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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

International R&M/Safety Cooperation Lessons Learned Between NASA and JAXA

Presented are a number of important experiences gained and lessons learned from the collaboration of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re-Configurable Testbed) project. Both space agencies worked on the CoNNeCT Project to design, assemble, test, integrate, and launch a communications testbed facility mounted onto the International Space Station (ISS) truss. At the 2012 RAMS, two papers about CoNNeCT were presented: one on Ground Support Equipment Reliability & System Safety, and the other one on combined application of System Safety & Reliability for the flight system. In addition to the logistics challenges present when two organizations are on the opposite side of the world, there is also a language barrier. The language barrier encompasses not only the different alphabet, it encompasses the social interactions; these were addressed by techniques presented in the paper. The differences in interpretation and application of Spaceflight Requirements will be discussed in this paper. Although many, but definitely not all, of JAXA's Spaceflight Requirements were inspired by NASA, there were significant and critically important differences in how they were interpreted and applied. This paper intends to summarize which practices worked and which did not for an international collaborative effort so that future missions may benefit from our experiences. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, shipped, launched and installed on the ISS without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to facilitate international understanding, communication, and coordination were successful and warrant discussion as lessons learned.

Fernandez, Rene↗
NASA NTRS2021

Spacecraft Line-Of-Sight Jitter Management and Mitigation Lessons Learned And Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to on-board internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance (e.g., nano-radian/milli-arcsecond class), vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. The Nation Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The guidance, navigation, and control community of practice will need to leverage collective experiences and document their best practices and lessons learned to address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center sponsored a 2-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to addressing the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. The primary objective was to identify, document, and share lessons learned, best practices, and preferred options for jitter-related analysis and test activities. Representatives from NASA, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper will describe the motivation for the workshop and summarize the identified findings and recommendations.

Swanson, Davin K.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor Program Overview and Lessons Learned

An overview of the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) program is provided with a summary of lessons learned since the first test firing in 1977. Fifteen different lessons learned are discussed that fundamentally changed the motor's design, processing, and RSRM program risk management systems. The evolution of the rocket motor design is presented including the baseline or High Performance Solid Rocket Motor (HPM), the Filament Wound Case (FWC), the RSRM, and the proposed Five-Segment Booster (FSB).

Graves, Stan R.↗
NASA NTRS2013

X-43A lessons learned

The primary discussion in this paper is about the lessons learned in the loss of the first Hyper-X vehicle and how those problems were overcome.

lessons learned↗
DOE OSTI2026

ICSBEP evaluation lessons learned and good practice

This document describes lessons learned during my nearly 20 years of experience in International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) meetings and in the development of several evaluations employing the IPEN/MB-01 reactor. The evaluations cover a wide range of possible configurations at the reactor core of this facility. Most of the evaluations are related to critical configurations, although two of them concern subcritical measurements. Examples of the evaluations submitted and approved for ICSBEP publication are the critical configurations employed in the standard core; critical configurations employing heavy reflectors composed of stainless steel, nickel, and carbon steel; and critical configurations employing the standard fuel rods and fuel rods composed of UO 2 -Gd 2 O 3 , among several others. Additionally, this document addresses good practices for the development of ICSBEP evaluations; the intention is to help beginners who are going to start evaluations for ICSBEP. The sections of the ICSBEP evaluation are described and illustrated with several examples.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS1993

User observations on information sharing (corporate knowledge and lessons learned)

The sharing of 'corporate knowledge' and lessons learned in the NASA aerospace community has been identified by Johnson Space Center survey participants as a desirable tool. The concept of the program is based on creating a user friendly information system that will allow engineers, scientists, and managers at all working levels to share their information and experiences with other users irrespective of location or organization. The survey addresses potential end uses for such a system and offers some guidance on the development of subsequent processes to ensure the integrity of the information shared. This system concept will promote sharing of information between NASA centers, between NASA and its contractors, between NASA and other government agencies, and perhaps between NASA and institutions of higher learning.

Montague, Ronald A.↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Decade of X-Vehicles: Lessons Learned

The paper discusses the following: Collect lessons learned from successful and unsuccessful X-vehicle programs conducted by DoD and NASA during the 1990s. Evaluate data to determine broad/cross cutting reasons for success. Propose guidelines that will promote successful future NASA X-vehicle program.

McNeal, Curtis I., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Acting on Lessons Learned: A NASA Glenn Acoustics Branch Perspective

Lessons learned from the International Space Station have indicated that early attention to acoustics will be key to achieving safer, more productive environments for new long duration missions. Fans are known to be dominant noise sources, and reducing fan noise poses challenges for fan manufacturers and systems engineers. The NASA Glenn Acoustics Branch has considered ways in which expertise and capabilities traditionally used to understand and mitigate aircraft engine noise can be used to address small fan noise issues in Exploration and Information Technology applications. Many could benefit if NASA can capture what is known about small fan aero and acoustic performance in a "Guide for the Design, Selection, and Installation of Fans for Spaceflight Applications." A draft outline for this document will be offered as a useful starting point for brainstorming ideas for the various smaller, near-term research projects that would need to be addressed first.

Koch, L. Danielle↗
NASA NTRS2016

Lessons Learned from the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System

The ICESat-2 Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) instrument is an upcoming Earth Science mission focusing on the effects of climate change. The flight instrument passed all environmental testing at GSFC (Goddard Space Flight Center) and is now ready to be shipped to the spacecraft vendor for integration and testing. This presentation walks through the lessons learned from design, hardware, analysis and testing perspective. ATLAS lessons learned include general thermal design, analysis, hardware, and testing issues as well as lessons specific to laser systems, two-phase thermal control, and optical assemblies with precision alignment requirements.

Thermal↗
NASA NTRS2011

An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned from Fifty Years of Observing Hardware and Human Behavior

Pica Kahn conducted "An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned in Human and Hardware Behavior" on August 16, 2011. With more than 40 years of experience in the aerospace industry, McMann has gained a wealth of knowledge. This presentation focused on lessons learned in human and hardware behavior. During his many years in the industry, McMann observed that the hardware development process was intertwined with human influences, which impacted the outcome of the product.

McMann, Joe↗
NASA NTRS1992

Building a quality culture in the Office of Space Flight: Approach, lessons learned and implications for the future

The purpose of this paper is to describe the approach and lessons learned by the Office of Space Flight (OSF), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), in its introduction of quality. In particular, the experience of OSF Headquarters is discussed as an example of an organization within NASA that is considering both the business and human elements of the change and the opportunities the quality focus presents to improve continuously. It is hoped that the insights shared will be of use to those embarking upon similar cultural changes. The paper is presented in the following parts: the leadership challenge; background; context of the approach to quality; initial steps; current initiatives; lessons learned; and implications for the future.

Roberts, C. Shannon↗
NASA NTRS2004

Lessons Learned Study Final Report for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate

This report is the final product of a 90-day study performed for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. The study was to assemble lessons NASA has learned from previous programs that could help the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate pursue the Exploration vision. It focuses on those lessons that should have the greatest significance to the Directorate during the formulation of program and mission plans. The study team reviewed a large number of lessons learned reports and data bases, including the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and Rogers Commission reports on the Shuttle accidents, accident reports from robotic space flight systems, and a number of management reviews by the Defense Sciences Board, Government Accountability Office, and others. The consistency of the lessons, findings, and recommendations validate the adequacy of the data set. In addition to reviewing existing databases, a series of workshops was held at each of the NASA centers and headquarters that included senior managers from the current workforce as well as retirees. The full text of the workshop reports is included in Appendix A. A lessons learned website was opened up to permit current and retired NASA personnel and on-site contractors to input additional lessons as they arise. These new lessons, when of appropriate quality and relevance, will be brought to the attention of managers. The report consists of four parts: Part 1 provides a small set of lessons, called the Executive Lessons Learned, that represent critical lessons that the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should act on immediately. This set of Executive Lessons and their supporting rationale have been reviewed at length and fully endorsed by a team of distinguished NASA alumni; Part 2 contains a larger set of lessons, called the Selected Lessons Learned, which have been chosen from the lessons database and center workshop reports on the basis of their specific significance and relevance to the near-term work of the Exploration Directorate. These lessons frequently support the Executive lessons but are more general in nature; Part 3 consists of the reports of the center workshops that were conducted as part of this activity. These reports are included in their entirety (approximately 200 pages) in Appendix G and have significance for specific managers; Part 4 consists of the remainder of the lessons that have been selected by this effort and assembled into a database for the use of the Explorations Directorate. The database is archived and hosted in the Lessons Learned Knowledge Network, which provides a flexible search capability using a wide variety of search terms. Finally, a spreadsheet lists databases searched and a bibliography identifies reports that have been reviewed as sources of lessons for this task. NASA has been presented with many learning opportunities. We have conducted numerous programs, some extremely successful and others total failures. Most have been documented with a formal lessons learned activity, but we have not always incorporated these learning opportunities into our normal modes of business. For example, the Robbins Report of 2001 clearly indicates that many project failures of the past two decades were the result of violating well documented best practices, often in direct violation of management instructions and directives. An overarching lesson emerges: that disciplined execution in accordance with proven best practices is the greatest single contributor to a successful program. The Lessons Learned task team offers a sincere hope that the lessons presented herein will be helpful to the Exploration Systems Directorate in charting and executing their course. The success of the Directorate and of NASA in general depends on our collective ability to move forward without having to relearn the lessons of those who have gone before.

Van Laak, Jim↗
NASA NTRS2017

Orbiter Water Dump Nozzles Redesign Lessons Learned

Hank Rotter, NASA Technical Fellow for Environmental Control and Life Support System, will provide the causes and lessons learned for the two Space Shuttle Orbiter water dump icicles that formed on the side of the Orbiter. He will present the root causes and the criticality of these icicles, along with the redesign of the water dump nozzles and lessons learned during the redesign phase.

Rotter, Hank↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned Based on SNL Experience in Reviews of SPA Controls Awardees

This report summarizes the key contributions and lessons learned from SNL experience in technical reviews of Controls awardees in the DOE SPA program from 2013 - 2020. The purpose of this report is to provide observations and technical suggestions that are likely to be beneficial to the WEC industry as a whole. Over the course of the SPA FOA program, SNL has engaged in technical review for a total of 5 different Controls awardees. The awardees represent a diversity of WEC devices and the application of different control design approaches. The report begins with a summary of key performance metrics results reported by the 5 Controls awardees. This is followed by a summary of observations and lessons learned distilled from the technical reviews of the awardees . The report concludes with a list of general technical suggestions for future WEC controls projects.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗
NASA NTRS1998

NASA/Mir Phase 1: A Lesson Learned in Long Duration Mission Planning and Operations

The NASA/Mir Phase I Program is a precursor to the assembly and operations of the International Space Station (ISS). The Phase I Program covers a four-year period and encompasses over ten shuttle flights to the Mir, culminating with the flight of STS-91 in June 1998. The Mir-Orbiting Station (Mir-OS) provides an excellent environment, both onboard and on the ground, for learning and studying the characteristics associated with crew-tended operations on long duration missions. By the end of the Phase I program, NASA astronauts will have accumulated over two years of continuous operations experience working and living onboard the Mir-OS. Ground controllers, working in Russia and at remote sites in the United States, will have gained valuable experience in the generation, maintenance, and coordination of the information and products required to support the long duration crew members onboard the Mir-OS. The experience gained by the crew and ground support personnel in the area of long duration mission operations has resulted in a number of factors that need to be considered in the definition and implementation of the processes and products for the ISS. While there are many areas in which experience has been gained, this paper focuses on the lessons learned regarding the level of detail and flexibility of crew timelines. Provided in this paper is an overview of the characteristics associated with long duration mission timeline development and execution, a summary of applicable lessons learned identified and documented through participation in the NASA/Mir Phase I Program, a detailed discussion of "Gross Timelines" as implementation which addresses the lessons learned. Also discussed are the challenges that must be overcome in getting the ISS program to recognize, evaluate, and learn from the crew and ground controller experience gained through participation in the NASA/Mir Phase I Program.

Hagopian, Jeff↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Power Quality Lessons Learned

Power Quality is a physical description of the electrical characteristics that allow the system to function properly without significant loss of performance or life. This physical description includes steady state voltage limits, transient voltage limits in normal/abnormal conditions, ripple voltage, stability, fault conditions, and more. All which are vital for improving reliability, ensuring stable operation, defining proper fault recovery, and ensuring a ‘plug and play’ approach to design and integration. Typically, a specification for Power Quality is created based on expected system performance or an existing standard, such as the International Space Power System Interoperability Standards (ISPSIS). One example of such a specification is the Gateway Power Quality Specification. It defines the requirements and characteristics of the 120 Volt direct current electrical power system for the Gateway Electrical Power System (EPS) and the Gateway Electrical Power Consuming Equipment (EPCE). This specification also maintains a separate requirement verification section that defines test methods for requirement verification. The test methods include analysis, test, inspection, and demonstration. These test methodologies and requirements are used to ensure that the loads operate when connected to the specified power quality and performance as defined by this specification. The challenge with developing a specification is that desired system characteristics are not always fully matured before the specification is needed and many performance requirements may be application specific. This drives the need to utilize lessons learned through extensive analysis and testing as well as historical knowledge to finalize requirements. Some example requirements where this is important are Small and Large Signal Stability, Ripple Voltage, Inrush/Surge Currents, and Fault Containment. Lessons learned are also important in the testing, analysis, and verification to ensure consistent and accurate results to verify performance. This presentation will cover the lessons learned for power quality relative to ripple, inrush/surge, fault containment, testing/verification, and more.

Power Quality↗