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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

Project Summary 27th International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities

The course content consisted of 32 modules that included topics necessary to understand how to conduct PPS design and evaluation. An important aspect of ITC-27's training methodology was to ensure that each topic was presented via lecture (hear), and also included demonstrations (see) and hands-on field activities (do), whenever applicable. A final exercise provided participants with the opportunity to apply the design and evaluation knowledge gained during the course. Guest lecturers—both domestic and international—supplemented information from related agency perspectives. A new topic—Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)—offered participants a high-level awareness of the types, uses, and capabilities of these systems and how they might be used in both an adversarial and protective capacity.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Machine Learning Modeling Pipeline for Extracting Nuclear Proliferation Events of Interest from Open Data Sources (U)

In FY2020, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and the Sanghani Center for Artificial Intelligence and Data Analytics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University entered a collaboration funded by Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development. The project’s mission was to take the first steps toward developing a demonstration prototype system that uses multiple machine learning and data analytics methods on largescale open data sources to identify new, developing, and/or undeclared nuclear programs. Given the SRNL team’s on-site perspective of events culminating in the DOE’s decision to pursue the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF), the team targeted the identification of events and indicators in retrospective datasets that pointed to the activity of “fissile core fabrication at the Savannah River Site” prior to the official announcement in May of 2018. A preliminary modeling pipeline was developed in FY20 that showed the datasets contained adequate signal for continuation of efforts. In FY21, a modular demonstration prototype modeling pipeline has continued in development for two text-based data sources: a broad internet archive (Webhose Ltd.) and a decahose Twitter database (i.e., a global sampling of one in every ten Tweets). The techniques that have been developed rely on graph theory and anomaly detection to identify contextual shifts in key words and phrases at various points in time such that indicators of events of interest could be identified and subsequently, events could be extracted from the corpuses. The foundational concept behind the approaches is that contextual shifts in key words and phrases can act as indicators of events of interest. Both datasets have proven successful in extracting events of interest related to pit production at the Savannah River Site prior to the official announcement. In addition, the pipelines have generated a wide range of events broadly summarized as: the awarding of DOE contracts at major sites, DOE investments in various programs, accidents at DOE national laboratories, speculations about the fate of pit production in the DOE complex, domestic and international shipments and receipts of nuclear materials at DOE sites, termination of non-proliferation agreements with Russia, termination of MOX, new weapons development approvals/testing, nuclear posture reviews, major DOE cleanup/production milestones, political opinions, and nuclear watch groups’ opinions, among many others.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Material Control & Accounting Modeling Developments for a Generic TRISO Fuel Fabrication Facility

The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program utilizes modeling and simulation to assess Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) concerns for a variety of nuclear facilities. The Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)-developed Fissile Facility Flow Modeler (F3M) and the Material Accountancy Performance Indicator Toolkit (MAPIT) have historically provided MPACT with the capability to analyze MC&A approaches for nuclear facilities to determine that these facilities meet regulatory requirements. In FY25, improvements on the application of the F3M and MAPIT tools to simulate a generic TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) fuel fabrication facility were successfully completed. The generic TRISO fuel fabrication F3M model captures the entire TRISO fuel fabrication process and is adaptable to any final TRISO fuel form, including spherical pebbles and cylindrical compacts loaded into graphite prismatic blocks. Comprehensive F3M/MAPIT functionality for the generic TRISO fuel fabrication model has been demonstrated. This modeling framework can be applied to support the U.S. Department of Energy and domestic nuclear industry stakeholders in developing MC&A approaches for advanced fuel fabrication facilities via statistical tests that demonstrate compliance to regulatory requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2012

Nonproliferation, Nuclear Security, and the Insider Threat

Insider threat concept is evolving and getting more attention: (1) Domestically, internationally and in foreign countries, (2) At the government, academia, and industry levels, and (3) Public awareness and concerns are also growing. Negligence can be an insider's action. Technology advancements provide more opportunities, new tools for the insider. Our understanding of the insider is shaped by our cultural, social and ethnic perceptions and traditions. They also can limit our recognition of the issues and response actions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Methodology and Tool for the Physical Security Analysis of Micro and Advanced Reactors

This work proposes a dynamic evaluation methodology to relax the conservatism in physical security evaluation, by leveraging an ongoing work in the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway. This methodology is implemented in a dynamic risk assessment tool named Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The work extends EMRALD’s capability to support a sandbox feature where analysts can easily create attack scenarios and modify advanced/small modular reactor (A/SMR) security and safety features using templates. This approach saves time and cost since the analysis does not require creating detailed computer-aided design models, as is commonly required in commercial force-on-force software tools. EMRALD is completely free to use at https://emraldapp.inl.gov. We have developed basic templates including physical barriers, intrusion sensors, physical areas, and safety actions, that can be downloaded from EMRALD’s GitHub site: https://github.com/idaholab/EMRALD. These templates use generic data commonly used for training purposes, which do not reflect any actual operating nuclear reactor. Users may adjust the data in the templates with their own dataset and/or create new templates in EMRALD. The proposed methodology combines security and safety by assessing sabotage effects up to the radiological consequence to the public instead of merely the core damage state. This practice follows the industry standard for advanced non-light-water reactors currently proposed for endorsement by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The combination of security and safety is expressed in an achievability-consequence chart. EMRALD can be used to generate data for this chart. A hypothetical case study using a representative sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) facility is presented in this report to demonstrate this methodology. This case study does not contain any actual nuclear plant information. This work will benefit A/SMR vendors and utilities to implement security by design during the reactor design iteration phase, such that they do not have to perform upgrades and retrofits to the reactor after it is installed to improve its physical protection system. The tool may also be used to analyze domestic or foreign reactor designs to support the International Nuclear Security Techniques for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR) bilateral missions. Future works are planned to implement the methodology on a reference SFR reactor and a reference high-temperature gas-cooled reactor to obtain insights and lessons-learned for the A/SMR community.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2012

OSRP Source Repatriations-Case Studies: Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) began recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources) in 1999. As of February 2012, the project had recovered over 30,000 sources totaling over 820,000 Ci. OSRP grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover disused excess Plutonium- 239 (Pu-239) sources that were distributed in the 1960's and 1970's under the Atoms for Peace Program. Source recovery was initially considered a waste management activity. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the interagency community began to recognize that excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources pose a national security threat, particularly those that lack a disposition path. After OSRP's transfer to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, its mission was expanded to include all disused sealed sources that might require national security consideration. Recognizing the transnational threat posed by porous borders and the ubiquitous nature of sources, GTRI/OSRP repatriates U.S. origin sources based on threat reduction prioritization criteria. For example, several recent challenging source repatriation missions have been conducted by GTRI/OSRP in South America. These include the repatriation of a significant amount of Cs-137 and other isotopes from Brazil; re-packaging of conditioned Ra-226 sources in Ecuador for future repatriation; and, multilateral cooperation in the consolidation and export of Canadian, US, and Indian Co-60/Cs-137 sources from Uruguay. In addition, cooperation with regulators and private source owners in other countries presents opportunities for GTRI/OSRP to exchange best practices for managing disused sources. These positive experiences often result in long-term cooperation and information sharing with key foreign counterparts. International source recovery operations are essential to the preservation of U.S. national security interests. They are also mutually beneficial for fostering positive relationships with other governments and private industry, and demonstrate that responsible end-of-life options are given to legacy U.S.-origin sources in other countries. GTRI/OSRP does not take back sources that have a viable path for commercial disposal. Most US origin sources were sold commercially and were not provided by the US government. Below is a synopsis of cooperative efforts with Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Bilateral and multilateral efforts have been successful in removing hundreds of U.S.origin sealed radioactive sources from Latin American countries to the U.S. As many disused sources remain in the region, and since repatriation is not always an option, GTRI will continue to work with those countries to ensure that these sources are stored securely for the long-term. Successful Latin America operations should serve as a model for other regional cooperation in the repatriation of sealed sources, encouraging other source exporting countries to implement similar programs. Securing and removing sources, both domestically and internationally, is crucial to strengthening the life-cycle management of radioactive sources worldwide. Such efforts not only prevent these materials from being used maliciously, but also address public health and safety concerns, and under-gird the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Robust Network Interdiction Considering Multiple Defense Resources

We extend the network interdiction problem in order to consider multiple options for defending arcs in a network. We apply our model to select an optimal set of countermeasures for nuclear material smuggling. In order account for the joint impact of multiple countermeasures, we consider multiple components of defense: situational awareness, detection, and interdiction. We develop a bi-level programming model, where the adversary's goal is to maximize damage to the system while the defender seeks to minimize damage by selecting countermeasure options under a restricted bud- get. Furthermore, since effectiveness of countermeasures is often difficult to assess with high accuracy, we use robust optimization to allow for parametric uncertainty. We test our method on a synthetic example of the U.S. supply chain network that includes rail, air, and maritime transportation between both domestic and international locations. For this test example, we find that increasing the budget for countermeasures has the greatest impact within the first 1-2% of the cost to implement all countermeasures and that the uncertainty tolerance has a greater impact on expected damage than the countermeasure budget does. Thus, when strategically selecting countermeasures it is important to precisely understand the effectiveness of each option and the adversary's probability of subverting them.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

IEEE PES GM Poster - Cyber-Informed Engineering Approach to Mitigating BESS Supply Chain Concerns

Battery energy storage systems (BESS) are increasingly important to meet the needs of grid resilience and reliability. BESS provide critical grid services, maintaining stability of the grid with increased variable conditions. However, there are significant geopolitical and security concerns regarding their operation in critical infrastructure, due to lack of a domestic supply chain and prevalence of foreign entity of concern (FEOC) components in BESS and associated inverter-based resources. The supply chain challenge is dually exacerbated by a lack of alternative suppliers who can meet the economic targets for energy delivery and a potentially adversarial supply chain. Solutions are needed to secure components, addressing mixed layers of risk and engineering controls. This paper presents a specific application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles for BESS and recommends an alternative strategy to blocking the supply chain, ensuring that grid modernization targets can be met despite lack of a validated or secure supply chain. This study focuses on the United State (U.S.) use case, but the process can be applied globally to address supply chain security challenges. CIE practices represent the next step in functional assurance and risk mitigation, ensuring optimal resource allocation and enhancing security measures to safeguard the future of energy in the U.S. and beyond.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2015

Update On The Development, Testing, And Manufacture Of High Density LEU-Foil Targets For The Production Of Mo-99

This project has the objective to reduce and/or eliminate the use of HEU in commerce. Steps in the process include developing a target testing methodology that is bounding for all Mo-99 target irradiators, establishing a maximum target LEU-foil mass, developing a LEU-foil target qualification document, developing a bounding target failure analysis methodology (failure in reactor containment), optimizing safety vs. economics (goal is to manufacture a safe, but relatively inexpensive target to offset the inherent economic disadvantage of using LEU in place of HEU), and developing target material specifications and manufacturing QC test criteria. The slide presentation is organized under the following topics: Objective, Process Overview, Background, Team Structure, Key Achievements, Experiment and Activity Descriptions, and Conclusions. The High Density Target project has demonstrated: approx. 50 targets irradiated through domestic and international partners; proof of concept for two front end processing methods; fabrication of uranium foils for target manufacture; quality control procedures and steps for manufacture; multiple target assembly techniques; multiple target disassembly devices; welding of targets; thermal, hydraulic, and mechanical modeling; robust target assembly parametric studies; and target qualification analysis for insertion into very high flux environment. The High Density Target project has tested and proven several technologies that will benefit current and future Mo-99 producers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2017

The Significance of Strategic Foresight in Verification Technologies: A Case Study of the INF Treaty

Verification technologies can serve as important tools of statecraft in arms control efforts beyond providing monitoring capabilities and deterring noncompliance. The INF Treaty provides an insightful case study of the strategic side of verification technologies, illuminating how these capabilities can be used to shape negotiation positions and treaty content, provide domestic and international assurance, and manage tensions in the treaty implementation process. Operationalizing verification technologies in this way expands the tools available at the diplomatic and policy levels, but it requires foresight and preparedness to identify and develop the relevant technical capabilities. The most important finding of this case study is that technical preparedness had an important impact, but only after a period of latency. The verification approaches used in the INF Treaty were developed before the topic was raised in the negotiations, and thus the capabilities were available when certain political shifts had occurred

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Algorithm improvement program nuclide identification algorithm scoring criteria and scoring application.

The goal of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Algorithm Improvement Program (AIP) is to facilitate gamma-radiation detector nuclide identification algorithm development, improvement, and validation. Accordingly, scoring criteria have been developed to objectively assess the performance of nuclide identification algorithms. In addition, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet application for automated nuclide identification scoring has been developed. This report provides an overview of the equations, nuclide weighting factors, nuclide equivalencies, and configuration weighting factors used by the application for scoring nuclide identification algorithm performance. Furthermore, this report presents a general overview of the nuclide identification algorithm scoring application including illustrative examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Scintillators

As concerns about the illicit movement of radioactive materials across international borders increase, so too has the need for increased protection of those borders both foreign and domestic. The challenge is not only to detect hidden radioactive materials, but also to distinguish them from legitimate radionuclides such as radio-pharmaceuticals that are often transported across borders and shipped throughout a country. With more than 600 U.S. border sites to protect, screening imported radioactive material requires a careful balance of high throughput and high search efficiency. However, these requirements are difficult to meet as rapid screening operations leave less time for radiation detectors to efficiently evaluate materials. In support of border security, Sandia developed organic glass scintillators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2013

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE'S H-CANYON FACILITY: IMPACTS OF FOREIGN OBLIGATIONS ON SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DISPOSITION

The US has a non-proliferation policy to receive foreign and domestic research reactor returns of spent fuel materials of US origin. These spent fuel materials are returned to the Department of Energy (DOE) and placed in storage in the L-area spent fuel basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The foreign research reactor returns fall subject to the 123 agreements for peaceful cooperation. These “123 agreements” are named after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and govern the conditions of nuclear cooperation with foreign partners. The SRS management of these foreign obligations while planning material disposition paths can be a challenge.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Space Sustainability Strategy: An Overview and a Conceptual Framework for Implementation

Space sustainability is crucial for the continuation of humanity's exploration and utilization of space. NASA recognizes the imperative of maintaining a sustainable space operating environment to safeguard the future of space activities. On April 9, 2024, NASA released its first part of an integrated Space Sustainability Strategy focused on the domain of earth orbit, with future volumes to address impacts of space operations on earth itself; cislunar space, including the Lagrange points and the lunar surface; and deep space, including other celestial bodies. This commitment extends to ensuring the safety of astronauts conducting operations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), as well as enabling missions to the Moon and Mars. Moreover, sustainable space practices are essential for the uninterrupted operation of NASA's robotic science missions, which monitor Earth's changes and probe the mysteries of the universe. The strategy sets out a set of goals, the first of which is to establish a framework for assessing space sustainability at NASA, addressing the absence of a universally accepted framework with key metrics that promotes understanding of how metrics are interconnected. This framework will provide a basis for evaluating the sustainability of orbital activities, with metrics informed by input from the domestic and international space community. Objectives under this goal include defining key parameters affecting space sustainability, determining tolerable levels of risk, and annually publishing NASA's effect on space sustainability, including compliance with orbital debris mitigation standards. The subsequent goals build upon this foundation, identifying effective actions for enhancing space sustainability, incentivizing adoption of these actions through technology development and policy changes, and ensuring coordination with the global space community. An organizational change within NASA is also proposed to facilitate day-to-day coordination and accountability for space sustainability efforts. By pursuing these goals, NASA aims to strengthen the technical foundations of and continue to set an example for sustainable space operations. Regular evaluation of NASA mission performance in context with meeting sustainability objectives will ensure alignment with evolving challenges in the space operating environment.

Matt Forsbacka↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Criticality Safety Training: Needs and Efforts

Nuclear criticality safety (NCS) training is essential and required for NCS professionals to ensure that fissionable materials outside of nuclear reactors are safely processed, handled, stored, and transported. Furthermore, the requirement of training in NCS is mandated in several international and domestic documents. In this regard, management has an obligation to establish an NCS training program that provides confidence in the continuing proficiency of personnel, and supervisors must ensure that their staff is suitably trained. Training of all personnel in nuclear facilities is required to support the robust performance of operations. There is a continuing need to maintain, enhance, and develop new training courses to support the NCS community. This paper provides an outline of some of the ongoing and future training courses in the United States to support the field of NCS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Re-evaluating the Thermal-Spectrum Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor Fuel Cycle in a Modern Context

The current need to rapidly and substantially expand clean power production combined with limited capability for domestic uranium enrichment results in a U.S. nuclear power production planning environment similar to that of the first nuclear era. The U.S. thermal-spectrum molten-salt breeder reactor (TS-MSBR) program emerged during the first nuclear era as means to support rapid nuclear power expansion while minimizing demand on fissile resources. The primary reasons that the TS-MSBR program was discontinued in the 1970s were the comparatively large amount of required effort to mature its technology sufficiently for commercial deployment and the access to separated fissile material provided by the design of its integrated fuel cycle. The slowdown in U.S. electrical load growth after 1980 and the abundance of inexpensive fossil fuels inhibited reconsideration of TS-MSBR development for decades. The purpose of this discussion is to re-examine the value and technical challenges of TS-MSBRs with integrated fuel salt chemical processing considering the renewed need for rapid expansion of clean energy production worldwide, the current state of technology, the challenge of actinide wastes, and the continuing need to maintain a high degree of proliferation resistance and to integrate safeguards into the design.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Microreactor Security-by-Design Recommendations for Domestic and International Deployments

This report outlines methods vendors can use to incorporate security-by-design (SeBD) into their microreactor facility design to support and address security for both U.S. and international deployment. The team developed a hypothetical below-grade microreactor with a physical protection system (PPS) to protect the microreactor against acts of theft and sabotage and evaluated it against two adversary attack scenarios defined by a group of adversary subject matter experts (SMEs). The hypothetical microreactor facility consists of two distinct buildings. The first is the above-grade protected area (PA) entry control point (ECP) building, which houses security personnel responsible for conducting screenings and managing access to the PA. The second building is the reactor building, which features both an above-grade floor and a below-grade floor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Cyberspace, Information Strategy and International Security (Workshop Summary)

In recent years, the Center for Global Security Research has hosted a number of events to inform strategic thought on key areas of concern to national security and laboratory planning. This was the first dedicated workshop that CGSR has hosted seeking to convene a community of experts around issues of cybersecurity and Internet governance as they pertain to national security. The goal of this work was to bridge policy, academic, military, technical and other expert communities that often have limited contact with each other’s concerns and specialized knowledge. This workshop brought together over 80 experts from government, military, national labs, academic institutions, think tanks, the private sector, and civil society and hailing from 10 countries. While focusing on the national security challenges and military strategy emerging in and through cyberspace, the workshop aimed to address the cross-cutting interests and concerns of different stakeholders in the development and future governance of cyberspace, including those of the private sector, and civilian publics. To this end, the first day of the workshop focused particularly on issues directly relevant to military strategy in the cyber domain, while the second day addressed questions bridging national security and military concerns and their connections to the domestic and international politics of Internet governance. Topics discussed included the evolving cyber strategies of the U.S., U.S. allies and potential adversaries, as well as the complex characteristics of the cyber domain, the potential for deterrence in or through cyberspace, the domain’s escalation risks, and the ways in which the “dual use” nature of much of the underlying technology of cyberspace connects actions in the domain with broader questions of global Internet governance. Issues of online disinformation and information warfare and the unique conceptual tensions and governance challenges posed by these forms of conflict were addressed. The workshop also examined the roles and interests of different stakeholders in addressing cybersecurity challenges, as well as the possibility of norms, international law, and other potential mechanisms of constraint.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗