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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Electrochemical behaviour of uranium at a tripolyphosphate modified ITO electrode

UO 2 2+ binds to the surface of a tripolyphosphate modified mesoporous indium tin-doped oxide electrode (nanoITO|P 3 ). Electrochemical studies reveal that nITO|P 3 electrodes catalyze the 2-electron interconversion between UO 2 2+ and U 4+ with the P 3 -ligand assisting in the rate-limiting proton-coupled reduction of U(V) to U(IV), based on the kinetic isotope effect (1.8). Product composition between nITO|P 3 (U 4+ ) and surface adsorbed UO 2 can be controlled by adjusting the proton concentration and/or scan rate in voltammograms. Furthermore these studies with uranium suggest that nITO|P 3 electrodes are good candidates for redox transformations with other actinides including neptunium, plutonium, and americium.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2024

Early-stage oxidation and subsequent damage of the used nuclear fuel extractant TODGA; electron pulse radiolysis and theoretical insights

Radiation induced damage of extractant molecules is a well-known phenomenon responsible for reducing efficiency and increasing the waste and cost of reprocessing used nuclear fuel (UNF). As such, understanding early-stage (pico- to nanoseconds) radiation-induced reaction mechanisms is essential for informing the design of next generation extractants with enhanced radiation robustness. Here, in this work, we utilized picosecond and nanosecond electron pulse radiolysis experiments to probe the early-stage radioactive environment experienced by the organic phase extractant N,N,N',N'-tetraoctyldiglycolamide (TODGA), proposed for separating highly radioactive trivalent minor actinides (specifically americium and curium) from the trivalent lanthanides. Using comparisons to the similar ionization potential (IP) solute p-xylene, this work determined the mechanism of reaction with the ionized diluent (i.e., n-dodecane radical cation, DD˙ + ) is hole transfer to produce TODGA˙ + . At high TODGA concentrations (>100 mM), the majority of this transfer occurs faster than 10 ps via the capture of DD˙ + holes prior to their solvation with a C 37 = 300 mM. The surviving solvated holes were captured with k = (2.38 ± 0.15) × 10 10 M -1 s -1 . Attempts at subsequent hole transfer to lower IP solutes found that only 10% of holes were transferred, indicating bond rupture of TODGA˙ + occurs within 2.6 ns at 200 mM TODGA. Possible reaction pathways for the rapid decomposition of TODGA˙ + were explored using a combination of experiments and density functional theory (DFT) calculations.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2024

Effect of f -element complexation on the radiolysis of 2-ethylhexylphosphonic acid mono-2-ethylhexyl ester (HEH[EHP])

A systematic study of the impact on the chemical reactivity of the oxidising n-dodecane radical cation (RH˙ + ) with f-element complexed 2-ethylhexylphosphonic acid mono-2-ethylhexyl ester (HEH[EHP]) has been undertaken utilizing time-resolved electron pulse radiolysis/transient absorption spectroscopy and high-level quantum mechanical calculations. Lanthanide ion complexed species, [Ln((HEH[EHP]) 2 ) 3 ], exhibited vastly increased reactivity (over 10× faster) in comparison to the non-complexed ligand in n-dodecane solvent, whose rate coefficient was k = (4.66 ± 0.22) × 10 9 M -1 s -1 . Similar reactivity enhancement was also observed for the corresponding americium ion complex, k = (5.58 ± 0.30) × 10 10 M -1 s -1 . The vastly increased reactivity of these f-element complexes was not due to simple increased diffusion-control of these reactions; rather, enhanced hole transfer mechanisms for the complexes were calculated to become energetically more favourable. Interestingly, the observed reactivity trend with lanthanide ion size was not linear; instead, the rate coefficients showed an initial increase (Lu to Yb) followed by a decrease (Tm to Ho), followed by another increase (Dy to La). This behaviour was excellently predicted by the calculated reaction volumes of these complexes. In conclusion, complementary cobalt-60 gamma irradiations for select lanthanide complexes demonstrated that the measured kinetic differences translated to increased ligand degradation at steady-state timescales, affording ~38% increase in ligand loss of a 1:1 [La((HEH[EHP]) 2 ) 3 ]: HEH[EHP] ratio system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Thermal and radiation response of 4H–SiC Schottky diodes with direct-write electrical contacts

In this work, a high-sensitivity 4H–SiC temperature sensor and an alpha detector have been fabricated using additively printed metal contacts. The surface morphology and electrical conductivity of the printed electrodes were established prior to Schottky diode development. 4H–SiC Schottky diodes with direct-write printed silver contacts on the 5 μ m-thick epilayer on 4H–SiC were characterized electrically in terms of the forward and reverse current–voltage and high-frequency capacitance–voltage characteristics. Furthermore, the turn-on voltage of the Schottky diodes, as established from the forward current–voltage characteristics measured up to a temperature of 400 °C, showed a linear temperature dependence. Schottky diodes with direct-write printed Ag electrodes were able to measure alpha particles emitted from Americium-241. The high temperature and radiation response of the Schottky diodes show their suitability for multi-modal sensor fusion on the 4H–SiC platform for harsh environment applications.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Mortality among workers at the Rocky Flats Plant, 1951–2017

The Rocky Flats (RFs) Plant operated from 1951–1989 as part of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear complex. Its primary mission was weapons component fabrication, whereby workers were potentially exposed to radioactive and non-radioactive hazards. RF worker mortality was compared to the general population, and dose-response relationships between mortality and radiation organ doses were examined. RF workers first employed between 1951 and 1979 for ⩾30 d were identified (n = 9397). Vital status was determined using national and state death records up to 2017. Organ doses from external photons and neutrons irritation and internalised plutonium (Pu), americium (Am), and uranium (U) were modelled as cumulative lagged total doses per year. Beryllium exposure was evaluated as an effect modifier using data from the DOE Nationwide Beryllium Medical Program. Statistical analyses included standardised mortality ratios (SMRs), Cox proportional hazard models, and excess relative risk (ERR) models. Approximately 53.2% of workers were deceased by the end of the study. Nearly 90% were monitored for radiation exposure, with a mean weighted absorbed dose of 59.0 mGy for the lungs. Nearly 45% of workers had intakes of alpha-particle emitting radionuclides, and 46.7% were monitored for neutrons. Leading causes of death included ischemic heart disease (n = 999) and lung cancer (n = 361). The highest SMRs were observed for berylliosis (SMR: 176.9; 95% CI: 76.2, 348.7; n < 10) and asbestosis (SMR: 4.65; 95% CI: 2.23, 8.55; n = 10). Dose-response analyses showed no statistical increase in risk from low-dose radiation including lung cancer (ERR per 100 mGy: −0.02; 95% CI: −0.11, 0.08; n = 361) and Parkinson’s disease (ERR per 100 mGy: 0.13; 95% CI: −0.26, 0.31; n = 57). Approximately 45% of workers were monitored for beryllium, with a weak non-significant indication of effect modification for lung cancer risk. The RF cohort showed no evidence of a statistically significant increase in mortality from occupational radiation exposure. However, this study was limited by low statistical power, which inhibits the ability to detect effects. Future pooling of Million Person Study (MPS) cohorts will provide further insights, particularly regarding Pu as a carcinogen.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Neutron tagging following atmospheric neutrino events in a water Cherenkov detector

We present the development of neutron-tagging techniques in Super-Kamiokande IV using a neural network analysis. The detection efficiency of neutron capture on hydrogen is estimated to be 26%, with a mis-tag rate of 0.016 per neutrino event. The uncertainty of the tagging efficiency is estimated to be 9.0%. Measurement of the tagging efficiency with data from an Americium-Beryllium calibration agrees with this value within 10%. The tagging procedure was performed on 3,244.4 days of SK-IV atmospheric neutrino data, identifying 18,091 neutrons in 26,473 neutrino events. The fitted neutron capture lifetime was measured as 218±9 μs.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Utilization of traceable standards to validate plutonium isotopic purification and separation of plutonium progeny using AG MP-1M resin for nuclear forensic investigations

Radio-chronometric studies on plutonium (Pu) materials require independent measurement of the Pu (parent) content and isotopic distribution as well as concentration and isotopic distribution of the plutonium isotopic decay products. We performed a series of experiments to demonstrate the consistency of separations using the Lewatit MP 800 macroporous anion exchange resin and the AG MP-1M resin with traceable Pu isotopic certified reference material (CRM) standards 136, 137, 138, and 126-A. Two different mesh-sizes of the AG MP-1M resin were tested and the 50–100 mesh size resin was found to work more efficiently for the separation task. Both Lewatit and AG MP-1M resins were found to perform satisfactorily for quantitatively extracting the americium (Am) and uranium (U) progeny as well as gallium (Ga) present as a tracer in the Pu material. Both resins were effective in removing isobaric interferences from the Pu fraction used in isotopic measurements by thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS). To address the co-elution of uranium and gallium, Alizarin red S (ARS) was used as a colorimetric dye to determine the behavior of UO 2 2+ and Ga 3+ on AG MP-1M resin with various acidic solutions as eluents using UV–vis spectra. Poor resolution of these peaks complicated quantitative analysis by UV–vis spectroscopy, but these results were informative in planning automated separation experiments by HPLC. LA-UR-24-28919.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2020

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: (Jan 1 - Dec 31 2018)

During the late 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted a series of safety experiments to determine if a nuclear device subjected to a large conventional explosives detonation would result in a nuclear yield. The AEC obtained temporary use of a large portion of western Emigrant Valley from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for one of these experiments: Project 57. Following the Project 57 safety experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Emigrant Valley is part of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). For safety and security reasons, access to the NTTR is controlled using both physical (i.e., fences) and administrative (e.g., signs and postings) controls. Therefore, the public cannot access the Project 57 site and there are no known human receptors that routinely access the site. Project 57 was detonated on April 24, 1957, in Emigrant Valley approximately 13 mi (21 km) northeast of the north end of Yucca Flat. This test was undertaken to develop: (1) a means of estimating immediate distribution and long-term redistribution of plutonium dispersed during a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in likely plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of decontaminating ground areas, pavements, and building materials; and (4) alpha survey instruments and field monitoring procedures to promptly estimate contaminant deposition. Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the ground surface. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area since Project 57 was conducted. The AEC delineated the area containing radioactive material based on radioactivity surveys performed shortly after the test was conducted. A designated Contamination Area (CA), marked by a fence, was established later. The distribution of americium-241 (Am-241) in the area was determined again in a 1997 flyover, which showed Am-241 ranging from as much as 70,000 counts per second (cps) at ground zero to background (<70 cps). This survey also documented Am-241 radioactivity on the ground surface beyond the east side CA fence at levels of up to 150 cps. In 2007, the DOE expanded the CA by posting “Contamination Area” signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) beyond the original fence, which formed a new CA boundary.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nevada National Security Site 2019 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2019 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (Mission Support and Test Services, LLC 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS are below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection systems at the Area 5 mixed low-level waste disposal unit are below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2019, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 77 percent above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 69 percent above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter at the Area 5 RWMS dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring in the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS soil covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 120 centimeters (3.9 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS during 2019. There was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. At the Area 3 RWMS, which received three times the natural precipitation, 57 percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter. All 2019 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

2019↗
DOE OSTI2020

Development of a High-Energy Neutron Sniffer and Subsequent Dose Quantification for High-Energy Particle Accelerator Shielding Surveys

The objective of this research is to design a portable neutron detector that is lightweight and responds to neutrons with energies of 20 MeV and greater. The instrument will be used as a ‘sniffer’ probe for identifying shielding weaknesses at high-energy particle accelerators and be paired with a plastic scintillator to quantify the high-energy neutron dose equivalent. The sniffer probes are two different sizes and comprised of either cesium iodide or sodium iodide, all doped with thallium, making a total of four detectors. The probes were calibrated to respond only to radiations with 8 MeV electron equivalent energy or higher, vastly reducing detector response from background and lower energy radiations. The sniffer probes were tested using californium- 252 and americium-beryllium sources, followed by high-energy (up to 800 MeV) neutron exposures at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center Weapons Neutron Research (WNR) facility. The sniffer probes were then used to identify areas around the accelerator facility where elevated levels of high-energy radiation was present and the plastic scintillators were placed in these locations to determine the high-energy neutron dose equivalent. The dose equivalent is calculated by measuring the 12 C(n,2n) 11 C reaction, which has a 20.4 MeV neutron threshold. Two locations behind the WNR facility were identified with the probes and the dose equivalent rates from neutron energies above 20 MeV were calculated to be 1.24 mrem/h behind flightpath 30-left and 1.53 behind flightpath 30-right. Of the four sniffer probes, the 2-inch x 2-inch cesium iodide is the recommended probe for performing high-energy shielding surveys. The larger crystal size yields higher sensitivity at lower count rates and the more dense material increases the likelihood of interaction within the crystal.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Thermal Evaluation of the SAVY-4000 1 Quart Container at High Heat Loads

The SAVY-4000 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was published in 2013 which established the design life of the container series through physical testing that meets applicable requirements from DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. One critical requirement in DOE M 441.1-1 is to set a maximum heat load for the entire series to ensure that throughout the lifetime of the container, each of the components still performs within manufacture specifications. The original maximum decay heat limit has been defined within the SAVY-4000 SAR, which was accomplished by completing a series of tests that heat loaded the SAVY-4000 series and measured the steady state temperature and graded it against manufacture specifications. The container series is comprised of a corrosion resistant 316L stainless steel containment boundary, ceramic composite filter for the prevention of radiological particulate release and a chemically stable O-ring made of Viton ® . Currently, the SAVY 4000 maximum decay heat load is set at 25 Watts and the heat load expected during normal handling and storage is considered sufficient that the SAVY 4000 container requirements will not be the limiting factor for storage of most common material in use at TA-55, e.g. weapons grade oxide, americium, Pu-238 oxide and encapsulated heat sources. The SAVY 4000 lifetime was originally set as 5 years within the SAVY-4000 SAR, but in July 2019 the lifetime was extended to 15 years through a technical basis justification approved by the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Field Office. The 25 Watt limit applies to all SAVY 4000 container sizes; 1-quart, 2-quart, 3-quart, 5-quart, 8-quart, 12-quart, 5-gallon, and 10-gallon.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

AMPP Division Rack Cards [Posters/Cards]

The Actinide Material Processing and Power (AMPP) Division supports plutonium 238 science and manufacturing for NASA exploration, Defense Programs, Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) for nuclear non-proliferation, Materials Recovery & Recycle to enable the future of our operations, and americium production to support well logging for the United States.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of a Bulk 237 Np Oxide Sample for Trace Actinides

A neptunium oxide sample was dissolved and trace actinide constituents were measured by isotope dilution ICP-MS (for 239–244 Pu, 233–238 U, 237 Np, 241–243 Am) and alpha spectrometry ( 238 Pu, 242 Cm, 244 Cm). This material contained significant quantities of transuranic elements, notably americium and curium. The isotopic composition of the material will continue to evolve over time due to radioactive decay; the measurements reported here include all isotopes decay corrected to a reference date of 1/1/2022. These factors may be considerations in criticality studies of the related 237 Np sphere.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2022

Solubility of An(OH) 3 am and An(OH) 3 cr in the presence of Citrate and EDTA

The solubility of An(III), which pertains to Pu(III), Am(III), and Cm(III), in brine is an important contributor in WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) performance assessment (PA) models to calculate the potential release of transuranic elements in the near-field environment of the WIPP repository. Americium, although present in much smaller quantities than plutonium (~ 336 kg on year 2033 is potentially WIPP-bound primarily as Am-241), has a significant impact on release due to its higher activity during the earlier times of repository history (~26% initially, decreasing to 17% and ~0% at 1000 and 10,000 years after emplacement) (SOTERM, 2019). Lanthanide analogues such as Nd 3+ possess physical and chemical characteristics that allow them to be used to examine the chemical behavior of trivalent actinides (Lucchini, et al., 2007).

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2022

A new TEVA-DGA chromatography procedure to separate Pu, Am, and Np from bulk U materials

Trace actinides present within uranium (U) material are diagnostic signatures of U processing history. For example, the emplacement of U material within the high neutron-flux environment of a nuclear reactor can cause neutron capture of U to form 241-plutonium ( 241 Pu). Plutonium-241 then decays to progeny isotopes 241-americium ( 241 Am) and 237-neptunium ( 237 Np); therefore, the presence and relative abundances of these trace actinides is indicative of the material’s production history and intended employment (Mayer et al., 2013). During a pre-detonation nuclear forensics investigation, measurement of trace actinide 241 Pu, 241 Am, and 237 Np concentrations by an analytical laboratory may be requested. However, chemically purifying these elements from bulk U is a challenging and involved procedure requiring several sequential chromatography columns across 4+ days. To expedite Pu-Am-Np separation from bulk U material, and to improve the yield recovery of these elements, this DHS Postdoc Fellowship has worked to create a new chromatography separation chemistry.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2023

Station 11: An Overview of Plutonium

Sitting between neptunium (atomic number 93) and americium (atomic number 95) is the element plutonium (atomic number 94). Of all the elements on the periodic table, plutonium exhibits some of the strangest characteristics, some of which continue to baffle scientists to this day.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2022

Drones for Decommissioning

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has responsibility for regulating the safe decommissioning of facilities and sites to meet the License Termination Rule in 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Subpart E “Radiological Criteria for License Termination.” Decommissioning is performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, as part of license termination (§50.82) and release of the facility or site for unrestricted use (§50.83). The guidance currently demonstrates the minimum requirements and necessary conditions for conducting radiological surveys by a person carrying a radiation detector(s). The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) evaluated the use of an unoccupied aerial vehicle (UAV) to conduct radiological surveys that could be used in decommissioning to potentially reduce time, cost, and worker safety compared to current survey methods. The objective of this project was to evaluate the performance and limitations of a UAV to support a decommissioning radiological survey and compare it to a radiological survey conducted by a human. The primary research questions of interest evaluated were: 1. Did observed UAV paths differ from human paths and, if so, how much? 2. Did survey path deviation affect survey results and, if so, how? 3. Were radiological measurements from human and UAV surveys significantly different? To answer these research questions, an experimental field was set up at PNNL’s 3440 test track, and it included radiological sources commonly surveyed during decommissioning: cobalt-60 (Co-60), cesium-137 (Cs-137), and americium-241 (Am-241). Nine check sources (three each of Am-241, Cs-137, and Co-60) with activities ranging from 3.54 µCi to 39.34 µCi were set over a path that also included an area for measuring background radiation. An Aurelia X6 UAV coupled with a GPS and lidar unit was used to conduct the radiological surveys. UAV and human surveys were conducted using two different NaI(Tl) scintillation radiation detectors (2 in. × 2 in. Ludlum, Inc. and 2 in. × 0.04 in. Alpha Spectra, Inc.) at a travel velocity of approximately 0.2 m/s at a low (15–40 cm median altitude) or high (87–105 cm median altitude) survey altitude. Since the survey velocity and altitude parameters were atypical for normal UAV operations, testing was done prior to conducting the radiological surveys to establish airworthiness, evaluate the navigation system, and establish flight control. Human and UAV surveys were paired according to the detector type and altitude regime to compare the survey data. The results of this proof-of-concept research determined that the UAV and human surveys followed similar survey paths and detected the radiological sources with no significant statistical difference (in 33 out of 36 surveys). However, further research is needed prior to deploying UAVs for decommissioning surveys.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗