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At least 109 records · Page 6

Differential games.

General discussion of the theory of differential games with two players and zero sum. Games starting at a fixed initial state and ending at a fixed final time are analyzed. Strategies for the games are defined. The existence of saddle values and saddle points is considered. A stochastic version of a differential game is used to examine the synthesis problem.

Varaiya, P. P.↗

Urban simulation and gaming: Preliminary experience and perspectives, appendix F

A three-month summer study of gaming, as applied to urban problems, was conducted. The results of the study are presented along with a series of recommendations aimed at guiding the warranted efforts of others to further explore the application of scientific gaming to the solution of some of America's urban problems. Three main topics are considered and are discussed in depth. These include: (1) gaming and urbanology, (2) methodology and lessons, and (3) reforms in the Cities Game.

Shostak, A. B.↗

Analysis of a combat problem - The turret game

The turret game is defined and solved to illustrate the nature of games of combat. This game represents a highly simplified version of air combat, yet it is sufficiently complex so as to exhibit a rich variety of combat phenomena. A review of the formulation of delta-combat games is included.

Ardema, M.↗

A two-dimensional air-to-air combat game - Toward an air-combat advisory system

Air-to-air combat is modeled as a discrete differential game, and by constraining the game to searching for the best guidance laws from the sets of those considered for each opponent, feedback and outcome charts are obtained which can be used to turn one of the automatic opponents into an intelligent opponent against a human pilot. A one-on-one two-dimensional fully automatic, or manned versus automatic, air-to-air combat game has been designed which includes both attack and evasion alternatives for both aircraft. Guidance law selection occurs by flooding the initial-condition space with four simulated fights for each initial condition, depicting the various attack/evasion strategies for the two opponents, and recording the outcomes. For each initial condition, the minimax method from differential games is employed to determine the best choice from the available strategies.

Neuman, Frank↗

Two-target game model of an air combat with fire-and-forget all-aspect missiles

An air combat duel between similar aggressive fighter aircraft, both equipped with the same type of guided missiles, is formulated as a two-target differential game using the dynamic model of the game of two identical cars. Each of the identical target sets represents the effective firing envelope of an all-aspect fire-and-forget air-to-air missile. The firing range limits depend on the target aspect angle and are approximated by analytical functions. The maximum range, computed by taking into account the optimal missile avoidance maneuver of the target, determines the no-escape firing envelope. The solution consists of the decomposition of the game space into four regions: the respective winning zones of the two opponents, the draw zone, and the region where the game terminates by a mutual kill. The solution provides a new insight for future air combat analysis.

Davidovitz, A.↗

A game theoretic controller for a linear time-invariant system with parameter uncertainty and its application to the Space Station

A game theoretic controller is developed for a linear time-invariant system with parameter uncertainties in system and input matrices. The input-output decomposition modeling for the plant uncertainty is adopted. The uncertain dynamic system is represented as an internal feedback loop in which the system is assumed forced by fictitious disturbance caused by the parameter uncertainty. By considering the input and the fictitious disturbance as two noncooperative players, a differential game problem is constructed. It is shown that the resulting time invariant controller stabilizes the uncertain system for a prescribed uncertainty bound. This game theoretic controller is applied to the momentum management and attitude control of the Space Station in the presence of uncertainties in the moments of inertia. Inclusion of the external disturbance torque to the design procedure results in a dynamical feedback controller which consists of conventional PID control and cyclic disturbance rejection filter. It is shown that the game theoretic design, comparing to the LQR design or pole placement design, improves the stability robustness with respect to inertia variations.

Rhee, Ihnseok↗

A game theoretic approach to a finite-time disturbance attenuation problem

A disturbance attenuation problem over a finite-time interval is considered by a game theoretic approach where the control, restricted to a function of the measurement history, plays against adversaries composed of the process and measurement disturbances, and the initial state. A zero-sum game, formulated as a quadratic cost criterion subject to linear time-varying dynamics and measurements, is solved by a calculus of variation technique. By first maximizing the quadratic cost criterion with respect to the process disturbance and initial state, a full information game between the control and the measurement residual subject to the estimator dynamics results. The resulting solution produces an n-dimensional compensator which expresses the controller as a linear combination of the measurement history. A disturbance attenuation problem is solved based on the results of the game problem. For time-invariant systems it is shown that under certain conditions the time-varying controller becomes time-invariant on the infinite-time interval. The resulting controller satisfies an H(infinity) norm bound.

Rhee, Ihnseok↗

Improving Simulated Annealing by Replacing Its Variables with Game-Theoretic Utility Maximizers

The game-theory field of Collective INtelligence (COIN) concerns the design of computer-based players engaged in a non-cooperative game so that as those players pursue their self-interests, a pre-specified global goal for the collective computational system is achieved as a side-effect. Previous implementations of COIN algorithms have outperformed conventional techniques by up to several orders of magnitude, on domains ranging from telecommunications control to optimization in congestion problems. Recent mathematical developments have revealed that these previously developed algorithms were based on only two of the three factors determining performance. Consideration of only the third factor would instead lead to conventional optimization techniques like simulated annealing that have little to do with non-cooperative games. In this paper we present an algorithm based on all three terms at once. This algorithm can be viewed as a way to modify simulated annealing by recasting it as a non-cooperative game, with each variable replaced by a player. This recasting allows us to leverage the intelligent behavior of the individual players to substantially improve the exploration step of the simulated annealing. Experiments are presented demonstrating that this recasting significantly improves simulated annealing for a model of an economic process run over an underlying small-worlds topology. Furthermore, these experiments reveal novel small-worlds phenomena, and highlight the shortcomings of conventional mechanism design in bounded rationality domains.

Wolpert, David H.↗

Game Development for Engineering Education

Game Development (Process); Game Development Tools; Implementation Tools; Materials Education Game Environment; Virtual Cleanroom; E-learning as game-like environments + CLDT; +CPR Tool.

Morsi, Rasha↗

Digi Island: A Serious Game for Teaching and Learning Digital Circuit Optimization

Karnaugh maps, also known as K-maps, are a tool used to optimize or simplify digital logic circuits. A K-map is a graphical display of a logic circuit. K-map optimization is essentially the process of finding a minimum number of maximal aggregations of K-map cells. with values of 1 according to a set of rules. The Digi Island is a serious game designed for aiding students to learn K-map optimization. The game takes place on an exotic island (called Digi Island) in the Pacific Ocean . The player is an adventurer to the Digi Island and will transform it into a tourist attraction by developing real estates, such as amusement parks.and hotels. The Digi Island game elegantly converts boring 1s and Os in digital circuits into usable and unusable spaces on a beautiful island and transforms K-map optimization into real estate development, an activity with which many students are familiar and also interested in. This paper discusses the design, development, and some preliminary results of the Digi Island game.

Harper, Michael↗

The Role of Game Based Learning in the Health Literacy of African American Adolescent Males

Twenty-first century literacy is more than being able to encode for spelling ability, decode for reading comprehension, and calculate for numeric reasoning. It demands the skills to negotiate the world of technology. Health literacy is lower than general literacy, and general literacy is lower among African American males than the overall population. The authors discuss the prospects of incorporating Game Based Learning approaches into strategies for teaching health literacy. Results of a survey administered to youth to determine their level of involvement in video game playing indicate that key elements must be in place to ensure that a game will be played. These include action, strategy, and entertainment. Future investigation will examine the knowledge level of African American adolescent males of the nexus of certain concepts of climate change and health literacy. Climate change has significant implications for human health. This understanding will produce a scientifically based foundation for curricular and instructional decisions that include GBL. Results of this study will be used to design a video game concept and will contribute to the body of knowledge concerning environmental justice and empower individuals to make informed decisions about their own health and those they influence.

Connell, Judith↗

Why Games Work and the Science of Learning

In 2010, the Navy formally added the Damage Control Trainer (DCT) to the recruit training program at Great Lakes, Illinois. Despite the incredibly dense training schedule at the Navy's boot camp, the instructors were willing to set aside two hours of time for recruits to play a game. Why? Because it worked. Even with just one hour of play, research showed that recruits gained a 50-80% improvement in performance that transferred to Battle Stations 21 (B821), the Navy's capstone training event. This paper explores why games makes these kinds of results possible. It argues that the things that are known to improve learning are almost exactly the same reasons why games work: the time-honored laws of learning. It concludes that the traditional gulf between instructional design and game design is really an issue of perspective, rather than fundamentals.

Murphy, Curtiss↗

A game-theoretic approach to nuclear fuel cycle transition analysis under uncertainty

We present a novel methodology for optimizing nuclear fuel cycle transitions that incorporates a game-theoretic approach and captures interactions among multiple decision makers. The methodology is demonstrated using a two-person sequential game with uncertainty, where the two players represent a policy maker and an electric utility company, though the method generalizes to any number and type of individual decision making entities. Coupled with a sophisticated nuclear fuel cycle simulator, rich transition scenarios may be analyzed to identify robust transition strategies. These strategies explicitly treat uncertainties using a stochastic programming approach, devising optimal near-term hedging strategies that simultaneously consider all possible states of the world, maintaining flexibility to allow for intelligent recourse decisions once uncertainties are resolved. In the demonstration game, reactor technology and fuel cycle scheme adopted by the electric utility are shown to depend on both the policy maker’s decisions and the distributions over uncertain technological and economic outcomes.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Art of War: Beyond Memory-one Strategies in Population Games

We show that the history of play in a population game contains exploitable information that can be successfully used by sophisticated strategies to defeat memory-one opponents, including zero determinant strategies. The history allows a player to label opponents by their strategies, enabling a player to determine the population distribution and to act differentially based on the opponent’s strategy in each pairwise interaction. For the Prisoner’s Dilemma, these advantages lead to the natural formation of cooperative coalitions among similarly behaving players and eventually to unilateral defection against opposing player types. We show analytically and empirically that optimal play in population games depends strongly on the population distribution. For example, the optimal strategy for a minority player type against a resident TFT population is ALLC, while for a majority player type the optimal strategy versus TFT players is ALLD. Such behaviors are not accessible to memory-one strategies. Drawing inspiration from Sun Tzu’s the Art of War, we implemented a non-memory-one strategy for population games based on techniques from machine learning and statistical inference that can exploit the history of play in this manner. Via simulation we find that this strategy is essentially uninvadable and can successfully invade (significantly more likely than a neutral mutant) essentially all known memory-one strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, including ALLC (always cooperate), ALLD (always defect), tit-for-tat (TFT), winstay-lose-shift (WSLS), and zero determinant (ZD) strategies, including extortionate and generous strategies.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Evolutionary Game Dynamics between Distributed Energy Resources and Microgrid Operator: Balancing Act for Power Factor Improvement

This article investigates the intricate dynamics between Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and the Microgrid Operator (MGO) within a microgrid interconnected with the main grid. Employing an evolutionary game framework, the study scrutinizes the strategic evolution of DERs’ decision-making processes in their interactions with the MGO. Modeled as an evolutionary game, these interactions encapsulate the strategies adopted by DERs, resulting in stable equilibrium strategies over time. Motivated by direct benefits linked to increased active power production, DERs strive to sell all available power, while the MGO focuses on optimizing the microgrid’s overall performance. The study assesses the microgrid’s performance in terms of its power factor, emphasizing the strategic balance DERs must achieve in their active power generation to avoid penalization. This penalization results in decreased individual utility for DERs due to the overall power factor decrease resulting from their prioritization of active power generation. Additionally, the diminished overall power factor implies a decrease in MGO utility. The individual utility of each DER is further influenced by the strategies adopted by other DERs, impacting the penalization factor. Leveraging a modified IEEE 13-node distribution microgrid consisting of three DERs, the study presents case studies encompassing both cooperative and non-cooperative evolutionary game scenarios. These case studies illuminate the intricacies of interactions and the resulting equilibrium outcomes.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber Threat Screening Using a Queuing-Based Game-Theoretic Approach

Dynamic and uncertain security environments, such as cyber systems, often involve strategic interactions among multiple decision-making agents. In this paper, we consider a cybersecurity setting where a system administrator (defender) has to screen malicious service requests of an attacker who seeks to exhaust available cyber resources and inconvenience users with normal requests. We propose a novel cyber-threat inspection model, based on Stackelberg games, that unies aspects of Threat Security Games with the Erlang-B queuing framework to provide equilibrium strategies for both the attacker and defender. In our proposed model, the defender seeks to determine the optimal number of inspection nodes required to maximize detection probability of malicious requests, while the attacker maximizes the probability of legitimate requests dropping out of the system. We derive analytical expressions of the equilibrium solutions of the proposed Stackelberg game under realistic assumptions on system observability and payoff structure of the players. A numerical case study is presented, and steps for further research are identified.

Cybersecurity, Stackelberg game, Erlang-B loss sys↗

A game theoretic investigation of deception in network security

We perform a game theoretic investigation of the effects of deception on the interactions between an attacker and a defender of a computer network. The defender can employ camouflage by either disguising a normal system as a honeypot or by disguising a honeypot as a normal system. We model the interactions between defender and attacker using a signaling game, a non-cooperative two player dynamic game of incomplete information. For this model, we determine which strategies admit perfect Bayesian equilibria. These equilibria are refined Nash equilibria in which neither the defender nor the attacker will unilaterally choose to deviate from their strategies. Finally, we discuss the benefits of employing deceptive equilibrium strategies in the defense of a computer network.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Probabilistic-Numerical Approximation for an Obstacle Problem Arising in Game Theory

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical schemes for the value function of this game, which is given by the solution of a quasilinear partial differential equation with obstacle.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗