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At least 109 records · Page 6

Attack detection and strategy optimization in game-theoretic trust models

Trust in a microelectronics-based systems can be characterized as the level of confidence that the system is free of subversive alterations inserted by a malicious adversary during system development. Outkin et al. recently developed GPLADD, a game-theoretic framework that enables trust analysis through a set of mathematical models that represent multi-step attack graphs and contention between system attackers and defenders. This paper extends GPLADD to include detection of attacks on development processes and defender decision processes that occur in response to detection events. The paper provides mathematical details for implementing attack detection and demonstrates the models on an example system. The authors further demonstrate how optimal defender strategies vary when solution concepts and objective functions are modified.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Adversary phase change detection using SOMs and text data.

In this work, we developed a self-organizing map (SOM) technique for using web-based text analysis to forecast when a group is undergoing a phase change. By 'phase change', we mean that an organization has fundamentally shifted attitudes or behaviors. For instance, when ice melts into water, the characteristics of the substance change. A formerly peaceful group may suddenly adopt violence, or a violent organization may unexpectedly agree to a ceasefire. SOM techniques were used to analyze text obtained from organization postings on the world-wide web. Results suggest it may be possible to forecast phase changes, and determine if an example of writing can be attributed to a group of interest.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Adversary phase change detection using S.O.M. and text data.

In this work, we developed a self-organizing map (SOM) technique for using web-based text analysis to forecast when a group is undergoing a phase change. By 'phase change', we mean that an organization has fundamentally shifted attitudes or behaviors. For instance, when ice melts into water, the characteristics of the substance change. A formerly peaceful group may suddenly adopt violence, or a violent organization may unexpectedly agree to a ceasefire. SOM techniques were used to analyze text obtained from organization postings on the world-wide web. Results suggest it may be possible to forecast phase changes, and determine if an example of writing can be attributed to a group of interest.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Adversary phase change detection using S.O.M. and text data.

In this work, we developed a self-organizing map (SOM) technique for using web-based text analysis to forecast when a group is undergoing a phase change. By 'phase change', we mean that an organization has fundamentally shifted attitudes or behaviors. For instance, when ice melts into water, the characteristics of the substance change. A formerly peaceful group may suddenly adopt violence, or a violent organization may unexpectedly agree to a ceasefire. SOM techniques were used to analyze text obtained from organization postings on the world-wide web. Results suggest it may be possible to forecast phase changes, and determine if an example of writing can be attributed to a group of interest.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Remote inspection of adversary-controlled environments

Remotely monitoring the location and enduring presence of valuable items in adversary-controlled environments presents significant challenges. In this article, we demonstrate a monitoring approach that leverages the gigahertz radio-wave scattering and absorption of a room and its contents, including a set of mirrors with random orientations placed inside, to remotely verify the absence of any disturbance over time. Our technique extends to large physical systems the application of physical unclonable functions for integrity protection. Its main applications are scenarios where parties are mutually distrustful and have privacy and security constraints. Examples range from the verification of nuclear arms-control treaties to the securing of currency, artwork, or data centers.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Evaluating Direct and Indirect Influence on EV Charging Stations Across the US

The adoption of new technology for electric vehicles (EV) and mobility applications can bring underappreciated vulnerabilities to the power grid. One area of potential fraud and adversarial influence is through the business ecosystem of startups that own and deploy EV technology. Yet, there are no models or analyses that map the network of organizations and people that have direct and indirect influence over technologies currently deployed in the grid. To fill this gap, we develop a multilayer network model to measure direct and indirect influence on EV charging stations. First, we create and adversarial socio-technical network (ASTN) model via a data fusion pipeline for different US regions of interest (ROI). Then, we develop an integrated ASTN for Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. We rank EV charging companies direct influence within each geographic region as well as indirect influence via social network analysis. While some companies have strong direct and indirect influence (i.e., ChargePoint) others show a mismatch between their influence over charging stations and their position within the social network. For example, Tesla has strong direct influence on stations and weak indirect influence over competitors. In contrast, 7Charge has weak direct influence over stations, but strong indirect influence over competitors.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Audit Report on "Management Controls over the Department's Excess Weapons Inventories and Selected Sensitive Equipment used by Protective Forces"

Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Energy has, on several occasions, revised its security posture based on identified threats and adversaries. These revisions in security posture have driven Departmental sites to upgrade their defensive and tactical equipment. Subsequent changes in the perceived threats have, in some cases, led to a reduction in the need for certain types of weapons, thus creating a pool of surplus equipment. These surplus weapons could potentially be used by other Department sites and Federal law enforcement agencies. Recent Office of Inspector General reports have raised concerns with the adequacy of controls related to defensive and tactical equipment. For example, our report on Management Controls Over Defense Related High Risk Property (OAS-M-08-06, April 2008) found that administrative controls over certain defense related high risk property were not sufficient for providing accountability over these items. Because of prior reported weaknesses in controls over defensive and tactical equipment, we initiated this audit to determine whether the Department and its contractors were properly managing excess weapons inventories and selected sensitive equipment used by protective forces. Our review disclosed that the Department was not always properly managing its inventories of excess weapons and selected sensitive equipment. We identified issues with the retention of unneeded weapons at many locations and with the identification and tracking of sensitive items. More specifically: Sites maintained large inventories of weapons that were no longer needed but had not been made available for use by either other Departmental sites or other Federal law enforcement agencies. For instance, at six of the locations included in our review we identified a total of 2,635 unneeded weapons with a total acquisition value of over $2.8 million that had not been officially declared as excess - an action that would have made them available for others to use. In addition; Sites were not always identifying, tracking and properly disposing of potentially high risk and sensitive equipment. In particular, we identified control weaknesses in this area related to weapons sights and scopes. These issues occurred because the Department did not have processes in place to properly manage excess inventories of weapons. In particular, the Department does not have requirements for ensuring timely declaration of excess weapons. Additionally, certain sites indicated that they were unwilling to give up excess weapons because of the possibility that they may be needed in the future. However, other sites had a need for some of these weapons and could have avoided purchasing them had they been made available through the excess screening process. Also, we found that the Department lacks clear guidance on the identification of high risk/sensitive equipment. Except for immaterial differences, we were able to locate and verify accountability over the items of defensive and tactical equipment we selected for review. Specifically, we took statistical samples of weapons, ammunition, and other related equipment and were able to verify their existence. While these accountability measures were noteworthy, additional action is necessary to strengthen controls over weapon and sensitive equipment management. Untimely declaration of excess weapons may result in an inefficient use of scarce Government resources. Similarly, if selected high risk/sensitive equipment is not properly categorized and tracked, accountability issues may occur. To address these issues, we made recommendations aimed at improving the management of these categories of defensive and tactical equipment.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Metabonomics for detection of nuclear materials processing.

Tracking nuclear materials production and processing, particularly covert operations, is a key national security concern, given that nuclear materials processing can be a signature of nuclear weapons activities by US adversaries. Covert trafficking can also result in homeland security threats, most notably allowing terrorists to assemble devices such as dirty bombs. Existing methods depend on isotope analysis and do not necessarily detect chronic low-level exposure. In this project, indigenous organisms such as plants, small mammals, and bacteria are utilized as living sensors for the presence of chemicals used in nuclear materials processing. Such 'metabolic fingerprinting' (or 'metabonomics') employs nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy to assess alterations in organismal metabolism provoked by the environmental presence of nuclear materials processing, for example the tributyl phosphate employed in the processing of spent reactor fuel rods to extract and purify uranium and plutonium for weaponization.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Uncertainties associated with GAN-generated datasets in high energy physics

Recently, Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) trained on samples of traditionally simulated collider events have been proposed as a way of generating larger simulated datasets at a reduced computational cost. In this paper we point out that data generated by a GAN cannot statistically be better than the data it was trained on, and critically examine the applicability of GANs in various situations, including a) for replacing the entire Monte Carlo pipeline or parts of it, and b) to produce datasets for usage in highly sensitive analyses or sub-optimal ones. We present our arguments using information theoretic demonstrations, a toy example, as well as in the form of a formal statement, and identify some potential valid uses of GANs in collider simulations.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Next-generation Algorithms for Assessing Infrastructure Vulnerability and Optimizing System Resilience

This report summarizes the work performed under the project project Next-Generation Algorithms for Assessing Infrastructure Vulnerability and Optimizing System Resilience. The goal of the project was to improve mathematical programming-based optimization technology for infrastructure protection. In general, the owner of a network wishes to design a network a network that can perform well when certain transportation channels are inhibited (e.g. destroyed) by an adversary. These are typically bi-level problems where the owner designs a system, an adversary optimally attacks it, and then the owner can recover by optimally using the remaining network. This project funded three years of Deon Burchett's graduate research. Deon's graduate advisor, Professor Jean-Philippe Richard, and his Sandia advisors, Richard Chen and Cynthia Phillips, supported Deon on other funds or volunteer time. This report is, therefore. essentially a replication of the Ph.D. dissertation it funded in a format required for project documentation. The thesis had some general polyhedral research. This is the study of the structure of the feasible region of mathematical programs, such as integer programs. For example, an integer program optimizes a linear objective function subject to linear constraints, and (nonlinear) integrality constraints on the variables. The feasible region without the integrality constraints is a convex polygon. Careful study of additional valid constraints can significantly improve computational performance. Here is the abstract from the dissertation: We perform a polyhedral study of a multi-commodity generalization of variable upper bound flow models. In particular, we establish some relations between facets of single- and multi- commodity models. We then introduce a new family of inequalities, which generalizes traditional flow cover inequalities to the multi-commodity context. We present encouraging numerical results. We also consider the directed edge-failure resilient network design problem (DRNDP). This problem entails the design of a directed multi-commodity flow network that is capable of fulfilling a specified percentage of demands in the event that any G arcs are destroyed, where G is a constant parameter. We present a formulation of DRNDP and solve it in a branch-column-cut framework. We present computational results.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Multi-level optimization with the koopman operator for data-driven, domain-aware, and dynamic system security

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) like the power grid are critically important but also increasingly vulnerable; ensuring reliable system operation in the face of disruptions is becoming more and more challenging. Multi-Level Optimization (MLO) is a powerful way to model adversarial interactions, which naturally makes it applicable to studying CPS security. However, MLO typically does not address underlying system dynamics, and incorporating nonlinear dynamics is generally infeasible. In this paper, we show how to combine MLO with the Koopman Operator (KO) to remedy this. The KO maps nonlinear dynamics to a lifted space in which those dynamics are linear, thus making it ideal for use with MLO. Moreover, the structure of the KO also provides convenient ways to incorporate domain knowledge into the data-driven process of learning the KO representation of a given system. Here we then demonstrate the use of MLO-KO on a small example problem taken from the power grid domain, discuss the scalability and computational cost of MLO-KO, and identify future research directions for this work.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Analyzing Cyber Security Threats on Cyber-Physical Systems Using Model-Based Systems Engineering

The spectre of cyber attacks on aerospace systems can no longer be ignored given that many of the components and vulnerabilities that have been successfully exploited by the adversary on other infrastructures are the same as those deployed and used within the aerospace environment. An important consideration with respect to the mission/safety critical infrastructure supporting space operations is that an appropriate defensive response to an attack invariably involves the need for high precision and accuracy, because an incorrect response can trigger unacceptable losses involving lives and/or significant financial damage. A highly precise defensive response, considering the typical complexity of aerospace environments, requires a detailed and well-founded understanding of the underlying system where the goal of the defensive response is to preserve critical mission objectives in the presence of adversarial activity. In this paper, a structured approach for modeling aerospace systems is described. The approach includes physical elements, network topology, software applications, system functions, and usage scenarios. We leverage Model-Based Systems Engineering methodology by utilizing the Object Management Group's Systems Modeling Language to represent the system being analyzed and also utilize model transformations to change relevant aspects of the model into specialized analyses. A novel visualization approach is utilized to visualize the entire model as a three-dimensional graph, allowing easier interaction with subject matter experts. The model provides a unifying structure for analyzing the impact of a particular attack or a particular type of attack. Two different example analysis types are demonstrated in this paper: a graph-based propagation analysis based on edge labels, and a graph-based propagation analysis based on node labels.

MBSE↗

Certified randomness using a trapped-ion quantum processor

Although quantum computers can perform a wide range of practically important tasks beyond the abilities of classical computers, realizing this potential remains a challenge. An example is to use an untrusted remote device to generate random bits that can be certified to contain a certain amount of entropy. Certified randomness has many applications but is impossible to achieve solely by classical computation. Here we demonstrate the generation of certifiably random bits using the 56-qubit Quantinuum H2-1 trapped-ion quantum computer accessed over the Internet. Our protocol leverages the classical hardness of recent random circuit sampling demonstrations: a client generates quantum ‘challenge’ circuits using a small randomness seed, sends them to an untrusted quantum server to execute and verifies the results of the server. We analyse the security of our protocol against a restricted class of realistic near-term adversaries. Using classical verification with measured combined sustained performance of 1.1 × 10 18 floating-point operations per second across multiple supercomputers, we certify 71,313 bits of entropy under this restricted adversary and additional assumptions. Our results demonstrate a step towards the practical applicability of present-day quantum computers.

computer science↗

Resilient Distributed Field Estimation

We study resilient distributed field estimation under measurement attacks. A network of agents or devices measures a large, spatially distributed physical field parameter. An adversary arbitrarily manipulates the measurements of some of the agents. Each agent's goal is to process its measurements and information received from its neighbors to estimate only a few specific components of the field. Here, we present SAFE, the saturating adaptive field estimator, a consensus + innovations distributed field estimator that is resilient to measurement attacks. Under sufficient conditions on the compromised measurement streams, the physical coupling between the field and the agents' measurements, and the connectivity of the cyber communication network, SAFE guarantees that each agent's estimate converges almost surely to the true value of the components of the parameter in which the agent is interested. Finally, we illustrate the performance of SAFE through numerical examples.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Explainable machine learning of the underlying physics of high-energy particle collisions

We present an implementation of an explainable and physics-aware machine learning model capable of inferring the underlying physics of high-energy particle collisions using the information encoded in the energy-momentum four-vectors of the final state particles. We demonstrate the proof-of-concept of our White Box AI approach using a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) which learns from a DGLAP-based parton shower Monte Carlo event generator. The constrained generator network architecture mimics the structure of a parton shower exhibiting similarities with Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs). We show, for the first time, that our approach leads to a network that is able to learn not only the final distribution of particles, but also the underlying parton branching mechanism, i.e. the Altarelli-Parisi splitting function, the ordering variable of the shower, and the scaling behavior. While the current work is focused on perturbative physics of the parton shower, we foresee a broad range of applications of our framework to areas that are currently difficult to address from first principles in QCD. Examples include nonperturbative and collective effects, factorization breaking and the modification of the parton shower in heavy-ion, and electron-nucleus collisions.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Additively Manufactured Tamper Evident Container (TEC)

The protection of sensitive data, proprietary information, and physical assets from adversarial disclosure is a high priority in today’s environment of government and industrial espionage. Furthermore, knowledge of the security history and monitoring for potential acquisition or disclosure of the protected assets from oppositional sources is equally important. In 2016, as part of an LANL Institute for Materials Science (IMS) rapid response research initiative, the investigators of this technology demonstration project developed the concept of an additively manufactured tamper resistant container that possessed tamper evident features. Tamper evident seals and detection technologies have a long history in protecting consumers from product tampering, recording the installation and activation of mechanical safety panels and fasteners on dangerous electro-mechanical systems, and serving as a warranty void indicator on expensive electronic equipment. Examples of such tamper evident seals range from “no-tech” versions, e.g., the paper seals under medicine caps, to “high-tech” seals that are radio frequency-active and include encryption capabilities used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor stored nuclear materials in support of safeguards missions. The tamper evident container (TEC) technology would have many uses.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Fast and accurate simulations of calorimeter showers with normalizing flows

In this study, we introduce caloflow, a fast detector simulation framework based on normalizing flows. For the first time, we demonstrate that normalizing flows can reproduce many-channel calorimeter showers with extremely high fidelity, providing a fresh alternative to computationally expensive geant4 simulations, as well as other state-of-the-art fast simulation frameworks based on generative adversarial networks (GANs) or variational autoencoders (VAEs). In addition to the usual histograms of physical features and images of calorimeter showers, we introduce a new metric for judging the quality of generative modeling: the performance of a classifier trained to differentiate real from generated images. We show that GAN-generated images can be identified by the classifier with nearly 100% accuracy, while images generated from caloflow are better able to fool the classifier. More broadly, normalizing flows offer several advantages compared to other state-of-the-art approaches (GANs and VAEs), including tractable likelihoods, stable and convergent training, and principled model selection. Normalizing flows also provide a bijective mapping between data and the latent space, which could have other applications beyond simulation, for example, to detector unfolding.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗