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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Scalable, Physical Effects Measurable Microgrid for Cyber Resilience Analysis (SPEMMCRA)

The ability to advance state of the art automated protections for industrial control systems (ICS) has as a precursor in the ability to understand the tradeoff space. That is, to enable a cyber feedback loop in a control system environment you must first consider both the security mitigation available, the benefits and the impacts to the control system functionality when the mitigation is used. More damaging impacts could be precipitated that the mitigation was intended to rectify. This paper details networked ICS that controls a simulation of the frequency response represented with the swing equation. The microgrid loads and base generation can be balanced through the control of an emulated battery and power inverter. The simulated plant, which is implemented in Raspberry Pi computers, provides an inexpensive platform to realize the physical effects of cyber attacks to show the tradeoffs of available mitigatoins. This network design can include a commercial ICS controller to introduce real world implementation of feedback controls, and provides a scalable, physical effects measurable Microgrid for cyber resilience analysis (SPEMMCRA).

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

CCE Case Study: Baltavia Substation Power Outage

In this case study, we will examine a fictional event broadly inspired by the real power outages in Ukraine that took place in December 2015 and December 2016—both the result of cyber-enabled sabotage. The actual events of 2015 and 2016 were well-documented—the adversaries in these attacks gained access to a few power companies’ corporate networks, pivoted to industrial control system (ICS) networks, and created widespread physical effects in the form of power outages.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator Cohort 1: Authentication and Authorization

In the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Biden-Harris Administration defines the need for a "defensible, resilient digital ecosystem where it is costlier to attack systems than defend them." The strategy cites the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (CECA) as an exemplary effort to bolster the security and resilience of clean energy generation. These efforts help "secure the clean energy grid of the future and [generate] security best practices that extend to other critical infrastructure sectors" and promise broad and far-reaching impacts to bridge the capabilities of private industry and the needs of energy production. Cohort 1 of CECA launched in the fall of 2022 with a focus on solutions that provide strong authentication and authorization for industrial control systems to mitigate attacks on the energy grid. Authentication and authorization verify that the identity (authentication) and permissions (authorization) of a user or device are aligned with their assigned roles. Weaknesses in either can have serious repercussions. To assess the strength of Cohort 1's solutions, CECA devised threat scenarios grounded in historical precedents: the CECA team reviewed exploits from real-world case studies of state-sponsored actors to match the assessment's attack paths and targets. Cohort 1 results provided the energy industry, product vendors, and related agencies valuable insights into the efficacy and applicability of solutions in common system configurations under realistic threat scenarios. The results of the assessment highlight points for interrogation and improvement in subsequent technology iterations. CECA's evaluations are part of an ongoing conversation and collaboration to bolster U.S. cyber resilience against adversaries today and in the future.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Living-off-the-land Techniques Unlikely to Supplant Energy Sector-Focused OT-Specific Malware

Despite increased reports of energy sector-focused threat actors using living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques, it is unlikely LOTL techniques will wholly supplant malware in energy sector operational technology (OT)-focused cyber operations. Threat actors leverage LOTL techniques to access energy sector networks, abstracting process information and maintaining persistence. Although threat actors using LOTL techniques have successfully interrupted energy sector industrial control environments, designed features of OT-specific malware likely increase the cyber-physical impact of an attack and delay recovery of critical functions and services. Malicious actors will very likely continue to use LOTL techniques for stealth, while designing malware to bolster final impacts on cyber-physical systems in energy sector OT environments.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

CCE Case Study: Baltavia Substation Power Outage

In this case study, we will examine a fictional event broadly inspired by the real power outages in Ukraine that took place in December 2015 and December 2016 - both the result of cyber-enabled sabotage. The actual events of 2015 and 2016 were well-documented - the adversaries in these attacks gained access to a few power companies’ corporate networks, pivoted to industrial control system (ICS) networks, and created widespread physical effects in the form of power outages.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Estimating Uncertainty in Simulated ENSO Statistics

Abstract Large ensembles of model simulations are frequently used to reduce the impact of internal variability when evaluating climate models and assessing climate change induced trends. However, the optimal number of ensemble members required to distinguish model biases and climate change signals from internal variability varies across models and metrics. Here we analyze the mean, variance and skewness of precipitation and sea surface temperature in the eastern equatorial Pacific region often used to describe the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO), obtained from large ensembles of Coupled model intercomparison project phase 6 climate simulations. Leveraging established statistical theory, we develop and assess equations to estimate, a priori, the ensemble size or simulation length required to limit sampling‐based uncertainties in ENSO statistics to within a desired tolerance. Our results confirm that the uncertainty of these statistics decreases with the square root of the time series length and/or ensemble size. Moreover, we demonstrate that uncertainties of these statistics are generally comparable when computed using either pre‐industrial control or historical runs. This suggests that pre‐industrial runs can sometimes be used to estimate the expected uncertainty of statistics computed from an existing historical member or ensemble, and the number of simulation years (run duration and/or ensemble size) required to adequately characterize the statistic. This advance allows us to use existing simulations (e.g., control runs that are performed during model development) to design ensembles that can sufficiently limit diagnostic uncertainties arising from simulated internal variability. These results may well be applicable to variables and regions beyond ENSO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP) model: Extending the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Across Organizational Security

Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Upgrade of hardware controls for the STAR experiment at RHIC

The STAR experiment has been delivering significant physics results for more than 20 years. Stable operation of the experiment was achieved by using a robust controls system based on the Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System (EPICS). Now an object-oriented approach with Python libraries, adapted for EPICS software, is going to replace the procedural-based EPICS C libraries previously used at STAR. Advantages of the new approach include stability of operation, code reduction and straightforward project documentation. The first two sections of this paper introduce the STAR experiment, give an overview of the EPICS architecture, and present the use of Python for controls software. Therefore, specific examples, as well as upgrades of user interfaces, are outlined in the following sections.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Modbus RTU for Embedded Cyber Secure Inverter Controller

The Modbus communication protocol is a widely adopted communication standard in industrial control systems. This communication protocol is known for being reliable and straightforward to implement while being versatile in terms of its operating parameters while supporting multiple formats over various hardware infrastructures and architectures. Many intelligent devices such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs), Internet-of-Things (IoT), and various Operational Technologies (OT) utilize Modbus for their communication systems. These types of systems must communicate with each other through a standardized and central communication process. To support the integration of these modular systems, a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) can act as an embedded central routing fabric for this communication to take place. Embedded systems are versatile enough to interface with various devices and systems to accomplish various goals. Additionally, embedded systems require relatively small physical designs to minimize the required resources to facilitate the intended application by providing low-level system access. This minimization of system resources goes hand in hand with reducing the financial cost of a proposed solution or system. As remotely collaborating researchers often use FPGAs to prototype designs that are required to have a method for data transmission among systems, it is imperative to provide a baseline standard for communications among devices and systems. A typical method of implementing the Modbus RTU communication protocol in an embedded environment is using integrated logic architectures within the FPGA called “Intellectual Property (IP) cores.” IP cores can be designed using integrated logic or circuit designs to function as an embedded processor. These IP cores can then perform the required computational actions to support the Modbus RTU communication protocol by utilizing high-level programming languages such as the C programming language. The hardware description language of Very High-Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL) allows for the control of real hardware at the logic gate and signal level. These logic gates and signals can be designed and controlled to perform desired actions based on the system design. Programming an FPGA using VHDL allows an individual to access the lowest abstraction level of the system during FPGA development. This level of abstraction is referred to as the register-transfer level (RTL), which gives access to manipulating values and variables at the register level. This register-level manipulation provides precision over creating the logical circuit within the FPGA, thus minimizing the required code to perform desired operations. The Modbus RTU communication protocol can be implemented within an FPGA using VHDL programming to establish a standardized and embedded serial communication pathway. This implementation provides a standardized communication protocol to streamline research efforts among researchers, thus increasing the efficiency of research efforts. Additionally, this Modbus RTU implementation requires fewer resources when compared to typical communication protocol implementations that utilize an IP core, reducing the hardware requirement for effective research efforts.

communication↗
DOE OSTI2025

Engineering Out Industry 4.0 Cyber Risk Presentation for EnCyCriS

The increasing complexity and business requirements of operational technology (OT) devices is beginning to break the normal segmentation between information technology (IT) and OT networks. The introduction of industry 4.0 devices such as industrial internet of things (IIoT) and other intelligent industrial devices (IID), virtualized OT systems, OT cloud integration, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven industrial control systems (ICS) has challenged traditional IT/OT cybersecurity strategies. Industry 4.0 devices are analyzed through the lens of well-regarded models such as the PERA model and confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security objectives, showing the division between what is needed and traditional cybersecurity countermeasures. In this paper, the practice of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is proposed to bridge the gap between IT/OT security, enhance the practice of cybersecurity in this modern age, and reduce the impacts of consequential events in OT.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Engineering Out Industry 4.0 Cyber Risk

The increasing complexity and business requirements of operational technology (OT) devices is beginning to break the normal segmentation between information technology (IT) and OT networks. The introduction of industry 4.0 devices such as industrial internet of things (IIoT) and other intelligent industrial devices (IID), virtualized OT systems, OT cloud integration, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven industrial control systems (ICS) has challenged traditional IT/OT cybersecurity strategies. Industry 4.0 devices are analyzed through the lens of well-regarded models such as the PERA model and confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security objectives, showing the division between what is needed and traditional cybersecurity countermeasures. In this paper, the practice of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is proposed to bridge the gap between IT/OT security, enhance the practice of cybersecurity in this modern age, and reduce the impacts of consequential events in OT.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Real time heat load calculation software based on EPICS for Fermilab PIP-II CM tests

Fermilab has a project to improve the proton beam energy which is called PIP-II (the 2nd Proton Improvement Plan). There is a superconducting linear accelerator, LINAC, to improve the proton beam power and the LINAC consists of 5 types of cryomodules (CM), 1 HWR CM, 2 SSR1 CM, 4 SSR2 CM, LB650 CM, and HB650 CM. The prototypes of these cryomodules are being tested at Fermilab’s CryoModule Test Facility (CMTF). Heat load measurements are an important part of the prototype CM testing. The CMTF cryogenic control system was developed based on the ACNET (Accelerator Control NETwork) for CM testing for other projects, but the PIP-II cryogenic control system will be implemented using the Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System (EPICS). As part of the prototype CM testing campaign an EPICS based control system has been implemented at CMTF. This EPICS cryogenic control system includes real time heat load calculation software utilizing the Fortran implementation of Hepak. This paper details the real time heat load calculation software developed for the prototype CM testing including the first results from the HB 650 CM.

Yoon, S. [Fermilab]↗
NASA NTRS1990

Signal Processor

Macrodyne, Inc.'s Model 3100 Frequency Domain Processor is an innovative instrument that significantly increases the amount and accuracy of information available from laser velocimeter flow measurement systems. The innovation permits use of laser velocimetry in industrial applications where extremely precise measurements are required; it has applicability in industrial controls and in improvement of transmission standards in the automotive industry.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2026

Real time heat load calculation software based on EPICS for Fermilab PIP-II CM tests

Fermilab has a project to improve the proton beam energy which is called PIP-II (the 2nd Proton Improvement Plan). There is a superconducting linear accelerator, LINAC, to improve the proton beam power and the LINAC consists of 5 types of cryomodules (CM), 1 HWR CM, 2 SSR1 CM, 4 SSR2 CM, LB650 CM, and HB650 CM. The prototypes of these cryomodules are being tested at Fermilab’s CryoModule Test Facility (CMTF). Heat load measurements are an important part of the prototype CM testing. The CMTF cryogenic control system was developed based on the ACNET (Accelerator Control NETwork) for CM testing for other projects, but the PIP-II cryogenic control system will be implemented using the Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System (EPICS). As part of the prototype CM testing campaign, an EPICS based control system has been implemented at CMTF. This EPICS cryogenic control system includes real-time heat load calculation software utilizing the Fortran implementation of Hepak. This paper details the real time heat load calculation software developed for the prototype CM testing including the first results from the HB650 CM.

Yoon, S. [Fermilab]↗
DOE OSTI2024

StructuredFuzzer: Fuzzing Structured Text-Based Control Logic Applications

Rigorous testing methods are essential for ensuring the security and reliability of industrial controller software. Fuzzing, a technique that automatically discovers software bugs, has also proven effective in finding software vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, fuzzing has been applied to a wide range of platforms, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs). However, current approaches, such as coverage-guided evolutionary fuzzing implemented in the popular fuzzer American Fuzzy Lop Plus Plus (AFL++), are often inadequate for finding logical errors and bugs in PLC control logic applications. They primarily target generic programming languages like C/C++, Java, and Python, and do not consider the unique characteristics and behaviors of PLCs, which are often programmed using specialized programming languages like Structured Text (ST). Furthermore, these fuzzers are ill suited to deal with complex input structures encapsulated in ST, as they are not specifically designed to generate appropriate input sequences. This renders the application of traditional fuzzing techniques less efficient on these platforms. To address this issue, this paper presents a fuzzing framework designed explicitly for PLC software to discover logic bugs in applications written in ST specified by the IEC 61131-3 standard. The proposed framework incorporates a custom-tailored PLC runtime and a fuzzer designed for the purpose. We demonstrate its effectiveness by fuzzing a collection of ST programs that were crafted for evaluation purposes. We compare the performance against a popular fuzzer, namely, AFL++. The proposed fuzzing framework demonstrated its capabilities in our experiments, successfully detecting logic bugs in the tested PLC control logic applications written in ST. On average, it was at least 83 times faster than AFL++, and in certain cases, for example, it was more than 23,000 times faster.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗