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This presentation provides an overview of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, including the program's history, mission, vision, main functions, budgetary information, accomplishments, challenges, initiatives, and current work.
This presentation provides an overview of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP), including its mission, vision, program element activities, current work, recent accomplishments, and budget/funding information.
The design of a new subcritical assembly at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been finalized. This design takes the feasibility study of the subcritical assembly performed in August 2020 to an implementable design. This subcritical assembly will support the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) training and education program. The addition of this subcritical assembly into the NCSP training and education will enhance the program by providing backup capacity for training if nuclear facility operations are disrupted at Sandia National Laboratories or the National Criticality Experiments Research Center; providing a new location that is more accessible to students in the Eastern portion of the United States; providing flexibility to support students from a diverse background (e.g., university students, foreign nationals). The proposed subcritical assembly uses legacy AGN-201M research reactor fuel plates that are available at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The final design of this subcritical assembly contains approximately 617 grams of 235 U as UO 2 powder distributed homogeneously in polyethylene. The fuel plates will have a graphite neutron reflector to obtain a core multiplication, M, from 10 to 20, corresponding to a $k_{eff}$ of 0.90 to 0.95, respectively. The subcritical assembly will be able to support at least four experiments for the training courses: (1) the addition of fissile material to the core (mass), (2) a core separation experiment (interaction), (3) the addition of moderators to the core (moderation), and (4) the addition of neutron absorbers to the core (poison/absorption). The subcritical assembly will be designed to be inherently safe—subcritical under all normal and abnormal conditions— and will provide the capability to conduct hands-on training to support NCSP and general nuclear criticality safety staff training and qualification goals.
The Space Station contains safety critical computer software components in systems that can affect life and vital property. These components require a multilevel secure system that provides dynamic access control of the data and processes involved. A study is under way to define requirements for a security model providing access control through level B3 of the Orange Book. The model will be prototyped at NASA-Johnson Space Center.
Modeling & Simulation (M&S) tools are used to analyze advanced reactor designs and the safety of current nuclear operations. As computers continue to improve, we are able to enhance resolution in our calculations. Therefore, the limitations of simulation capability are in the quality of data that is being used, including our ability to quantify the uncertainty and sensitivity of that data. In order to model systems of interest with increasing accuracy, the industry must improve key nuclear data measurements. The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) compiles and evaluates experiment data in a handbook that can be used by criticality safety engineers and others to validate computer codes and cross section libraries at nuclear facilities. Both critical and subcritical experiments are included in the handbook. These experiments, along with differential measurements, can help improve the quality of nuclear data. Concerns regarding the accuracy of Cu nuclear data have been published. The large values and trend of C-E for the Zeus intermediate energy benchmark, being one of the primary examples. Furthermore, very few experiments have been designed to be sensitive to Cu (as shown in Figure 1), so an integral, critical experiment is needed to help resolve these differences.
Since the beginning of the nuclear age in 1943, there have been 22 criticality accidents in process facilities worldwide in which fissionable materials were processed by hand for various purposes. Of these 22 process criticality accidents, 16 involved faulty or flawed conduct of operations. Most of these process accidents (17 of 22) occurred before 1970, mostly due to the implementation of formal conduct of operations—such as the use of operating procedures and training—and the use of consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Obviously, the nuclear facilities applied lessons learned from their accident history, and the rate of criticality accidents was significantly reduced as a result. Over the years, it has been emphasized in NCS training courses and other venues in the United States that the consensus standards, such as ASA N6.1-1964, were the key contributors to this reduction in accidents. The formality of operations required to implement and apply the standards at a facility is also a crucial prerequisite that must be sufficiently robust to ensure NCS. This prerequisite is crucial to success fully implement the NCS consensus and other safety standards at a site.
The Department of Energy invests tens of millions of dollars each year to develop the next generation of nuclear engineering modeling & simulation (M&S) tools. These tools are used to analyze advanced reactor designs and the safety of current nuclear operations. As computers become more powerful, we are able to enhance resolution in our calculations. This improved resolution is taking us to a point where the limitations of simulation capability are in the quality of data, including our ability to quantify the uncertainty and sensitivity of the data. In order to model systems of interest with increasing accuracy, the industry must improve key nuclear data measurements. Thus, M&S tools need evaluated and quality-assured experimental data for validation purposes. The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) compiles and evaluates experiment data in a handbook that can be used by criticality safety engineers and others to validate computer codes and cross-section libraries at nuclear facilities. Both critical and subcritical experiments are included in the handbook. Figure 1 organizes all the benchmark evaluations that have been performed by the isotope of interest, in this case Pb, and the average neutron energy the system. Compared to other isotopes of interest for nuclear applications, there are few benchmark evaluations for Pb systems. The lack of integral measurements to determine errors in Pb cross-section data has caused the latest nuclear cross-section libraries to over/underestimate k eff compared to experimental results. Therefore, this evaluation fills an important knowledge gap in benchmark evaluations.
The evaluation of the 15 N compound system was selected by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) due to the importance of nitrogen in criticality benchmarks and in actinide chemistry encountered during fuel reprocessing. For improved accuracy in transport calculations, it is recommended to obtain and distribute resonance parameters to describe n + 14 N reactions.
This presentation is on the formality of operations and nuclear criticality safety standards. This lecture starts with an Introduction then leads into a conversation on the dependencies of formality of operations. Secondly the presentation includes a review of past issues. Included is a Discussion about “credible” and “unlikely” – variables for process analysis in ANS-8.1, Section 4.1.2, and the double contingency principle, Section 4.2.2, respectively. The presentation finishes with some conclusions.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is preparing for anticipated licensing applications requesting fuel enrichments of UO 2 ceramic fuels enriched in excess of 5 weight percent (w/o) 235 U for commercial light-water reactors (LWRs). PNNL has been tasked with providing technical assistance to the NRC related to the review and approval of requests for enrichment increases above the current 5 w/o 235 U enrichment limit. This report will provide the agency with technical assistance to enhance the staff’s knowledge base and to identify developmental needs required to support the licensing of greater than 5 w/o UO 2 ceramic fuels. This report provides a background on increasing enrichment of UO 2 LWR fuel beyond 5 w/o 235 U. The primary concern of increasing enrichment is the impacts to criticality safety. This report will focus on criticality safety as it relates to enrichment, conversion of uranium hexafluoride to UO 2 , fuel assembly fabrication, transportation of fresh/spent fuel assemblies, reactor operations, and storage of fresh/spent fuel assemblies. The report provides a general summary of each of the steps in the UO 2 fuel cycle starting from transportation of enriched UF 6 through dry cask storage of spent fuel assemblies. This report also discusses other impacts of increased enrichment during reactor operation and the surrounding fuel cycle activities. Current needs regarding both data and analytical codes to support the increase above 5 w/o 235 U are identified and discussed.
This presentation provides background information about domestic and international nuclear criticality safety consensus standards and gives a status summary of work in progress.
This presentation provides an overview of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, including its history, mission, vision, organization, measurement and evaluation priorities for FY23, 5-year plan, and cross-cutting nuclear data work.
Members of the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have updated the suite of benchmark problems developed to validate MCNP6 Version 2.0 for use in NCS applications. The updated NCS benchmark suite adds approximately 600 new benchmarks and includes peer review of all input files by two different NCS engineers (or one NCS engineer and one candidate NCS engineer). As with the originally released benchmark suite, the updated suite covers a broad range of fissile material types, material forms, moderators, reflectors, and neutron energy spectra. The benchmark suite provides a basis to establish a bias and bias uncertainty for use in NCS analyses at SNL.
This presentation is on the Nuclear Criticality Safety Repository, LFE Database, and the NDA Program. This presentation covers a large section on the Learning from Experience Database (LFE).
This presentation explains the meaning of the terms “Credible” and “Unlikely” for nuclear criticality safety purposes. This presentation references several terminology resources. With a focused look into ANS-8.1 Terminology. The presentation concludes with a talk on safety culture and the formality of operations program (FOP).
This presentation touches on the purpose of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Technical Program Review. This presentation also covers the background, history, mission, and vison of the organization. Slides include visual representations of the technical program element activities and the current NCSP work sites.
Human-rated missions like NASA's Exploration Mission - 1 (EM-1) and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software's contribution to achieving mission objectives. The increasing complexity and inherent safety critical nature of the embedded flight software imposes a unique resource challenge to assurance providers responsible for affirming that the mission is going to fly safely. Another challenge NASA and other Government agencies are facing is that more and more software is being developed using an agile development methodology, which is divergent from the typical waterfall, iterative, and incremental development methodologies assurance providers generally observe in the development of safety-critical embedded software. Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) has addressed these challenges by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V evaluated areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the agile software development life cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer thereby imposing increased rework costs. As a result of evolving the approach to adding assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance conclusions and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This paper and presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and stimulate thinking for groups looking to add assurance to software being developed using an agile methodology.
A series of criticality safety analyses was performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to assess the CURIO NuCycle process based on information provided in late 2023 and early 2024. Each of the segments of the NuCycle process is considered separately, although some interface considerations are necessary. A separate detailed final report that includes proprietary analysis details has been provided to Curio; this report provides a high-level summary to document the closure of this cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA), identified as NFE-23-09571.