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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Simulations of Criticality Control Overpack Container Compaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Criticality Control Overpack (CCO) containers are being considered for the disposal of defense-related nuclear waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). At WIPP, these containers would be placed in underground disposal rooms, which will naturally close and compact the containers closer to one another over several centuries. This report details simulations to predict the final container configuration as an input to nuclear criticality assessments. Each container was discretely modeled, including the plywood and stainless steel pipe inside the 55-gallon drum, in order to capture its complex mechanical behavior. Although these high-fidelity simulations were computationally intensive, several different material models were considered in an attempt to reasonably bound the horizontal and vertical compaction percentages. When exceptionally strong materials were used for the containers, the horizontal and vertical closure respectively stabilized at 43:9 % and 93:7 %. At the other extreme, when the containers completely degraded and the clay seams between the salt layers were glued, the horizontal and vertical closure reached respective final values of 48:6 % and 100 %.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1973

Analysis of temperature and pressure distribution of containers for nuclear waste material disposal in space

A computer program was adapted from a previous generation program to analyze the temperature and internal pressure response of a radioactive nuclear waste material disposal container following impact on the earth. This program considers component melting, LiH dissociation, temperature dependent properties and pressure and container stress response. Analyses were performed for 21 cases with variations in radioactive power level, container geometry, degree of deformation of the container, degree of burial and soil properties. Results indicated that the integrity of SS-316 containers could be maintained with partial burials of either underformed or deformed containers. Results indicated that completely buried waste containers, with power levels above 5 kW, experienced creep stress rupture failures in 4 to 12 days.

Vanbibber, L. E.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Results of tests of MTA-2 TPS on the SRB hold-down bolt blast container

The four solid rocket booster (SRB) hold-down posts are fastened to the mobile launch platform (MLP) with four large nuts. At liftoff the nuts are split with explosive changes to release the SRB/Shuttle. A blast container is placed over the nuts to protect the vehicle from flying debris. The blast container is a reusable part and has to be protected from aerodynamic heating during flight. The thermal protection system (TPS) used to protect these blast containers is cork. Fitting the flat cork sheet to this hemispherical shaped blast container is both time consuming and expensive. Another problem is removing the charred cork and epoxy glue from the blast containers. Replacements of this cork with another TPS material such as MTA-2 was examined. Heating rates along the centerline of the forward facing areas of the blast container were determined. The feasibility of using 1/2 in. MTA-2 on the SRB blast containers for protection from ascent, plume impingement and reentry heating is demonstrated.

Dean, W. G.↗
NASA NTRS2002

The Evaluation and Implementation of a Water Containment System to Support Aerospace Flywheel Testing

High-energy flywheel systems for aerospace power storage and attitude control applications are being developed because of the potential for increasing the energy density and reducing operational costs. A significant challenge facing the development of the test hardware is containment of the rotating elements in the event of a failure during the development and qualification stages of testing. This containment is critical in order to ensure the safety of the test personnel and the facility. A containment system utilizing water as the containment media is presented. Water containment was found to be a low cost, flexible, and highly effective containment system. Ballistic test results and analytical results are discussed along with a description of a flywheel test facility that was designed and built utilizing the water containment system at the NASA Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field in Cleveland, Ohio.

Trase, Larry M.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Method of forming a relatively stable slip of silicon metal particles and yttrium containing particles

The method concerns forming a relatively stable slip of silicon metal particles and yttrium containing particles. In one embodiment, a casting slip of silicon metal particles is formed in water. Particles of a yttrium containing sintering aid are added to the casting slip. The yttrium containing sintering aid is a compound which has at least some solubility in water to form Y.sup.+3 ions which have a high potential for totally flocculating the silicon metal particles into a semiporous solid. A small amount of a fluoride salt is added to the casting slip which contains the yttrium containing sintering aid. The fluoride salt is one which will produce fluoride anions when dissolved in water. The small amount of the fluoride anions produced are effective to suppress the flocculation of the silicon metal particles by the Y.sup.+3 ions so that all particles remain in suspension in the casting slip and the casting slip has both an increased shelf life and can be used to cast articles having a relatively thick cross-section. The pH of the casting slip is maintained in a range from 7.5 to 9. Preferably, the fluoride salt used is one which is based on a monovalent cation such as sodium or ammonia. The steps of adding the yttrium containing sintering aid and the fluoride salt may be interchanged if desired, and the salt may be added to a solution containing the sintering aid prior to addition of the silicon metal particles.

Dickie, Ray A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Ultrasonic Low-Friction Containment Plate for Thermal and Ultrasonic Stir Weld Processes

The thermal stir welding (TSW) process is finding applications in fabrication of space vehicles. In this process, workpieces to be joined by TSW are drawn, by heavy forces, between "containment plates," past the TSW tool that then causes joining of the separate plates. It is believed that the TSW process would be significantly improved by reducing the draw force, and that this could be achieved by reducing the friction forces between the workpieces and containment plates. Based on use of high-power ultrasonics in metal forming processes, where friction reduction in drawing dies has been achieved, it is believed that ultrasonic vibrations of the containment plates could achieve similar friction reduction in the TSW process. By applying ultrasonic vibrations to the containment plates in a longitudinal vibration mode, as well as by mounting and holding the containment plates in a specific manner such as to permit the plates to acoustically float, friction between the metal parts and the containment plates is greatly reduced, and so is the drawing force. The concept was to bring in the ultrasonics from the sides of the plates, permitting the ultrasonic hardware to be placed to the side, away from the equipment that contains the thermal stir tooling and that applies clamping forces to the plates. Tests demonstrated that one of the major objectives of applying ultrasonics to the thermal stir system, that of reducing draw force friction, should be achievable on a scaled-up system.

Graff, Karl↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

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DOE OSTI2020

Model for Collaboration among Carriers to Reduce Empty Container Truck Trips

In recent years, intermodal transport has become an increasingly attractive alternative to freight shippers. However, the current intermodal freight transport is not as efficient as it could be. Oftentimes an empty container needs to be transported from the empty container depot to the shipper, and conversely, an empty container needs to be transported from the receiver to the empty container depot. These empty container movements decrease the freight carrier’s profit, as well as increase traffic congestion, decrease roadway safety, and add unnecessary emissions to the environment. To this end, our study evaluates a potential collaboration strategy to be used by carriers for domestic intermodal freight transport based on an optimization approach to reduce the number of empty container trips. A binary integer-linear programming model is developed to determine each freight carrier’s optimal schedule while minimizing its operating cost. The model ensures that the cost for each carrier with collaboration is less than or equal to its cost without collaboration. It also ensures that average savings from the collaboration are shared equally among all participating carriers. Additionally, two stochastic models are provided to account for uncertainty in truck travel times. The proposed collaboration strategy is tested using empirical data and is demonstrated to be effective in meeting all of the shipment constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2017

The Benefits of Incorporating Shipping Containers into the Climate Change Adaption Plans at NASA Wallops Flight Facility

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has several centers and facilities located near the coast that are undoubtedly susceptible to climate change. One of those facilities is Wallops Flight Facility on the Eastern Shore of Virginia which is separated into three areas: Main Base, Mainland, and the Island. Wallops Island has numerous buildings and assets that are vulnerable to flood inundation, intense storms, and storm surge. The shoreline of Wallops Island is prone to beach erosion and is slated for another beach replenishment project in 2019. In addition, current climate projections for NASAs centers and facilities, conducted by the Climate Adaptation Science Investigators, warn of inevitable increases in annual temperature, precipitation, sea level rise, and extreme events such as heat waves. The aforementioned vulnerabilities Wallops Island faces in addition to the projections of future climate change reveal an urgency for NASA to adjust how new buildings at its centers and facilities near the coast are built to adapt to the inevitable effects of climate change. Although the agency has made strides to mitigate the effects of climate change by incorporating L.E.E.D. into new buildings that produce less greenhouse gas, the strides for the agency to institute clear climate adaptation policies for the buildings at its centers and facilities near the coast seem to lag behind. As NASA continues to formulate formidable climate change adaptation plans for its centers and facilities, an architectural trend that should be examined for its potential to replace several old buildings at Wallops Island is shipping containers buildings. Shipping containers or Intermodal Steel Building Units offer an array of benefits such as strength, durability, versatility, modular, and since they can be upcycled, they are also eco-friendly. Some disadvantages of shipping containers are they contain harmful chemicals, insulation must be added, fossil fuels must be used to transport them to the site, and multiple ISBUs are needed. However, the benefits of shipping container buildings could be utilized at NASA centers or facilities near the coast such as Wallops Island on new buildings that are designed to adapt to the impending effects of climate change. Thus, this Masters Research Project will explore how those benefits can be incorporated into the climate change adaptation plans at Wallops Island and make recommendations for policy guidelines and shipping container buildings specific to Wallops Island.

Sustainable Design↗
DOE OSTI2023

The HPC Container Experience on the Summit Supercomputer

Containers are seeing widespread use in the world of High Performance Computing, with many HPC Centers either providing their own containerization solution or adopting existing ones like Singularity and Apptainer. The demand for containerization options come from users who want to take advantage of the portability and reproducibility containers can provide, as well as being able to build and use applications that are only distributed in container form or are otherwise unsuited to natively run in an HPC environment. The users served by the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility are no exception. We go over the past and current containerization offerings at the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility, mainly focusing on the Summit supercomputer. We arrive at using a combination of Podman and Singularity to allow users to build and run containers directly on Summit, without requiring external resources or hardware for any step of the process. We look at a couple of projects running on Summit that greatly benefited from being able to use containers on Summit. And we compare benchmarks running natively and in containers on Summit at different scales, observing minimal performance difference and consistent behavior across all tests.

Abraham, Subil↗
DOE OSTI2020

Coupon Container Pressure Test

A total of six containers were tested to verify the Maximum Allowed Working Pressure (MAWP) rating of 100 psi. Three Inner Container Pressure Test Assemblies (1006759387-AA) and three Outer Container Pressure Test Assemblies (1006729168-AA) were tested. The container serial numbering is the drawing number followed by the serial number (i.e.,1006759387-###). The test procedure was performed as follows: 1. Pressurize to 50 psi and hold for 5 minutes. 2. Increase pressure to 100 psi and hold for 5 minutes. 3. Increase pressure to 150 psi and hold for a minimum of 20 minutes. A container is considered to pass if the pressure drops less than 1% at the end of the 20 minutes. All six containers passed the test.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Thermal Evaluation of the SAVY-4000 1 Quart Container at High Heat Loads

The SAVY-4000 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was published in 2013 which established the design life of the container series through physical testing that meets applicable requirements from DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. One critical requirement in DOE M 441.1-1 is to set a maximum heat load for the entire series to ensure that throughout the lifetime of the container, each of the components still performs within manufacture specifications. The original maximum decay heat limit has been defined within the SAVY-4000 SAR, which was accomplished by completing a series of tests that heat loaded the SAVY-4000 series and measured the steady state temperature and graded it against manufacture specifications. The container series is comprised of a corrosion resistant 316L stainless steel containment boundary, ceramic composite filter for the prevention of radiological particulate release and a chemically stable O-ring made of Viton ® . Currently, the SAVY 4000 maximum decay heat load is set at 25 Watts and the heat load expected during normal handling and storage is considered sufficient that the SAVY 4000 container requirements will not be the limiting factor for storage of most common material in use at TA-55, e.g. weapons grade oxide, americium, Pu-238 oxide and encapsulated heat sources. The SAVY 4000 lifetime was originally set as 5 years within the SAVY-4000 SAR, but in July 2019 the lifetime was extended to 15 years through a technical basis justification approved by the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Field Office. The 25 Watt limit applies to all SAVY 4000 container sizes; 1-quart, 2-quart, 3-quart, 5-quart, 8-quart, 12-quart, 5-gallon, and 10-gallon.

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DOE OSTI2024

Using containers to speed up development, to run integration tests and to teach about distributed systems

GlideinWMS is a workload manager provisioning resources for many experiments including CMS and DUNE. The software is distributed both as native packages and specialized production containers. Following an approach used in other communities like web development we built our workspaces, system-like containers to ease development and testing. Developers can change the source tree or check out a different branch and quickly reconfigure the services to see the effect of their changes. In this paper, we’ll talk about what differentiates workspaces from other containers. We’ll describe our base system composed of three containers. A one-node cluster including a compute element and a batch system. A GlideinWMS Factory controlling pilot jobs. And a scheduler and Frontend, to submit jobs and provision resources. Additional containers can be used for optional components. This system can easily run on a laptop and we’ll share our evaluation of different container runtimes, with an eye for ease of use and performance. Finally, we’ll talk about our experience as developers and with students. The GlideinWMS workspaces are easily integrated with IDEs like VS Code, simplifying debugging and allowing development and testing of the system also when offline. They simplified the training and onboarding of new team members and Summer interns. And they were useful in workshops where students could have first-hand experience with the mechanisms and components that, in production, run millions of jobs.

Mambelli, Marco↗
DOE OSTI2025

Full Submersion Water Testing of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers

SAVY-4000 (SAVY) containers are the primary container used at Technical Area (TA) TA-55 plutonium facility for the prevention of water ingress to mitigate against a criticality event. The basis for water resistance of these containers has long been attributed to the Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) membrane that is assembled on the outermost surface of the filter assembly. On August 22nd a test of a container used inside of a glovebox was performed that brought into question this long-standing-basis. This test was performed by inverting a SAVY-lid onto a specialized piece of equipment for evaluating the integrity of the PTFE membrane. During the test water was observed passing through the filter indicating that the filter membrane was no longer preventing the ingress of water through the filter. The assumption after making this observation was that alpha-particles were rapidly degrading the membrane creating a leak path through the underlying aluminosilicate media (Fiberfrax®). The apparatus used was designed to only test the lid rather than the entire SAVY assembly. A test plan, PA-PLAN-01921, was developed to investigate whether a fully assembled container with a fully degraded PTFE membrane would be capable of meeting the criteria defined in PA-RD-1009 of not allowing more than 200 ml of water to enter the container with a water column of 6-inches applied over a 2-hour period. This report provides the results of the testing performed against PA-PLAN-01921.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

ALARA Review for Venting of Flanged Tritium Waste Containers (FTWCs) at TA-54

This project will vent headspace hydrogen and oxygen from specialized high-pressure storage vessels called flanged tritium waste containers (FTWCs). There are four of these containers located in Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL’s) Technical Area 54 (TA-54), Building 1028. This building is in the southwest corner of LANL’s Material Disposal Area G. The vented headspace gas is expected to contain tritium in the form of water vapor, elemental hydrogen or a combination of both. The venting operation is expected to take place in 2025. There will be a series of operational readiness reviews prior to venting activities commencing. The FTWCs at TA-54 contain tritium-contaminated metal parts and molecular sieve media, which is a pebble-like material used to absorb water vapor from the air. This molecular sieve media inside the FTWCs is contained in metal canisters, along with some loose media material in bags. Over time, tritiated water vapor that had been adsorbed onto the media can become liberated into the FTWC headspace gas. Radiolysis can cause separation of the water vapor into its hydrogen and oxygen components, resulting in the potentially hazardous gas mixture within the FTWC. LANL has determined that continued tritium storage in these containers can pose an unsafe condition due to possible hydrogen and oxygen gas buildup within the FTWCs with a potential for explosion if sparks are generated within the FTWCs. To mitigate this hazard, the FTWCs will be stabilized by venting them in-place to remove hazardous gases.

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DOE OSTI2025

3013 Baseline Inner Container Report: Description, Imaging, and Analysis

This report presents consolidated findings from three microscopy studies of baseline Bagless Transfer Containers (BTCs), which are the inner containers used in DOE Standard 3013-compliant plutonium storage packages. The studies were conducted by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), and DNV, a subcontractor specializing in corrosion science. The baseline BTCs examined had not been exposed to corrosive environments, serving as control samples for comparison with destructively examined (DE) containers. Additionally, the Background section provides an overview of the BTC design, including manufacturing methods, material properties, and container configurations that may influence corrosion behavior. The primary objective of the LANL and SRNL studies was to establish reference characteristics of BTCs to distinguish manufacturing artifacts from corrosion-induced features observed in DE containers. Both laboratories used advanced microscopy techniques, including Wide Area Microscopy (WAMS), Laser Confocal Microscopy (LCM), Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), and Focused Ion Beam (FIB), to reveal that most surface anomalies were shallow and attributable to flow-forming processes, not corrosion. Subsurface impurities, identified as non-metallic inclusions, were also observed. DNV’s investigation focused on characterizing the mechanical and chemical properties of the BTC material to support crack growth modeling. Their findings indicate higher hardness and strength but reduced ductility—consistent with flow-formed 304L stainless steel and a higher-than-expected martensite content, in contrast to manufacturer claims. Ongoing and future studies, including Electron Backscatter Diffraction (EBSD), aim to further understand the microstructural factors influencing crack initiation and propagation. The combined studies provide a crucial baseline for distinguishing corrosion effects in DE containers, contributing to the safe and reliable long-term storage of plutonium-bearing materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Evaluation of Technologies to Mitigate the Presence of Gaseous Elemental Mercury in Waste Disposal Containers

A study was conducted to evaluate sorbent technologies that can mitigate the presence of elemental mercury (Hg⁰) in waste containers for mercury-contaminated debris (MCD). Decontamination and demolition (D&D) activities at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) facilities generate MCD requiring offsite disposal. The debris is packaged in appropriate waste containers and may be temporarily stored onsite prior to transport for treatment and/or disposal. During transportation of loads that had no visible liquid Hg at the point of origin, temperature changes can cause Hg⁰ to evaporate, condense, and form droplets on container walls. Furthermore, vibration during transportation could cause beads of Hg to be released from the debris, container walls, and ceiling, resulting in pools of liquid Hg⁰ on the container floor. Waste acceptance criteria (WAC) limitations for commercial disposal facilities, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and ORR mixed low-level waste landfills prohibit the presence of any free liquids in containers identified as a solid waste form. Potential solutions to mitigate the presence of residual liquids that could be formed through vapor condensation include the use of sorbents or similar materials to capture and stabilize volatile Hg⁰ vapors and thus ensure compliance with landfill WAC requirements. This report summarizes data from small-scale laboratory experiments conducted to evaluate sorbent materials for Hg⁰ vapor suppression and sorption of liquid Hg⁰ that could form under relevant transportation and disposal conditions. A series of experiments was conducted to evaluate commercial sorbent materials and their effectiveness for Hg⁰ sorption across a temperature range from 19.4°C to 60°C. The impact of residual moisture on sorption was investigated under relevant conditions, and leaching tests were performed to assess the stability of Hg⁰ captured sorbent materials. The results provide estimates for sorbent quantities needed for a given Hg⁰ mass loading based on experimental results exposing sorbents to gaseous and liquid Hg⁰ at various mass ratios. Overall, sorbents that were most effective for Hg⁰ vapor suppression were brominated activated carbons, mackinawite-based sorbents coated on vermiculite, and sulfur-modified granular activated carbon. Elevated temperatures and moisture conditions did not result in significant increases of Hg⁰ headspace concentrations, and the materials also demonstrated high sorption capacities for the sorption of liquid Hg⁰.

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DOE OSTI2026

Technical Basis SAVY-4000® Series, 5.5G Container (Rev. 1)

The 5.5 Gallon (5.5G) SAVY-4000® nuclear material storage container is the latest in the SAVY-4000® series. The 5.5G is similar to that of a 1or 2Qt container in functionality with the exception of a larger volume deep drawn and spun form body achieved through increases in the depth and diameter of the container. Here, a technical basis using engineering equivalency analysis, calculation, and test data is presented to establish that the 5.5G SAVY-4000® Container is a DOE Manual 441.1-1 compliant container at a drop height of 9 feet (rather than the typical 12 ft of the other SAVY-4000® containers) and that a twenty-five year design life (as with the currently approved SAVY-4000® series) is justified.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗