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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Establishing a sustainable regulatory framework for the security of radioactive sources through harmonization with a safety regulatory framework

In order to establish and maintain sustainable nuclear security regulatory infrastructures for radioactive sources, it is important for States to develop nuclear security regulations with regulatory requirements and relevant criteria for security, which are consistent and well integrated with those for radiation safety. In establishing national regulations, experts worldwide follow the international recommendations on safety and security of radioactive sources published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Within the IAEA publications on safety and security of radioactive sources, some international recommendations are identical or very similar for both safety and security, for example, the requirement for the establishment of a national registry of radioactive sources. However, some other international recommendations are unique to the security area, such as the recommendation to examine the trustworthiness of employees, or to the safety area, such as the need to establish public exposure controls. Additionally, many international recommendations fall somewhere in between, such as the need for effective authorization of facilities and activities, a regulatory inspection and enforcement regime and the graded approach to establish and apply regulatory requirements. This paper examines how the IAEA international recommendations for establishing regulatory frameworks for safety and security relate to one another.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) NFE-18-07194 with TerraPower LLC (Final Report)

Because of the potential economic and safety benefits of the molten salt reactor (MSR) concept, development of several designs has been initiated around the world over the past decade. New international nuclear safeguards needs and verification challenges are likely to arise because of the commercial interests in MSRs and the number of MSR design variants. As a result, work was undertaken to explore the cross-cutting issues specific to the application of international nuclear safeguards (i.e., safeguards) to liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (LFMSRs). Through a public-private partnership, a report was developed that focuses on the TerraPower Molten Chloride Fast Reactor (MCFR) design that has received a funding award from the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The report is intended to provide a preliminary analysis for a safeguards-by-design (SBD) effort to inform designers about how safeguards could be applied to LFMSRs by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).Although the report specifically focuses on the TerraPower design, the conclusions are applicable to the main design features of LFMSRs and can be used to extrapolate how existing IAEA safeguards measures for other fuel cycle facilities can be appropriately applied or modified. The report evaluates the appropriate safeguards approaches for LFMSRs, presents existing safeguards inspection technologies are still valid for LFMSRs, and identifies new challenges that will require novel measurement instruments to meet verification standards of the IAEA and the international safeguards regime. This document summarizes the results of the work performed under the full report developed as part of the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA). This summary does not contain any protected CRADA information and is intended for public release.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Benchmark Modeling and Simulation of the FFTF LOFWOS Test #13 Using SAM

The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) was a 400 MW thermal powered, oxide-fueled, liquid sodium cooled test reactor, built to assist development and testing of advanced fuels and materials for fast breeder reactors. In July 1986, a series of unprotected Loss of Flow Without Scram (LOFWOS) transients were performed in FFTF as part of the Passive Safety Testing (PST) program. The LOFWOS Test #13, which was initiated at 50% power and 100% flow with the pump pony motors left off, has been chosen as a benchmark case by IAEA to support collaborative efforts within international partnerships on the validation of simulation tools and models in the area of sodium fast reactor passive safety in an IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP), launched in October 2018. The System Analysis Module (SAM) is an advanced and modern system analysis tool under development at Argonne National Laboratory for advanced non-LWR safety analysis. It utilizes the object-oriented application framework MOOSE to leverage the modern software environment and advanced numerical methods. The capabilities of SAM are being extended to enable the transient modeling, analysis, and design of various advanced nuclear reactor systems. To participate the IAEA CRP and enhance the SAM validation base for advanced reactor transient safety analysis, benchmark simulations of the FFTF LOFWOS Test #13 are performed using the SAM code. In this first phase of the validation effort, the thermal-hydraulic behavior of the reactor system is the focus and the reactor kinetics is not considered in the SAM FFTF model. Instead, the results of Argonne’s neutronics calculations are directly used, including the power shape of the active core region and the power history during the transient. The simulation results of FFTF at steady state agreed well with the measured data from the test. During the transient, reasonably good agreement were also obtained. Future work to improve the model will focus on introducing the reactivity predictions into the model, as well as better understanding or resolving the current discrepancies with the measured data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Considerations for using Privacy Preserving Machine Learning Techniques for Safeguards

In international nuclear safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked with inspecting and verifying nuclear facilities and their activities. Data analytics and machine learning to support inspections require large amounts of data that nuclear facility operators may consider proprietary or sensitive, so the IAEA may not have full access. Allowing computation over private data without compromising its security therefore has value for safeguards inspections and analysis. Privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) consists of security-focused techniques that allow data analytics and machine learning algorithms to run on sensitive data without revealing it. This includes ideas like homomorphic encryption (HE), secure multiparty computation (SMPC), and secure enclaves. HE allows algorithms and mathematical operations to be conducted directly on the encrypted data instead of first decrypting it. With SMPC, multiple entities collaboratively compute over distributed data such that no party is able to directly view any others’ original data. Secure enclaves allow computation to take place in a separate and heavily blocked-off section of a CPU. Techniques like these allow for several potential use cases in which the security of data is essential. With SMPC, machine learning models can be trained over the input data from multiple entities, resulting in a model that all users can benefit from without leaking the input data from any particular entity. With SMPC or a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), an algorithm returning some single answer or truth value can be run on someone else’s data without ever needing to see that data, potentially allowing for verification or proof of some underlying question. HE can allow for outsourcing computation on data to a hostile or untrusted environment. Although most of the research in this field resides within the health and financial domains, tools from PPML may have similar applications in nuclear safeguards. Allowing the IAEA to compute over proprietary information, such as process models and raw sensor data using PPML techniques, provides the baseline for running complex analytics without needing direct unencrypted access to the underlying data, maintaining its privacy. Important limitations to consider for these techniques include the efficiency and level of security required. The security of HE and SMPC come at the cost of speed—the significant amount of overhead means that algorithms implemented in these protocols and encryption schemes are slower than when run on plaintext. Additionally, several important parameters determine what techniques or protocols are used based on the security requirements. SMPC protocols may need to be selected for resistance against a party that attempts to deviate from the protocol to distort the result or gain access to additional information, and a protocol secure against these attacks may further increase the overhead of the algorithm.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

24.1.3.1.1 - Frisch Grid CZT Spectrometer

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) worked with FLIR System Inc., the manufacturer of the nanoRAIDER, to develop a handheld field deployable detector based on the novel position-sensitive virtual Frisch-grid (VFG) Cadmium-Zinc-Telluride (CdZnTe or CZT) detectors (with 1% FWHM at 662 keV or better energy resolution). The detector called nanoRAIDER-VFG would be an improvement to the current nanoRAIDER, which is a compact gamma-ray detection instrument manufactured by FLIR Systems Inc. that employs relatively lower-performing CZT hemispheric detectors (i.e., 3%-FWHM CZT detectors). The nanoRAIDER-VFG would have significantly improved accuracy of measurements while maintaining similar efficiency, as compared to the nanoRAIDER, for in-field analysis of nuclear materials and detection of undeclared activities during inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since the nanoRAIDER is currently used by the IAEA as part of its Complementary Access toolkit, a relatively quick acceptance of the nanoRAIDER-VFG for safeguards was anticipated. The nanoRAIDER-VFG project was undertaken to address the following items in the IAEA's Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012-2023: 2.2 (elemental and isotopic signatures of fuel cycle processes); 2.3 (detect signatures of undeclared activity and improve analysis); and 2.6 (detect process emanations). The high energy-resolution of the nanoRAIDER-VFG would also have had applicability to 3.2 (fissile content of metal mixtures containing actinides Np, Am, etc.). The project was not completed due to a change in priorities within FLIR.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Conceptual Design for a Desktop Application to Support Inventory Reconciliation Activities

This paper describes desktop software being developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to empower users to reconcile observations about items at nuclear facilities more accurately, reliably, and quickly. Inventory activities at nuclear facilities are often conducted using pen and paper, which can be time-consuming, tedious, and susceptible to reading or transcription errors. The proposed inventory assistant would be a replacement for the paper-based process that could be used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, nuclear facility operators, or treaty verification monitors to conduct an inventory of nuclear and non-nuclear items in a more timely and accurate manner. Garner, McGirl, and Whitaker previously reported their work about a conceptual design for a mobile app to assist users in the field. In general, the inventory assistant would ingest an inventory list, distribute assigned items from the inventory list to one or more mobile devices, enable inventory teams to record their observations in the field, and then enable an inventory lead to integrate and reconcile the observations to produce a final report. The assistant consists of two software components - one for the inventory teams to record observations in the field (In-Field Observations App [IFOA]) and one for the inventory lead to (1) distribute the inventory list to each team, (2) integrate the observations from each team, and (3) reconcile the inventory list with observations (Distribution, Integration, and Reconciliation Application [DIRA]). This paper reviews the inventory assistant workflow and describes the DIRA user experience in more detail. As an example, the authors have chosen to follow the use case of IAEA inspectors conducting item counting and tag checking activities of UF 6 cylinders at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant with a large number of UF 6 cylinders (e.g., thousands). These activities can currently require 30 - 40 person-days of inspection to complete. The authors believe an inventory assistant could allow the IAEA to complete item counting and tag checking using the global identifier or the operator’s barcode in 8 - 10 person-days of inspection. We would expect other users (e.g., facility operators or treaty verification monitors) to also benefit from significant time savings.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Workshop on Establishing and Operating a National Nuclear Security Support Centre Hypothetical Scenario: “Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre Strategy Implementation Plan”

[This is part of a hypothetical scenario-based exercise for workshop participants, based on the fictitious country "Centralia."] In prior years, as a part of efforts to strengthen and better sustain nuclear security within the State, Centralia requested through the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) framework that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conduct an expert mission on establishing and operating a national nuclear security support centre (NSSC). After the IAEA conducted the NSSC expert mission, members of the Centralia Committee on Nuclear Security (CNS) agreed to initiate the feasibility determination phase of establishing an NSSC, in line with the systematic process recommended by the IAEA. Centralia Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNRA), as the designated lead organization for coordinating the feasibility determination process, prepared a Feasibility Report in collaboration with members of the CNS and based on input gathered among relevant national stakeholders. The report was presented to the National Security Advisor (NSA), who reviewed and approved the proposal for Centralia to proceed with establishing an NSSC. After Centralia moved into the planning phase for the Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre (CNSSC), per REF, the primary stakeholders of the centre jointly developed this strategy implementation plan, which provides an outline of the organizational structure, needs analysis, programme objectives, financial and project management, risk management, and other key aspects of the centre. This document will be reviewed and updated as necessary on a semi-annual basis during the project implementation period of establishing CNSSC.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Summary Report of the Workshop on Compilation of Experimental Nuclear Reaction Data

This report summarizes the IAEA Workshop on Compilation of Experimental Nuclear Reaction Data held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria from 13 to 16 December 2022. The meeting was attended by 23 participants representing 12 cooperative Centres from seven Member States (China, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and USA) and two International Organisations (NEA, IAEA) as well as a participant from Mongolia and Spain. A summary of the workshop is given in this report along with the conclusions and actions.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Carbon, Nitrogen, and Sulfur Analysis of the Cetama Viognier Standard Reference Material

The Viognier sample was analyzed for C, N, and S concentrations and stable isotope compositions using an Elementar Vario Isotope Cube Elemental Analyzer (EA) that is coupled to an IsoPrime PrecisION IRMS. Powder samples were placed in tin capsules and then loaded onto a rotary autosampler. The autosampler dropped samples into the EA, and samples were combusted at 1175 °C over tungsten oxide in a continuous stream of helium carrier gas. A pulse of oxygen is added to the gas stream resulting in flash combustion of the tin capsule containing the sample, which raises the reaction temperature to approximately 1800 °C for a few seconds. The combustion reaction produces SO 2 , N 2 and CO 2 from any sulfur, nitrogen and carbon present in the sample. The resulting gases were then passed through a reduced copper reactor that was heated to 850 °C, to reduce NO x to N 2 , reduce SO 3 to SO 2 , and trap any volatile halogen compounds on silver wool. Following water removal using an adsorption tube, the N 2 , CO 2 , and SO 2 analyte gases were separated and purified using purge-trap columns. The purified gases were then carried through a thermal conductivity detector. The detector signal was passed to software that calculated elemental abundances based on integrated peak areas. The sample gases were then passed to the IRMS and stable isotope ratios were measured. Raw sample peak areas were corrected by subtracting the average peak area from blanks consisting of empty tin capsules run using the same EA analysis method. Blanks were also run following each replicate to verify that all the material was combusted. The Viognier sample was analyzed in triplicate on two days (target sample masses: 30, 60 and 90 mg). The following standards were analyzed to calibrate EA-IRMS measurements: IAEA-C6, USGS-40, USGS-41, IAEA-S1, and IAEA-S2.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2025

An In Situ Feed Monitoring System for Molten Salt Reactors with Fast Neutron Energy Spectrum Molten Salt Reactor Applications

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are one of the six promising advanced reactor technologies selected for further research and development by the Generation IV International Forum. More than twenty MSR designs are actively being developed around the world. Several of these designs are liquid-fueled and intended for operation within the fast neutron energy spectrum.1 National regulations will require liquid-fueled MSRs to control and account for nuclear material within licensed facilities. Additionally, states with comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are obligated to declare nuclear material quantities within facilities. In return, the IAEA Department of Safeguards independently verifies these quantities and provides assurance that the nuclear material and facility are being used only for peaceful purposes. One key distinction of liquid-fueled MSRs compared with other types of reactors is that in portions of the facility, the nuclear material is in bulk form rather than discrete items. Traditional nuclear material accounting techniques such as physical item counting and verification of serial numbers on fresh fuel assemblies do not translate directly to all process streams within liquid-fueled reactors. Liquid-fueled MSRs are typically designed with low excess reactivity. This feature provides safety benefits but also means that most MSRs require the addition of makeup fuel salt while a reactor is operational. The nuclear material in the initial fuel salt and in any makeup fuel salt must be quantified. Additionally, distinct nuclear material diversion and reactor misuse scenarios form the basis of the detection methods and monitoring systems developed for liquid-fueled MSRs. For example, the IAEA provides assurance that fuel salt containing nuclear material is not being diverted from the system, that the feed salt matches the reported actinide concentrations and uranium enrichment, and that no additional fertile material is being introduced into the system. Measurement systems currently used for nuclear material control and accounting are not directly applicable to achieving MSR safeguards goals. This paper concerns a system being designed to account for the nuclear material added to liquid-fueled MSRs and monitor for diversion and misuse scenarios related to MSR feed systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Safeguards; Evaluating Safeguards and Security Risks and Benefits for Advanced and Small Modular Reactor Deployments

Rapidly growing interest in advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) technologies presents challenges as well as opportunities for implementing international safeguards and security. A/SMR deployments are expected to be more numerous, more geographically dispersed, and more varied in their designs, placing new demands on the data systems and analytical tools used to support oversight (Alberti et al., 2023; Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission et al., 2024). Because of this variability, the importance and reliance on data systems for A/SMR deployments is expected to be higher than for previous reactor generations. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) offer potential capabilities to address the high variability inherent in A/SMR technology. The beneficiaries of AI-assisted tools include facility operators, government regulators, IAEA inspectors, and A/SMR vendors. This report analyzes how AI/ML-assisted technologies can strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards and security measures. It also identifies AI-assisted tools to strengthen operator, facility, and regulator knowledge management practices and examines the potential risks AI/ML-based tools may introduce to IAEA safeguards and security efforts. It concludes with a set of hypothetical, standards-style requirements for AI/ML systems used in safeguards contexts, grounded in an inspector-centric view of system verification. Despite the potential benefits of AI/ML systems, understanding potential intentional and unintentional failure modes is critical for ensuring adequate protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Unique features of A/SMRs including sealed cores, remote and novel paradigms of operation, off-site reactor fabrication, novel fuel forms, and varied refueling requirements, introduce challenges for traditional safeguards technological approaches (Pensado et al., 2024; Federation of American Scientists, 2025). AI/ML systems deployed to address these challenges may introduce new risks requiring systematic evaluation rooted in both AI-specific risk frameworks, such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (NIST AI RMF), and established cyber risk management standards such as NIST SP 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2023; NIST, 2012).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluating Safeguards Statistical Assumptions via Stochastic Simulation

Herein, the authors built and tested a stochastic simulation to estimate achieved detection probabilities (DPs) on a stratum basis, over a tailorable range of diverted amounts from 0 to 2 SQ, using typical IAEA inspection data: i.e., SQ in stratum, number of items, number of gross/partial/bias defect measurements conducted, and realistic relative standard deviation (RSD) values for typical IAEA verification measurements. For bulk strata, the model calculates achieved DP at 0.01 SQ diversion increments; for item strata, the model calculates DP using the smallest realistic diversion increment (e.g., a plate, pin, or coupon). After successfully benchmarking against IAEA deterministic models, the simulation was used to test the sensitivity of DP to certain standard assumptions and selected input parameters. First, the equal defect assumption was tested; the results suggest significant complexity in the effectiveness of partial defect measurements. Next, the authors explored the sensitivity of DP to the assumed RSD of attribute tests. Then, the authors compared non-normal models for instrument performance (e.g., logistic, step, or arbitrary functions) to the typical results from a normal distribution (characterized by RSD). This last comparison was supplemented with experimentally derived performance data for an HM-5. The HM-5 was used to make enrichment measurements on both LEU and HEU MTR fuel elements as plates were removed, and the results fit with logistic and step curves and applied in the simulation. These stochastic DP results were compared to DP estimates from a deterministic model assuming a normal curve and typical RSD, yielding insights that could improve effectiveness in the field. These early results illustrate the potential of stochastic models to better understand achieved DP and to improve safeguards effectiveness.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Review on the State of the Art of Machine Learning and Satellite Imaging: Detecting Scene Changes in Selected Nuclear Fuel Cycle Datasets

The timely detection of clandestine nuclear facilities is one of the greatest challenges faced by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA). Idaho National Laboratory is currently applying machine learning (ML) to existing satellite imagery (SI) datasets to find facilities within the nuclear fuel life cycle, with primary focus placed on identifying critical predecessor (i.e., fuel fabrication and fuel enrichment) and successor (i.e., nuclear power plants) facilities. This could provide a satellite image methodology that the IAEA could leverage to discover clandestine facilities. The work presented in this paper describes the evolution of a workflow developed by this team for object detection related to critical infrastructure by expanding that workflow for the purpose of identifying nuclear fuel cycle components and automating dependency assessments. This will be done using two methods housed within a single pipeline. The first method involves implementing a DenseNet161 convolutional neural network to classify the images and explain the results using Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME). The second method implements You Only Look Once version 5 (YoloV5), to detect objects within images, provide a probability for the detection, and provide a bounding box that corresponds to the object of interest. The results of this work are anticipated to provide a clear picture of this portion of the nuclear fuel cycle and perform as a stand-alone tool for image assessment that can be expanded to additional fuel cycle components and implemented in international safeguards and national security domains. This capability addresses the IAEA’s need to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities within a state while encompassing the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Development of the Mobile Systems for Conditioning of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in Serbia - 20105

Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are being used worldwide in the field of medicine, agriculture, industry and research. They can be found in mobile as well as stationary devices. SRS contains radioactive material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule or (b) closely bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of an SRS should be strong enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and purpose for which the source was designed, also in case of accidents. In this case only emitted radiation is utilized. Firstly, the hazard from external radiation has to be considered, but the possibility of contamination due to fracture of the capsule should not be disregarded. The radioactive sources are composed of the radiating isotope contained in the filling medium, the single or double isotope holder that partially or totally surrounds the filling medium, the outer cover that contains the parts mentioned above and the capsule closed airtightly by welding or using some other method. The capsule must be tested for leakage periodically. If the SRS is no longer needed (e.g. replaced by a different technique) or it becomes useless for the intended application (e.g. the activity becomes too weak, the equipment containing the source works poorly or becomes obsolete, the source is damaged or leaking) it is considered disused. Disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are typically conditioned and disposed if a facility is available. If the disposal option is not available, conditioned DSRS should be stored under proper conditions. In some cases, the radionuclide(s) in DSRS can be recovered/recycled or the DSRS can be repurposed for other applications. Conditioning of DSRS ensures containment of the radioactive material, provides confinement for leaking sources, provides sufficient radiation shielding, reduces storage/disposal volume by allowing consolidation of multiple sources into a single storage/disposal container, facilitates transport operations and contributes to safety and security as well. Typically, conditioning technologies are deployed either as permanently installed stationary systems in centralized or mobile on-site waste processing facilities, or in a mobile configuration. Centralized stationary facilities provide a single processing location for multiple users that requires transport of the waste to the facility. On the other hand, mobile systems may be provided for the selection and application of the optimum technology for a specific waste stream (such as DSRS) by bringing the process to the point where the waste is generated. In addition, mobile systems could offer additional flexibility by sharing equipment among multiple waste generating sites for processing campaigns that vary in duration, from very short periods to several years. The term 'mobile processing system' refers to any radioactive waste processing system or component which is designed to be transportable and which is not considered permanently installed. Two mobile system for conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources are developed in the Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia. Development of these mobile systems was supported by SRB9005 national project via Technical Cooperation of the IAEA. The first mobile system, built inside the 20 feet ISO container, will be used for conditioning of DSRS category 3 to 5. The second mobile system, built inside the 7 m long vehicle (Iveco Daily Van), will be used for dismantling of ionizing smoke detectors mostly with Am-241 sources. Designs of the mobile systems were defined in cooperation with two companies from Belgium (Belgoprocess and Leniko) and a Croatian company Ekoteh as well as with the support of the IAEA experts. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures for the mobile systems are developed. Based on safety assessment the acceptance criteria and operational limits and conditions are established. Operational procedures include: (a) equipment and material requirements, (b) assembling procedure of the mobile unit, (c) procedure for acceptance of devices for dismantling and conditioning, (d) dismantling procedure for devices to recover the DSRS, (e) characterization of DSRS, (f) encapsulation procedure of DSRS, (g) disassembling procedure of the mobile unit, and (h) keeping records, identification and traceability. In addition, radiation safety, health safety, security and emergency preparedness plans are prepared. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures could be updated with site specific requirements, DSRS inventory, and different needs for future customers. Developed mobile systems could be used in all situations when it is feasible to perform conditioning of DSRS on the spot in the county and worldwide. Development of these mobile units was just the first step to create the Reference Center for Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disused Radioactive Sources Conditioning for Small Facilities which can become a regional training center in the future, and/or as a tool for comprehensive national search and secure programmes. In the next phases development of e-learning platforms and blended learning packages as well as application for the IAEA Qualified Technical Centre (QTC) for the management of DSRS is foreseen. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Investigation of Misuse Potential and Detection for Homogeneous Fluoride Fast Molten Salt Reactors Based on Neutronics Signatures

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has obligations to apply safeguards to nuclear material and facilities within States subject to IAEA safeguards agreements. As a result of these obligations, safeguards will need to be applied to Generation IV reactors, including liquid fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), if they are deployed in States with safeguards agreements. Recently, the IAEA has noted that a growing number of Member States are showing interest in MSR technology. This has been accompanied by an increase in short term development and deployment activities relating to MSRs. To ensure MSRs can be safeguarded effectively and efficiently upon possible future deployment, safeguards approaches and techniques need to be investigated now.

DeGuire, Thomas↗
DOE OSTI2021

Design Considerations for the Field Use of International Nuclear Safeguards Technology

The process of developing and deploying safeguards technology should be carried out in such a way that it supports the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) international safeguards verification mission, while also being efficient in terms of both cost and time. This process, however, may be hindered by a general lack of nuclear facility operating experience among the scientists or engineers designing safeguards technology, or the inability to interact with the IAEA inspector end user. As a result, equipment designers may have difficulty understanding inspector needs and the limitations of using safeguards technology in the field, often leading to inefficiencies (in the form of increased cost and time spent) in the safeguards technology design process. Here, to mitigate this knowledge gap, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has developed design considerations that should be incorporated into safeguards technologies, focusing on non-destructive assay equipment. Timelines for integration of these considerations into the design process are also discussed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 132: Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management: Reasonable Assurance for Safety

Mr. Larry Camper organized a panel of experts to discuss approaches to better make risk-informed decisions in waste management, decommissioning, and the management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The audience heard the perspectives from four panelists that addressed issues ranging from the technical basis used to make risk-informed decisions to for developing cleanup criteria and promulgating regulations and safety standards both domestically and abroad. A summary of each of the presentations given by the panelists is provided herein. This WMS BOD featured panel focused on the Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management and the Reasonable Assurance for Safety. The panelists addressed and discussed with the audience different approaches used for decision-making, summarizing ongoing probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches, including IAEA graded approach, and discussed policies/approaches to achieve reasonable assurance for safety rather than using absolute assurance. Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Decision Making - More than a Motto? (Paul Black); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid); Risk-Informed Decision-Making and Illustrative National Academies Studies (Charles Ferguson); IAEA's Revised Safety Guidance on Remediation (Michelle Roberts); NDA Radioactive Waste Strategy - A Risk Informed Approach (James McKinney)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Progress on the reevaluation and validation of the n+233U neutron cross sections

The set of 233 U resonance parameters of the ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data library was adopted from the previous ENDF/B-VII.1 evaluation using the external levels to update the thermal values. Adoption of IAEA 2017 thermal standards ( σ f = 533.0 ± 2.2 b, σ c = 44.9 ± 0.9 b, and ν ‾ tot = 2.487 ± 0.011 ) and of the IAEA-recommended thermal-neutron induced prompt fission neutron spectrum (PFNS) with average PFNS energy of 2.030 ± 0.013 MeV requires a re-evaluation of 233 U neutron cross sections in the resolved resonance region. A newly produced evaluation is being tested on benchmarks carefully selected from the Handbook of International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP) which are highly sensitive to 233 U data. An important goal of this work was to eliminate the strong negative gradient of the calculated effective multiplication factors with respect to the epithermal fission fraction observed in the validation of the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library for those assemblies. A significant improvement in integral performance of critical 233 U solutions is observed for the newly proposed evaluation. Further work addressing the fast neutron region is needed.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗