project.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Fragility Analysis Methodology for Degraded Structures and Passive Components in Nuclear Power Plants - Illustrated using a Condensate Storage Tank

The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is conducting a five-year research project to develop a realistic seismic risk evaluation system which includes the consideration of aging of structures and components in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The KAERI research project includes three specific areas that are essential to seismic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA): (1) probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, (2) seismic fragility analysis including the effects of aging, and (3) a plant seismic risk analysis. Since 2007, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has entered into a collaboration agreement with KAERI to support its development of seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures and components. The collaborative research effort is intended to continue over a five year period. The goal of this collaboration endeavor is to assist KAERI to develop seismic fragility analysis methods that consider the potential effects of age-related degradation of structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The research results of this multi-year collaboration will be utilized as input to seismic PRAs. In the Year 1 scope of work, BNL collected and reviewed degradation occurrences in US NPPs and identified important aging characteristics needed for the seismic capability evaluations. This information is presented in the Annual Report for the Year 1 Task, identified as BNL Report-81741-2008 and also designated as KAERI/RR-2931/2008. The report presents results of the statistical and trending analysis of this data and compares the results to prior aging studies. In addition, the report provides a description of U.S. current regulatory requirements, regulatory guidance documents, generic communications, industry standards and guidance, and past research related to aging degradation of SSCs. In the Year 2 scope of work, BNL carried out a research effort to identify and assess degradation models for the long-term behavior of dominant materials that are determined to be risk significant to NPPs. Multiple models have been identified for concrete, carbon and low-alloy steel, and stainless steel. These models are documented in the Annual Report for the Year 2 Task, identified as BNL Report-82249-2009 and also designated as KAERI/TR-3757/2009. This report describes the research effort performed by BNL for the Year 3 scope of work. The objective is for BNL to develop the seismic fragility capacity for a condensate storage tank with various degradation scenarios. The conservative deterministic failure margin method has been utilized for the undegraded case and has been modified to accommodate the degraded cases. A total of five seismic fragility analysis cases have been described: (1) undegraded case, (2) degraded stainless tank shell, (3) degraded anchor bolts, (4) anchorage concrete cracking, and (5)a perfect combination of the three degradation scenarios. Insights from these fragility analyses are also presented.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update

This report documents the quantitative results of the common-cause failure (CCF) data collection effort (which included data through 2020) and summarizes the results of the parameter estimation quantification process performed on CCF data in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) CCF database. This is the 2020 update to NUREG/CR-5497, updating data and parameter estimations for CCFs. This release, CCF Parameter Estimation 2020, reflects the CCF data contained within the CCF database, https://rads.inl.gov/Pages/CCF.aspx, by executing (in August 2021) the CCF query rules in the folder SPAR Rules 2020. The data covers the period from 1/1/2006 to 12/31/2020, the most recent 15-year period in which data are available. The use of the most recent rolling 15-year data in parameter estimation differs from previous updates, in which 1/1/1997 was used as the starting date (e.g., 1/1/1997 to 12/31/2015 for the 2015 update, 1/1/1997 to 12/31/2012 for the 2012 update). The new date range (i.e., the most recent 15-year period), was selected for this CCF update so as to be consistent with the date range chosen for the component reliability parameter estimation, and with the effort to include sufficient data for analysis while simultaneously reflecting the most recent industry performance. These results are appropriate for use in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies, including the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models of commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the U.S. This update may be referred as: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update," https://nrcoe.inl.gov/publicdocs/CCF/ccfparamest2020.pdf, November 2021.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗

A Methodology for the Integration of a Mechanistic Source Term Analysis in a Probabilistic Framework for Advanced Reactors

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) and Argonne National Laboratory are currently engaged in a joint effort to modernize and develop probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques for advanced non-light water reactors. At a high level, the primary outcome of this project will be the development of next-generation PRA methodologies that will enable risk-informed prioritization of safety- and reliability-focused research and development, while also identifying gaps that may be resolved through additional research. A subset of this effort is the development of PRA methodologies to conduct a mechanistic source term (MST) analysis for event sequences that could result in the release of radionuclides. The MST analysis seeks to realistically model and assess the transport, retention, and release of radionuclides from the reactor to the environment. The MST methods developed during this project seek to satisfy the requirements of the Mechanistic Source Term element of the ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA standard. The MST methodology consists of separate analysis approaches for risk-significant and non-risk significant event sequences that may result in the release of radionuclides from the reactor. For risk-significant event sequences, the methodology focuses on a detailed assessment, using mechanistic models, of radionuclide release from the fuel, transport through and release from the primary system, transport in the containment, and finally release to the environment. The analysis approach for non-risk significant event sequences examines the possibility of large radionuclide releases due to events such as re-criticality or the complete loss of radionuclide barriers. This paper provides details on the MST methodology, including the interface between the MST analysis and other elements of the PRA, and provides a simplified example MST calculation for a sodium fast reactor.

Grabaskas, Dave↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

RISK MONITORING CAPABILITES FROM DYNAMIC PRA DATA

Risk Monitors (RMs) are software tools that are employed in nuclear power plants to monitor the safety properties of the plant itself during operation. These safety properties are generated using classical PRA methods which are typically based on static Boolean structures such as Fault-Trees (FTs) and Event-Trees (ETs). The outcomes of these methods are Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and risk importance values of plant components (e.g., valves and pumps). Examples of Risk Importance Measures (RIMs) commonly used are: Risk Achievement Worth (RAW), Risk Reduction Worth (RRW), Birnbaum (B) and Fussell-Vesely (FV) [1,2]. In a RM these values are updated in real time once plant components status is updated (e.g., under maintenance, off-line, testing). In addition, RMs can be used to optimize maintenance schedules so those safety features of the plant are below plant standard values. This paper presents an approach to create temporal profiles of RIMs (i.e., RM capabilities) given a temporal change of the plant configuration. Instead of employing data generated by ETs and FTs, the proposed approach will employ data generated by Dynamic PRA methods. In contrast to classical PRA methods, Dynamic PRA methods couple stochastic methods with safety analysis codes to determine risk associate to complex systems such as nuclear plants. Compared to classical PRA methods, they can evaluate with higher resolution the safety impact of timing and sequencing of events on the accident progression. We will describe how classical RIMs can be generated by Dynamic PRA data and then we will show how the temporal profiles of the RIMs can be generated given a temporal profile of the system configuration.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

IMPLEMENTING THE NFPA 805 PROCESS: Observations of a Technical Reviewer

In June 2004 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) amended its fire protection requirements to permit existing nuclear power reactor licensees to voluntarily adopt fire protection requirements contained in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805. NFPA 805 is a performance-based standard for nuclear power plant fire protection that is an alternative to the deterministic, prescriptive fire protection requirements, such as 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, that was issued in 1980. One aspect of implementing NFPA 805 is that the licensee adopts the performance goals, objectives, and criteria for nuclear safety specified in the Standard. These goals, objectives, and criteria can be met through the implementation of deterministic approaches or performance-based approaches, including engineering analyses, probabilistic risk assessment, and fire modeling. Licensees voluntarily adopting the fire protection requirements in NFPA 805 must submit a license amendment request (LAR) to the NRC. The LAR provides the new proposed fire protection licensing basis, including the methodology and results of required evaluations and analyses that show how the NFPA 805 performance criteria are met. As of August 2014, licensees have submitted LARs for 26 nuclear power plants, representing 42 nuclear reactor units. Of these, 7 nuclear power plants, representing 10 nuclear reactor units, have been issued a safety evaluation (SE) by the NRC approving transition of their fire protection licensing basis to one that complies with NFPA 805. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) supports the NRC staff’s technical review of the LARs in the areas of fundamental fire protection, safe shutdown analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). PNNL, of course, cannot speak for the nuclear industry and its choice of implementation strategies or the NRC staff’s assessment of the approaches being taken to adopt NFPA 805. However, as a reviewer of the technical details of these submittals, PNNL is in a position to observe the array of implementation tactics taken in these submittals, and observe different ways licensees are making the NFPA 805 process work. For example, we see differences in how fire areas are being transitioned, the kinds of plant modifications being implemented, the changes being made to plant procedures, the number and types of recovery actions being credited, and the kinds and extent of detailed modeling being performed in support of the Fire PRAs. As a caveat, we note that it is probably too early to comment on the overall success or limitations of the NFPA 805 process or provide lessons learned for the future. Furthermore, it is not our intention to endorse any particular approach taken in a submittal over another or to critique the industry or the regulator. Rather our goal in this paper is to summarize a set of interesting and useful differences across submittals that may provide context for further future discussions about what we (i.e., reviewers, industry, and regulators) have learned in being part of the NFPA process; and how to best use that information to inform future NFPA 805 activities or other risk-informed endeavors.

NFPA 805, PRA, PSA, probabilistic risk assessment,↗

Common-Cause Component Group Modeling Issues in Probabilistic Risk Assess

Common cause failures (CCFs) have been recognized as significant risk contributors in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) since 1980s. A series of reports including those of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (NUREGs) have been published from late 1980s to early 2000s to provide guidelines for performing CCF event data analysis and modeling CCF in PRA. However, there are still some issues existed in CCF modeling and CCF parameter estimations. One of such issues is the modeling of multiple common-cause component group (CCCG) for the same component in a PRA model. This paper exams the CCCG definition and the requirements from the PRA standard, investigates the CCCG modeling practices and issues existing in PRAs, and presents systematic approaches and guidelines to model CCCG in PRA properly and consistently.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor: Accident Analysis

Types of Potential Accidents and Reactor Response Codes and Tools Experimental Validation Safety Analysis Approach Licensing Modernization Project Use of PRA in LMP, ASME/ANS, Non-LWR PRA Standard Methods for Incorporating Passive System Reliability into a PRA

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Methodology for the Development of a Reliability Database for an Advanced Reactor Probabilistic Risk Assessment

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) and Argonne National Laboratory are currently engaged in a joint effort to modernize and develop probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques for advanced non-light water reactors. At a high level the primary outcome of this project will be the development of next-generation PRA methodologies that will enable risk-informed prioritization of safety- and reliability-focused research and development, while also identifying gaps that may be resolved through additional research. A subset of this effort is the development of a reliability database (RDB) methodology to determine applicable reliability data for inclusion in the quantification of the PRA. The RDB method developed during this project seeks to satisfy the requirements of the Data Analysis element of the ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA standard. The RDB methodology utilizes a relevancy test to examine reliability data and determine whether it is appropriate to include as part of the reliability database for the PRA. The relevancy test compares three component properties to establish the level of similarity to components examined as part of the PRA. These properties include the component function, the component failure modes, and the environment/boundary conditions of the component. The relevancy test is used to gauge the quality of data found in a variety of sources, such as advanced reactor-specific databases, non-advanced reactor nuclear databases, and non-nuclear databases. The RDB also establishes the integration of expert judgment or separate reliability analysis with past reliability data. This paper provides details on the RDB methodology, and includes an example application of the RDB methodology for determining the reliability of the intermediate heat exchanger of a sodium fast reactor. The example explores a variety of reliability data sources, and assesses their applicability for the PRA of interest through the use of the relevancy test.

Grabaskas, Dave↗

Quantitative Risk Analysis Support to Decision-Making for New Systems

Nowadays, it is widely accepted that scenario-based probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is needed to support key decisions about new space flight systems. However, taking a risk estimate at face value and comparing it with a management “threshold” to determine whether a system is safe enough is too simplistic. This paper discusses considerations that need to accompany PRA results in particular decision contexts. The present point is not to criticize PRA itself; others have eloquently stressed the point that, for complex, high-stakes systems, whatever PRA’s imperfections, doing PRA is better than not doing it. But while all analysis results are hostage to underlying assumptions, this is especially true for PRA, and over the years, PRA results have occasionally been overinterpreted or otherwise misused. In short, there are more enlightened and less enlightened ways to understand and use PRA results. This paper discusses several issues relating to these concerns, and suggests ways of dealing with them.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗