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NASA NTRS2011

An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned from Fifty Years of Observing Hardware and Human Behavior

Pica Kahn conducted "An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned in Human and Hardware Behavior" on August 16, 2011. With more than 40 years of experience in the aerospace industry, McMann has gained a wealth of knowledge. This presentation focused on lessons learned in human and hardware behavior. During his many years in the industry, McMann observed that the hardware development process was intertwined with human influences, which impacted the outcome of the product.

McMann, Joe↗

NASA NTRS1992

Building a quality culture in the Office of Space Flight: Approach, lessons learned and implications for the future

The purpose of this paper is to describe the approach and lessons learned by the Office of Space Flight (OSF), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), in its introduction of quality. In particular, the experience of OSF Headquarters is discussed as an example of an organization within NASA that is considering both the business and human elements of the change and the opportunities the quality focus presents to improve continuously. It is hoped that the insights shared will be of use to those embarking upon similar cultural changes. The paper is presented in the following parts: the leadership challenge; background; context of the approach to quality; initial steps; current initiatives; lessons learned; and implications for the future.

Roberts, C. Shannon↗

NASA NTRS2004

Lessons Learned Study Final Report for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate

This report is the final product of a 90-day study performed for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. The study was to assemble lessons NASA has learned from previous programs that could help the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate pursue the Exploration vision. It focuses on those lessons that should have the greatest significance to the Directorate during the formulation of program and mission plans. The study team reviewed a large number of lessons learned reports and data bases, including the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and Rogers Commission reports on the Shuttle accidents, accident reports from robotic space flight systems, and a number of management reviews by the Defense Sciences Board, Government Accountability Office, and others. The consistency of the lessons, findings, and recommendations validate the adequacy of the data set. In addition to reviewing existing databases, a series of workshops was held at each of the NASA centers and headquarters that included senior managers from the current workforce as well as retirees. The full text of the workshop reports is included in Appendix A. A lessons learned website was opened up to permit current and retired NASA personnel and on-site contractors to input additional lessons as they arise. These new lessons, when of appropriate quality and relevance, will be brought to the attention of managers. The report consists of four parts: Part 1 provides a small set of lessons, called the Executive Lessons Learned, that represent critical lessons that the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should act on immediately. This set of Executive Lessons and their supporting rationale have been reviewed at length and fully endorsed by a team of distinguished NASA alumni; Part 2 contains a larger set of lessons, called the Selected Lessons Learned, which have been chosen from the lessons database and center workshop reports on the basis of their specific significance and relevance to the near-term work of the Exploration Directorate. These lessons frequently support the Executive lessons but are more general in nature; Part 3 consists of the reports of the center workshops that were conducted as part of this activity. These reports are included in their entirety (approximately 200 pages) in Appendix G and have significance for specific managers; Part 4 consists of the remainder of the lessons that have been selected by this effort and assembled into a database for the use of the Explorations Directorate. The database is archived and hosted in the Lessons Learned Knowledge Network, which provides a flexible search capability using a wide variety of search terms. Finally, a spreadsheet lists databases searched and a bibliography identifies reports that have been reviewed as sources of lessons for this task. NASA has been presented with many learning opportunities. We have conducted numerous programs, some extremely successful and others total failures. Most have been documented with a formal lessons learned activity, but we have not always incorporated these learning opportunities into our normal modes of business. For example, the Robbins Report of 2001 clearly indicates that many project failures of the past two decades were the result of violating well documented best practices, often in direct violation of management instructions and directives. An overarching lesson emerges: that disciplined execution in accordance with proven best practices is the greatest single contributor to a successful program. The Lessons Learned task team offers a sincere hope that the lessons presented herein will be helpful to the Exploration Systems Directorate in charting and executing their course. The success of the Directorate and of NASA in general depends on our collective ability to move forward without having to relearn the lessons of those who have gone before.

Van Laak, Jim↗

NASA NTRS2017

Orbiter Water Dump Nozzles Redesign Lessons Learned

Hank Rotter, NASA Technical Fellow for Environmental Control and Life Support System, will provide the causes and lessons learned for the two Space Shuttle Orbiter water dump icicles that formed on the side of the Orbiter. He will present the root causes and the criticality of these icicles, along with the redesign of the water dump nozzles and lessons learned during the redesign phase.

Rotter, Hank↗

NASA NTRS1998

NASA/Mir Phase 1: A Lesson Learned in Long Duration Mission Planning and Operations

The NASA/Mir Phase I Program is a precursor to the assembly and operations of the International Space Station (ISS). The Phase I Program covers a four-year period and encompasses over ten shuttle flights to the Mir, culminating with the flight of STS-91 in June 1998. The Mir-Orbiting Station (Mir-OS) provides an excellent environment, both onboard and on the ground, for learning and studying the characteristics associated with crew-tended operations on long duration missions. By the end of the Phase I program, NASA astronauts will have accumulated over two years of continuous operations experience working and living onboard the Mir-OS. Ground controllers, working in Russia and at remote sites in the United States, will have gained valuable experience in the generation, maintenance, and coordination of the information and products required to support the long duration crew members onboard the Mir-OS. The experience gained by the crew and ground support personnel in the area of long duration mission operations has resulted in a number of factors that need to be considered in the definition and implementation of the processes and products for the ISS. While there are many areas in which experience has been gained, this paper focuses on the lessons learned regarding the level of detail and flexibility of crew timelines. Provided in this paper is an overview of the characteristics associated with long duration mission timeline development and execution, a summary of applicable lessons learned identified and documented through participation in the NASA/Mir Phase I Program, a detailed discussion of "Gross Timelines" as implementation which addresses the lessons learned. Also discussed are the challenges that must be overcome in getting the ISS program to recognize, evaluate, and learn from the crew and ground controller experience gained through participation in the NASA/Mir Phase I Program.

Hagopian, Jeff↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Power Quality Lessons Learned

Power Quality is a physical description of the electrical characteristics that allow the system to function properly without significant loss of performance or life. This physical description includes steady state voltage limits, transient voltage limits in normal/abnormal conditions, ripple voltage, stability, fault conditions, and more. All which are vital for improving reliability, ensuring stable operation, defining proper fault recovery, and ensuring a ‘plug and play’ approach to design and integration. Typically, a specification for Power Quality is created based on expected system performance or an existing standard, such as the International Space Power System Interoperability Standards (ISPSIS). One example of such a specification is the Gateway Power Quality Specification. It defines the requirements and characteristics of the 120 Volt direct current electrical power system for the Gateway Electrical Power System (EPS) and the Gateway Electrical Power Consuming Equipment (EPCE). This specification also maintains a separate requirement verification section that defines test methods for requirement verification. The test methods include analysis, test, inspection, and demonstration. These test methodologies and requirements are used to ensure that the loads operate when connected to the specified power quality and performance as defined by this specification. The challenge with developing a specification is that desired system characteristics are not always fully matured before the specification is needed and many performance requirements may be application specific. This drives the need to utilize lessons learned through extensive analysis and testing as well as historical knowledge to finalize requirements. Some example requirements where this is important are Small and Large Signal Stability, Ripple Voltage, Inrush/Surge Currents, and Fault Containment. Lessons learned are also important in the testing, analysis, and verification to ensure consistent and accurate results to verify performance. This presentation will cover the lessons learned for power quality relative to ripple, inrush/surge, fault containment, testing/verification, and more.

Power Quality↗

NASA NTRS2006

Heritage Adoption Lessons Learned: Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism

This viewgraph presentation reviews the lessons learned from heritage adoption designs. A general overview of cover deployment hardware that includes the three mechanisms of latch, hinge, and energy absorbers are also discussed.

heritage adoption↗

NASA NTRS1993

Previous experience in manned space flight: A survey of human factors lessons learned

Previous experience in manned space flight programs can be used to compile a data base of human factors lessons learned for the purpose of developing aids in the future design of inhabited spacecraft. The objectives are to gather information available from relevant sources, to develop a taxonomy of human factors data, and to produce a data base that can be used in the future for those people involved in the design of manned spacecraft operations. A study is currently underway at the Johnson Space Center with the objective of compiling, classifying, and summarizing relevant human factors data bearing on the lessons learned from previous manned space flights. The research reported defines sources of data, methods for collection, and proposes a classification for human factors data that may be a model for other human factors disciplines.

Chandlee, George O.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Lessons Learned JSC Micro-Wireless Instrumentation Systems on Space Shuttle and International Space Station CANEUS 2006

A viewgraph presentation on lessons learned from NASA Johnson Space Center's micro-wireless instrumentation is shown. The topics include: 1) Background, Rationale and Vision; 2) NASA JSC/Structural Engineering Approach & History; 3) Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System; 4) WLEIDS Confidence and Micro-WIS Lessons Learned; and 5) Current Projects and Recommendations.

Studor, George↗

NASA NTRS2015

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program Lessons Learned

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the COTS Program. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

COTS↗

NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal: Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

The editors of Loss of Signal wanted to document the aeromedical lessons learned from the Space Shuttle Columbia mishap. The book is intended to be an accurate and easily understood account of the entire process of recovering and analyzing the human remains, investigating and analyzing what happened to the crew, and using the resulting information to recommend ways to prevent mishaps and provide better protection to crewmembers. Our goal is to capture the passions of those who devoted their energies in responding to the Columbia mishap. We have reunited authors who were directly involved in each of these aspects. These authors tell the story of their efforts related to the Columbia mishap from their point of view. They give the reader an honest description of their responsibilities and share their challenges, their experiences, and their lessons learned on how to enhance crew safety and survival, and how to be prepared to support space mishap investigations. As a result of this approach, a few of the chapters have some redundancy of information and authors' opinions may differ. In no way did we or they intend to assign blame or criticize anyone's professional efforts. All those involved did their best to obtain the truth in the situations to which they were assigned.

Stepaniak, Philip C.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Lessons Learned from the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage and Water Recovery and Management Subsystem Design

Node 1 flew to the International Space Station (ISS) on Flight 2A during December 1998. To date the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has learned a lot of lessons from this module based on its history of approximately two years of acceptance testing on the ground and currently its twelve years on-orbit. This paper will provide an overview of the ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) design of the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage (ACS) and Water Recovery and Management (WRM) subsystems and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for these subsystems based on problems prelaunch, problems encountered on-orbit, and operational problems/concerns. It is hoped that documenting these lessons learned from ISS will help in preventing them in future Programs.

Williams, David E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage and Water Recovery and Management Subsystem Design

Williams, David E.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Lessons Learned Implementing Multi-Mission Sequencing Software

This paper will describe the software and its uses to provide context for its criticality. The different approaches that have been taken to implement the software in a multi-mission format will be outlined. The advantages and disadvantages as well as the lessons learned during development and maintenance of these different architectures will be discussed, Finally. the use of multi-mission software in operations and the lessons learned from using it will be discussed.This paper will provide valuable information to organizations exploring the use of multi-mission software. regardless of whether the change is to minimize spacecraft ground software development time or cost reduction. Similarly. the paper will provide insight into some of the steps that can be taken during software development and operational use that will minimize difficulty later.

software↗

NASA NTRS2006

Heritage Adoption Lessons Learned: Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism

Within JPL, there is a technology thrust need to develop a larger Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism (CDLM) for future missions. The approach taken was to adopt and scale the CDLM design as used on the Galaxy Evolution Explorer (GALEX) project. The three separate mechanisms that comprise the CDLM will be discussed in this paper in addition to a focus on heritage adoption lessons learned and specific examples. These lessons learned will be valuable to any project considering the use of heritage designs.

Wincentsen, James↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spacecraft Line-Of-Sight Jitter Mitigation and Management Lessons Learned and Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to onboard internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance, vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. Both NASA and ESA are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The GN&C community of practice will need to leverage and build upon their collective experiences and lessons learned to better address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best engineering practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) sponsored a two-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to solving the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. A primary objective was to identify and share best practices, rules of thumb, and options for jitter-related activities. Representatives from NASA, JPL, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper will describe the motivation for the NASA Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop and summarize the identified findings, observations, and recommendations.

Lessons Learned;↗

NASA NTRS2013

Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from Solar Array Structures and Mechanisms Deployment

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the Engineering Directorate at LaRC. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

Solar Array Structures↗

NASA NTRS2011

Hayabusa Recovery, Curation and Preliminary Sample Analysis: Lessons Learned from Recent Sample Return Mission

I describe lessons learned from my participation on the Hayabusa Mission, which returned regolith grains from asteroid Itokawa in 2010 [1], comparing this with the recently returned Stardust Spacecraft, which sampled the Jupiter Family comet Wild 2. Spacecraft Recovery Operations: The mission Science and Curation teams must actively participate in planning, testing and implementing spacecraft recovery operations. The crash of the Genesis spacecraft underscored the importance of thinking through multiple contingency scenarios and practicing field recovery for these potential circumstances. Having the contingency supplies on-hand was critical, and at least one full year of planning for Stardust and Hayabusa recovery operations was necessary. Care must be taken to coordinate recovery operations with local organizations and inform relevant government bodies well in advance. Recovery plans for both Stardust and Hayabusa had to be adjusted for unexpectedly wet landing site conditions. Documentation of every step of spacecraft recovery and deintegration was necessary, and collection and analysis of launch and landing site soils was critical. We found the operation of the Woomera Text Range (South Australia) to be excellent in the case of Hayabusa, and in many respects this site is superior to the Utah Test and Training Range (used for Stardust) in the USA. Recovery operations for all recovered spacecraft suffered from the lack of a hermetic seal for the samples. Mission engineers should be pushed to provide hermetic seals for returned samples. Sample Curation Issues: More than two full years were required to prepare curation facilities for Stardust and Hayabusa. Despite this seemingly adequate lead time, major changes to curation procedures were required once the actual state of the returned samples became apparent. Sample databases must be fully implemented before sample return for Stardust we did not adequately think through all of the possible sub sampling and analytical activities before settling on a database design - Hayabusa has done a better job of this. Also, analysis teams must not be permitted to devise their own sample naming schemes. The sample handling and storage facilities for Hayabusa are the finest that exist, and we are now modifying Stardust curation to take advantage of the Hayabusa facilities. Remote storage of a sample subset is desirable. Preliminary Examination (PE) of Samples: There must be some determination of the state and quantity of the returned samples, to provide a necessary guide to persons requesting samples and oversight committees tasked with sample curation oversight. Hayabusa s sample PE, which is called HASPET, was designed so that late additions to the analysis protocols were possible, as new analytical techniques became available. A small but representative number of recovered grains are being subjected to in-depth characterization. The bulk of the recovered samples are being left untouched, to limit contamination. The HASPET plan takes maximum advantage of the unique strengths of sample return missions

Zolensky, Michael E.↗