A MANUAL ABORT TECHNIQUE FOR THE MIDCOURSE REGION OF A LUNAR MISSION
Manual abort technique for the midcourse region of a lunar mission, consisting of precomputed abort charts and an inertial measurement unit
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Manual abort technique for the midcourse region of a lunar mission, consisting of precomputed abort charts and an inertial measurement unit
Hardware design and functions of Apollo guidance and navigation system for inertial measurement unit realignment, outlining computer programs and routines
Simple fluidic vibration damper for installation at each pivotal mounting between gimbals isolates inertial measuring units from external vibration and other disruptive forces. Installation between each of the three gimbal axes can dampen vibration and shock in any direction while permitting free rotation of the gimbals.
Evaluation of alignment of optical telescope performance during prelaunch lunar surface inertial measurement unit alignment
Manual completion of lunar orbit insertion burn with inertial measuring unit drifting about pitch axis
A market survey and evaluation of inertial guidance systems (inertial measurement units and digital computers) were made. Comparisons were made to determine the candidate systems for use in the Scout launch vehicle. Error analyses were made using typical Scout trajectories. A reaction control system was sized for the fourth stage. The guidance hardware to Scout vehicle interface was listed.
Methods which have been proposed to improve the navigation accuracy for the low-thrust space vehicle include modifications to the standard Sequential- and Batch-type orbit determination procedures and the use of inertial measuring units (IMU) which measures directly the acceleration applied to the vehicle. The navigation accuracy obtained using one of the more promising modifications to the orbit determination procedures is compared with a combined IMU-Standard. The unknown accelerations are approximated as both first-order and second-order Gauss-Markov processes. The comparison is based on numerical results obtained in a study of the navigation requirements of a numerically simulated 152-day low-thrust mission to the asteroid Eros. The results obtained in the simulation indicate that the DMC algorithm will yield a significant improvement over the navigation accuracies achieved with previous estimation algorithms. In addition, the DMC algorithms will yield better navigation accuracies than the IMU-Standard Orbit Determination algorithm, except for extremely precise IMU measurements, i.e., gyroplatform alignment .01 deg and accelerometer signal-to-noise ratio .07. Unless these accuracies are achieved, the IMU navigation accuracies are generally unacceptable.
Failure detection and isolation techniques are developed for application to off-the-shelf type four-gimbaled inertial measurement units such as the KT-70 or Carousel IV. By using simulated boost and entry shuttle trajectories with specific gimbaled IMU models, failure detection thresholds are developed based upon red-line life dependent requirements and warning thresholds are given within the red-line thresholds based upon expected worst case IMU performance. Using these trajectories, established trajectory thresholds, and multiple IMU models, various failure detection and isolation techniques are evaluated for application in both powered and unpowered flight phases. The adequacy of off-the-shelf systems for both attitude and velocity detection methods is evaluated and recommendations for shuttle application are made.
The test plan for a redundant sensor strapdown inertial measuring unit evaluation program is presented. The subjects discussed are: (1) test philosophy and limitations, (2) test sequence, (3) equipment specifications, (4) general operating procedures, (5) calibration procedures, (6) alignment test phase, and (7) navigation test phase. The data and analysis requirements are analyzed.
A failure detection and isolation technique for use with four gimbaled inertial measurement units (IMU) is presented. By using simulated boost and entry shuttle trajectories with specific gimbaled IMU models, failure detection thresholds are developed based on red-line life dependent requirements and warning thresholds within the red-line thresholds based on expected worst case IMU performance. Using these trajectories, established trajectory threshold, and multiple IMU models, various failure detection and isolation techniques are evaluated for application in both powered and unpowered flight phases. The adequacy of the systems for both attitude and velocity detection methods is evaluated and recommendations for space shuttle applications are made.
The steering system of the space shuttle vehicle is presented for the several hundred miles of flight preceding landing. The guidance scheme is characterized by a spiral turn to dissipate excess potential energy (altitude) prior to a standard straight-in final approach. In addition, the system features pilot oriented control, drag brakes, phugoid damping, and a navigational capacity founded upon an inertial measurement unit and an on-board computer. Analytic formulas are used to calculate, represent, and insure the workability of the system's specifications
The conclusions of the analyses of the inflight performance of the Apollo 13 spacecraft guidance, navigation, and control equipment are presented. The subjects discussed are: (1) the command module systems, (2) the lunar module inertial measurement unit, (3) the lunar module digital autopilot, (4) the lunar module abort guidance system, (5) lunar module optical alignment checks, and (6) spacecraft component separation procedures.
The station-keeping guidance system is described, which is designed to automatically keep one orbiting vehicle within a prescribed zone fixed with respect to another orbiting vehicle. The active vehicle, i.e. the one performing the station-keeping maneuvers, is referred to as the shuttle. The other passive orbiting vehicle is denoted as the workshop. The passive vehicle is assumed to be in a low-eccentricity near-earth orbit. The primary navigation sensor considered is a gimballed tracking radar located on board the shuttle. It provides data on relative range and range rate between the two vehicles. Also measured are the shaft and trunnion axes gimbal angles. An inertial measurement unit (IMU) is provided on board the orbiter. The IMU is used at all times to provide an attitude reference for the vehicle. The IMU accelerometers are used periodically to monitor the velocity-correction burns applied to the shuttle during the station-keeping mode. The guidance system is capable of station-keeping the shuttle in any arbitrary position with respect to the workshop by periodically applying velocity-correction pulses to the shuttle.
This paper analyzes the reliability of the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) portion of an avionics system for the Space Shuttle Orbiter. This analysis shows how the GNC design is affected by the need to achieve an acceptable probability of successful completion of a mission and of safe return to an airport. It varies the redundancy of the inertial measurement unit (IMU), computers, and other time-critical elements. It also includes the reliability of the flight control electronics and of the nontime-critical sensors on a phase-by-phase basis. It shows that quadruple redundancy in certain subsystems, high quality parts, and cross-strapping on orbit are required.
A failure detection and isolation technique is presented for application to 'off-the-shelf' type four-gimbaled inertial measurement units (IMUs) such as the KT-70 or Carousel IV. This study concentrates initially upon actual four-gimbaled IMU performance requirements for current Space Shuttle booster and orbiter mission phases. When this information is obtained for a simplex system, the remaining area of study necessary to attain redundant IMU capabilities is the establishment of mission-dependent performance failure detection thresholds. These thresholds, then, permit a careful evaluation of the capabilities of various 'off-the-shelf' four gimbaled IMUs to satisfy the Shuttle mission performance requirements with various failure detection and isolation methods.
A simulator is described, which was designed for testing and evaluating inertial measuring units, and flight platforms. Mechanical and electrical specifications for the outer, middle, and inner axis are presented. Test results are included.
A technique for on-board detection and identification of hard failures and leaks of the shuttle orbiter reaction control subsystem jets, during the orbital flight phase, is presented. The method uses gimbal angle and linear accelerometer measurements from the orbiter inertial measurement unit and requires no additional hardware. Extended Kalman filters with residual traps are employed for state estimation, and generalized likelihood ratio tests for jet failure identification. Rigid body simulation results indicate identification times of less than 2 seconds for hard jet failures and less than 70 seconds for jet leaks.
The general purpose of this study is to aid in the evaluation and design of multi-sensor navigation schemes proposed for the orbiter. The scope of the effort is limited to the post-entry, energy management, and approach and landing mission phases. One candidate system based on conventional navigation aids is illustrated including two DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) stations and ILS (Instrument Landing System) glide slope and localizer antennas. Some key elements of the system not shown are the onboard IMUs (Inertial Measurement Units), altimeters, and a computer. The latter is programmed to mix together (filter) the IMU data and the externally-derived data. A completely automatic, all-weather landing capability is required. Since no air-breathing engines will be carried on orbital flights, there will be no chance to go around and try again following a missed approach.