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At least 109 records · Page 6

Smart Microgrids

The Nation’s electrical power depends on one bulk power grid to support security and economic prosperity. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Threat Assessment of 2020, the largest cyber threat to homeland security is potential disruption to critical infrastructure, including power grids. Critical infrastructure includes the physical and cyber systems which generate, transmit, and distribute electricity with an impact on economic security, public health, or safety. The surety of the Nation’s power grid is vital for providing essential services and would put the population at risk if disrupted. Power outages can have catastrophic consequences for critical organizations such as hospitals and military installations. Additionally, the current fossil-fuel dependent power grid is extremely fragile and vulnerable to overloads, storms that destroy power lines, and cyber-attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Fisk-based criteria to support validation of detection methods for drinking water and air.

This report was prepared to support the validation of analytical methods for threat contaminants under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) program. It is designed to serve as a resource for certain applications of benchmark and fate information for homeland security threat contaminants. The report identifies risk-based criteria from existing health benchmarks for drinking water and air for potential use as validation targets. The focus is on benchmarks for chronic public exposures. The priority sources are standard EPA concentration limits for drinking water and air, along with oral and inhalation toxicity values. Many contaminants identified as homeland security threats to drinking water or air would convert to other chemicals within minutes to hours of being released. For this reason, a fate analysis has been performed to identify potential transformation products and removal half-lives in air and water so appropriate forms can be targeted for detection over time. The risk-based criteria presented in this report to frame method validation are expected to be lower than actual operational targets based on realistic exposures following a release. Note that many target criteria provided in this report are taken from available benchmarks without assessing the underlying toxicological details. That is, although the relevance of the chemical form and analogues are evaluated, the toxicological interpretations and extrapolations conducted by the authoring organizations are not. It is also important to emphasize that such targets in the current analysis are not health-based advisory levels to guide homeland security responses. This integrated evaluation of chronic public benchmarks and contaminant fate has identified more than 200 risk-based criteria as method validation targets across numerous contaminants and fate products in drinking water and air combined. The gap in directly applicable values is considerable across the full set of threat contaminants, so preliminary indicators were developed from other well-documented benchmarks to serve as a starting point for validation efforts. By this approach, at least preliminary context is available for water or air, and sometimes both, for all chemicals on the NHSRC list that was provided for this evaluation. This means that a number of concentrations presented in this report represent indirect measures derived from related benchmarks or surrogate chemicals, as described within the many results tables provided in this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Mobile Biometric Device (MBD) Technology

Mobile biometric devices (MBDs) capable of both enrolling individuals in databases and performing identification checks of subjects in the field are seen as an important capability for military, law enforcement, and homeland security operations. The technology is advancing rapidly. The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate through an Interagency Agreement with Sandia sponsored a series of pilot projects to obtain information for the first responder law enforcement community on further identification of requirements for mobile biometric device technology. Working with 62 different jurisdictions, including components of the Department of Homeland Security, Sandia delivered a series of reports on user operation of state-of-the-art mobile biometric devices. These reports included feedback information on MBD usage in both operational and exercise scenarios. The findings and conclusions of the project address both the limitations and possibilities of MBD technology to improve operations. Evidence of these possibilities can be found in the adoption of this technology by many agencies today and the cooperation of several law enforcement agencies in both participating in the pilot efforts and sharing of information about their own experiences in efforts undertaken separately.

Aldridge, Chris D.↗

Final Report: Multi-State Sharing Initiative

In 2003 a joint effort between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Justice created state and metropolitan intelligence fusion centers. These fusion centers were an effort to share law enforcement, disaster, and terrorism related information and intelligence between state and local jurisdictions and to share terrorism related intelligence between state and local law enforcement agencies and various federal entities. In 2006, DHS commissioned the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to establish and manage a groundbreaking program to assist local, state, and tribal leaders in developing the tools and methods required to anticipate and forestall terrorist events and to enhance disaster response. This program, called the Southeast Region Research Initiative (SERRI), combines science and technology with validated operational approaches to address regionally unique requirements and suggest regional solutions with the potential for national application. In 2009, SERRI sponsored the Multistate Sharing Initiative (MSSI) to assist state and metropolitan intelligence fusion centers with sharing information related to a wider variety of state interests than just terrorism. While these fusion centers have been effective at sharing data across organizations within their respective jurisdictions, their organizational structure makes bilateral communication with federal entities convenient and also allows information to be further disbursed to other local entities when appropriate. The MSSI-developed Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) sharing system allows state-to-state sharing of non-terrorism-related law enforcement and disaster information. Currently, the MSSI SAR system is deployed in Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, and South Carolina. About 1 year after implementation, cognizant fusion center personnel from each state were contacted to ascertain the status of their MSSI SAR systems. The overwhelming response from these individuals was that the MSSI SAR system was an outstanding success and contributed greatly to the security and resiliency of their states. At least one state commented that SERRI's implementation of the MSSI SAR actually 'jump started' and accelerated deployment and acceptance of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). While all states were enthusiastic about their systems, South Carolina and Tennessee appeared to be the heaviest users of their respective systems. With NSI taking the load of sharing SARs with other states, Tennessee has redeployed the MSSI SAR system within Tennessee to allow SAR sharing between state and local organizations including Tennessee's three Homeland Security Regions, eleven Homeland Security Districts, and more than 500 police and sheriff offices, as well as with other states. In one success story from South Carolina, the Economy SAR System was used to compile similar SARs from throughout the state which were then forwarded to field liaison officers, emergency management personnel, and law enforcement officers for action.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Historical Building Stability Monitoring by Means of a Cosmic Ray Tracking System

Cosmic ray radiation is mostly composed, at sea level, by high energy muons, which are highly penetrating particles capable of crossing kilometers of rock. The ubiquitous and steady presence at the Earth's surface and the high penetration capability have motivated the use of cosmic ray radiation also in fields beyond particle physics, from geology, archaeology, speleology to industrial applications and homeland security. In particular, in recent years, the novel technique of muon tomography has been proposed, with the aim of performing non invasive inspection of large non accessible volumes, material atomic number Z and density discrimination, and three dimension image reconstruction of the inspected volume. In the present paper, after a short recall of the physical principles and mathematical formalism on which muon tomography is based, a number of examples of application of the novel technique in industry and homeland security issues is given. Moreover, a new application of cosmic rays detection techniques in the field of civil engineering is proposed. The aim is the monitoring of the stability of large structures, in particular the static monitoring of historical buildings, where conservation constraints are more severe and the time evolution of the deformation phenomena under study may be of the order of months or years. The new technique may be seen, in some way, as the reverse problem of muon tomography. As a significant case study, the monitoring of the wooden vaulted roof of the Palazzo della Loggia in the town of Brescia, in Italy, has been considered. The feasibility as well as the performances and limitations of a monitoring system based on cosmic ray tracking have been studied by Monte Carlo simulation and discussed in comparison with more traditional monitoring systems. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Demonstration of Wide Area Radiological Decontamination and Mitigation Technologies for Building Structures and Vehicles - 16508

Researchers at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security conducted the 'Wide-Area Urban Radiological Contaminant, Mitigation, and Clean-Up Technology Demonstration' in Columbus, Ohio on June 22-25, 2015. EPA's National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) demonstrated five wide-area radiological decontamination technologies (including strippable coatings, gels, and chemical foam technologies) on an urban building. Decontamination technologies were applied to remove the contaminants from the building's surfaces by physical, chemical, or other methods, which in practice could reduce radiation exposure level. In addition, NHSRC teamed with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to demonstrate several radiological contaminant mitigation technologies including building and vehicle wash technologies, as well as several approaches to contain wash water and radioactive particles. 'Radiological contaminant mitigation' technologies are measures taken to reduce adverse impacts of radiological contamination on people and the environment, and facilitate such purposes as restoration of first responder services and critical infrastructure. Radiological contaminant mitigation technologies are designed for containing and removing radiological contamination on the surface in the first hours or days following a radiological event (early phase response). Such technologies include 'radiological particle containment', which is design to prevent the spread of particles which might result from vehicle or foot traffic. Radiological particle containment technologies are applicable for early phase response to contain the radionuclides and to reduce radiation dose to responders and the public. Mitigation also includes 'gross decontamination' technologies, which perform a type of decontamination that is conducted with the goal of reducing contamination levels. This reduction may not meet final cleanup levels, but may be useful to mitigate some public hazard or contain contamination. The purpose of the demonstrations was to educate potential end-users and stakeholders of this technology about a 'Toolbox of Options' for radiological decontamination, as well as radiological contaminant mitigation. Both demonstrations were conducted using a 75-year old brick building and the surrounding area (including parking lots) in Columbus, OH. No radioactive contaminants were applied during either demonstration, as the objective was to duplicate and implement realistic operational conditions for these technologies. Surrogate contaminants such as particle tracers were used in several demonstrations. The decontamination technologies were used in a scaled-up setting with application to the building. Contaminant mitigation technologies were demonstrated on the building as well as on vehicles. Example technology application techniques/accessories included an articulating boom lift, repelling boatswain chair, stand-alone surface material structures, high-volume foam applicators, fire truck foam applicator, a vehicle wash tent for vehicles, particle tracers to simulate radiological contaminants, and high- and low-technology liquid containment approaches. Results and stakeholder observations from the demonstration are now publically in a report entitled 'Technical Report for the Demonstration of Radiological Decontamination and Mitigation Technologies for Building Structures and Vehicles' available at http://www.epa.gov/hsresearch Example information that was obtained included decontamination rate, contaminant mitigation and containment capacity, user friendliness of each technology, the required utilities (electric, water, etc.) for each technology, skill of worker required, and the cost. The condition (color, texture, integrity, etc.) of each building material present on the structure along with all structural components such as gutters, windows, doors, etc. were carefully examined and documented. All demonstrations were open to individuals, organizations, and local, state, federal, tribal, and international governments who may be involved with implementing or planning radiological incident response. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Neutron Detection Alternatives to 3He for National Security Applications

One of the main uses for 3He is in gas proportional counters for neutron detection. Large radiation detection systems deployed for homeland security and proliferation detection applications use such systems. Due to the large increase in use of 3He for homeland security and basic research, the supply has dwindled, and can no longer meet the demand. This has led to the search for an alternative technology to replace the use of 3He-based neutron detectors. In this paper, we review the testing of currently commercially available alternative technologies for neutron detection in large systems used in various national security applications.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Zachary D. Barker: Final DHS HS-STEM Report

Working at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) this summer has provided a very unique and special experience for me. I feel that the research opportunities given to me have allowed me to significantly benefit my research group, the laboratory, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Energy. The researchers in the Single Particle Aerosol Mass Spectrometry (SPAMS) group were very welcoming and clearly wanted me to get the most out of my time in Livermore. I feel that my research partner, Veena Venkatachalam of MIT, and I have been extremely productive in meeting our research goals throughout this summer, and have learned much about working in research at a national laboratory such as Lawrence Livermore. I have learned much about the technical aspects of research while working at LLNL, however I have also gained important experience and insight into how research groups at national laboratories function. I believe that this internship has given me valuable knowledge and experience which will certainly help my transition to graduate study and a career in engineering. My work with Veena Venkatachalam in the SPAMS group this summer has focused on two major projects. Initially, we were tasked with an analysis of data collected by the group this past spring in a large public environment. The SPAMS instrument was deployed for over two months, collecting information on many of the ambient air particles circulating through the area. Our analysis of the particle data collected during this deployment concerned several aspects, including finding groups, or clusters, of particles that seemed to appear more during certain times of day, analyzing the mass spectral data of clusters and comparing them with mass spectral data of known substances, and comparing the real-time detection capability of the SPAMS instrument with that of a commercially available biological detection instrument. This analysis was performed in support of a group report to the Department of Homeland Security on the results of the deployment. The analysis of the deployment data revealed some interesting applications of the SPAMS instrument to homeland security situations. Using software developed in-house by SPAMS group member Dr. Paul Steele, Veena and I were able to cluster a subset of data over a certain timeframe (ranging from a single hour to an entire week). The software used makes clusters based on the mass spectral characteristics of the each particle in the data set, as well as other parameters. By looking more closely at the characteristics of individual clusters, including the mass spectra, conclusions could be made about what these particles are. This was achieved partially through examination and discussion of the mass spectral data with the members of the SPAMS group, as well as through comparison with known mass spectra collected from substances tested in the laboratory. In many cases, broad conclusions could be drawn about the identity of a cluster of particles.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DEVELOPMENT OF THE HS99 AIR TRANSPORT TYPE A FISSILE PACKAGE

An air-transport Type A Fissile radioactive shipping package for the transport of special form uranium sources has been developed by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for the Department of Homeland Security. The Package model number is HS99 for Homeland Security Model 99. This paper presents the major design features of the HS99 and highlights engineered materials necessary for meeting the design requirements for this light-weight Type AF packaging. A discussion is provided demonstrating how the HS99 complies with the regulatory safety requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The paper summarizes the results of structural testing to specified in 10 CFR 71 for Normal Conditions of Transport and Hypothetical Accident Conditions events. Planned and proposed future missions for this packaging are also addressed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Simulated PVT Detector Response with Unshielded/Shielded SNM and Mixed Radionuclides

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsors a 10 week internship for students majoring in homeland security related science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (HS-STEM) disciplines. As an awardee of the DHS-STEM program, I was given the opportunity to work at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) under my mentor, Harry Martz. My work at LLNL dealt with official use only or proprietary content. As consequence, I am unable to disclose many project details. Furthermore, the details that I can disclose about the work I performed are limited and I will be using arbitrary units for my results. Throughout the internship period, I met with my mentors and presented my results.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

FY18 Economic Impact Brochure

The brochure highlighted Sandia program portfolios: nuclear deterrence, global security, national security programs, energy & homeland security, and, advanced science and technology. Funding and subcontract statistics are reviewed.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Deep Learning for Full Waveform Inversion of Elastic Active-Source Seismic Data to Estimate P-Wave Velocity Models

Seismic imaging methods are critical for Global Security and Energy & Homeland Security missions and activities that rely on subsurface characterization, but traditional methods remain computationally expensive and require significant labor hours and expertise to execute. Within the past few years, machine learning (ML), namely deep learning (DL), has been used to develop data-driven end-to-end full waveform inversion (FWI) methods to estimate 2D P-wave velocity (Vp) models in a fraction of the time as conventional FWI. These methods, however, are trained on simplistic acoustic wave seismic data and Vp models that are not realistic nor representative of real-world observations, leaving a large gap between the state-of-the-art and deployable, feasible, and practical DL FWI methods. Here, we generate a synthetic active-source, 3D, elastic wave seismic data set and a variety of Vp models with realistic geologic structure for training DL FWI methods. We evaluate six different methods that have performed well for acoustic DL FWI or medical imaging tasks using our more realistic dataset. We find that these six trained models do not match the performance of published acoustic end-to-end DL FWI methods, indicating more training data may be needed, physics may need to be incorporated to achieve good accuracy at the sacrifice of the end-to-end advantage, and/or novel methods need to be developed to enable end-to-end DL FWI methods to perform well for real-world seismic data.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Remote Sensing Laboratory - RSL

One of the primary resources supporting homeland security is the Remote Sensing Laboratory, or RSL. The Laboratory creates advanced technologies for emergency response operations, radiological incident response, and other remote sensing activities. RSL emergency response teams are on call 24-hours a day, and maintain the capability to deploy domestically and internationally in response to threats involving the loss, theft, or release of nuclear or radioactive material. Such incidents might include Nuclear Power Plant accidents, terrorist incidents involving nuclear or radiological materials, NASA launches, and transportation accidents involving nuclear materials. Working with the US Department of Homeland Security, RSL personnel equip, maintain, and conduct training on the mobile detection deployment unit, to provide nuclear radiological security at major national events such as the super bowl, the Indianapolis 500, New Year's Eve celebrations, presidential inaugurations, international meetings and conferences, just about any event where large numbers of people will gather.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Security Management and Safeguards Office

The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are in a safe environment.

Bewley, Nathaniel M.↗

Comparison of MCNP and Experimental Measurements for an HPGe-based Spectroscopy Portal Monitor.

The necessity to monitor international commercial transportation for illicit nuclear materials resulted in the installation of many nuclear radiation detection systems in Portal Monitors. These were mainly gross counters which alarmed at any indication of high radioactivity in the shipment, the vehicle or even the driver. The innocent alarm rate, due to legal shipments of sources and NORM, or medical isotopes in patients, caused interruptions and delays in commerce while the legality of the shipment was verified. To overcome this difficulty, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supported the writing of the ANSI N42.38 standard (Performance Criteria for Spectroscopy-Based Portal Monitors used for Homeland Security) to define the performance of a Portal Monitor with nuclide identification capabilities, called a Spectroscopy Portal Monitor. This standard defines detection levels and response characteristics for the system for energies from 25 keV to3. MeV. To accomplish the necessary performance, several different HPGe detector configurations were modeled using MCNP for the horizontal field of view (FOV) and vertical linearity of response over the detection zone of 5 meters by 4.5 meters for 661 keV as representative of the expected nuclides of interest. The configuration with the best result was built and tested. The results for the FOV as a function of energy and the linearity show good agreement with the model and performance exceeding the requirements of N42.38.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Resilience Measurement Index: An Indicator of Critical Infrastructure Resilience

The world faces numerous threats from both natural and man-made sources. Since the beginning of the 21 st century, in the United States alone, we have experienced several devastating events. Incidents such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Northeast blackout in 2003, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and Superstorm Sandy in 2012 have had far-reaching impacts that have directly affected our society’s well-being. Although current efforts that have focused on preventing or mitigating the impact of incidents have achieved admirable results, a more comprehensive approach is needed to improve the nation’s overall resilience. An all-hazards methodology that emphasizes not only protection but also preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery programs and capabilities is desired. Presidential Policy Directive 21 defines 16 critical infrastructure sectors that are essential to the nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and general quality of life (White House, 2013). If the operations of these critical infrastructure sectors are essential, their protection and resilience is paramount. As stated by President Obama, “Our goal is to ensure a more resilient Nation—one in which individuals, communities, and our economy can adapt to changing conditions as well as withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010a). Enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure requires its owners/operators to determine the ability of the system to withstand specific threats, minimize or mitigate potential impacts, and to return to normal operations if degradation occurs. Thus, a resilience methodology requires the comprehensive assessment of critical infrastructure systems/assets—from threat to consequence. The methodology needs to support decision-making for risk management, disaster response, and business continuity. Considering these issues, the Infrastructure Assurance Center at Argonne National Laboratory, in partnership with the Protective Security Coordination Division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has developed an index, the Resilience Measurement Index (RMI), to characterize the resilience of critical infrastructure.

Petit, F. D. P.↗

Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk (Abbreviated Version)

Nuclear forensics is important to our national security. Actions, including provision of appropriate funding, are needed now to sustain and improve the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with cooperating agencies and national laboratories, should plan and implement a sustainable, effective nuclear forensics program. Nuclear forensics is the examination and evaluation of discovered or seized nuclear materials and devices or, in cases of nuclear explosions or radiological dispersals, of detonation signals and post-detonation debris. Nuclear forensic evidence helps law enforcement and intelligence agencies work toward preventing, mitigating, and attributing a nuclear or radiological incident. This report, requested by DHS, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Department of Defense, makes recommendations on how to sustain and improve U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities. The United States has developed a nuclear forensics capability that has been demonstrated in real-world incidents of interdicted materials and in exercises of actions required after a nuclear detonation. The committee, however, has concerns about the program and finds that without strong leadership, careful planning, and additional funds, these capabilities will decline. Major areas of concern include: Organization. The responsibility for nuclear forensics is shared by several agencies without central authority and with no consensus on strategic requirements to guide the program. This organizational complexity hampers the program and could prove to be a major hindrance operationally. Sustainability. The nation's current nuclear forensics capabilities are available primarily because the system of laboratories, equipment, and personnel upon which they depend was developed and funded by the nuclear weapons program. However, the weapons program's funds are declining. Workforce and Infrastructure. Personnel skilled in nuclear forensics are too few and are spread too thinly. Some key facilities are in need of replacement because they are old, outdated, and not built to modern environmental, health, and safety standards. Procedures and Tools. Most nuclear forensics techniques were developed to carry out Cold War missions and to satisfy a different, less restrictive set of environmental, health, and safety standards. Some of the equipment also does not reflect today's technical capabilities. The Executive Office of the President established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, to coordinate nuclear forensics in the United States. DHS's responsibility can only be carried out with the cooperation and support of the other agencies involved. The committee recommends that DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 1. Streamline the organizational structure, aligning authority and responsibility; and develop and issue appropriate requirements documents. 2. Issue a coordinated and integrated implementation plan for fulfilling the requirements and sustaining and improving the program's capabilities. This plan would form the basis for the agencies' multi-year program budget requests. 3. Implement a plan to build and maintain an appropriately sized and composed nuclear forensics workforce, ensuring sufficient staffing at the national laboratories and support for university research, training programs, and collaborative relationships among the national laboratories and other organizations. 4. Adapt nuclear forensics to the challenges of real emergency situations, including, for example, conducting more realistic exercises that are unannounced and that challenge regulations and procedures followed in the normal work environment, and implementing lessons learned. The national laboratories should: 5. Optimize procedures and equipment through R&D to meet program requirements. Modeling and simulation should play an increased role in research, development, and planning. The nuclear forensics community should: 6. Develop standards and procedures for nuclear forensics that are rooted in the same underlying principles that have been recommended to guide modern forensic science. DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 7. Devise and implement a plan that enables access to relevant information in databases including classified and proprietary databases for nuclear forensics missions. The Executive Office of the President and the Department of State, working with the community of nuclear forensics experts, should: 8. Determine the classes of data and methods that are to be shared internationally and explore mechanisms to accomplish that sharing.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Engage States on Energy Assurance and Energy Security

The NGA Center's 'Engaging States on Energy Security and Energy Assurance' has been successful in achieving the stated project purposes and objectives both in the initial proposal as well as in subsequent revisions to it. Our activities, which involve the NGA Center for Best Practices (The NGA Center) Homeland Security and Technology Division, included conducting tabletop exercises to help federal and state homeland security and energy officials determine roles and actions for various emergency scenarios. This included efforts to education state official on developing an energy assurance plan, harmonizing approaches to controlling price volatility, implementing reliability standards, understanding short and long-term energy outlooks and fuel diversification, and capitalizing on DOE's research and development activities. Regarding our work on energy efficiency and renewable energy, the NGA Center's Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Division hosted three workshops which engaged states on the clean energy and alternative transportation fuel and also produced several reports on related topics. In addition, we convened 18 meetings, via conference call, of the Energy Working Group. Finally, through the NGA Center's Front and Center newsletter articles, the NGA Center disseminated promising practices to a wide audience of state policymakers. The NGA Center also hosted a number of workshops and web conferences designed to directly engage states on the deliverables under this Cooperative Agreement. Through the NGA Center's written products and newsletter articles, the NGA Center was able to disseminate promising practices to a wide audience of state policymakers.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗