Data-driven compact photocurrent models: A system identification approach for non-intrusive reduced order modeling of dose-rate induced photocurrents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
An atomistically-informed mean field cluster dynamics model has been developed to investigate the nucleation and growth of prismatic loops in irradiated a-Uranium. TEM analysis of neutron irradiated a-Uranium shows the evolution of self-interstitial atom and vacancy loops on (010) and (100) crystallographic planes, respectively, resulting in an anisotropic lattice swelling of its face-centered orthorhombic crystal. To provide model parameters, the crystallography of loops and the binding energy of point defects to these loops were studied using an angular dependent EAM potential and classical molecular dynamics (MD) simulations. Furthermore, using the bond-boost hyperdynamics method, the anisotropic diffusion of interstitials and vacancies in a-Uranium was investigated. Here, the mechanisms of point defect diffusion and the associated migration energies were reported and compared with previous DFT studies. The energetics and kinetic quantities mentioned above were used in the cluster dynamics model to predict the cluster density as a function of dose rate, dose and temperature and the results were compared to the reported neutron irradiation experiments. The model predictions reveal an accumulation of small sized vacancy loops along with a population of large and growing self-interstitial loops, which closely corresponds to the TEM observations.
IRSN (France), LLNL (USA) and ORNL (USA) began a long-term collaboration effort in 2015 to update the nuclear criticality Slide Rule for the emergency response to a nuclear criticality accident. The Slide Rule permits the estimation of neutron and gamma dose rates and integrated doses based upon estimated fission yields, as a function of distance from the fission source, and time after criticality accidents for different critical systems. This paper presents results from the fourth phase of the current update of the Slide Rule project, in which delayed fission-product gamma (DFG) dose rates of unreflected plutonium critical systems were compared by several modern 3D radiation transport codes (MCNP, COG, SCALE), using updated flux-to-dose conversion factors. Dose rates are calculated for fissile material at five moderation ratios (H/Pu), at 1 m above the ground as a function of distance (between 30 cm and 1,200 m) from the external surface of the source to the center of the detector, and for periods between 1 s and 1,000 min after the critical instantaneous event. Further efforts have been devoted to the determination of the delayed gamma source, by comparing the time-dependent energy spectra obtained from several methods. Overall, DFG dose rates calculated by each participant led to consistent results. Extra effort is under way to identify the cause of the remaining differences, by comparing precisely the gamma source, and particularly nuclides inventories.
At the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Second Target Station (STS) beamline sources for preliminary design have been used to perform a shielding analysis of the bunker. The simulations in this report used the ST11 beamline source, primarily the ST11 neutron source, because that source provides conservative prompt total dose rate estimates for all beamlines. Prompt total dose rates (i.e., neutron plus photon dose rates when the beam is on) were calculated on top of the bunker roof, outside the bunker wall, and in the basement below the bunker and instrument floor. Design changes were made to ensure the prompt total dose rate in these areas does not exceed 0.25 mrem/h. This report documents the required shielding thicknesses to meet this dose rate limit. There is one exception to this: for a combination of open and closed beamlines, the prompt total dose rate outside the bunker across from the closed beamline, where there is less shielding due to the lack of beamline shielding, slightly exceeds 0.25 mrem/h. A future analysis will document the shielding modifications required to reduce the calculated prompt total dose rates for this configuration to less than 0.25 mrem/h once more details regarding the STS high density concrete density and composition are known. Finally, prompt total dose rates inside the bunker were simulated. The results of this simulation show that the majority of prompt total dose rate in the bunker is due to neutrons, and a few percent of the total is caused by secondary photons created by the neutrons. The contribution to prompt total dose rate inside the bunker by the primary photons that enter each beamline from the target/moderator area is at least two orders of magnitude less than the neutron contribution. This means prompt total dose rate contributions due to primary photons inside and outside the bunker can be neglected.
A radiation shielding system is needed to protect personnel and equipment from harsh neutron and photon fluxes during: Reactor operations Post shut down operations Disassembly Decommissioning Examples of RSS driving requirements Radiological Controls Operating dose rate: the dose rate during normal reactor operations shall be <0.5 mrem/hr at the exterior wall of DOME containment Outdoor radiation limit: shielding shall provide the dose to a facility worker outside of DOME to <0.05 mrem/hr at 50 ft from the exterior wall of the DOME Temperature Reactors may have operating temperatures up to 800C The RSS shall be capable of removing up to 100 KW of heat during normal operating conditions the concrete structure has an upper temperature limit of 100°C
At the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Second Target Station (STS) beamline sources for preliminary design have been used to perform a shielding analysis of the bunker. Prompt total effective dose rates (i.e., neutron plus photon effective dose rates when the proton beam is on) were calculated on top of the bunker roof and outside the bunker wall. These areas outside the bunker will be generally accessible, so the prompt total dose rate in these areas should not exceed 2.5 μSv . h -1 (0.25 mrem . h -1 ). This paper presents the required shielding thicknesses to meet this dose rate limit. In one instance, this dose rate limit is not met: For a combination of populated and unpopulated beamlines, the prompt total dose rate outside the bunker across from the unpopulated beamline, which has less shielding because of the lack of beamline shielding, slightly exceeds 2.5 μSv . h -1 . In conclusion, once more details are known regarding the STS high-density concrete density and composition, a future analysis will investigate the shielding modifications required to reduce the calculated prompt total dose rates for this configuration to less than 2.5 μSv . h -1 .
This test report provides the results of radiation tolerance robustness testing that was performed on samples of robotic components and an ultrasonic guided wave air-slot sensor that represent components/sub-systems of the Robotic Air-slot Volumetric Inspection System (RAVIS) that has been engineered for volumetric inspection of Hanford tank bottom plates via under-tank refractory pad air-slots. The specific components tested for 1) functionality during active irradiation and 2) tolerance to cumulative radiation dose (until failure or upon reaching a cumulative dose test limit) were: • four samples each of a printed circuit board (PCB) and direct current (DC) motor, which are robotic components, and • 26 ultrasonic piezoelectric elements (samples) inside an air-slot sensor. The robotic components are part of the RAVIS air-slot inspection crawler drive control system that is responsible for remote communication with and actuation of the air-slot inspection crawler. The failure of either of these components during under-tank deployment would require manual retrieval via the crawler’s tether, which risks damage to the robot/refractory/tank. Preemptive replacement of the components at appropriately conservative dose/time intervals informed by failure dose would reduce the likelihood of under-tank failure. The components were included in radiation tolerance testing to quantify their failure doses to inform replacement intervals. The air-slot sensor is responsible for collecting ultrasonic inspection data (scan images) for the tank bottom plates during under-tank deployment. Compromised signal quality due to elevated noise levels caused by gamma radiation would compromise inspection performance. The air-slot sensor was included in radiation tolerance testing to quantify the impact of active irradiation on sensor signal quality. The irradiation and in-situ functional tests of the PCBs, DC motors and air-slot sensor took place in June and July 2020 at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Testing was performed at a gamma dose rate near 300 rad/hr., which, in the absence of under-tank dose rate data, has been conservatively estimated to be the upper-bound dose rate beneath the primary tanks at Hanford. Irradiation took place at elevated temperatures of 150-200°F to determine failure doses that reflect the compounding effects of gamma radiation and heat. The test results revealed: • The DC motors can tolerate being actively irradiated at the high dose rate at 200°F and can tolerate a cumulative dose of 300,000 rad, that which would be incurred after 5 years of service at the 300 rad/hr dose rate. The component therefore meets minimum and preferred radiation tolerance and lifecycle requirements for robotic components. • The air-slot sensor can tolerate being actively irradiated at the high dose rate at 150°F and can tolerate a cumulative dose of 60,000 rad, that which would be incurred after 1 year of service at the 300 rad/hr dose rate. The sensor therefore meets minimum radiation tolerance and lifecycle requirements. • The PCB can tolerate being actively irradiated at the high dose rate, but can only tolerate a cumulative dose of 19,000 rad at 150-200°F. The PCB does not meet minimum radiation tolerance and lifecycle requirements; however, because the component is considered replaceable, it can be replaced before a cumulative dose of 19,000 rad is reached, determined through either monitoring with a dosimeter or scheduled time intervals that are calculated based on conservative estimates of under-tank dose rates.
This report investigated best practices for performing shielding evaluations of Type B waste packages, as defined in 10 CFR Part 71 regulations on packaging and transportation of radioactive material, or packages for which the contents are not defined before loading and may include a broad range of nuclides, geometries, and non-fuel materials. The following non-fuel waste streams were analyzed: Activated metals from decommissioned commercial power reactors, including Type 304 stainless steel, reactor vessel steel, and Inconel, Control blades from boiling water reactors, Neutron-activated corrosion products on surfaces of activated metals, and Spent resins from power plant operations. Measured elemental compositions, including major constituents and impurities, for steel and Inconel samples from commercial power reactors were used in activation calculations to determine radionuclide inventories in activated metals. For a simplified cask model, 60 Co contribution to the total external package dose rate at 30 days after shutdown varied from approximately 60% to 95%, depending on the activated metal, initial cobalt impurity concentration in the metal, and the thickness of the overpack gamma shield. Its maximum contribution to the total external package dose rate of approximately 100% was reached within the time interval of 2 to 5 years after shutdown and was maintained for up to 45 to 60 years after shutdown, depending on material, initial cobalt impurity concentration, and shield thickness. Thereafter, the 60 Co contribution to external package dose rate decreased with increasing decay time. Cobalt-60 is primarily produced by neutron reactions with the cobalt impurity in steel and Inconel. Other important radionuclides in activated metals contributing to package external dose rate are radionuclides with relatively short decay times, including 51 Cr, 59 Fe, 58 Co, and 54 Mn. These radionuclides may be represented as an equivalent 60 Co activity/source because 60 Co gamma ray emissions are bounding in terms of source strength and energy to other important radionuclides identified in the analyzed activated metals. Approaches for modeling the neutron-activated corrosion products that may be attached to activated reactor components were analyzed in this report. It was demonstrated that a surface source is more conservative than a uniform volumetric source for the treatment of neutron-activated corrosion products with respect to external package dose rates. An analysis of the maximum radionuclide loadings reported on spent resins identified the radionuclides 137 Cs, 60 Co, 134 Cs, 65 Zn, and 58 Co as the primary contributors to external package dose rate. For a resin cooled for 3.08 years, the external package dose rate was entirely produced by the reported 137 Cs and 60 Co inventory. The neutron sources from actinides found on spent resins or activated metals produced negligible dose rates and may be ignored in dose rate analyses. Effects of idealized waste material, source geometry, and spatial material/source distributions on external package dose rates were determined based on dose rate results for a simplified cask model under normal conditions of transport. Type 304 stainless steel, zirconium, and aluminum with adjusted mass densities based on a maximum content weight were analyzed for material modeling effects on external package dose rate. These materials produced identical external package dose rates within the statistical uncertainties of the dose rate estimates. Among four different source geometry configurations with homogeneous material of different mass densities, uniform volumetric source distribution, and the same source strength, the geometry configuration with lowest mass density (i.e., minimum self-shielding effect among the four cases) was most conservative. Spatial source distributions that better represent localized peak 60 Co activity values were more conservative than a uniform volumetric source distribution, assuming the same weight and total source strength per package. The increase in external dose rate caused by localized source peaks can be as much as the ratio between source peak activity density to average activity density, depending on the location of the activated metal with peak activity density. Therefore, the shielding analysis may be simplified if localized peak activities and the average activity per package can be measured/determined and documented at the time of cask loading. For simplicity, external package dose rates may be determined based on average source activity and a uniform volumetric source distribution. The dose rate results from that calculation model multiplied by the ratio of peak activity density to average activity density will produce maximum dose rate values for conservative estimates.