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Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 114: Area 25 EMAD Facility Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 114, Area 25 EMAD Facility, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 114 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: • 25-41-03, EMAD Facility (Building 3900) • 25-99-23, Manned Control Car (MCC) and Engine Installation Vehicle (EIV) • 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building (Train Shed) This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAU 114. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 114 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective actions for CAU 114. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of corrective actions will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. The purpose of the corrective action investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for either clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. If specific conditions or findings fall outside the bounds of the conceptual site model, such as an unanticipated release, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine the path forward before proceeding. Upon completion of SAFER activities, a closure report (CR) will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval. The schedule for completion of the CR will be established in consultation with NDEP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Functionalized Cellular Magmatics

We are pioneering the development of fundamental and applied research related to engineered cellular magmatics (ECM) technology. Over the course of our first year, we developed the methodology and measured the effects of various additives on ECM properties. We demonstrated the ability to control the phase and morphology of post-process secondary minerals on ECMs based on starting conditions and compositions. Both achievements are critical to advancing the use of ECMs for applications such as water filtration and runoff remediation. We established the ability to grow various microbiologic consortia on ECM surfaces as well as a process that allows industrial scaling of the technology for rapid field deployment in applications such as the cleanup of fossil fuel contamination. Furthermore, this biotechnology also has potential application in the nascent fields of biomining of precious metals and bioremediation of toxic heavy metals.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

What Lies Beneath Can Be Imaged

The Hanford Site was quickly established to help end World War II, making history for producing the plutonium used in the world’s first nuclear weapons. Throughout the Cold War years, Hanford employees produced plutonium for most of the more than 60,000 weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal stockpile. Today, the once highly active nuclear reactors are shut down. And the mission at Hanford turned full-circle as scientists, engineers and specialists work to clean up our nation’s most contaminated nuclear site. PNNL Computational Geophysicist Tim Johnson is helping decision-makers understand the complexity and breadth of the contamination in soils at Hanford. Tim and others are applying remote, high-resolution geophysical imaging to determine the extent of contamination in the soil below the surface and understand the processes controlling its movement. They also provide real-time imaging of remediation processes that are working to limit the movement of contaminants below the surface and toward water resources. Geophysical imaging simply means that PNNL scientists are combining the techniques of geology, physics, mathematics and chemistry with supercomputer modeling to create three-dimensional images of the waste and its movement. These real-time, remote images are essential in reducing the uncertainty associated with cleanup costs and remediation technologies.

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Challenges in Obtaining Property Access: The FUSRAP Maywood Site Experience - 13433

The Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) is the US government program started in 1974 to identify, investigate and clean up or control sites that became contaminated as a result of the nation's early atomic programs. Many of these sites are not owned by the federal government and therefore require owner permission to enter. The experience in pursuing such access at the FUSRAP Maywood Superfund Site (the Maywood Site or the Site) in Bergen County, New Jersey, is extensive. Since the US Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) assumed responsibility for the Maywood Site from the US Department of Energy in 1997, at least 186 separate property access agreements (known in FUSRAP as a Real Estate Right-of- Entry or ROE) have been executed between the Corps and approximately 55 different land owners and tenant occupants at the Maywood Site (agreement renewals with the same owners over time account for the difference). Maywood's experience during the Corps' tenure, reflected here in three case studies of representative property access efforts, offers some lessons and best practices that may apply to other remedial programs. While the Site Community Relations Manager (the author of this paper) managed the property access task, multi-disciplinary support from across the project was also critical to success in this endeavor. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Port Hope Are Initiative Port Granby Project - Water Management in Extreme Weather Conditions - 19257

The Port Granby Project is part of the Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) through which Canadian Nuclear Laboratory (CNL) is managing long-term historic low level radioactive waste (LLRW) resulting from 60 years of uranium and radium processing operations in the urban setting of Port Hope, Ontario. Port Granby remediation scope includes 1) constructing a new, secure long-term waste management facility (LTWMF) and supporting infrastructure, and 2) excavating and relocating LLRW and marginally contaminated soil from the Port Granby Waste Management Facility (PGWMF), which accepted waste until the 1980's, to the newly constructed LTWMF. This paper provides an overview of the challenges of water management (control of storm and groundwater at the LTWMF and PGWMF) on a large-scale construction project with changing and unpredictable weather patterns. Consistent with increased observations of extreme weather events, over two consecutive construction seasons, weather changed from one of the driest on record (high temperatures, dry conditions and strong wind) to one of the wettest on record (short duration high-intensity rainfall that flooded the LTWMF, excavations and on-site PGWMF and LTWMF retention ponds). This paper describes the collaborative approach among Wood (Constructor), AECOM (Engineer of Record), and CNL to adjust to extremes in weather to control dust and excessive water during construction. The summer of 2016, one of the driest summers on record in southern Ontario, was followed by one of the wettest in 2017. In 2016, the project team used water from the uncontaminated on-site storm water ponds, applied a polymer product for dust control across the site to augment water applications, obtained a Permit to Take Water from the provincial government to pump water from Lake Ontario, procured large tanks for storage of Lake Ontario water to meet peak demand, and retained additional water trucks/operators for day to day site operations. In stark contrast, to accommodate heavy rains in 2017 the project team installed ∼6 million liter aboveground storage tanks with secondary containment for contaminated water storage; procured 100+ mobile water storage tanks to supplement the on-site storage, utilized LTWMF cells sumps, excavations and retention ponds to store and manage onsite water; and adjusted additional staff resources (more staff and longer shifts) during anticipated periods of high-intensity rainfall, at times managing water around the clock. Recognizing the need to minimize the release of contaminated soil and water from the construction site at all times, these efforts illustrate the importance of anticipating and reacting to extreme weather events on a more regular basis. (authors)

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Ex-situ Heat Treatment of TEM Foils in a Custom Titanium Fixture: A Case Study on Ni-based Superalloy

The advancement of microstructural characterization at the nanoscale is critical to understanding the microstructural evolution and performance of engineering materials. Transmission electron microscopy (TEM) plays a vital role in such investigations, particularly when coupled with controlled ex- and in-situ experiments. In this study, we introduce a novel method for ex-situ heat treatment (HT) of TEM foils using a custom-designed fixture, made from pure titanium, and vacuum furnace to inhibit oxidation. This approach ensures precise temperature control and minimal sample contamination during HT, critical for substructural characterization and analysis of metallic materials. The fixture consists of a titanium base with three slits, for three sample foils, and a titanium cap for closure. The entire assembly is placed in a vacuum heat treatment furnace with high vacuum capability to prevent oxidation. To validate the effectiveness of the setup, precipitation behavior and microstructural changes were studied in an IN725 variant heat-treated at 500°C for 1 hour and 282 variant heat-treated at 700°C for 1 hour, as case studies.

electron microscopy↗

Bench-Scale Silicone Process for Low-Cost CO 2 Capture

GE Global Research is developing technology to remove carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from the flue gas of coal-fired power plants. A mixture of 3-aminopropyl end-capped polydimethylsiloxane (GAP-1m) and triethylene glycol (TEG) is the preferred CO 2 capture solvent. GE Global Research was contracted by the Department of Energy to test a bench-scale continuous CO 2 absorption/desorption system using a GAP-1m/TEG mixture as the solvent. SiVance LLC was sub-contracted to provide the GAP-1m material and conduct an Environmental, Health, and Safety (EH&S) assessment for a 550 MW coal-fired power plant. Five components of the solvent, CAS#2469-55-8 (GAP-0), CAS#106214-84-0 (GAP-1-4), TEG, and methanol and xylene (minor contaminants from the aminosilicone) are included in this assessment. One by-product, GAP-1m/SOX salt, and dodecylbenzenesulfonic acid (DDBSA) were also identified for analysis. All of the solvent components and DDBSA are listed on the EPA’s TSCA Inventory allowing companies to manufacture and use the chemicals commercially. The toxicological effects of each component were defined, and control mechanisms necessary to comply with U.S. EH&S regulations are summarized. An engineering and control system, including environmental abatement, was described for minimizing exposure and release of the chemical components. Proper handling and storage recommendations are made for each chemical to minimize risk to workers and the surrounding community.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Annual Performance Report April 2015 Through March 2016 for the Shiprock, New Mexico, Disposal Site

This annual report evaluates the performance of the groundwater remediation system at the Shiprock, New Mexico, Disposal Site (Shiprock site) for the period April 2015 through March 2016. The Shiprock site, a former uranium-ore processing facility remediated under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, is managed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management. This annual report is based on an analysis of groundwater quality and groundwater level data obtained from site monitoring wells and the groundwater flow rates associated with the extraction wells, drains, and seeps. Background The Shiprock mill operated from 1954 to 1968 on property leased from the Navajo Nation. Remediation of surface contamination, including stabilization of mill tailings in an engineered disposal cell, was completed in 1986. During mill operation, nitrate, sulfate, uranium, and other milling-related constituents leached into underlying sediments and contaminated groundwater in the area of the mill site. In March 2003, DOE initiated active remediation of groundwater at the site using extraction wells and interceptor drains. At that time, DOE developed a baseline performance report that established specific performance standards for the Shiprock site groundwater remediation system. The Shiprock site is divided into two distinct areas: the floodplain and the terrace. The floodplain remediation system consists of two groundwater extraction wells, a seep collection drain, and two collection trenches (Trench 1 and Trench 2). The terrace remediation system consists of nine groundwater extraction wells, two collection drains (Bob Lee Wash and Many Devils Wash), and a terrace drainage channel diversion structure. All extracted groundwater is pumped into a lined evaporation pond on the terrace. Compliance Strategy and Remediation Goals As documented in the Groundwater Compliance Action Plan, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission–approved compliance strategy for the floodplain is natural flushing supplemented by active remediation. The contaminants of concern (COCs) at the site are ammonia (total as nitrogen), manganese, nitrate (nitrate + nitrite as nitrogen), selenium, strontium, sulfate, and uranium. The compliance standards for nitrate, selenium, and uranium are listed in Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 192. Regulatory standards are not available for ammonia, manganese, and sulfate; remediation goals for these constituents are either risk-based alternate cleanup standards or background levels. These standards and background levels apply only to the compliance strategy for the floodplain. The compliance strategy for the terrace is to eliminate exposure pathways at the washes and seeps and to apply supplemental standards in the western section.

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Decommissioning, Decontamination, and Disposal of LLW-LL, and ILW-LL at a Former Rare Earths Processing Facility in Malaysia - 19087

Geosyntec Consultants, Inc. (Geosyntec) was the design-build Contractor for a project involving the remediation and disposal of low level (LLW-LL and ILW-LL) NORM and TENORM wastes at a former rare earth processing facility in Malaysia. These sites were associated with a plant that extracted rare earth elements from local tin ores. Because of the naturally occurring radioactivity contained in the raw materials, these productions resulted in by-products and residues containing LLW-LL and ILW-LL thorium hydroxide and uranium hydroxide. The total mass of uranium (∼120 tons) and thorium (∼1,200 tons) managed in a single repository required the project design incorporate requirements related to inventory, security and safeguards around nuclear precursor materials. The requirement to consider a performance over a period of more than 10,000 years led to significant challenges in design and modeling of the disposal facility as this disposal facility was purposely designed and permitted as a final disposal for the LLW-LL and ILW-LL. The first phase of the project was the decommissioning, decontamination, and demolition of the 14- acre former rare earth processing plant and excavation of contaminated soils, construction of an engineered cell at the repository for waste disposal, and transportation and disposal of the waste materials into the cell. Final status surveys were carried out to allow the site to be successfully released by the Malaysian regulatory authorities as a clean site for re-development as common industrial use. Over 11,000 loads of material, including approximately 75,000 cubic meters of excavated soils and plant debris, were transported in specially designed steel transport boxes on public roads for disposal in the engineered cell. The second phase of the project included the design and construction of a second engineered cell, enhanced with protective barrier systems and a final cover system constructed of natural materials. Ancillary facilities such as substations, offices, processing buildings, and wastewater treatment plants were constructed to support retrieval and processing of the materials from more than 87,000 individual drums using a semi-automated process. The drums, waste packages, and other materials in the storage facility were systematically extracted, sorted, inventoried, solidified using Portland cement, transported, and disposed in the cell. All temporary facilities were decontaminated, demolished, and disposed in the cell. Radiological inventory and radiation safety programs were implemented to quantify the waste activity and to control exposure to workers and the public during the project. The total mass of radioactive contaminated waste disposed in the two projects is nearly 200,000 tons. The projects were carried out under a high level of scrutiny from Malaysian and international regulatory bodies. Between 2014 and 2017, performance monitoring and modeling activities were carried out to demonstrate that the disposal facility was performing in accordance with design requirements established by regulatory agencies. (authors)

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Carbon Capture Pilot at Vicksburg Containerboard Mill (Final Technical Report)

This is the final technical report for the DOE-OCED project DE-CD0000051. The report provides the progress at the close of the project. The objective of the project is to design and build a large pilot plant for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capture from a pulp and paper (P&P) mill using RTI’s non-aqueous solvent (NAS) technology at a capacity of 120,000 t-CO 2 /year, with >90% CO 2 captured. The pilot plant will be used for testing and evaluating the NAS capture process using real flue gas from the P&P mill’s power boiler for a minimum of 1 year of parametric testing and a minimum of 2,000 hours of continuous long-term testing. The testing will provide data for process optimization and scale-up for the P&P industry, provide information on interaction of flue gas contaminants on solvent performance and degradation, and inform strategies for emission control. At the end of the project, the pilot plant will be managed by International Paper (IP), the host site owner, which will continue to capture CO 2 , sequester the captured CO 2 , and be eligible for the 45Q credit.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Technical/ administrative options for managing tritium MCL exceedances in P-area groundwater and Steel Creek

This white paper was requested by the Core Team (United States Department of Energy [USDOE], United States Environmental Protection Agency [USEPA], and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control [SCDHEC]) at the P-Area Groundwater (PAGW) Operable Unit (OU) Scoping Meeting held in January 2017 to discuss recent data and potential alternatives in support of a focused Corrective Measures Study/Feasibility Study (CMS/FS). This white paper presents an overview of the problem, and a range of technical and administrative options for addressing the tritium contamination in groundwater and Steel Creek. As tritium cannot be treated practicably, alternatives are limited to media transfer, containment and natural attenuation principally relying on radioactive decay. Using other groundwater OU decisions involving tritium as precedent, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) recommends that final tritium alternatives be evaluated in a CMS/FS, understanding that the likely preferred remedy will include natural attenuation with land use controls (LUCs). This is based on the inability to significantly reduce tritium impact to Steel Creek using an engineered solution as compared to natural attenuation. The timing of this evaluation could be conducted concurrently with the final remedy evaluation for volatile organic compounds (VOCs).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Cerium dioxide (CeO2) nanoparticles decrease arsenite (As(III)) cytotoxicity to 16HBE14o- human bronchial epithelial cells

Highlights: • CeO{sub 2} NPs display a high adsorption capacity for As(III). • As(III) is highly toxic to lung 16HBE14o- cells (81% inhibition at 0.5 mg As/L). • As(III) adsorption onto CeO{sub 2} NPs decreased As(III) cytotoxicity on 16HBE14o- cells. • Cell uptake of As(III)-loaded CeO{sub 2} NPs did not lead to enhanced cytotoxicity. The production and application of engineered nanoparticles (NPs) are increasing in demand with the rapid development of nanotechnology. However, there are concerns that some of these novel materials could lead to emerging environmental and health problems. Some NPs are able to facilitate the transport of contaminants into cells/organisms via a “Trojan Horse” effect which enhances the toxicity of the adsorbed materials. In this work, we evaluated the toxicity of arsenite (As(III)) adsorbed onto cerium dioxide (CeO{sub 2}) NPs to human bronchial epithelial cells (16HBE14o-) using the xCELLigence real time cell analyzing system (RTCA). Application of 0.5 mg/L As(III) resulted in 81.3% reduction of cell index (CI, an RTCA measure of cell toxicity) over 48 h when compared to control cells exposed to medium lacking As(III). However, when the cells were exposed to 0.5 mg/L As(III) in the presence of CeO{sub 2} NPs (250 mg/L), the CI was only reduced by 12.9% compared to the control. The CeO{sub 2} NPs had a high capacity for As(III) adsorption (20.2 mg/g CeO{sub 2}) in the bioassay medium, effectively reducing dissolved As(III) in the aqueous solution and resulting in reduced toxicity. Transmission electron microscopy was used to study the transport of CeO{sub 2} NPs into 16HBE14o- cells. NP uptake via engulfment was observed and the internalized NPs accumulated in vesicles. The results demonstrate that dissolved As(III) in the aqueous solution was the decisive factor controlling As(III) toxicity of 16HBE14o- cells, and that CeO{sub 2} NPs effectively reduced available As(III) through adsorption. These data emphasize the evaluation of mixtures when assaying toxicity.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Update to the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20124

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)

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Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

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Cold Trap Dismantling and Sodium Removal at a Fast Breeder Reactor - 12327

The first German prototype Fast Breeder Nuclear Reactor (KNK) is currently being dismantled after being the only operating Fast Breeder-type reactor in Germany. As this reactor type used sodium as a coolant in its primary and secondary circuit, seven cold traps containing various amounts of partially activated sodium needed to be disposed of as part of the dismantling. The resulting combined difficulties of radioactive contamination and high chemical reactivity were handled by treating the cold traps differently depending on their size and the amount of sodium contained inside. Six small cold traps were processed onsite by cutting them up into small parts using a band saw under a protective atmosphere. The sodium was then converted to sodium hydroxide by using water. The remaining large cold trap could not be handled in the same way due to its dimensions (2.9 m x 1.1 m) and the declared amount of sodium inside (1,700 kg). It was therefore manually dismantled inside a large box filled with a protective atmosphere, while the resulting pieces were packaged for later burning in a special facility. The experiences gained by KNK during this process may be advantageous for future dismantling projects in similar sodium-cooled reactors worldwide. The dismantling of a prototype fast breeder reactor provides the challenge not only to dismantle radioactive materials but also to handle sodium-contaminated or sodium-containing components. The treatment of sodium requires additional equipment and installations to ensure a safe handling. Since it is not permitted to bring sodium into a repository, all sodium has to be neutralized either through a controlled reaction with water or by incinerating. The resulting components can be disposed of as normal radioactive waste with no further conditions. The handling of sodium needs skilled and experienced workers to minimize the inherent risks. And the example of the disposal of the large KNK cold trap shows the interaction with others and also foreign decommissioning projects can provide solutions with were unknown before. (authors)

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Effects of bentonite heating on U(VI) adsorption

Engineered barrier systems designed to isolate high-level radioactive waste utilize bentonite, a montmorillonite rich material, to restrict contaminant transport due to its low hydraulic conductivity and high adsorption capacity. High temperatures (100–200 °C) near waste canisters resulting from radioactive decay may alter the clay's ability to adsorb contaminants. In this study, we examine U(VI) adsorption onto two different bentonite samples subjected to (1) 18 years of in situ heating during an underground experiment and (2) short-term (7-week), high temperature (300 °C) heating in the laboratory. Results show that U(VI) adsorption was lower for field-heated bentonite located closest to the heater, which experienced temperatures of approximately 95 °C, compared to a control sample, which experienced temperatures of approximately 20 °C, over a range of aqueous chemical conditions. On average, K d values for U(VI) adsorption were 31% lower for 95 °C heated samples. By contrast, U(VI) adsorption onto intermediate-heated bentonite (50 °C) was indistinguishable from the adsorption onto the cold-zone (20 °C) sample. U(VI) adsorption onto lab-heated bentonite was also lower than onto control bentonite over the pH range 4.5–8.0, with an average decrease in K d values of 50% after heating. Lower U(VI) adsorption to field-heated bentonite persisted after bentonite was purified to isolate the clay fraction. This allows us to rule out changes in pore-water chemistry or accessory mineral composition as causes of the lower adsorption. No evidence of montmorillonite illitization was observed in the heated samples. While some of the lower U(VI) adsorption in the lab-heated bentonite can be explained by changes in aqueous U(VI) speciation, we propose that lower U(VI) adsorption to field-heated bentonite may be primarily due to changes in the montmorillonite edge structure. The observed changes in U(VI) adsorption to bentonite after heating have implications for U(VI) diffusive transport through engineered barriers and must be considered when designing radioactive waste disposal repositories.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

FUSRAP Maywood Site - Remediation of a Residential Property at 61 Trudy Drive, Lodi, NJ - 17533

The Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) is the U.S. government program started in 1974 to identify, investigate and clean up or control sites that became contaminated as a result of the nation's early atomic programs. The FUSRAP Maywood (New Jersey) Superfund Site (FMSS) consists of 92 designated property parcels known as vicinity properties. 61 Trudy Drive in Lodi, New Jersey is one such vicinity property. Construction planning for a recently-completed remedial excavation at 61 Trudy Drive was predicated on a fundamental question: to remediate the property with the existing home remaining in place or to demolish the exiting home. Answering this question involved detailed engineering and cost analyses, programmatic considerations, and stakeholder input. 61 Trudy Drive was originally addressed under FUSRAP in 1985 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). However, subsequent remediation on an adjacent property by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in 1998 suggested that residual contamination remained at depth at 61 Trudy. The property owner at that time declined to allow FUSRAP access to the property. However, a property transfer in 2012 presented USACE with an opportunity to address this property. Characterization of the property began in 2013; remedial activities were completed in 2015. The 61 Trudy Drive remediation required an intensive stakeholder communications program tailored for several audiences, including the affected property owner, local government officials and the neighboring community This paper will present the FUSRAP history at 61 Trudy Drive, to provide context for recent FUSRAP actions there. It will then focus on the challenges and complexities of performing environmental remediation in a suburban residential setting, focusing on both construction and communications. (authors)

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Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 547 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 547 consists of the following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 3, and 9 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; AND (3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly Closure activities began in August 2011 and were completed in June 2012. Activities were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 547 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 was closure in place with administrative controls. The following closure activities were performed: (1) Open holes were filled with concrete; (2) Steel casings were placed over vertical expansion joints and filled with cement; (3) Engineered soil covers were constructed over piping and exposed sections of the gas sampling system components; (4) Fencing, monuments, Jersey barriers, radiological postings, and use restriction (UR) warning signs were installed around the perimeters of the sites; (5) Housekeeping debris was picked up from around the sites and disposed; and (6) Radiological surveys were performed to confirm final radiological postings. UR documentation is included in Appendix D. The post-closure plan was presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 547 and is included as Appendix F of this report. The requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this report. The proposed post-closure requirements consist of visual inspections to determine the condition of postings and radiological surveys to verify contamination has not migrated. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 547; and (2) The transfer of CAU 547 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

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