Cognitive impacts of computer vision-based decision support for international nuclear safeguards-relevant visual analysis tasks.
Abstract not provided.
Gastelum, Zoe Nellie↗
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Destructive Analysis of TRISO Particles: Crush/Burn/Leach Followed by Davies-Gray Titration and IDMS
The accurate accounting of nuclear materials is a cornerstone of international nuclear safeguards. One emerging challenge in this domain is the fabrication of TRIstructural ISOtropic (TRISO) particle fuels. Although these innovative fuel forms are critical for advanced reactor applications, their robust refractory ceramics and coating compositions present significant obstacles to destructive analysis (DA) methods. Ensuring full and quantitative recovery from these particles is essential for accurate mass accountancy. The current study was initiated to address these challenges, first by validating a previously established destructive method developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the quantitative recovery of uranium from TRISO particles and then following that process with uranium content determination through isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) and Davies-Gray titration. This study expands on the scope of a digestive method that was developed under the Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification program and is currently implemented in both the Coated Particle Fuel Development Laboratory and Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory at ORNL. The success of the previous Advanced Gas Reactor work relied on developing a DA method to evaluate the fabrication process and reactor experiments. The methodology described in this report was designed to rigorously investigate the efficacy of the crush/burn/leach sample preparation of TRISO particles; it aims to quantify uranium recovery while also assessing the effects of TRISO constituents (e.g., silicon and zirconium) on analytical precision and accuracy. By comparing the results from the titration method and IDMS, we sought to determine whether existing analytical procedures accepted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be effectively translated to TRISO fuel forms. The team employed an approach that involved processing replicate TRISO samples, optimizing the milling (i.e., crushing) step and performing serial leaches. The elemental composition of the analytical samples was examined to prepare for interference studies in the second year of this project. The integration of gamma spectrometry to verify residual uranium activity further strengthened the validation. Statistical methods were applied to the collected data to evaluate the uncertainties arising from sampling, sample preparation and uranium quantification. These uncertainties were then compared to the IAEA’s international target values (ITVs). Additional data collected in upcoming project work will strengthen the uncertainty estimates. Ultimately, it is hoped that this project will contribute materially to the body of work related to characterization of TRISO based fuels for the purpose of material accountancy and its applications to international safeguards.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Safeguards by Design Projects (FY2020 Final Report)
This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, that do not have Bachelor degrees in nuclear engineering but do have research reactors and some nuclear engineering coursework, to incorporate Safeguards by Design concepts into their Senior Capstone Design Project. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Human Capital Development: University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering majors and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards. FY20, three teams at the University of Rhode Island and one team at the University of Texas - Austin participated in researching, designing, building, and testing projects to support international nuclear safeguards measurements or verification. The projects involved engaging in activities at the university’s research reactors. All the projects engaged students with prototyping a design and/or tool for application at the Universities’ reactor. At the end of the course, most of the students expressed the experience was a positive and they learned more about international nuclear safeguards and applying requirements than they had previously encountered. This school year the projects were further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Both universities cancelled in class room classes, and limited direct student/professor interactions. Furthermore, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) greatly restricted travel, therefore making it impossible to visit the students at the end of the semester for the review of their design projects. The final design and review meeting for the projects happened via the internet. Additionally, while the teams planned to build prototypes this did not happen since there was a social distancing ban on students meeting in person.
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Safeguards by Design Projects (Final Report-FY-22)
This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, that do not have Bachelor degree programs in nuclear engineering but do have research reactors and some nuclear engineering coursework, to incorporate Safeguards by Design concepts into their Senior Capstone Design Project. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Capital Development (HCD): University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering majors and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards. In FY22, three teams at the University of Rhode Island and two teams at the University of Texas - Austin participated in researching, designing, building, and testing projects to support international nuclear safeguards measurements or verification. The projects involved engaging in activities at the university’s research reactors. All the projects engaged students with prototyping a design and/or tool for application at the Universities’ reactor. At the end of the course, most of the students expressed the experience was positive and they learned more about international nuclear safeguards and applying requirements than they had previously encountered. This school year the projects were further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Both universities had limited in classes on campus, still relying on Zoom classes, and limited direct student/professor interactions. Furthermore, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) greatly restricted travel, therefore making it impossible to visit the students at the end of the semester for the review of their design projects. The final design and review meeting for the projects happened via meetings over the internet. Additionally, the teams did build and test some prototypes but could only do so in a limited capacity.
42 ENGINEERING↗
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) NFE-18-07194 with TerraPower LLC (Final Report)
Because of the potential economic and safety benefits of the molten salt reactor (MSR) concept, development of several designs has been initiated around the world over the past decade. New international nuclear safeguards needs and verification challenges are likely to arise because of the commercial interests in MSRs and the number of MSR design variants. As a result, work was undertaken to explore the cross-cutting issues specific to the application of international nuclear safeguards (i.e., safeguards) to liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (LFMSRs). Through a public-private partnership, a report was developed that focuses on the TerraPower Molten Chloride Fast Reactor (MCFR) design that has received a funding award from the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The report is intended to provide a preliminary analysis for a safeguards-by-design (SBD) effort to inform designers about how safeguards could be applied to LFMSRs by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).Although the report specifically focuses on the TerraPower design, the conclusions are applicable to the main design features of LFMSRs and can be used to extrapolate how existing IAEA safeguards measures for other fuel cycle facilities can be appropriately applied or modified. The report evaluates the appropriate safeguards approaches for LFMSRs, presents existing safeguards inspection technologies are still valid for LFMSRs, and identifies new challenges that will require novel measurement instruments to meet verification standards of the IAEA and the international safeguards regime. This document summarizes the results of the work performed under the full report developed as part of the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA). This summary does not contain any protected CRADA information and is intended for public release.
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Beating the Auditors: Comparing Doping in Sport to Nuclear Proliferators
The Berlinger Bottle (Figure 1, below) is the central part of the BEREG-Kit that has been used by anti-doping agencies worldwide for over 25 years. As documented in the World Anti-Doping Agency’s investigative report [Ref 1], in 2014, Russian state-level actors found ways to defeat these bottles and was able to secretly replace an athlete’s drug-laced urine with clean urine samples that had been collected earlier. This cheating scheme allowed rampant performance enhancing drug use by its athletes, and (before disqualifications) earned Russia 33 medals in the 2014 Sochi Olympics – more than double its haul of 15 medals at the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. All this activity was conducted despite the watchful eye of the World Anti-Doping Agency. Similarly, Lance Armstrong and the US Postal Team infamously used performance enhancing drugs and blood transfusions to win 7 Tour de France titles (again, before disqualification) in a row, all under the supervision of L’Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and the US Anti Doping Agency. The inspection role of anti-doping agencies is similar in scope to the role of a Safeguards Inspector with the International Atomic Energy Agency: detect the misuse of facilities, and conduct scheduled and randomized testing to detect and deter would-be cheaters. This paper will explore the motivation, the means, and the mistakes which led to discovery – and will draw out commonalities between those who seek to cheat in sports, and those who seek to undermine international nuclear safeguards as Iraq tried in the 1980s.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Safeguards by Design Table Top Exercises Final Report (FY 2023)
This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, that do not have bachelor’s degree programs in nuclear engineering but do have research reactors and some nuclear engineering coursework, to develop capacity in Safeguards by Design concepts through the application of Tabletop Exercises. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Capital Development (HCD): University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering majors and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards. In FY22, three teams at the University of Rhode Island and two teams at the University of Texas Austin participated in researching, designing, building, and testing projects to support international nuclear safeguards measurements or verification. The projects involved engaging in activities at the university’s research reactors. All the projects engaged students with prototyping a design and/or tool for application at the Universities’ reactor. However, for FY23, the direction of the HCD project had changed to implementing a Tabletop Exercise in Safeguards by Design (SBD). A Tabletop Exercise was not executed during FY23, but relationships with both Universities was maintained and how to integrate the exercise into the curriculum of both programs was determined.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Select Proliferation Studies on TRISO-fueled, Heat-Pipe-cooled Microreactors
Nuclear microreactors carry the potential to open up new markets for the nuclear industry, as their expected cost competitiveness in non-traditional market segments (e.g., mines, military bases, extraterrestrial surfaces, and remote areas), and their inherent safety features make them deployable when other power sources are unavailable or difficult to exploit. For countries that have not traditionally participated in nuclear power, microreactors represent a clean energy solution [1]. However, their use, especially in non-weapons states, may entail challenges in terms of maintaining international nuclear safeguards [2]. Furthermore, the deployment locations where microreactors may prove most cost competitive would be difficult to access by state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors [3]. In addition to the isolated nature of potential deployment sites, the low-power characteristic of microreactors suggests that numerous microreactors would need to be deployed to meet energy demands. That, coupled with the unique physics of many current microreactor designs, opens up a new area of research with respect to nonproliferation and safeguards concerns [2]. Whereas traditional facilities are inspected as isolated cases when looking for signs of diversion or misuse; microreactors may need to be assessed in the context of the entire fleet to which they belong. International safeguards necessitate timely detection of any significant quantities (SQs) of material that are being diverted (e.g., 1 SQ of special nuclear material diverted over the course of a 1-year period) [4]. For low-enriched uranium, the IAEA defines 1 SQ as corresponding to 75 kg of 235U. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the detectability threshold for material diversion in microreactors by relying on critical control drum angles, excess reactivity, and the reactor lifetime as the selected operational parameters. For this assessment, a heat-pipe-cooled microreactor was regarded as the base design. While the conclusions reached in this paper are not readily extendable to the design of actual microreactors, the analysis herein enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the level of accuracy needed for reference calculations in order to detect diversion scenarios by utilizing the selected operational parameters (i.e., mainly control drum angles, critical insertion angle, and the reactor lifetime).
22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Inspecta Technical Report
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is in the process of creating Inspecta (International Nuclear Safeguards Personal Examination and Containment Tracking Assistant), an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-powered smart digital assistant (SDA) with robotic capabilities, aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, and safety of international nuclear safeguards inspections. This innovative tool is designed to assist inspectors on-site by supporting or automating tasks that are typically mundane, hazardous, or susceptible to errors. In 2021, the development team established the specifications for Inspecta by analyzing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents and consulting with former IAEA inspectors and subject matter experts. This process involved aligning in-field inspection tasks with existing commercial or open-source technologies to outline a roadmap for the initial prototype of Inspecta, while also identifying areas needing further research and development. From 2022 – 2024, the focus has shifted to integrating a critical inspection activity, the examination of seals, into an early version of Inspecta. This has involved developing both the software and hardware capabilities necessary for this task. This report outlines the ongoing advancements in Inspecta's functionalities, specifically those supporting the seal examination process.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Inspecta Technical Report
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed Inspecta (International Nuclear Safeguards Personal Examination and Containment Tracking Assistant), an AI-powered smart digital assistant (SDA) equipped with robotic capabilities. This innovative tool aims to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and safety of international nuclear safeguards inspections. Inspecta is designed to assist inspectors on-site by supporting or automating tasks that are often mundane, hazardous, or prone to errors. In 2021, the development team established the specifications for Inspecta by thoroughly analyzing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents and consulting with former IAEA inspectors and subject matter experts. This process involved aligning in-field inspection tasks with existing commercial and open-source technologies, thereby creating a roadmap for the initial prototype of Inspecta and identifying areas requiring further research and development. From 2022 to 2025, the focus shifted to integrating a critical inspection activity—the examination of seals—into an early version of Inspecta. This phase has involved the development of both software and hardware capabilities essential for this task. This report outlines the advancements in Inspecta’s functionalities, particularly those that support the seal examination process.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Safeguards by Design Projects (Final Report FY2021)
This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, that do not have Bachelor degrees in nuclear engineering but do have research reactors and some nuclear engineering coursework, to incorporate Safeguards by Design concepts into their Senior Capstone Design Project. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Human Capital Development: University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering majors and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Safeguards Material Control And Accountancy Considerations For Molten Salt Reactors
Molten salt reactors are a class of nuclear reactor designs with features and operational characteristics that vary significantly. Variations in design features include the physical, chemical, and isotopic composition of fresh and irradiated fuel, neutron energy spectrums, breeding ratios, and the design’s plans for chemical processing. Specific designs within these variations affect the material control and accountancy approaches implemented by both domestic and international nuclear safeguards. This paper identifies safeguards-relevant design features for molten salt reactors and describes how each feature might influence both domestic and international nuclear safeguards implementation. Additionally, this paper describes two potential general categories of material control and accountancy approaches that may be appropriate for molten salt reactors: a black box material-balance approach with measurements on the feed and waste streams combined with robust containment and surveillance on the nuclear material within the reactor or an approach that aims to quantify the nuclear material throughout the reactor (i.e., a process monitoring approach). This paper describes the benefits and challenges of these approaches to meet technical safeguards objectives and identifies gaps in current technologies.
Hogue, Karen↗
Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)
Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Assessing Cognitive Impacts of Errors from Machine Learning and Deep Learning Models: Final Report
Due to their recent increases in performance, machine learning and deep learning models are being increasingly adopted across many domains for visual processing tasks. One such domain is international nuclear safeguards, which seeks to verify the peaceful use of commercial nuclear energy across the globe. Despite recent impressive performance results from machine learning and deep learning algorithms, there is always at least some small level of error. Given the significant consequences of international nuclear safeguards conclusions, we sought to characterize how incorrect responses from a machine or deep learning-assisted visual search task would cognitively impact users. We found that not only do some types of model errors have larger negative impacts on human performance than other errors, the scale of those impacts change depending on the accuracy of the model with which they are presented and they persist in scenarios of evenly distributed errors and single-error presentations. Further, we found that experiments conducted using a common visual search dataset from the psychology community has similar implications to a safeguards- relevant dataset of images containing hyperboloid cooling towers when the cooling tower images are presented to expert participants. While novice performance was considerably different (and worse) on the cooling tower task, we saw increased novice reliance on the most challenging cooling tower images compared to experts. These findings are relevant not just to the cognitive science community, but also for developers of machine and deep learning that will be implemented in multiple domains. For safeguards, this research provides key insights into how machine and deep learning projects should be implemented considering their special requirements that information not be missed.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Holdup Measurement Program Management. Safeguards Considerations Related to Nuclear Material Holdup VTC [PowerPoint]
The outline for the presentation is: Programmatic considerations; End use of data; Holdup measurements used to support safeguards; Quality assurance program components; Technical and administrative challenges; and, Summary.
42 ENGINEERING↗
Validation and demonstration of the AEFC as a practical safeguards tool for inventory verification
The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) instrument designed to determine the residual fissile mass in irradiated fuel assemblies for safeguards verification purposes. This is done by actively interrogating an assembly with a neutron source and measuring the total (Singles) and correlated (Doubles) neutron count rates resulting from induced fissions in the irradiated nuclear fuel and relating those rates to the residual fissile mass using calibration curves. Comprehensive NDA measurements of the irradiated fuel inventory at Israeli Research Reactor 1 (IRR-1) were taken with the AEFC to validate a set of previously developed calibration curves. During the campaign, measurements were acquired of 32 standard fuel assemblies and three control assemblies in just nine days. This is a significant majority of the research reactor's irradiated fuel inventory and the largest data set gathered by the AEFC to date. Many of the fuel assemblies measured during the campaign had much shorter cooling times than those assemblies previously measured with the instrument. Calibration curves developed from previous AEFC deployments were used to determine the residual 235 U mass in the measured standard fuel assemblies. The results of the campaign demonstrated that the AEFC can be used to estimate the 235 U mass remaining in a large number of irradiated fuel assemblies with 1%–5% uncertainty in a reasonable amount of time despite operating in a high dose environment.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Technical Basis for the International Export of Handheld Spectroscopy Detectors
The international export of handheld spectroscopy detectors by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to partner states will provide state regulatory authorities and nuclear material owners a way to improve accountancy for accidental gains of nuclear material, including the provision of reports to the IAEA, in order to meet their safeguards agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements for non-nuclear weapons states requires accountancy for all nuclear material. As defined in Article XX of the IAEA statute, nuclear material includes source materials: "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature," and special fissionable material: "plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233". For IAEA Member States to meet their requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), safeguards are to be applied on "all source or special fissionable material," which "includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards". Therefore, accidental gains and losses of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA. An accidental gain occurs when a state unexpectedly adds nuclear material to their inventory by various means such as seizing smuggled material or the discovery of legacy items previously unaccounted for. The material type and quantity must be added to the State's inventory by updating domestic records and then communicated to the IAEA.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors
What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.
Kovacic, Donald N↗