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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Remote Technology to Retrieve Waste Below the 324 Building at the Hanford Site - 19622

The Waste Technology Engineering Laboratory (324 Building) is a Category 2 Nuclear Facility at Hanford. The 324 Building Disposition Project is responsible for the removal and remedial actions under CERCLA. Additionally, there are RCRA Dangerous Waste Management Units which the CERCLA actions are presumed to satisfy. The Radiochemical Engineering Complex (REC) is a group of four hot cells (A, B, C and D Cells) with an interconnecting airlock inside of the 324 Building. Underneath the REC B-Cell are contaminated soils that have an estimated 12,793 R/Hr dose rate and remediation is under CERCLA 300-FF-2 Operable Unit. The current action consists of debris removal from the floor of B-Cell, B-Cell floor removal, and excavation of the soils beneath the floor to a depth of up to twelve feet with four Remote Excavator Arms (REA). This paper provides insight into the preparation and performance of high tolerance core drilling into a hot cell complex. Installation of the REA Through Support (REA TS) mechanism through the 4'-6' concrete shield walls is a complex series of tasks with demanding tolerances at each of four locations around the perimeter of B-Cell. The use of training mock ups was included in the completion of this work. The REA TS is two 11 inch diameter high strength steel sleeves that have expandable collars at each end allowing the interstitial space between the outside of the sleeve and inside of the core drill to be grouted to form a substantial structural connection, and a 10 inch pipe with hydraulic hoses to power the REA. There are three cores required for each REA location. The REAs themselves are customized excavator arms, mounted on support columns to be used in the excavation and transfer of the contaminated soil into storage facilities. The tasks for the installation of the REA TSs are: 1) Characterization of B-Cell Cubicles. 2) Embedded Pipe Fill. 3) Interference Removal. a. Internal Walls, b. External Walls. 4) Core Drilling. 5) Go/No-Go gauge, and video inspection. 6) Installation of REA Through Support Assembly. The 324 Building REC Hot Cells have internal, external, and embedded utilities throughout the shield walls in conflict with the REA TS locations. Some of the embedded utilities have connection points inside of the B-Cell Cubicles. There were two separate issues at the conflicted locations. The first issue was the core drill cooling water would flow along the embedded utility potentially spreading legacy chemical and radiological contamination to areas of the facility that was unwanted. The second issue was that the REA TS required a substantial structural connection to the B-Cell wall, the cored diameter is larger than the REA TS and these interstitial areas required a full grouted connection. The embedded utilities posed a hazard that if unfilled, the interstitial grout would flow into the embedded utility and destabilize the required grouted structural connection. The B-Cell Cubicles had not been opened in over 10 years. A mockup was completed to install a glovebag over the cubicle opening and then to verify functionality and port requirements. The embedded utility pipe connections in the cubicles were then opened inside a glovebag to verify the correct connection points, connection method for future embedded pipe fill material delivery system, radiological characterization, and air flow to show that the embedded utility pipes were not blocked and would not pressurize. The embedded pipe fill material and grout system was mocked up and run several times to verify methodology and functionality. The B-Cell Cubicles were then reentered and the embedded utility pipe fill was completed using a hand pump. External interferences at the core drill locations were removed using standard interference removal techniques. Internal interferences at the core drill locations were removed using a remote cutting tool that was controlled through the use of the B-Cell crane, remote cameras and remote lighting. The core drilling was mocked up two separate times, the project's purpose built 'Mock Up Facility' was core drilled to verify tolerances and methodology prior to subcontract award, the core drill subcontractor built a 'dummy wall' to train and practice on achieving the demanding tolerances, coordinated alignments between the cores, short term and long term dose shielding techniques, and contamination control techniques. A core drill template, and additional anchoring techniques were used to maximize accuracy and precision of the REA TS core drills. A 'Go/No-Go' gauge was built and installed at each of the four REA TS locations to verify that the core drill met tolerances. The core drill locations were visually inspected using a boroscope. The REA TS installation was mocked up at the projects 'Mock Up Facility' beginning with basic hazard controls, then with intermediate hazard controls, and finally with full occupational safety, industrial hygiene, and radiological controls. The REA TSs were installed and grouted into place. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The TRANSCEND University Consortium: Theme 2 - Site Decommissioning, Deconstruction and Remediation - 20329

This paper will discuss the aims, objectives and progress to-date under Theme 2 of the TRANSCEND consortium project: Site decommissioning, deconstruction and remediation. Decommissioning nuclear sites involves waste retrieval, decontamination, deconstruction and, where necessary, containment and/or remediation of the remaining structure and surrounding land. Critical to management of these processes is limiting radiation exposure for the workforce, restricting the spread of radionuclides in groundwater, surface water and airborne particulates, and minimising the volume of contaminated waste for disposal. The aim of Theme 2 research is to develop new technologies for monitoring, remediation and containment that serve to minimise the volume of radioactively contaminated waste for disposal, for application prior to, during and after retrieval, deconstruction and decontamination operations. Prior research, conducted under the previous DISTINCTIVE project, demonstrated that colloidal silica grout can penetrate low permeability materials (including cement) for hydraulic barrier formation, and improved sorption capacity. The silica grout can be injected at surface using extremely small (potentially gravity-driven) fluid pressures, without the need for borehole drilling. Current work is investigating the erodibility of silica-grouted soils for inhibition of airborne and water-borne particulates as well as enhancing the grout's sorption capacity by addition of other materials to provide a chemical, as well as hydraulic, barrier to subsurface migration. EK remediation uses low voltage DC current to control migration of contaminants in porous media as well as to remove or degrade them. Researchers in the consortium have already demonstrated that low-energy ex-situ EK techniques can be used to provide remediation and volume minimisation for AWE legacy wastes in the UK. Under the current project researchers are building EK test cells containing simulated site materials at laboratory and intermediate(m)-scales to: remove, focus or degrade contaminants (remediation or waste minimisation); and direct subsurface water, chemical and colloid flow (fencing/containment or forced migration). This lab-based research is being informed by numerical models of EK processes that can subsequently be used to design full-scale on-site applications by nuclear site holders. Research under theme 2 of TRANSCEND will ultimately combine novel non-invasive detection technologies with EK techniques and colloidal silica grout barriers, to optimise the containment of radionuclide contamination in soils. Thus, allowing us to detect in-situ contamination, mobilise it to a selected location and grout it in-situ, prior to the initiation of decommissioning and deconstruction operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Production of an impermeable composite of irradiated graphite and glass by hot isostatic pressing as a long term leach resistant waste form

Around 250,000 tons of irradiated graphite (i-graphite) exists worldwide and can be considered as a current waste or future waste stream. The largest national i-graphite inventory is located in UK (∼ 100,000 tons) with significant quantities also in Russia and France [5]. Most of the i-graphite remains in the cores of shutdown nuclear reactors including the MAGNOX type in UK and the UNGG in France. Whilst there are still operational power reactors with graphite cores, such as the Russian RBMKs and the AGRs in UK, all of them will reach their end of life during the next two decades. The most common reference waste management option of i-graphite is a wet or dry retrieval of the graphite blocks from the reactor core and the grouting of these blocks in a container without further conditioning. This produces large waste package volumes because the encapsulation capacity of the grout is limited and large cavities in the graphite blocks could reduce the packing densities. Packing densities from 0.5 to 1 tons per cubic meter have been assumed for grouting solutions. Furthermore the grout is permeable. This could over time allow the penetration of aqueous phases into the waste block and a potential dissolution and release of radionuclides. As a result particularly highly soluble radionuclides may not be retained by the grout. Vitrification could present an alternative, however a similar waste package volume increase may be expected since the encapsulation capacity of glass is potentially similar to or worse than that of grout. FNAG has developed a process for the production of a graphite-glass composite material called Impermeable Graphite Matrix (IGM) [3]. This process is also applicable to irradiated graphite which allows the manufacturing of an impermeable material without volume increase. Crushed i-graphite is mixed with 20 vol.% of glass and then pressed under vacuum at an elevated temperature in an axial hot vacuum press (HVP). The obtained product has zero or negligible porosity and a water impermeable structure. Structural analysis shows that the glass in the composite has replaced the pores in the graphite structure. The typical pore volume of a graphite material is in the range of 20 vol.%. Therefore no volume increase will occur in comparison with the former graphite material. This IGM material will allow the encapsulation of graphite with package densities larger than 1.5 ton per cubic meter. Therefore a huge volume saving can be achieved by such an alternative encapsulation method. Disposal performance is also enhanced since little or no leaching of radionuclides is observed due to the impermeability of the material NNL and FNAG have proved that IGM can be produced by hot isostatic pressing (HIP) which has several advantages for radioactive materials over the HVP process. - The sealed HIP container avoids the release of any radionuclides. - The outside of the waste package is not contaminated. - The HIP process time is shorter than the HVP process time. The isostatic press avoids anisotropic density distributions. - Simple filling of the HIP container has advantages over the filling of an axial die. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Model Package Report: Composite Analysis Solid Waste Release Model (CASWR Model)

This document describes the implementation of a solid waste form release model in GoldSim for the Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) Update. This Composite Analysis Solid Waste Release model (CASWR model) was designed to generate deterministic radionuclide release rates for Hanford’s Central Plateau solid waste disposal sites using single realizations of release model coefficients. Five generalized waste form types are used for the conceptual model of waste release: surplus reactor block, cement, soil-debris, grouted residual waste, and ancillary equipment. The surplus reactor block waste form consists of radionuclide leaching from surplus production graphite reactor core blocks via unspecified processes (White et al., 1984 as cited in PNNL-15965). The cement waste form represents solidified wastes whose permeability is much lower than that of the surrounding soil. The soil-debris waste form type is defined as unconsolidated waste mixed with soil material. Tanks and canyon complexes comprise the grouted residual waste form such that their solid waste will be grouted and capped with a surface barrier at the completion of their cleanup. Finally, the ancillary equipment waste form constitutes contaminant releases from ancillary and auxiliary waste form residues associated with tank farms at closure. Individual sub-models are implemented to numerically represent a respective waste form within the CASWR Model: Surplus Reactor Block Sub-model, Cement Sub-model, SoilDebris Sub-model, Grouted Residual Waste Sub-model, and Ancillary Equipment Submodel. Advection is assumed to be the primary transport process governing the release of radionuclides in the Ancillary Equipment and Soil-Debris Sub-models. Diffusion is assumed to be the primary release process in the Grouted Residual Waste and Cement Sub-models. An unspecified zero-order release process is considered in the Surplus Reactor Block Sub-model due to the lack of information regarding actual processes involved in irradiated graphite leaching. The Surplus Reactor Block, Cement, and SoilDebris Sub-models were compared against analytical solutions (PNNL-11800, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the 200 Area Plateau of the Hanford Site). The agreement between results of these analytical solutions and the corresponding waste form models verified their correct implementation in GoldSim. A 1-D modeling abstraction approach for the Grouted Residual Waste and Ancillary Equipment Sub-models was adopted from existing Performance Assessment (PA) models. Despite the simplifications made in these sub-models, they were found to be appropriate representations of the waste forms, similar to what was used in the Waste Management Area C PA model (RPP-ENV-58782, Performance Assessment of Waste Management Area C, Hanford Site, Washington, Rev. 0). A sensitivity analysis was conducted to identify the most influential parameters in each waste form sub-model. Suggestions for considering pH-dependent and redox-dependent release mechanisms are formulated through the development of a conditional constant approach in GoldSim.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Thermal Response Testing Takes a Step Forward

Oak Ridge National Labs has independently confirmed the accuracy of a new breakthrough Advanced Thermal Response Test (TRT) method that it claims “uses less than half of the test time, allows for a fluctuating or interruptible heat flux, performs quality validation of a GHEX installation, and yields new insights into ground thermal conductivity that warrant further research.” The new Advanced TRT approach will reduce costs and, for the first time, also determine the actual thermal conductivity of grout as it is installed. As everyone in the ground source heat pump (GSHP) industry knows, assuring the quality of the grout job of a ground heat exchanger (GHEX) is an especially vexing problem. Unless one is standing at the borehole head the entire time grouting is underway, they basically have no idea how good or bad the grouting job is or even if the loop pipe itself is installed correctly. This problem has been further brought to light with formal third party grout reports confirming that grout had been poured from the surface and that many loops were shorter than the specified depth in several projects

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

PREPARATION OF U-PLANT FOR FINAL DEMOLITION AND DISPOSAL - 12109E

The U-Plant is one of the five major nuclear materials processing facilities at Hanford and was chosen as a pilot project to develop the modalities for closure of the other four facilities at Hanford and the rest of the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The remedy for this facility was determined by a Record of Decision (ROD) pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). That remedy was to 'Close in Place - Partially Demolished Structure'. The U-Plant facility is identified as the 221-U Building and is a large, concrete structure nominally 247m (810 ft) long, 20 M (66 ft) wide and 24 m (77 ft) high with approximately 9 m (30 ft) being below grade level. It is a robust facility with walls ranging from 0.9 m to 2.7 m (3 ft to 9 ft) thick. One large room extends the entire length of the building that provides access to 40 sub-grade processing cells containing tanks, piping and other components. The work breakdown was divided into three major deliverables: (1) Tank D-10 Removal: removal of Tank D-10, which contained TRU waste; (2) Equipment Disposition: placement of contaminated equipment in the sub-grade cells; and (3) Canyon Grouting: grouting canyon void spaces to the maximum extent practical. A large number of pieces of contaminated equipment (pumps, piping, centrifuges, tanks, etc) from other facilities that had been stored on the canyon operating floor were placed inside of the sub-grade cells as final disposition, grouted and the cell shield plug reinstalled. This action precluded a large volume of waste being transported to another burial site. Finally, {approx}19,000 m3 ({approx}25,000 yd3) of grout was placed inside of the cells (in and around the contaminated equipment), in the major galleries. the ventilation tunnel, the external ventilation duct, and the hot pipe trench to minimize the potential for void spaces and to reduce the mobility, solubility, and/or toxicity of the grouted waste. The interim condition of the facility is 'cold and dark'. Upon availability of funding the structure will have contamination fixative applied to all contaminated surfaces and may be explosively demolished, with the remaining structure buried under an engineered barrier.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

A Dual Regime Reactive Transport Model for Simulation of High Level Waste Tank Closure Scenarios - 13375

A numerical simulation framework is presented in this paper for estimating evolution of pH and release of major species from grout within high-level waste tanks after closure. This model was developed as part of the Cementitious Barriers Partnership. The reactive transport model consists of two parts - (1) transport of species, and (2) chemical reactions. The closure grout can be assumed to have varying extents of cracking and composition for performance assessment purposes. The partially or completely degraded grouted tank is idealized as a dual regime system comprising of a mobile region having solid materials with cracks and macro-pores, and an immobile/stagnant region having solid matrix with micropores. The transport profiles of the species are calculated by incorporating advection of species through the mobile region, diffusion of species through the immobile/stagnant region, and exchange of species between the mobile and immobile regions. A geochemical speciation code in conjunction with the pH dependent test data for a grout material is used to obtain a mineral set that best describes the trends in the test data of the major species. The dual regime reactive transport model predictions are compared with the release data from an up-flow column percolation test. The coupled model is then used to assess effects of crack state of the structure, rate and composition of the infiltrating water on the pH evolution at the grout-waste interface. The coupled reactive transport model developed in this work can be used as part of the performance assessment process for evaluating potential risks from leaching of a cracked tank containing elements of human health and environmental concern. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Decommissioning an Active Historical Reactor Facility at the Savannah River Site - 13453

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina, where Management and Operations are performed by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). In 2004, DOE recognized SRS as structure within the Cold War Historic District of national, state and local significance composed of the first generation of facilities constructed and operated from 1950 through 1989 to produce plutonium and tritium for our nation's defense. DOE agreed to manage the SRS 105-C Reactor Facility as a potentially historic property due to its significance in supporting the U.S. Cold War Mission and for potential for future interpretation. This reactor has five primary areas within it, including a Disassembly Basin (DB) that received irradiated materials from the reactor, cooled them and prepared the components for loading and transport to a Separation Canyon for processing. The 6,317 square meter area was divided into numerous work/storage areas. The walls between the individual basin compartments have narrow vertical openings called 'slots' that permit the transfer of material from one section to another. Data indicated there was over 830 curies of radioactivity associated with the basin sediments and approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated water, not including a large quantity of activated reactor equipment, scrap metal, and debris on the basin floor. The need for an action was identified in 2010 to reduce risks to personnel in the facility and to eliminate the possible release of contaminants into the environment. The release of DB water could potentially migrate to the aquifer and contaminate groundwater. DOE, its regulators [U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)-Region 4 and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC)] and the SC Historical Preservation Office (SHPO) agreed/concurred to perform a non-time critical removal action for the In Situ Decommissioning (ISD) of the 105-C Disassembly Basin. ISD consisted of stabilization/isolation of remaining contaminated water, sediment, activated reactor equipment, and scrap metal by filling the DB with underwater non-structural grout to the appropriate (-4.877 meter) grade-level, thence with dry area non-structural grout to the final -10 centimeter level. The roof over the DB was preserved due to its potential historical significance and to prevent the infiltration of precipitation. Forced evaporation was the form of treatment implemented to remove the approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated basin water. Using specially formulated grouts, irradiated materials and sediment were treated by solidification/isolation thus reducing their mobility, reducing radiation exposure and creating an engineered barrier thereby preventing access to the contaminants. Grouting provided a low permeability barrier to minimize any potential transport of contaminants to the aquifer. Efforts were made to preserve the historical significance of the Reactor in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act. ISD provides a cost effective means to isolate and contain residual radioactivity from past nuclear operations allowing natural radioactive decay to reduce hazards to manageable levels. This method limits release of radiological contamination to the environment, minimizes radiation exposure to workers, prevents human/animal access to the hazardous substances, and allows for ongoing monitoring of the decommissioned facility. Field construction was initiated in August 2011; evaporator operations commenced January 2012 and ended July 2012 with over 9 M liters of water treated/removed. Over 8,525 cubic meters of grout were placed, completing in August 2012. The project completed with an excellent safety record, on schedule and under budget. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Solid Secondary Waste Immobilization in Cementitious Waste Forms at the Hanford Site - 19081

During operations of the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, solid secondary wastes (SSW) will be generated. These materials include HEPA filters, granular activated carbon (GAC), and silver mordenite (AgM). The planned disposal pathway for SSW is through solidification (blending) or encapsulation in a cementitious waste form and then disposal on site at the Hanford Site's Integrated Disposal Facility. Performance assessment evaluations of SSW forms have been performed; however, limited experimental data on simulated SSW is available as input. This paper will cover efforts to fill this gap in experimental data through testing of simulated SSW materials. Two grout formulations were used in the tests: 1) Hanford grout mix 5, a mix of 25 wt% ordinary Portland cement (OPC) and 75 wt% fly ash (FA); and 2) the Cast Stone dry blend of 47 wt% blast furnace slag, 45 wt% FA, and 8 wt% OPC. The sorption (Kd) of potential contaminants (iodide, iodate, technetium) to the grouts and SSW materials was investigated in simulated grout pore water. Waste forms containing GAC and AgM were prepared using the two grout formulations and characterized using scanning electron microscopy energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy and X-ray diffraction. Acquiring this information will further support the candidacy of cementitious waste forms to be used for disposal of SSW at Hanford. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

How do Early Age Geopolymers Respond to Gamma Irradiation Exposure? - 19515

Geopolymers have been proposed by the UK nuclear industry as a potential replacement for the currently accepted blend of Portland cement and supplementary cementitious materials, such as fly ash and blast furnace slag. This preferred grouting system is not ideal for the encapsulation of some problematic waste streams, such as oils and reactive metals. Metakaolin based geopolymers have been selected as the alternative grouting system, as this mitigates the supply risk which is currently associated with the supplementary cementitious materials described above. To allow these systems to be used as an alternative nuclear grouting system, the effect of irradiation on the 'neat' grout needs to be understood. The majority of the literature appears to present studies of the irradiation of aged grouts (3 - 7 days). This study will assess samples that have been irradiated at early age curing (20 hours). The effects of clay type and total dose will also be studied, and a comparison between the effects of rotary and flash calcined clays, irradiated to doses up to 1 MGy will be presented. The thermogravimetry data indicates that irradiation promotes the liberation of water and also the formation of carbonate species. The rotary calcined metakaolin liberates more water than the flash calcined metakaolin. Therefore, it is expected that the flash calcined system is more stable to irradiation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Thermal Analysis for SRS Saltstone Disposal Unit Facility

Saltstone Disposal Units (SDU) are long term disposal units for low activity grout produced from the solidification of decontaminated non-hazardous salt waste at SRS. The unit is a cylindrical disposal vault of 150 ft. in diameter and 23 ft. in height. The total volume the SDU can hold is 3 million gallons of grout. The hydration process of the grout material produces heat from an exothermic chemical reaction. If the grout reaches temperatures higher than the maximum safety temperature of 95 deg. C, cracks can start forming leading to contamination of the environment. The purpose of this study is to develop the optimal baseline domain boundary conditions and to perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the baseline modeling conditions. The following assumptions were made for the modeling calculations: - The system geometry is axisymmetric; - The system was at steady state; - Ambient temperature was set to 100 deg. F; - Air was assumed to be an incompressible ideal gas; - Radiation was neglected for a conservative estimation; - Natural convection for the SDU vapor space is assumed to be turbulent because Rayleigh number based on typical operating conditions is higher than 10{sup 8}; - Water tables were not taken into consideration. The following sensitivity analyses were performed to find the optimal domain boundary: - Mesh size sensitivity; - Soil depth sensitivity - Soil depth varied from 30 ft to 250 ft with a soil thickness of 90 ft; - Soil thickness sensitivity - Soil thickness varied from 30 ft to 270 ft with a soil depth of 180 ft; - Soil conductivity sensitivity - Soil thermal conductivity varied from 0.25 W/m-K to 1 W/m-K; - Ambient Temperature Sensitivity - Ambient temperature varied from 70 deg. F to 110 deg. F. For the thermal calculations, the temperature of the bottom of the soil was set to 17.4 deg. C. The heat flux on the roof of the building and surface of the earth is 163.2 W/m{sup 2}. The soil sides are set to be adiabatic. The sensitivity analysis shows that the mesh size has no effect on the numerical results. This is mainly due to a small convection zone and large conduction zones in the modeling domain. The optimal domain boundary was found to be a soil thickness of 90 ft and a soil depth of 150 ft. The different sensitivity analysis performed here shows the optimal boundary domain to be used for thermal calculations is a soil depth of 150 ft beneath the SDU and a soil thickness of 90 ft. Anything larger would produce similar solutions but at a longer computational time to solve. The maximum temperature was more sensitive to soil properties as shown here. While the ambient temperature affected the max temperature linearly. Most of the heat transfer takes place downward vertically between the SDU and the soil beneath it. Using the optimal domain boundary determined by the sensitivity analyses, the maximum thermal loading to keep the maximum grout temperature below 95 deg. C is 1.646 W/m{sup 3}.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Numerical modeling study of a man-made low-permeability barrier for the compressed air energy storage in high-permeability aquifers

Compressed air energy storage (CAES) is a grid-scale energy storage technology for intermittent energy, as proven by the decades-long successful operation of two existing compressed air energy storage in cavern (CAESC) power plants. Because of the limited availability of salt domes appropriate for CAESC, the more widely available aquifers (compressed air energy storage in aquifers, CAESA) have recently attracted considerable attention as candidates for CAES. An ideal aquifer for CAESA is highly permeable around the well to facilitate easy injection and withdrawal of air, but the high-permeability region is surrounded by low-permeability zones to minimize the loss of injected air and decrease in energy efficiency. However, such ideal geological structures are not always available in nature. Therefore, the potential of creating man-made low-permeability barrier in high-permeability aquifers is very interesting. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of man-made low-permeability barriers in high-permeability aquifers using the numerical simulator TOUGH2/Gel to calculate the three-component flow (including a miscible gelling liquid). The simulation results show that an expected low-permeability barrier can be created by injecting grout with certain properties, and the altered aquifer performs well for CAESA. Additional sensitivity studies are also performed to reveal the effects of the various factors on the success of the low-permeability barrier creation, including the critical solidification concentration, the scale factor of the time dependence of the grout viscosity, the relative density of the grout, and the volume of the follow-up water injection. The results indicate that, in a horizontal aquifer, low critical solidification concentrations, and small scale factors are generally preferred and the density of grout should be close to that of the in situ water. For the given volume of the injected grout, there is an optimal follow-up water injection that will create the largest storage space without damaging the barrier. Furthermore, these results may help to extend the candidate sites for CAESA and the prospect of large scale energy storage.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2015

Decommissioning of a facility in a historical reactor at SRS: achieving both historical significance preservation and effective in-situ decommissioning - 15275

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina, where Management and Operations are performed by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS). In 2004, US DOE recognized SRS as a structure within the Cold War Historic District of national, state and local significance because it is composed of the first generation of facilities constructed and operated from 1950 through 1989 to produce plutonium and tritium for our nation's defense. US DOE agreed to manage the SRS 105-C Reactor Facility as a potentially historic property due to its significance in supporting the U.S. Cold War Mission and for potential for future interpretation. The Disassembly Basin (DB) in C Reactor was evaluated for action under CERCLA. Data indicated there were over 830 curies of radioactivity associated with the basin sediments and approximately 9.1 million (M) liters (L) of contaminated water, not including a large quantity of activated reactor equipment, scrap metal, and debris on the basin floor. The release of DB water could potentially migrate to the aquifer and contaminate groundwater. The need for an action was identified to reduce risks to personnel in the facility and to eliminate the possible release of contaminants into the environment. In-situ decommissioning was selected as the remedy. The remedial action proceeded in stages: -Above-grade modifications to the interior of DB building -Relocation of irradiated scrap and reactor components to the deepest segments of the DB - Construction of a metal building to house evaporators - Forced evaporation of the DB's radiologically contaminated water - Grouting with special hybrid grouts - Removal of the evaporators and temporary building. Since the building itself was not demolished and will remain unchanged in appearance with the exception of filling the DB with grout, this ISD removal action/methodology did not adversely impact the historical significance of the 105-C Reactor Building, in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act, nor did it adversely affect the ability to determine the full extent and details of preservation at some later date. Both special hybrid grout materials met all requirements. Overall average 7-day compressive strength for the dry area mix was 1.54 MPa (223 psi) and for the underwater mix 2.94 MPa (427 psi).Overall 28-day compressive strength for the dry area mix was 2.88 MPa (417 psi) and for the underwater mix 4.99 MPa (724 psi). A limited amount of testing was also performed at 91 days, where the overall compressive strength for the dry area mix was found to be 9.40 MPa (1363 psi) and for the underwater mix 13.98 MPa (2028 psi). All compressive strength values far exceeded the 0.34 MPa (50 psi) minimum requirements. The special, flowable-fill grouts designed and used for P- and R-Reactor ISD and used again for this 105-C ISD removal action resulted in considerable labor, cost, and schedule savings versus conventional materials. As an added bonus/benefit, the CO{sub 2} footprint of the SRS C-Reactor DB ISD was minimized by using a small amount of cement and byproduct material to produce the structural fill materials. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Waste Management 2016 300-296 Soil Remediation Project. Developing Innovative Solutions to Overcome Design Challenges - 16229

The 324 Building is a non-reactor, Hazard Category 2, Nuclear Facility located in the 300 Area of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site, located near Richland, Washington. The building is undergoing deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination, and demolition by Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) under the River Corridor Closure Contract. During the Cold War Era, the facility was used for chemical and radionuclide processing associated with nuclear weapons production. Historical records indicate that in October 1986, approximately 516 L of a concentrated liquid waste stream containing cesium-137 and strontium-90 was spilled onto the floor of B-Cell. B-Cell is located in the Radiochemical Engineering Complex (REC) of the 324 Building. It is estimated that this spill contained approximately 1.3 million curies of radioactivity. Some fraction of the spill was recovered; however, an unknown quantity was released into the soil beneath the 324 Building through an undetected breach in the B-Cell floor sump. Unknown quantities of water were used after the spill to wash items contained in B-Cell. When B-Cell was taken out of service, wastes being removed from B-Cell were placed in Grout Containers (GCs) and stabilized using a particulate grout. In the course of grouting activities, grout was spilled on the floor of B-Cell, eventually filling the sump. The primary scope of this project is to design, test, and implement a process capable of removing and isolating contaminated soil below B-Cell. This remediation effort has been divided into two removal zones identified as the primary and secondary removal zones. Based on current assumptions and estimates, the primary phase of this cleanup effort will remove roughly 156.45 m{sup 3} of highly contaminated materials. B-Cell debris, particulate grout, and the floor slab and liner comprise about 21.24 m{sup 3} of the total. The remaining 135.21 m3 will be contaminated soil. All of this material must be disposed of within the existing 324 Facility or packaged for disposal at the Hanford site. The objective of this project is to remove the B-Cell floor and highly contaminated underlying soils from beneath B-Cell using remote equipment to reduce the radiation levels and allow open-air excavation for the remaining contaminated soil. The challenges and subsequent technological solutions encountered from the Conceptual Design phase to the 100% Design Issued For Fabrication/Issued For Construction (IFF/IFC) consisted in part of the following: Design an efficient remote cleanup strategy for highly contaminated Low Level Waste (LLW) given the unknowns. Maintain contamination control down to 18 feet below B-Cell in a highly radioactive environment (12,870 R/Hr Cs-137 and Sr-90). Perform facility upgrades to enable remediation process implementation while maintaining integrity of pre-existing facility structure and license. Designing first-of-a-kind remote equipment for use in high radiation areas. Developing first-of-a-kind operations sequences for remote equipment while minimizing usage of original facility equipment (i.e. cranes, manipulators, etc.). Conducting time-motion studies of operations sequences to maximize efficiency while keeping dose As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) in a high dose environment. Construction of a full scale mockup to conduct performance testing in a clean environment and train the work force to operate the equipment. Overcoming scope, budget and schedule constraints associated with a fast-track DOE project. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2012

Saltstone 3QCY11 TCLP Results

A Saltstone waste form was prepared in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from a Tank 50H sample and Z-Area premix material for the third quarter of calendar year 2011 (3QCY11). After the prescribed 32 day cure, samples of the saltstone were collected, and the waste form was shown to meet the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24 and R.61-79.268.48(a) requirements for a nonhazardous waste form with respect to RCRA metals and underlying hazardous constituents. These analyses met all quality assurance specifications of USEPA SW-846. The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives waste from Tank 50H for treatment. In the third quarter of the 2011 calendar year (3QCY11), Tank 50H accepted transfers of approximately 20 kgal from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), approximately 236 kgal from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (ARP/MCU) Decontaminated Salt Solution Hold Tank (DSS-HT), and approximately 25 kgal from other sources. The Saltstone Grout Sampling plan provides the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution which is to be disposed of in the Z-Area Solid Waste Landfill (SWLF). During operation, samples were collected from Tank 50H and grout samples prepared to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24(b) and R.61-79.268.48(a). Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was asked to prepare saltstone from samples of Tank 50H obtained July 7, 2011 during 3QCY11 to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout. The samples were cured and shipped to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group-Radioisotope and Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (B&W TSG-RACL) to perform the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and subsequent extract analysis on saltstone samples for the analytes required for the quarterly analysis saltstone sample. In addition to the eight toxic metals - arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury, lead, selenium and silver - analytes included the underlying hazardous constituents (UHC) antimony, beryllium, nickel, and thallium which could not be eliminated from analysis by process knowledge. B&W TSG-RACL provided subsamples to GEL Laboratories, LLC for analysis for the UHCs benzene, phenols and total and amenable cyanide.

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DOE OSTI2012

Variability of K d Values in Cementitious Materials and Sediments

Measured distribution coefficients (K d values) for environmental contaminants provide input data for performance assessments (PA) that evaluate physical and chemical phenomena for release of radionuclides from wasteforms, degradation of engineered components and subsequent transport of radionuclides through environmental media. Research efforts at SRNL to study the effects of formulation and curing variability on the physiochemical properties of the saltstone wasteform produced at the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) are ongoing and provide information for the PA and Saltstone Operations. Furthermore, the range and distribution of plutonium K d values in soils is not known. Knowledge of these parameters is needed to provide guidance for stochastic modeling in the PA. Under the current SRS liquid waste processing system, supernate from F & H Tank Farm tanks is processed to remove actinides and fission products, resulting in a low-curie Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS). At the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF), DSS is mixed with premix, comprised of blast furnace slag (BFS), Class F fly ash (FA), and portland cement (OPC) to form a grout mixture. The fresh grout is subsequently placed in SDF vaults where it cures through hydration reactions to produce saltstone, a hardened monolithic waste form. Variation in saltstone composition and cure conditions of grout can affect the saltstone's physiochemical properties. Variations in properties may originate from variables in DSS, premix, and water to premix ratio, grout mixing, placing, and curing conditions including time and temperature (Harbour et al. 2007; Harbour et al. 2009). There are no previous studies reported in the literature regarding the range and distribution of K d values in cementitious materials. Presently, the Savannah River Site (SRS) estimate ranges and distributions of K d values based on measurements of K d values made in sandy SRS sediments (Kaplan 2010). The actual cementitious material K d values and solubility values differ from the sandy sediments. The K d value range and distribution currently used in the PA are estimated to range between 0.25*K d and 1.75*K d , where the minimum and maximum values of the ranges reflect the 95% confidence level for the mean K d value (Kaplan 2010). The objective of the research with cementitious materials was to measure the range and distribution of a monovalent (Cs) and I - (anion), divalent (Sr), and trivalent (Eu) ions for a variety of laboratory-prepared saltstone surrogate samples to establish a K d range other than that which is presently used in the PA. It has been observed in laboratory samples that cure temperature profiles can affect properties such as heat of hydration, permeability, porosity, compressive strength, and set time (Harbour et al. 2009). The intent was to identify a range and distribution that could be used by stochastic modelers for the PA. Furthermore, the intent was to replace the arbitrarily selected distributions based on geological sandy sediments and to base it on actual cementitious materials. The scope of this study did not include understanding saltstone sorption mechanisms responsible for increasing or decreasing sorption. Similar to the work with cementitious materials, the purpose of the Pu sediment K d dataset was not to attempt to understand through statistics how to better understand Pu sorption to sediments or to lower Pu K d variance. The sediment Pu K d data is included in this study because it is a key risk driver for the PAs on the SRS, and there is presently no direct studies of Pu variability in SRS soils. Instead the distribution of Pu sediment K d values was assumed to be similar to other cations, as presented by Kaplan (2010).

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