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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2011

Toward Scalable Trustworthy Computing Using the Human-Physiology-Immunity Metaphor

The cybersecurity landscape consists of an ad hoc patchwork of solutions. Optimal cybersecurity is difficult for various reasons: complexity, immense data and processing requirements, resource-agnostic cloud computing, practical time-space-energy constraints, inherent flaws in 'Maginot Line' defenses, and the growing number and sophistication of cyberattacks. This article defines the high-priority problems and examines the potential solution space. In that space, achieving scalable trustworthy computing and communications is possible through real-time knowledge-based decisions about cyber trust. This vision is based on the human-physiology-immunity metaphor and the human brain's ability to extract knowledge from data and information. The article outlines future steps toward scalable trustworthy systems requiring a long-term commitment to solve the well-known challenges.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Active High Assurance Authentication Protocol (AHAAP)

The AHAAP Maturation Project involves maturation and evaluation of a patented zero-trust tamper-resistant high-assurance session-less dynamic and active device authentication protocol that simultaneously authenticates identity and provides integrity verification in a single step, substantially reducing the risk of cyberattack, and eliminating the need for costly and complex conventional communication security systems requirements (i.e., cryptography, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and key management). These cybersecurity attributes of the technology must be preserved when applying the technology to different cybersecurity solutions, including Command & Control (C&C), Over-the-Air (OTA) update, Common Access Card (CAC), and distributed energy resource (DER) implementations, among others. The technology research objective is to test and verify that the cybersecurity attributes of the technology are not degraded in different cybersecurity applications. The primary technology development objective is to build minimum viable products to demonstrate the technology addresses today’s cybersecurity threats so that prospective investors, strategic partners, regulatory agencies, and commercial customers can interact with and assess the protection assured by the technology. The AHAAP Maturation Project goal is to develop, test, and validate one or more AHAAP implementations. The AHAAP Maturation Project tasks are: (i) engineer AHAAP implementation software, (ii) build a functional prototype that implements the AHAAP software for demonstration, testing, analysis, and evaluation purposes, and (iii) generate a report detailing the results of the AHAAP C&C software and hardware implementation. The final project deliverables are: (i) AHAAP software implementation and prototype, (ii) a report from Sandia National Laboratories detailing the results of the AHAAP implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Digital Energy Infrastructure: Procurement, Contracting, and Supply Chain Risk Management Guidance

Recognizing the scale of this industry challenge, the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Grid Deployment Office (GDO) and Cybersecurity Energy Security & Emergency Response office have launched a multi-year BESS supply chain security initiative to identify consequence-driven approaches to addressing BESS supply chain security and provide resources to support prioritization of supply chain security efforts associated with the procurement of BESS equipment and services. This guide is one element of the supporting resources to be provided and sets forth a framework and guidance for procurement bidding, selection, risk analysis, and agreements stakeholders can implement to mitigate cybersecurity risks across the entirety of battery system component ecosystem, including the interconnected software and hardware required for control and monitoring BESSs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2023

DER Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis

Solar photovoltaic (PV) cybersecurity is a growing field of research. As deployments of solar PV have increased, cyber risk has also increased. Utility solar PV installations, however, are not required to comply with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) plan unless they meet a minimum generation threshold of 75 MW. Individual residential-scale solar PV deployments will not meet that generation threshold and are therefore excluded from the NERC CIP requirements. With most solar installations less than 75 MW, solar PV has been deployed with minimal oversight and highly variable cybersecurity maturity. The resources that comprise the digital supply chain can include software, code, data, and other digital components. But as clean energy technologies advance, cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities continue to evolve and grow in sophistication. Supply chain cybersecurity represents a critical area for ensuring safe operations as the U.S. moves toward a clean energy future.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2017

Application of HFE to the design and V and V of a computerized procedure system: benefits and challenges - 234

The application of Human Factors Engineering (HFE) practices to the Human Machine Interface design and subsequent Verification and Validation (V and V) is a widely applied practice when talking about the design of complete control rooms or important control room modernizations, but not so often applied to the design of computerized operator support systems. In order to overcome the challenges faced on designing a Computerized Operation Support System (COSS) that meets the process efficiency requirements and integrates seemingly with hybrid plant operation concept, the involvement of a HFE team early in the COSS design and implementation process along with operation, Instrumentation and Control (I and C) and cybersecurity experts will guarantee the project success. This paper documents the HFE process applied during the design and evaluation of a Computerized Procedure System (CPS) and how final product was shaped to ensure that the transition from paper to computerized procedures will help in meeting Delivering the Nuclear Promise (DNP) goals, improving plant efficiency. The HFE program included the following activities: 1. A review of existing operating experience 2. An analysis of functions and tasks associated to the use and maintenance of CPS 3. A design verification of the system to meet guidelines prescribed in the NUREG-0700 (Rev.2), requirements of the ISG-05 and cybersecurity criteria (NEI 08-09, IEC-62646, EPRI 1015313, these among others). 4. An integrated system validation in a full scope simulator The application of HFE practices in the design and implementation of COSS helps not only to ensure that efficiency and safety improvement requirements are met, but also to evaluate the potential return of the investment, that such tools should bring. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Residential Vehicle-to-Home Backup Power Capabilities: Key Findings from a ComEd Beneficial Electrification R&D Pilot

This report summarizes key findings from a collaborative technical study of residential, non-grid-tied vehicle-to-home (V2H) backup power systems in Commonwealth Edison’s (ComEd’s) service territory. The work integrates (1) a feeder-level technoeconomic analysis (TEA) using historical outage-event data and simulated electric-vehicle (EV) driving/charging profiles to estimate potential reliability and customer interruption-cost impacts under V2H and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) adoption scenarios; (2) controlled laboratory performance testing of a representative V2H backup ecosystem to characterize transfer-to-backup behavior, sustained power delivery, efficiency trends, and repeatable reliability limitations; and (3) a cybersecurity assessment aligned with NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 and ISO/SAE 21434 to evaluate interface-level risk drivers and identify program-relevant mitigations. Results indicate that V2H can provide measurable resilience value, but outcomes are strongly context dependent on outage patterns and the share of events that are “V2H-applicable.” Typical transfer-to-backup behavior clustered on the order of minutes, but rare long-delay edge cases were observed (including an event approaching 30 minutes) and should be treated as a reliability risk. High-power testing showed that peak-rated output is not necessarily continuously deliverable; stable operation may require operation below nameplate ratings and attention to thermal and installation constraints. The cybersecurity assessment highlights a broad attack surface spanning commissioning, home networks, embedded services, and cloud/OTA pathways, motivating minimum controls for secure onboarding, signed updates, patch cadence, and coordinated vulnerability response for any scaled deployment.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2015

SPSP Phase III Recruiting, Selecting, and Developing Secure Power Systems Professionals: Individual and Team Performance Guidelines

The pending retirement of significant numbers of power system experts and a continuing trend of increasing complexity in modern power systems prompted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to establish the three-phase Secure Power Systems Professional (SPSP) project. The project developed resources for job definition and competency analysis along with tools to guide assessment and curriculum design and to help identify and develop required knowledge, skills, and abilities in technical and operational aspects of power systems cybersecurity. The Secure Power Systems Professional Phase III final report was released last year which an appendix of Individual and Team Performance Guidelines. This new report is that appendix broken out as a standalone document to assist utilities in recruiting and developing Secure Power Systems Professionals at their site. Individual/Team Performance Guidelines were developed for each of the four job roles: the secure power systems engineer, incident responder, intrusion analyst, and security operator. They enable an “at-a-glance” view of the multidisciplinary and collaborative nature of SPSP job roles, for which skill sets were studied and then mapped to stories of critical incidents or vignettes. This afforded an enumeration of tasks required of each job role to effectively perform responsibilities and to meet bestpractice goals for that operation. Assignment of these tasks among the job roles, either as an individual responsibility or a collaborative responsibility, was validated during a job performance model analysis. The analysis identified 13 master vignettes from the collection of critical incident stories, many of which shared a common set of job responsibilities and tasks that were grouped into four vignette categories according to the task requirement for effective response to each event.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Lessons Learned from Vehicle to Grid Engagement

As the transportation industry continues to become electrified, introduction of additional digital devices within associated actions such as recharging bring additional potential for cybersecurity attacks. Devices that are designed, implemented, and operated with cybersecurity as a crucial consideration exacerbate these concerns by failing to provide strict boundaries on access to and use of the equipment. Emerging use cases such as Vehicle to Grid (V2G) charging may expand the potential physical effects of a cybersecurity attack by providing indirect access to electrical components of a building microgrid or portions of the larger power grid. This paper serves as an overview of findings and recommendations based on cybersecurity testing performed at a V2G implementation site operated by a member of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Establish the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Collaboration [1]. The Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response is a signatory of the MOU, and has funded this research paper and associated body of work regarding V2X cybersecurity. Sandia has a large background of previous research focused on Electric Vehicle (EV) cybersecurity, such as reference [2], which includes an overall survey of EV infrastructure cybersecurity and recommendations based on those findings. This report seeks to expand knowledge of EV cybersecurity status and needs by focusing on a specific implementation of V2G charging, and providing recommendations based on the relevant findings. This report serves as a publicly available, sanitized description of applied vulnerability testing on an operational V2G implementation. A more in-depth technical version of the report is provided to the MOU partner, but not available at the time of writing due to inclusion of proprietary information. V2G charging comes with many research problems that must be solved before the technology can securely implemented in sites with unrestricted public access or where cybersecurity attacks could have increased consequences, such as government offices. V2G charging requires many stakeholders such as end users, host sites, equipment vendors, and integrators, which all rely on operational safety and security as well as security and trustworthiness of any associated financial transactions.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Considerations and Research Pathways for Grid-Interactive Efficient Buildings

Federal facilities serve critical missions and functions that require safe, reliable, and efficient operations. Digitization of several facility operations has increased the cost-effectiveness of energy usage and optimization of energy system performance. As the building controls landscape shifts to become more connected and smarter, building operators now face unique opportunities and challenges to adopt smart enabled devices that can lower energy usage while also optimizing building system performance. The grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEB) initiative aims to make buildings cleaner and more flexible through these smart devices. Smart enabled devices allow greater connectivity and control through remote operations and provide crucial data for analytics and increased efficiency. GEBs enable demand flexibility that has the potential to reduce electrical costs and transform the grid edge where buildings connect to power grids. This operation of interconnected systems, if not designed with cybersecurity practices, causes security gaps and introduces potential attack paths by adversarial and non-adversarial entities leading to disruption of operations.

building controls↗
DOE OSTI2022

Synchrophasors-based Master State Awareness Estimator for Cybersecurity in Power Grid: Testbed Implementation & Field Demonstration

The integration of distributed energy resources(DERs) and expansion of complex network in the distribution grid requires an advanced distributed state estimator to monitor the grid health at micro-level. The distribution state estimator will improve the situational awareness and resiliency of distributed power system. This paper proposes a synchrophasors-based master state awareness (MSA) estimator to enhance the cybersecurity in distribution grid by providing a real-time estimation of system operating states to control center operators. In this paper, the proposed MSA estimator utilizes only phasor measurements, bus magnitudes and angles, from phasor measurement units (PMUs),deployed in local substations, to estimate the system states and also detects data integrity attacks, such as load tripping attack that disconnects the load. To validate the proof of concept, we implement the proposed methodology in cyber-physical testbed environment at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Electric Grid Security Testbed. Further, to address the “valley of death” and support technology commercialization, field demonstration is also performed at the Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex(CITRC) at the INL. Our experimental results reveal a promising performance in detecting load tripping attack and providing an accurate situational awareness through an alert visualization dashboard in real-time

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) User Story

This document presents a user story for the Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) tool designed to aggregate and analyze cyber-attack observables for operational technology (OT) systems. BAM aims to empower cybersecurity analysts by providing a streamlined interface for collecting observable data from various sources, enabling real-time analysis of potential adversary activity. By enhancing the response capabilities of security teams, BAM facilitates risk-informed decision-making and improves organizational security posture. This user story outlines the key functionalities, user interactions, and requirements necessary to successfully integrate BAM with other security information and event management (SIEM) technology and cybersecurity operations centers (CSOCs).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Cybersecurity Assessments on Emulated DER Communication Networks

An increasing number of public utility commissions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. The recently updated national standard, IEEE 1547-2018, requires all DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5, or IEEE 1815 communication interface in order to provide local and bulk power system services. Those communication protocols and associated information models will ensure system interoperability for PV and storage systems, but these new utility-to-DER communication networks must be deployed with sufficient cybersecurity to protect the U.S. power system and other critical infrastructure reliant on dependable power. Unlike bulk generators, DER are commonly connected to grid operators via public internet channels. These DER networks are exposed to a large attack surface that may leverage sophisticated techniques and infrastructure developed on IT systems, including remote exploits and distributed attacks. Although DER make up a growing portion of the national generation mix, they have limited processing capabilities and do not typically support modern security features such as encryption or authentication. In this work, Sandia National Laboratories constructed simulated DER communication net- works with a range of security features in order to study the security posture of different communication approaches. The experimental test environment was created in a Sandia-developed co-simulation platform, called SCEPTRE, which emulated Sun Spec-compliant DER equipment, the utility DER management system, communication network, and distribution power system. Adversary-based assessments were conducted and a quantitative scoring criteria was applied to evaluate the resilience of various architectures against cyber attacks and to measure the systemic impact during such attacks. The team found that network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defense improved the security of these networks and would be recommended for utility, aggregator, and local DER networks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Midwest Industrial Assessment Center (Final Technical Report)

The Midwest IAC’s prime center was at the University of Missouri (MU) and the satellite center was at Wichita State University, Kansas. During the 5-year period we conducted at least 96 energy assessments, with recommended energy cost savings of $10.3 million of which $6.5 million was implemented savings. The implemented energy savings were 0.63 Terra BTU and CO2 emissions reduction was 400,000 tons. Thirty-five students completed requirements for a certificate of completion from DOE. IAC students received training in cybersecurity basics and application to manufacturing, fundamentals of energy efficiency, ISO50001, smart manufacturing.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2024

MFANS 2024 - Formally Proving Characteristics of Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are engineered systems that rely on the smooth integration of computational algorithms and physical elements. This integration presents new challenges for verifying that systems will behave as expected. The goal of this presentation is to present current challenges and potential solutions for the formal verification of cyber-physical systems. For cyber systems, formal methods refer to systematically rigorous mathematical techniques employed in the specification, development, analysis, and verification of both software and hardware systems. Recent advancements in computer science have yielded sophisticated tools specifically designed to address challenges associated with formal methods in complex systems. These tools leverage various foundational concepts such as logic, formal languages, program semantics, type systems, type theory, and automata theory. A notable achievement in the application of formal methods is the seL4 microkernel, claimed to be the first general-purpose operating-system kernel to be verified. Its proof implies the absence of bugs and guarantees that the kernel meets specifications. For physical systems, dynamic and control theory has a history of using rigorous analytic techniques to prove functional correctness. Lyapunov, optimal, classical, modern, and robust control theories all provide rigorous mathematical methods both to analyze system performance and to design controller that can be guaranteed to meet certain objectives. Recent computational techniques like level set theory and reachability analysis provide assertions that a system's state will avoid unsafe regions. Even though success has been independently achieved for cyber systems and physical systems, the integration of such systems creates new challenges. In particular, there is an obvious discrepancy between finite-state machines and infinite-state systems, resulting in different approaches for modeling and analyzing these system. While it is possible to simulate hybrid systems, this provides only a demonstration of a performance and not proof. For hybrid systems, current formal methods and system analysis approaches typically require a workarounds to work on hybrid systems like CPS. This paper will outline the state of the art and limits of current practice for formally verifying CPS and will identify possible research directions that require attention.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

University of Wisconsin-Madison Campus-Wide Deep Dive

In June 2019, staff members from the Engagement and Performance Operations Center (EPOC) and the University of Wisconsin–Madison Division of Information Technology (UW DoIT) met with researchers for the purpose of a Campus-Wide Deep Dive. The goal of this meeting was to help characterize the requirements for a number of research and educational activities, and to enable cyberinfrastructure support staff to better understand the needs of researchers. Material for this event includes both the written documentation from nine projects, and the campus technology organization, but also a writeup of the discussion that took place in person. The Case Studies highlighted the ongoing challenges that the University of Wisconsin–Madison will face in the coming years to support, encourage, and grow several emerging and established use cases. The University of Wisconsin–Madison received an NSF award to help support upgrading the campus network in 2012, specifically to include a Science DMZ and monitoring equipment. However, there is a currently identified need to refresh equipment and identify and work more closely with current campus researchers. Updates to the state network, as well as the campus, are being planned and were discussed during this event. As part of the overall review, the necessity of working more closely with research teams as they are still in the planning phase was discussed so that DoIT can better understand and adapt to changes in requirements as the research demands grow over time . Additional challenges with securing sensitive data, cybersecurity, and supporting collaborations were also discussed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Smart Packaging for Critical Energy Shipment (SPaCES)

Recent technical advances have brought forth revolutionary Smart Packaging (SP) technology. SP incorporates multiple electronics, chemical, and mechanical sensing technologies into packaging materials, and utilizes them to monitor and display package content status. SP can also employ embedded micro actuators to react to undesirable package conditions such as moisture/temperature anomalies or harmful chemical reactions and neutralize it. When further integrated with wireless sensing and secure networking, SP provides wholistic system-wide remote situation awareness capability for real-time crisis management. Finally, we also see that SP can be further integrated with 3D printing technology to offer form-factor customization and application specific solutions suitable for DOE (Department of Energy) NNSA’s (National Nuclear Security Administration) R/N (radiological/nuclear) material shipment and management needs; this has the potential to improve safety, security, and overall operation process quality. This report surveys SP technology as the state of the art (SOTA) and analyzes how it can integrate with cybersecurity and 3D printing to address NNSA’s critical R/N material shipment and storage requirements. This report further presents our FY23/24 investigation plan describing project background, goal, motivation, proposed work, and statement of work and cost.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Test & Measurement System Security in an IT World

Automated test and measurement systems are coming under increased cybersecurity scrutiny. Most of these systems fall under the “Operational Technology” designation, as defined by NIST, and often have unique requirements that conflict with enterprise security policy. These systems are typically not well understood by traditional enterprise IT personnel, which leaves them ill-supported or invalidated.▪This presentation attempts to help Test System owners recognize the security landscape, determine their unique system requirements and concerns, and negotiate a peer-level working arrangement with an existing IT department while maintaining a NIST-recommended level of autonomy and sovereignty.

automated test↗
DOE OSTI2019

PV Cyber Security Research (Final Report)

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. This project was split into two phases. The first provided a survey and roadmap of the cybersecurity for the solar industry. The second investigated multiple PV cybersecurity research and development (R&D) concepts identified in the first phase. In the first year, the team created a roadmap for improving cybersecurity for distributed solar energy resources. This roadmap was intended to provide direction for the nation over the next five years and focused on the intersection of industry and government and recommends activities in four related areas: stakeholder engagement, cyber security research and development, standards development, and industry best practices. At the same time, the team produced a primer for DER vendors, aggregators, and grid operators to establish a common taxonomy and describe basic principles of cyber security, encryption, communication protocols, DER cyber security recommendations and requirements, and device-, aggregator-, and utility-level security best practices to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This material was motivated by the need to assist the broader PV industry with cybersecurity resilience and describe the state-of-the-art for securing DER communications. Lastly, an adversary-based assessment of multiple PV devices was completed at the Distributed Energy Technologies Laboratory at Sandia National Laboratories to determine the status of industry cybersecurity practices. The team found multiple deficiencies in the security features of the assessed devices. In the second year, a set of recommendations was created for DER communication protocols— especially with respect to the state-of-the-art requirements in IEEE 2030.5. Additionally, several cybersecurity R&D technologies related to communications-enabled photovoltaic systems were studied to harden DER communication networks. Specifically, the team investigated (a) using software defined networking to create a moving target defense system for DER communications, and (b) engineering controls that prevent misprogramming or adversary action on DER devices/networks by disallowing setpoints that will generate unstable power system operations.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗