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At least 109 records · Page 6

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NASA NTRS2011

Long-Term International Space Station (ISS) Risk Reduction Activities

As the assembly of the ISS nears completion, it is worthwhile to step back and review some of the actions pursued by the Program in recent years to reduce risk and enhance the safety and health of ISS crewmembers, visitors, and space flight participants. While the initial ISS requirements and design were intended to provide the best practicable levels of safety, it is always possible to further reduce risk given the determination, commitment, and resources to do so. The following is a summary of some of the steps taken by the ISS Program Manager, by our International Partners, by hardware and software designers, by operational specialists, and by safety personnel to continuously enhance the safety of the ISS, and to reduce risk to all crewmembers. While years of work went into the development of ISS requirements, there are many things associated with risk reduction in a Program like the ISS that can only be learned through actual operational experience. These risk reduction activities can be divided into roughly three categories: Areas that were initially noncompliant which have subsequently been brought into compliance or near compliance (i.e., Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris [MMOD] protection, acoustics) Areas where initial design requirements were eventually considered inadequate and were subsequently augmented (i.e., Toxicity hazard level-4 materials, emergency procedures, emergency equipment, control of drag-throughs) Areas where risks were initially underestimated, and have subsequently been addressed through additional mitigation (i.e., Extravehicular Activity [EVA] sharp edges, plasma shock hazards). Due to the hard work and cooperation of many parties working together across the span of more than a decade, the ISS is now a safer and healthier environment for our crew, in many cases exceeding the risk reduction targets inherent in the intent of the original design. It will provide a safe and stable platform for utilization and discovery for years to come.

Forroci, Michael P.↗

DOE OSTI2021

2019 Megasun Illumination System. Modifications and Operating Procedure Updates [Slides]

The original operating procedure was nearly 20 years old, though it was on a semi-annual review schedule. Some electrical categories had changed, as well as their risk management assessments. The IWD did not reflect these updated guidelines. No injuries have been reported during nearly 20 years of operation (not a bad record), however, several abnormal conditions came to surface during our Hazard Analysis conversations. One of which included an oil based capacitor malfunction which cracked it’s housing and leaked oil within the 2001 system. Our training and qualifications were updated to reflect LANL’s current standards.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Microreactor Transportation Emergency Planning Challenges

This report discusses microreactor transportation emergency planning and response challenges. The emphasis of the report is on transporting a microreactor containing irradiated fuel by highway and rail. The report first discusses microreactors in general, including microreactor fuel types and the use of hazardous material in microreactor designs. The report presents a microreactor concept of operations for transport highway, rail, and vessel and presents several transportation regulatory challenges associated with microreactors. Updates contained in this report include the transportation implications of revising the uranium lung absorption category for tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) particle fuel, discussion of exercises and drills including the 2024 Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation Accident Demonstration with the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the State of Idaho, and Tribal and State perspectives on microreactor transportation emergency response planning. Additional microreactor transportation external engagement activities conducted during FY2024 are also discussed. The report discusses the implications of the recent East Palestine, Ohio, rail accident for transportation emergency response planning. Included in this update is a discussion of H.R. 8996, the Railroad Safety Enhancement Act of 2024.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Changes in Tropical Cyclones Undergoing Extratropical Transition in a Warming Climate: Quasi-Idealized Numerical Experiments of North Atlantic Landfalling Events

The current study extends earlier work that demonstrated future extratropical transition (ET) events will feature greater intensity and heavier precipitation to specifically consider potential changes in the impacts of landfalling ET events in a warming climate. A quasi-idealized modeling framework allows comparison of highly similar present-day and future event simulations; the model initial conditions are based on observational composites, increasing representativeness of the results. The future composite ET event features substantially more impactful weather conditions in coastal areas, with heavier precipitation and greater storm intensity. Specifically, a Category 2 present-day storm attained Category 4 Saffir-Simpson intensity in the future simulation and maintained greater intensity throughout the entire life cycle, although the storm undergoes less reintensification during the post-ET process, a result of reduced baroclinic conversion. These findings suggest increased potential for coastal hazards due to stronger tropical cyclone winds and heavier rainfall, leading to more severe coastal flooding and storm surge.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2026

Model-based, in-situ, non-destructive qualification and certification of parts made by autonomous additive manufacturing

To address the significant productivity challenges associated with the qualification and certification (Q&C) tasks of additively manufactured (AM) parts, which have traditionally relied on rigorous post‐build inspection and testing, we propose an integrated framework that combines model‐based qualification and certification (MBQ&C) with autonomous additive manufacturing (AAM). MBQ&C employs high‐fidelity predictive models, developed within the Integrated Computational Materials Engineering (ICME) paradigm, to simulate process–structure–property–performance relationships for assessing a part’s fitness for use. Since predictive models are commonly machine learning (ML)-based or reduced-order surrogates of validated physics models, they run efficiently, enabling timely inference. In parallel, the self-driving AAM utilises ML-based adaptive, closed‐loop control strategies to avoid, mitigate, or repair defects and anomalies during fabrication, thereby increasing the likelihood of producing acceptable parts. A key feature of the combined AAM-MBQ&C framework is that predictive models explicitly incorporate defects or anomalies that persist after the build, using instance-specific data captured via in-situ sensing. This customisation enables a build‐specific assessment of fitness for use, rather than relying on nominal or generic parameters. Such individualised evaluation provides a robust basis for Q&C-related acceptance decisions relating to each build. Additionally, the rapid solution capabilities of ML or reduced-order models enable the determination of a part’s suitability for service shortly after build completion. As the framework matures, it has the potential to substantially reduce reliance on conventional point‐design approaches—such as time‐consuming post‐build computed tomography scanning and costly destructive testing. Thus, the AAM-MBQ&C framework represents a transformative, scalable strategy for quality assurance of AM components, as parts produced within a stable, validated, and certified envelope can be certified with reduced testing. Key benefits include: (1) significant gains in Q&C productivity through efficient, model-centric assessment; (2) performance-based classification of defects into critical and non-critical categories; (3) the ability to predict potential deviations in the performance of parts affected by real-time, adaptive process control interventions relative to those produced under a certified process, and (4) the enabling of virtual Q&C for service environments that are difficult, hazardous, or impractical to access or reproduce experimentally. Collectively, these capabilities strengthen the business case for AM, particularly for high‐consequence and mission‐critical applications. Finally, although this work focuses on powder-based AM, the proposed techniques could be extended to AM processes employing alternative feedstock forms.

Gunasegaram, Dayalan↗

NASA NTRS2002

Human Factors Process Task Analysis Liquid Oxygen Pump Acceptance Test Procedure for the Advanced Technology Development Center

A process task analysis effort was undertaken by Dynacs Inc. commencing in June 2002 under contract from NASA YA-D6. Funding was provided through NASA's Ames Research Center (ARC), Code M/HQ, and Industrial Engineering and Safety (IES). The John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Engineering Development Contract (EDC) Task Order was 5SMA768. The scope of the effort was to conduct a Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HF PFMEA) of a hazardous activity and provide recommendations to eliminate or reduce the effects of errors caused by human factors. The Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Pump Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) was selected for this analysis. The HF PFMEA table (see appendix A) provides an analysis of six major categories evaluated for this study. These categories include Personnel Certification, Test Procedure Format, Test Procedure Safety Controls, Test Article Data, Instrumentation, and Voice Communication. For each specific requirement listed in appendix A, the following topics were addressed: Requirement, Potential Human Error, Performance-Shaping Factors, Potential Effects of the Error, Barriers and Controls, Risk Priority Numbers, and Recommended Actions. This report summarizes findings and gives recommendations as determined by the data contained in appendix A. It also includes a discussion of technology barriers and challenges to performing task analyses, as well as lessons learned. The HF PFMEA table in appendix A recommends the use of accepted and required safety criteria in order to reduce the risk of human error. The items with the highest risk priority numbers should receive the greatest amount of consideration. Implementation of the recommendations will result in a safer operation for all personnel.

Diorio, Kimberly A.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Safe Landings in Extreme Terrain

Following the failure of the Mars Polar Lander and the re-evaluation of the Mars Sample Return mission status, a Safe Landing Tiger team was established on January 7, 2000. The charter of the team was to re-evaluate large scale (1000-2000 Kg) Mars lander designs with the principal objective being the assurance of safe landing in hazardous terrain. The tiger team developed a number of concepts, two of the most notable and promising concepts, are both based on a Mobile Lander paradigm. Unlike the Pathfinder and Surveyor class landers, this paradigm groups all of the landed equipment into one of two categories: (1) EDL only equipment (i.e., not used after touchdown) and (2) multi-use equipment, those used during and or after touchdown. The objective is to maximize the use of all equipment being brought to the surface by placing the bulk of the avionics and mechanical systems onto a much larger 'rover' and leaving only the bare essentials on a 'dead-on-arrival' landing system. All of the hardware that the surface roving mission needs is enlisted into performing the EDL tasks. Any EDL specific avionics not used after touchdown are placed on the landing system.

Rivellini, Tom↗

NASA NTRS1982

Development of STS/Centaur failure probabilities liftoff to Centaur separation

The results of an analysis to determine STS/Centaur catastrophic vehicle response probabilities for the phases of vehicle flight from STS liftoff to Centaur separation from the Orbiter are presented. The analysis considers only category one component failure modes as contributors to the vehicle response mode probabilities. The relevant component failure modes are grouped into one of fourteen categories of potential vehicle behavior. By assigning failure rates to each component, for each of its failure modes, the STS/Centaur vehicle response probabilities in each phase of flight can be calculated. The results of this study will be used in a DOE analysis to ascertain the hazard from carrying a nuclear payload on the STS.

Hudson, J. M.↗

NASA NTRS1979

The natural resources inventory system ASVT project

The hardware/software and the associated procedures for a natural resource inventory and information system based on the use of LANDSAT-acquired multispectral scanner digital data is described. The system is designed to derive land cover/vegetation information from LANDSAT data and geographically reference this information for the production of various types of maps and for the compilation of acreage by land cover/vegetation category. The system also provides for data base building so that the LANDSAT-derived information can be related to information digitized from other sources (e.g., soils maps) in a geographic context in order to address specific applications. These applications include agricultural crop production estimation, erosion hazard-reforestation need assessment, whitetail deer habitat assessment, and site selection. The system is tested in demonstration areas located in the state of Mississippi, and the results of these application demonstrations are presented. A cost-efficiency comparison of producing land cover/vegetation maps and statistics with this system versus the use of small-scale aerial photography is made.

Joyce, A. T.↗

DOE OSTI2020

Safety Evaluation of Nitric Acid Reactions with Non-Polysaccharide Organic Materials

The hazards of non-polysaccharide materials in a transuranic (TRU) waste drum exposed to nitric acid (HNO 3 ) and metal nitrate salts have been evaluated, focusing on sorbents and on resins used in ion-exchange chromatography. The range of sorbent materials can be grouped into two general categories: 1) a variety of polyacrylate and polyacrylamide compounds that incorporate polar carbonyl functional groups designed to sorb protic (i.e., acidic) substrates and solutions; 2) hydrocarbon based polymers that include polystyrene, polybutadiene, and polyethylene derivatives, which are designed to sorb non-polar organic substrates and solutions. The ion-exchange resins are constructed of hydrocarbon based polymeric networks equipped with pendant ionizable functional groups designed to reversibly sorb/desorb ionic species that are targeted for separation from a mobile phase.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Processing Meteorological Data for the CAP-88 PC Model at Los Alamos National Laboratory

The Environmental Protection and Compliance-Compliance Programs (EPC-CP) group at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) uses the Clean Air Act Assessment Package 1988 (CAP-88, Littleton 2020) PC model (Version 4.1) to estimate radiological doses for a set of areal sectors surrounding a release location, in order to satisfy the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) dose calculation requirement in 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. Among several types of data that must be prepared for CAP-88 input is a text file of meteorological data (“WIND” file), consisting of the joint frequency of wind direction, wind speed, and atmospheric stability categories. EPC-CP produces customized WIND files by running a CAP-88 utility program on a user generated text file of wind data in a different format, known as a STability ARray (STAR) file (Turner, 1964). At LANL, EPC-CP meteorologists prepare customized STAR files with data over desired time periods at selected meteorological towers. A custom program written in Precision Visuals -Workstation Analysis and Visualization Environment (PV-WAVE), a commercial Fortran-like language, is used to read LANL meteorological data and write a STAR file; the executable filename is “Star.out”. However, the outdated PV-WAVE utility program is being phased out by EPC-CP, due to the inefficient process to run it and an inability to modify the code. To preserve the ability to create customized meteorological data for CAP-88 in a way that will be easy to use and maintain, a new replacement utility program, written in the Python programming language, has been developed. The new, improved program reads a data file from any LANL meteorological tower, and at each desired observation time, determines the wind direction, wind speed, and stability categories defined in the CAP-88 documentation. The frequencies of all combinations of the three sets of categories are calculated and written to a file in the STAR format, which can later be converted to a WIND file for input into CAP-88.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS1971

Mishaps with oxygen in NASA operations.

Oxygen safety programs were conducted, taking into consideration a review of the hazards, the available data concerning the failure of components and systems, and the oxygen handling procedures followed by NASA and its contractors. Information is presented regarding a substantial number of oxygen mishaps together with safety regulations aimed at reducing the accident probability. The information was used to establish categories of events causing the mishap. These categories include materials incompatibility deficiency, materials failure, design deficiency, cleaning deficiency, and procedural deficiencies. Mishaps are generally caused by a number of interacting factors.

Ordin, P. M.↗

DOE OSTI2022

Hazardous Waste Management Progress Report [SB14]

The Department of Energy (DOE) is the owner and part operator of multiple facilities in Northern California. The facilities include those located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Sandia National Laboratories/California (SNL/CA) and SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (SLAC) among other sites. Through their operations, the facilities generate hazardous waste and, thereby, are subject to the requirements of Chapter 31 of the Title 22 California Code of Regulations, Waste Minimization. The Northern California sites are primarily research and development facilities in the areas relating to national security, high-energy physics, engineering, bioscience and environmental health and safety disciplines. As mentioned above these DOE facilities are primarily research and development facilities. The hazardous wastes generated may be associated with operations that range in size from small, bench scale R&D to major maintenance and operations waste streams. Therefore, even though this document breaks down the waste streams based on California Waste Codes (CWC), the quantities of waste within one waste code category could be from many different locations and dissimilar processes. Because of the nature of the work at the sites, it is not economically feasible to try to implement source reduction measures for every process that generates a portion of the waste stream. This document identifies the processes that generate the major portion of the waste within an identified major waste stream and reports on progress made toward source reduction. In accomplishing the mission, it is DOE’s goal to eliminate waste generation and emissions giving priority to those that may present the greatest risk to human health and the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS1986

Safety considerations of lithium-thionyl chloride cells

The use of spirally wound lithium-thionyl chloride (Li-SOCl2) cells is currently limited because of their hazardous behavior. Safety hazards have ranged from mild venting of toxic materials to violent explosions and fires. These incidents may be related to both user- and manufacturer-induced causes. Many explanations have been offered to explain the unsafe behavior of the cells under operating and abuse conditions. Explanations fall into two categories: (1) thermal mechanisms, and (2) chemical mechanisms. However, it is quite difficult to separate the two. Both may be responsible for cell venting or explosion. Some safety problems encountered with these cells also may be due to design deficiencies and ineffective quality control during cell fabrication. A well-coordinated basic and applied research program is needed to develop safe Li-SOCl2 cells. Recommendations include: (1) learnig more about Li-SOL2 cell chemistry; (2) modeling cell and battery behavior; (3) optimizing cell design for safety and performance, (4) implementing quality control procedures; and (5) educating users.

Subbarao, Surampudi↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Grounded Theory of UAS Reported Accidents

Context: The manufacture and operation of sUAS are not as regulated as today’s commercial operation, and their widespread use introduces new risks and hazards to the general public. Aim: Our intent is to understand the various processes that prevent or portend sUAS incidents or accidents and the influence that pilots’ expectations and training have on these processes. Method: We use classic grounded theory on sUAS reported accidents (and incidents). Results: We identified three categories, Control Interference, Reviewing and Reporting, which describe various processes surrounding UAS accidents based on the dataset analyzed. Conclusion: The use of grounded theory can offer a different perspective in the analysis of UAS accidents. In addition, the traceability between data sources and the method results facilitate result validation, and navigation. While the results are preliminary, the concepts can be expanded through the use of other accident datasets or used as basis for UAS accident surveys.

Carlos Paradis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Grounded Theory of UAS Reported Accidents

Carlos Paradis↗

NASA NTRS2024

Lessons Learned in Designing A Proposed Ultraviolet Sterilization System for Space

This paper presents a number of lessons learned while designing a proposed sterilization system for Mars Sample Return. This sterilization system is needed to inactivate any potentially hazardous Mars material on the exterior surface of the vessel containing sealed sample tubes filled with Mars rock cores, regolith and atmosphere. These returned samples would provide information on the geologic history of Mars, the evolution of its climate and the potential for ancient life. Mars Sample Return is categorized at Planetary Protection Category V Restricted Earth Return, so it is required to protect the Earth–Moon system from the biological impact of returning samples from Mars to Earth. This article reviews lessons learned in the development of a particular engineering implementation to support the protection of the Earth–Moon biosphere: the use of in situ ultraviolet LED illumination. The details of the biological efficacy of this approach or the policy-related impacts are outside of the scope of this manuscript. The lessons learned presented here include establishing design requirements for the system, the selection of a light source, optical design options, contamination control and approaches to thermal and power management.

Planetary Protection↗

DOE OSTI2019

Technology Applicable to Remote Hazardous Constituents and Waste Stream Grouping

Originally, Rocky Flats transuranic (TRU) waste was managed from waste streams that were composed of similar chemical constituents and were generated from identical processes. Early waste processing at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) maintained the Rocky Flats record until INL began generating their own item description codes (IDCs). Ultimately TRU waste management at INL was driven to combine wastes from all IDCs that were assigned by Rocky Flats to a summary category group regardless of whether the chemical constituents in the waste were known or not. At this point, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) certified program requirements to process the TRU waste according to waste streams was nearly eliminated. In April 2018, operations in the Sludge Repackage Project (SRP) area were halted by a radiological materials release accident in which drums containing waste experienced a loss of containment after over-pressurization occurred. Four SRP drums, repackaged in the Accelerated Retrieval Project (ARP) V area, had an adverse, delayed chemical reaction event occur when prohibited materials from one container were mixed with chemically-incompatible materials from other containers in the repackaging process. This incident was the direct result of processing unknowns under a protocol where the components of the waste were added to incompatible materials resulting in a run-away reaction. After a Difficult Waste Team (DWT) and Los Alamos National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations (LANL-CO) subject matter expert (SME) visit in September 2019, it was determined by the team that all of the work observed on the September visit was performed upstream of the certified program and that the Visual Examination (VE) and other methods typically used by the certified program were being used for Acceptable Knowledge (AK) augmentation. This augmentation was needed in order to determine what the constituents in the waste might be, and is based primarily on collections of VE results. The waste at INL that is being processed in what is considered to be the Priority 2 (yellow) and Priority 3 (red) lists either needs AK to be completed before certified characterization can occur or is waiting to be processed because the waste has been mixed with unknown wastes resulting in a lack of information that could have impact of the ability to certify and ship the waste to the WIPP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗