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At least 109 records · Page 6

RELAP-7 Simulation Resolving an SBO Scenario on a Simplified Geometry of a BWR

The RELAP-7 code is the next generation nuclear reactor system safety analysis code being developed at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). RELAP-7 will become the main reactor systems toolkit for the Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization Pathway of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program and the next generation tool in the RELAP reactor safety/systems analysis application series (i.e., the replacement for RELAP5). The code is being developed based on Idaho National Laboratory’s modern scientific software development framework – MOOSE (the Multi-Physics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment). During Fiscal Year 2013, a number of physical components with two-phase flow capability have been developed to support the simplified boiling water reactor (BWR) station blackout analyses. The case selected for demonstration calculation is built from the specifications documented in an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development benchmark problem for BWR turbine trip analysis. The reference design for the benchmark problem was from the Peach Bottom-2 nuclear station, which is a General Electric BWR-4 design. The demonstration case includes the major components for the primary system of a BWR, as well as the safety system components for reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and the wet well of a BWR containment. The case was initially run to steady-state with RELAP-7. The station blackout transient simulations were subsequently initiated by using the INL-developed RAVEN code. Two scenarios for the station blackout simulations have been considered. Scenario I represents an extreme station blackout accident with no safety injection functioning. The reactor core could experience dry out fairly quickly with this scenario. Scenario II represents a more probable station blackout accident progression with the RCIC system functioning. In this scenario, the RCIC system is fully coupled with the reactor primary system and the safety injection to provide makeup cooling water to the reactor core from the suppression pool is dynamically simulated. With the RCIC system functioning, the core dry out is significantly postponed when compared to the results from Scenario I. This fully coupled RCIC system simulation capability represents the first-of-a-kind simulation capability. Sensitivity studies have also been carried out to study the effect of RCIC control strategy with varying core makeup cooling water mass flow rates. The next stage of development will be to demonstrate more refined BWR station blackout analyses with more realistic geometries, to be reported in the next demonstration simulation report.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Study of the Impact of Peak Demand on Increasing Vulnerability of Cascading Failures to Extreme Contingency Events

The vulnerability of large power systems to cascading failures and major blackouts has become evident since the Northeast blackout in 1965. Based on analyses of the series of cascading blackouts in the past decade, the research community realized the urgent need to develop better methods, tools, and practices for performing cascading-outage analysis and for evaluating mitigations that are easily accessible by utility planning engineers. PNNL has developed the Dynamic Contingency Analysis Tool (DCAT) as an open-platform and publicly available methodology to help develop applications that aim to improve the capabilities of power planning engineers to assess the impact and likelihood of extreme contingencies and potential cascading events across their systems and interconnections. DCAT analysis will help identify potential vulnerabilities and allow study of mitigation solutions to reduce the risk of cascading outages in technically sound and effective ways. Using the DCAT capability, we examined the impacts of various load conditions to identify situations in which the power grid may encounter cascading outages that could lead to potential blackouts. This paper describes the usefulness of the DCAT tool and how it helps to understand potential impacts of load demand on cascading failures on the power system.

indexes↗

Availability Assessment Based Case-Sensitive Power System Restoration Strategy

Increasingly frequent severe weather events in recent years threaten the security of power systems and result in major power outages throughout the world. The development of reasonable power system restoration (PSR) solutions is therefore urgently needed to speed up the recovery of the power supply while at the same time steering clear of vulnerable and risky equipment. This paper aims to develop a case-sensitive PSR model for power transmission systems that can adjust restoration solutions according to the evaluated availability of outage equipment in specific blackout scenarios and weather conditions. A novel PSR model that integrates the startup of generating units, formulation of the restoration network, renewable energy sources, and availability assessment of devices is proposed. A reformulated model is also proposed to relieve the computational burden of complex PSR problems. The availability of outage equipment is comprehensively assessed based on historical operating records, fault diagnosis results, and weather conditions. The assessed availability results are sensitive to the characteristics of real blackout cases and will support system operators generate case-sensitive PSR solutions while mitigating the vulnerable equipment. The feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed PSR model and its reformulations are verified through case studies.

availability assessment↗

Final Report: Assessment of Combined Heat and Power Premium Power Applications in California

This report analyzes the current economic and environmental performance of combined heat and power (CHP) systems in power interruption intolerant commercial facilities. Through a series of three case studies, key trade-offs are analyzed with regard to the provision of black-out ridethrough capability with the CHP systems and the resutling ability to avoid the need for at least some diesel backup generator capacity located at the case study sites. Each of the selected sites currently have a CHP or combined heating, cooling, and power (CCHP) system in addition to diesel backup generators. In all cases the CHP/CCHP system have a small fraction of the electrical capacity of the diesel generators. Although none of the selected sites currently have the ability to run the CHP systems as emergency backup power, all could be retrofitted to provide this blackout ride-through capability, and new CHP systems can be installed with this capability. The following three sites/systems were used for this analysis: (1) Sierra Nevada Brewery - Using 1MW of installed Molten Carbonate Fuel Cells operating on a combination of digestor gas (from the beer brewing process) and natural gas, this facility can produce electricty and heat for the brewery and attached bottling plant. The major thermal load on-site is to keep the brewing tanks at appropriate temperatures. (2) NetApp Data Center - Using 1.125 MW of Hess Microgen natural gas fired reciprocating engine-generators, with exhaust gas and jacket water heat recovery attached to over 300 tons of of adsorption chillers, this combined cooling and power system provides electricity and cooling to a data center with a 1,200 kW peak electrical load. (3) Kaiser Permanente Hayward Hospital - With 180kW of Tecogen natural gas fired reciprocating engine-generators this CHP system generates steam for space heating, and hot water for a city hospital. For all sites, similar assumptions are made about the economic and technological constraints of the power generation system. Using the Distributed Energy Resource Customer Adoption Model (DER-CAM) developed at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, we model three representative scenarios and find the optimal operation scheduling, yearly energy cost, and energy technology investments for each scenario below: Scenario 1 - Diesel generators and CHP/CCHP equipment as installed in the current facility. Scenario 1 represents a baseline forced investment in currently installed energy equipment. Scenario 2 - Existing CHP equipment installed with blackout ride-through capability to replace approximately the same capacity of diesel generators. In Scenario 2 the cost of the replaced diesel units is saved, however additional capital cost for the controls and switchgear for blackout ride-through capability is necessary. Scenario 3 - Fully optimized site analysis, allowing DER-CAM to specify the number of diesel and CHP/CCHP units (with blackout ride-through capability) that should be installed ignoring any constraints on backup generation. Scenario 3 allows DER-CAM to optimize scheduling and number of generation units from the currently available technologies at a particular site. The results of this analysis, using real data to model the optimal schedulding of hypothetical and actual CHP systems for a brewery, data center, and hospital, lead to some interesting conclusions. First, facilities with high heating loads will typically prove to be the most appropriate for CHP installation from a purely economic standpoint. Second, absorption/adsorption cooling systems may only be economically feasible if the technology for these chillers can increase above current best system efficiency. At a coefficient of performance (COP) of 0.8, for instance, an adsorption chiller paired with a natural gas generator with waste heat recovery at a facility with large cooling loads, like a data center, will cost no less on a yearly basis than purchasing electricity and natural gas directly from a utility. Third, at marginal additional cost, if the reliability of CHP systems proves to be at least as high as diesel generators (which we expect to be the case), the CHP system could replace the diesel generator at little or no additional cost. This is true if the thermal to electric (relative) load of those facilities was already high enough to economically justify a CHP system. Last, in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, the modeled CHP and CCHP systems provide some degree of decreased emissions relative to systems with less CHP installed. The emission reduction can be up to 10% in the optimized case (Scenario 3) in the application with the highest relative thermal load, in this case the hospital. Although these results should be qualified because they are only based on the three case studies, the general results and lessons learned are expected to be applicable across a broad range of potential and existing CCHP systems.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Ruthenium Behavior at Phase Separation of Borosilicate Glass-12259

The Rokkasho reprocessing plant (RRP) located in Aomori, Japan, vitrifies high level waste (HLW) into a borosilicate glass. The HLW is generated from the reprocessing of spent fuel and contains ruthenium (Ru) and other platinum group metals (PGMs). Based on the recent consequences after a huge earthquake that occurred in Japan, a hypothetical blackout was postulated for the RRP to address additional safety analysis requirements. During a prolonged blackout, the borosilicate glass could phase separate due to cooling of the glass in the melter. The Ru present in the glass matrix could migrate into separate phases and impact the durability of the borosilicate glass. The durability of the glass is important for quality assurance and performance assessment of the vitrified HLW. A fundamental study was performed at an independent university to understand the impact of a prolonged blackout. Simulated HLW glasses were prepared for the RRP, and the Ru behavior in phase separated glasses was studied. The simulated HLW glasses contained nonradioactive elements and PGMs. The glass compositions were then altered to enhance the formation of the phase-separated glasses when subjected to thermal treatment at 700 deg. C for 24 hours. The synthesized simulated glasses contained 1.1 % Ru by weight as ruthenium dioxide (RuO{sub 2}). A portion of the RuO{sub 2} formed needle-shaped crystals in the glass specimens. After the thermal treatment, the glass specimen had separated into two phases. One of the two phases was a B{sub 2}O{sub 3} rich phase, and the other phase was a SiO{sub 2} rich phase. The majority of the chemical species in the B{sub 2}O{sub 3} rich phase was leached away with the Material Characterization Center-3 (MCC-3) protocol standardized by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory using an aqueous low-concentrated nitric acid solution, but the leaching of the Ru fraction was very limited; less than 1% of the original Ru content. The Ru leaching was much less than those of the other elements, and the needle-shaped crystals of RuO{sub 2} were observed in the B{sub 2}O{sub 3} rich phase in the specimen after the leaching test. Another experiment was performed using another glass specimen which had been prepared with the same frits, but used reagent RuO{sub 2} of granular shape at lower content (0.0073% by weight as RuO{sub 2}). The leached fractions of elements for the latter specimen increased to almost the same fraction (more than 10% of the original Ru content) as observed for boron and sodium, when the phase separated glass was leached using the MMC-3 protocol with non-acidic de-ionized water. Based on the results of this study, it was concluded that needle-shaped RuO{sub 2} crystals are contained in the B{sub 2}O{sub 3}-rich phase after phase separation of the borosilicate glass after a hypothetical blackout. The leaching fraction for the needle-shaped RuO{sub 2} present in the phase separated glass is much lower than those for boron or sodium. Ruthenium behavior has been studied for a hypothetical loss of cooling in the liquid fed ceramic melter for high level waste by taking into account the phase separation of borosilicate glass. The needle-shaped crystal of ruthenium dioxide after bi-nodal-type phase separation of the borosilicate glass at 700 deg. C migrated into the B{sub 2}O{sub 3} rich phase, but remained without dissolution by an acidic aqueous solution. Additionally, granular ruthenium dioxide can be a morphological form of ruthenium after bimodal-type phase separation of the vitrified high level waste with borosilicate glass media. After the phase separation of the borosilicate glass, the crystal shape of the ruthenium dioxide is either needle-shaped or granular, and the leachable fraction of ruthenium is relatively much lower than those of major components (boron and sodium) in the vitrified borosilicate glass. The fraction of leached ruthenium increased to almost the same fraction as observed for boron and sodium when the phase-separated glass was leached with ultrapure water. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Impact of Load Tap Changer Control Operation Under Microgrid Conditions

Every microgrid is unique in its diversity of assets, operation, and network structure. This uniqueness presents challenges for each microgrid implementation that need to be understood and addressed to prevent power quality concerns, stability issues, and blackouts. In this research work, we present one challenge faced during microgrid operation that could potentially cause a blackout in some microgrid configurations. Through the incorrect operation of the load tap changer controller during an islanding event for a microgrid with generation present on both primary and secondary busses, the primary voltage will increase or decrease beyond allowable bounds, causing a cascading failure. This work presents the issue first with simulation results to demonstrate the phenomenon and then presents results of load tap changer controller operation using a controller-hardware-in-the-loop experiment. Finally, details of the complete sequence of operation and the blackout scenarios are presented and summarized.

blackout↗

The propagation characteristics of electromagnetic waves through plasma in the near-field region of low-frequency loop antenna

A high-speed vehicle flying through the atmosphere between 100 and 20 km may suffer from a “communication blackout.” In this paper, a low frequency system with an on-board loop antenna to receive signals is presented as a potential blackout mitigation method. Because the plasma sheath is in the near-field region of the loop antenna, the traditional scattering matrix method that is developed for the far-field region may overestimate the electromagnetic (EM) wave's attenuation. To estimate the EM wave's attenuation in the near-field region, EM interference (EMI) shielding theory is introduced. Experiments are conducted, and the results verify the EMI shielding theory's effectiveness. Simulations are also conducted with different plasma parameters, and the results obtained show that the EM wave's attenuation in the near-field region is far below than that in the far-field region. The EM wave's attenuation increases with the increase in electron density and decreases with the increase in collision frequency. The higher the frequency, the larger is the EM wave's attenuation. During the entire re-entry phase of a RAM-C module, the EM wave's attenuations are below 10 dB for EM waves with a frequency of 1 MHz and below 1 dB for EM waves with a frequency of 100 kHz. Therefore, the low frequency systems (e.g., Loran-C) may provide a way to transmit some key information to high-speed vehicles even during the communication “blackout” period.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Initial Review of Methods for Cascading Failure Analysis in Electric Power Transmission Systems

Large blackouts are typically caused by cascading failure propagating through a power system by means of a variety of processes. Because of the wide range of time scales, mulitple interacting processes, and the hugh number of possible interactions, the simulation and analysis of cascading blackouts is extremely complicated. This paper defines cascading failure for blackouts and gives an initial review of the current understanding, industrial tools, and the challenges and emerging methods of analysis and simulation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Application of Advanced Wide Area Early Warning Systems with Adaptive Protection

Recent blackouts of power systems in North America and throughout the world have shown how critical a reliable power system is to modern societies, and the enormous economic and societal damage a blackout can cause. It has been noted that unanticipated operation of protection systems can contribute to cascading phenomena and, ultimately, blackouts. This project developed and field-tested two methods of Adaptive Protection systems utilizing synchrophasor data. One method detects conditions of system stress that can lead to unintended relay operation, and initiates a supervisory signal to modify relay response in real time to avoid false trips. The second method detects the possibility of false trips of impedance relays as stable system swings “encroach” on the relays’ impedance zones, and produces an early warning so that relay engineers can re-evaluate relay settings. In addition, real-time synchrophasor data produced by this project was used to develop advanced visualization techniques for display of synchrophasor data to utility operators and engineers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Parametric and experimentally informed BWR Severe Accident Analysis Utilizing FeCrAl - M3FT-17OR020205041

Iron-chromium-aluminum (FeCrAl) alloys are being considered as advanced fuel cladding concepts with enhanced accident tolerance. At high temperatures, FeCrAl alloys have slower oxidation kinetics and higher strength compared with zirconium-based alloys. FeCrAl could be used for fuel cladding and spacer or mixing vane grids in light water reactors and/or as channel box material in boiling water reactors (BWRs). There is a need to assess the potential gains afforded by the FeCrAl accident-tolerant-fuel (ATF) concept over the existing zirconium-based materials employed today. To accurately assess the response of FeCrAl alloys under severe accident conditions, a number of FeCrAl properties and characteristics are required. These include thermophysical properties as well as burst characteristics, oxidation kinetics, possible eutectic interactions, and failure temperatures. These properties can vary among different FeCrAl alloys. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has pursued refined values for the oxidation kinetics of the B136Y FeCrAl alloy (Fe-13Cr-6Al wt %). This investigation included oxidation tests with varying heating rates and end-point temperatures in a steam environment. The rate constant for the low-temperature oxidation kinetics was found to be higher than that for the commercial APMT FeCrAl alloy (Fe-21Cr-5Al-3Mo wt %). Compared with APMT, a 5 times higher rate constant best predicted the entire dataset (root mean square deviation). Based on tests following heating rates comparable with those the cladding would experience during a station blackout, the transition to higher oxidation kinetics occurs at approximately 1,500°C. A parametric study varying the low-temperature FeCrAl oxidation kinetics was conducted for a BWR plant using FeCrAl fuel cladding and channel boxes using the MELCOR code. A range of station blackout severe accident scenarios were simulated for a BWR/4 reactor with Mark I containment. Increasing the FeCrAl low-temperature oxidation rate constant (3 times and 10 times that of the rate constant for APMT) had a negligible impact on the early stages of the accident and minor impacts on the accident progression after the first relocation of the fuel. At temperatures below 1,500°C, increasing the rate constant for APMT by a factor of 10 still resulted in only minor FeCrAl oxidation. In general, the gains afforded by the FeCrAl enhanced ATF concept with respect to accident sequence timing and combustible gas generation are consistent with previous efforts. Compared with the traditional Zircaloy-based cladding and channel box system, the FeCrAl concept could provide a few extra hours of time for operators to take mitigating actions and/or for evacuations to take place. A coolable core geometry is retained longer, enhancing the ability to stabilize an accident. For example, a station blackout was simulated in which cooling water injection was lost 36 hours after shutdown. The timing to first fuel relocation was delayed by approximately 5 h for the FeCrAl ATF concept compared with that of the traditional Zircaloy-based cladding and channel box system.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

An Overview of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Uncertainty Assessment Accident Progression Insights

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) have completed three uncertainty analyses (UAs) as part of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) program. The SOARCA UAs included an integrated evaluation of uncertainty in accident progression, radiological release, and offsite health consequence projections. The UA for Peach Bottom, a boiling-water reactor (BWR) with a Mark I containment located in the State of Pennsylvania, analyzed the unmitigated long-term station blackout SOARCA scenario. The UA for Sequoyah, a 4-loop Westinghouse pressurized-water reactor (PWR) located in the State of Tennessee, analyzed the unmitigated short-term station blackout SOARCA scenario, with a focus on issues unique to the ice condenser containment and the potential for early containment failure due to hydrogen deflagration. The UA for Surry, a 3-loop Westinghouse PWR with a sub-atmospheric large dry containment located in the State of Virginia, analyzed the unmitigated short-term station blackout SOARCA scenario including the potential for thermally-induced steam-generator tube rupture. These three UAs are currently documented in three NUREG/CR reports. This report provides input to planned NRC documentation on the insights and findings from the SOARCA UA program. The purpose of the summary report is to provide a useful reference for regulatory applications that require the evaluation of offsite consequence risk from beyond design basis event severe accidents. This report focuses on the accident progression and source term insights developed from the MELCOR analyses. MELCOR is the NRC's best-estimate, severe accident computer code used in the SOARCA UAs. In anticipation of the SOARCA UA insights work, NRC and Sandia benchmarked the response of the Peach Bottom model to selected reference calculations from the Peach Bottom SOARCA UA. Peach Bottom was the first SOARCA UA performed and was completed in 2015 using the MELCOR 1.8.6 code. The PWR SOARCA UAs evolved the original methodology and utilized the updated MELCOR 2.2 computer code. The Peach Bottom model has been systematically updated for other NRC research efforts and has been updated to MELCOR 2.2. computer code. The findings from the new reference calculations using the updated model with the MELCOR 2.2 code are also integrated into the report. A second objective is an assessment of the applicability of the results to the other nuclear reactors in the U.S. As the key findings are reviewed, judgments are presented on the applicability of the results to other U.S. nuclear power plants. An important objective of the SOARCA program relied on high- fidelity plant-specific modeling. However, the nature of the insights and conclusions allowed judgements to be made on the applicability of the various insights to the same general classification of plant (i.e., BWR or PWR) or the entire fleet of plants. Finally, the results from the SOARCA UA accident progression calculations contain a wealth of information not previously documented in the NUREG/CRs. This report includes new but related information that can be used to benchmark past or support future regulatory decisions related to severe accidents. The new work includes a benchmark of the NUREG-1465 licensing source term definitions, the variability of key accident progression events and timing to radionuclide release, and an improved understanding of the timing and source terms from consequential steam generator tube ruptures. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Sandia authors gratefully acknowledge the significant technical and programmatic contributions from the NRC SOARCA team which are reflected throughout the report. Dr. Tina Ghosh has been involved throughout the SOARCA UAs, providing the primary managerial and technical oversight. The long lists of NRC and Sandia contributors from the SOARCA UAs are cited in the three NUREG/CRs and are also gratefully acknowledged by the small team of authors compiling the results of their efforts. Significant technical contributions, advice, and reviews were provided by Dr. Hossein Esmaili, Dr. Alfred Hathaway, and Dr. Edward Fuller (retired) of the NRC. Dr. Randal Gauntt (retired), Mr. Patrick Mattie, Mr. Joseph Jones (retired), and Dr. Doug Osborn from Sandia are recognized as the SOARCA UA managers guiding the past efforts. There is a comparable list of project managers at the NRC including Ms. Patricia Santiago, Dr. Salman Haq, and Mr. Jon Barr. Sadly, we have lost Mr. Charlie Tinkler and Mr. Robert Prato, who were important contributors to the original SOARCA project. Finally, Mr. Kyle Ross and Mr. Mark Leonard have also retired but were significant technical contributors. Mr. Kyle Ross was the technical lead on all three SOARCA UAs and the original pressurized water reactor SOARCA study. Mr. Leonard was the technical lead on the original boiling water reactor SOARCA study and a key contributor to the first Peach Bottom SOARCA UA. iv

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

ESBWR response to an extended station blackout/loss of all AC power

U.S. federal regulations require light water cooled nuclear power plants to cope with Station Blackouts for a predetermined amount of time based on design factors for the plant. U.S. regulations define Station Blackout (SBO) as a loss of the offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine trip and unavailability of the onsite emergency AC power system. According to U.S. regulations, typically the coping period for an SBO is 4 hours and can be as long as 16 hours for currently operating BWR plants. Being able to cope with an SBO and loss of all AC power is required by international regulators as well. The U.S. licensing basis for the ESBWR is a coping period of 72 hours for an SBO based on U.S. NRC requirements for passive safety plants. In the event of an extended SBO (viz., greater than 72 hours), the ESBWR response shows that the design is able to cope with the event for at least 7 days without AC electrical power or operator action. ESBWR is a Generation III+ reactor design with an array of passive safety systems. The ESBWR primary success path for mitigation of an SBO event is the Isolation Condenser System (ICS). The ICS is a passive, closed loop, safety system that initiates automatically on a loss of power. Upon Station Blackout or loss of all AC power, the ICS begins removing decay heat from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) by (i) condensing the steam into water in heat exchangers located in pools of water above the containment, and (ii) transferring the decay heat to the atmosphere. The condensed water is then returned by gravity to cool the reactor again. The ICS alone is capable of maintaining the ESBWR in a safe shutdown condition after an SBO for an extended period. The fuel remains covered throughout the SBO event. The ICS is able to remove decay heat from the RPV for at least 7 days and maintains the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. The water level in the RPV remains well above the top of active fuel for the duration of the SBO event. Beyond 7 days, only a few simple actions are needed to cope with the SBO for an indefinite amount of time. The operation of the ICS as the primary success path for mitigation of an SBO, allows for near immediate plant restart once power is restored. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Research on Resilience of Power Systems Under Natural Disasters—A Review

Natural disasters can cause large blackouts. Research into natural disaster impacts on electric power systems is emerging to understand the causes of the blackouts, explore ways to prepare and harden the grid, and increase the resilience of the power grid under such events. At the same time, new technologies such as smart grid, micro grid, and wide area monitoring applications could increase situational awareness as well as enable faster restoration of the system. This paper aims to consolidate and review the progress of the research field towards methods and tools of forecasting natural disaster related power system disturbances, hardening and pre-storm operations, and restoration models. Challenges and future research opportunities are also presented in the paper.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

An Online Search Method for Representative Risky Fault Chains Based on Reinforcement Learning and Knowledge Transfer

In the analysis of cascading outages and blackouts in power systems, risky cascading fault chains should be accurately identified in order to do further block or alleviate blackouts. However, the huge computational burden makes online analysis difficult. In this paper, an online search method for representative risky fault chains based on reinforcement learning and knowledge transfer is proposed. This method aims at promoting efficiency by exploiting similarities of adjacent power flow snapshots in operations. After the “representative risky fault chain” is defined, a framework of tree search based on Markov Decision Process and Q-learning is constructed. The knowledge in past runs is accumulated offline and then applied online, with a mechanism of knowledge transition and extension. The proposed learning based approach is verified on an illustrative 39-bus system with different loading levels, and simulations are carried out on a realworld 1000-bus power grid in China to show the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach.

Blackout↗

Demonstration of fully coupled simplified extended station black-out accident simulation with RELAP-7

The RELAP-7 code is the next generation nuclear reactor system safety analysis code being developed at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The RELAP-7 code develop-ment effort started in October of 2011 and by the end of the second development year, a number of physical components with simplified two phase flow capability have been de-veloped to support the simplified boiling water reactor (BWR) extended station blackout (SBO) analyses. The demonstration case includes the major components for the primary system of a BWR, as well as the safety system components for the safety relief valve (SRV), the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, and the wet well. Three scenar-ios for the SBO simulations have been considered. Since RELAP-7 is not a severe acci-dent analysis code, the simulation stops when fuel clad temperature reaches damage point. Scenario I represents an extreme station blackout accident without any external cooling and cooling water injection. The system pressure is controlled by automatically releasing steam through SRVs. Scenario II includes the RCIC system but without SRV. The RCIC system is fully coupled with the reactor primary system and all the major components are dynamically simulated. The third scenario includes both the RCIC system and the SRV to provide a more realistic simulation. This paper will describe the major models and dis-cuss the results for the three scenarios. The RELAP-7 simulations for the three simplified SBO scenarios show the importance of dynamically simulating the SRVs, the RCIC sys-tem, and the wet well system to the reactor safety during extended SBO accidents.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Modeling of a Passive Endothermic Reaction Cooling System

Passive reactor core cooling systems can mitigate the effects of station blackout conditions and avoid accidents similar to what occurred at the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors. Advanced nuclear reactor designs such as the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) and others include passive cooling systems. The AHWR utilizes water storage tanks that can remove decay heat for more than 50 days after station blackout. While these systems do not rely on electricity, they do rely on passive valves to function during an emergency situation. The purpose of the present work is to determine the feasibility of a passive endothermic reaction cooling system (PERCS). The PERCS relies on an endothermic reaction that does not proceed until it reaches a threshold temperature. Thus, a vessel filled with chemicals that undergo an endothermic reaction can be directly connected to the reactor core without any valves and only react once accident conditions raise the temperature past the threshold temperature. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A simulation of I 2 S-LWR selected transients

The Integral Inherently Safe (I 2 S-LWR) reactor was designed to improve the safety performance of PWR types reactors, and several design basis accidents were eliminated using innovative approaches to the I 2 S-LWR plant layout. However, some accidents such as station blackout (SBO), main steam line break (MSLB) type accident – the secondary hot leg break (SHLB) – were deemed statistically relevant, and the work performed here was to simulate these events using the system thermal–hydraulics code RELAP5 coupled to the 3D spatial kinetics code PARCS. The safety response of the reactor to a station blackout is predicted to be acceptable at both beginning of cycle (BOC) and end of cycle EOC core conditions with either the UO 2 or U 3 Si 2 fuel options considered here. In the analysis of the SHLB performed here, an unprotected (no SCRAM) condition was assumed to highlight the I 2 S-LWR capabilities. Results indicate that with the UO 2 core, the fuel temperatures rise notably, but no fuel melting was predicted and departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) limits were not exceeded. Similarly, the U 3 Si 2 fuel performed well, but with lower fuel temperatures and decreased DNBR. Following the break of the steam line in the I 2 S-LWR, shutdown is achieved after about two minutes via negative reactivity from loss of primary flow. In all cases considered, the I 2 S-LWR appears to accomplish the goals of increased safety performance. Further design improvements and other fuel options may marginally improve on the observed safety performance. Additionally, higher fidelity analysis with the next generation subchannel, Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), or full core transport may be useful in refining the prediction of the peak fuel and cladding temperatures, as well limiting DNBR during the accidents.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Phenomena identification and categorization by the required level of multiphysics coupling in FHR modeling and simulation

Here, this study identifies the phenomena that impact the accuracy of the multiphysics analysis of fluoride salt-cooled high temperature reactors (FHR) and categorizes the level of coupling needed to model these phenomena with sufficient accuracy in the context of three scenarios, namely, normal operation, station blackout, and simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods. Such a study is a necessary step prior to developing or extending existing multiphysics modeling and simulation tools. The identified multiphysics phenomena are categorized into the groups requiring ‘‘tight” and ‘‘loose” coupling. ‘‘Tight” coupling refers to phenomena that require iterative feedback between multiple physics modules/methods whereas ‘‘loose” coupling refers to phenomena that require only data from other physics that can be pre-calculated and shared in tabular or functional form. For the station blackout scenario, it was determined that no identified phenomena required tight coupling. For the rod withdrawal and normal operation scenarios, it is found that there is a large number of phenomena that require tight coupling between neutronics and thermal hydraulics.

42 ENGINEERING↗