Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “ALARM SYSTEMS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Analysis Capability and Data Needs Identified During the Evaluation of the SILENE CAAS Benchmarks

In October 2010, a series of benchmark experiments was conducted at the Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives (CEA) Valduc SILENE facility. These experiments were a joint effort between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the French CEA to create three benchmarks for verification and validation of radiation transport codes, as well as evaluated nuclear data, used to analyze criticality accident alarm systems (CAASs). Many preliminary details of these experiments and their evaluation have been discussed in previous publications. The first benchmark evaluation was published in 2015, and the second and third evaluations will be published at the end of 2016.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

NDCS Group Meeting Work overview: NCSP Task ORNL IP&D-5 [Slides]

The presentation discusses the primary goal of the NCSP Task IP&D-5 which is to use available data from HPRR operation to create a benchmark report for inclusion in the ICSBEP, as a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) shielding benchmark. The presentation elaborates on the HPRR operation and how it relates to the KENO VI model, sulfur pellets measurements, and calculation methodology between KENO and MAVRIC FW-CADIS. The presentation concludes by stating that some work is still needed to evaluate uncertainties and to explain the discrepancy computation/experiment.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Computer-based human-machine interfaces for emergency operation - 233

The Halden Reactor Project (HRP) has many years of experience in developing and evaluating principles for computer-based human-machine interfaces (HMIs). We have synthesized the lessons learned in an integrated design concept that is implemented on a boiling water reactor (BWR) simulator in the Halden Man Machine Laboratory (HAMMLAB). The design concept is intended to alert and support the operators in monitoring and controlling the plant during normal operation, emergency situations and outages. The computer-based HMIs include an alarm system, operating displays, operating procedures and large screen displays. The design concept has been tested in a simulator study in HAMMLAB. This paper describes the design and initial testing of the computer-based emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and other displays to support the operators when using the EOPs. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

A smart alarm for particle accelerator beamline operations

We present the initial results of a proof-of-concept 'smart alarm' for the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility injector beamline at Jefferson Lab. To minimize machine downtime and improve operational efficiency, an autonomous alarm system able to identify and diagnose unusual machine states is needed. Our approach leverages a trained neural network capable of alerting operators (a) when an anomalous condition exists in the beamline and (b) identifying the element setting that is the root cause. The tool is based on an inverse model that maps beamline readings (diagnostic readbacks) to settings (beamline attributes operators can modify). The model takes as input readings from the machine and computes machine settings which are compared to control setpoints. Instances where predictions differ from setpoints by a user-defined threshold are flagged as anomalous. Given data corresponding to 354 anomalous injector configurations, the model can narrow the root cause of an anomalous condition to three potential candidates with 94.6% accuracy. Furthermore, compared to the current method of identifying anomalous conditions which raises an alarm when machine parameters drift outside their normal tolerances, the data-driven model can identify 83% more anomalous conditions.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

C-400 and C-409 Criticality Incredible Road Map

Many guides and standards describe a process for evaluating process operations with known quantities of fissile material. The accepted industry guides and standards for performing criticality evaluations for fissile material operations are not well suited for operating systems that may contain residual fissile material. The Paducah Site deactivation activities includes large process components that have unfavorable geometries for the {sup 235}U enrichment levels present. The fissile material holdup in these components can range from negligible residual quantities to significant deposits weighing several hundred pounds. The purpose of this white paper is to outline a methodology that can be used to declare a facility as criticality incredible (CI). For the purpose of this paper, criticality incredible means that the inventory and its form and distribution within the facility does not need Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) type (e.g., administrative or engineered) controls. This assumes of course that certain project assumptions are maintained. For example in the facilities that will be discussed within this paper, wet decontamination is not part of the planned demolition and disposal operations. The proposed methodology for deactivation of a facility to the point that criticality incredible can be declared will be applied to the C-400 Chemical Cleaning Building and to the C-409 Decontamination Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP). The purpose and intent of the CI declaration is to release a facility from Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) requirements and simplify the demolition of the facility. In practical terms, this means the facility can be re-categorized as < a Hazard Category 3 facility per DOE-STD-1027-92 Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, NCS controls are not needed, and the Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (CAAS) can be removed from service. The only involvement from the site NCS program following the declaration would be to ensure that the underlying assumptions are not violated through discovered conditions or project changes. This includes the institutional control of preventing new fissile material from being introduced into the facility. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2017

A novel approach to criticality accident detection for a legacy facility

For operations on the Sellafield site involving fissile material a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) has traditionally been installed unless an omission case can be made. An omission case would examine if, in the absence of all controls, a criticality could reasonably be expected or whether the potential dose to an operator would remain below a maximum acceptable dose. It is a UK legal requirement for adequate emergency arrangements to be in place for hazards on a nuclear licensed site. For facilities where criticality is credible there is a regulatory expectation that a -Criticality Warning System- should be in place. A -Criticality Warning System- is not necessarily a full CAAS and alternative means of criticality detection may be part of an adequate emergency plan. The Sellafield site has a Magnox fuel reprocessing facility which has been operated since the 1960's. Evaporation of the Medium Active (MA) liquid waste from this process is undertaken in an associated building. Following extensive review of the plant and process a number of maloperations which can route fissile material to the MA evaporator were identified. Adequate controls to prevent these scenarios were shown to be in place. In the unlikely event of a failure of controls leading to sustained loss of fissile material a criticality incident may occur and hence an emergency plan was determined to be necessary. The novel emergency arrangements which were developed utilized the existing gamma monitor network located across multiple building floors. These gamma monitors are present for radiological safety. This emergency arrangement would require rapid interpretation of the gamma alarms by an operator and the manual triggering of a criticality evacuation alarm. The gamma monitors were demonstrated to be able to detect the minimum incident of concern (10{sup 15} fissions) as well as being able to alarm during the ramp up in power of a large criticality incident (10{sup 18} fissions). It was shown that a criticality accident could readily be distinguished from a radiological event (e.g. loss of containment). To support this work, criticality excursion analysis was used to examine the likely characteristics of a criticality in the MA evaporator. This novel arrangement was justified due to a number of factors including: the limited remaining operational lifetime of this facility (<5 years), the low frequency of maloperation coupled with a failure of controls and the crucial risk reduction provided by the continued reprocessing of Magnox fuel. Furthermore, the time and cost involved with design and installation of a standard CAAS would be substantially greater than a plan based upon existing instrumentation. These arguments were accepted by the UK regulator the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

IER 498: Godiva-IV CAAS benchmark [Slides]

This presentation discusses the benchmark of the IER 498: Godiva-IV criticality accident alarm system (CAAS). It details the goal of the project which is to create a CAAS benchmark capability for Godiva-IV in order to create a shielding benchmark for NCSP software and data, to add geometrically diverse benchmark/benchmarks to the ICSBEP Handbook, to enable more precise measurements at NCERC, and to help assure CAAS performance is as-stated. It also states that work was completed on CED-1 in 2019 and that future work includes the completion of CED-2 in 2020.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2014

Diagnostics for machine protection of DEMO

DEMO aims to (i) integrate, demonstrate and validate all relevant technology necessary to convert fusion energy to electrical energy and (ii) that the machine and its operations are economically and environmentally acceptable. To maintain the efficiency and availability of the machine, there are several physics and combined physics/technology issues as well as the engineering issues. Machine Protection (also known as Protection of Investment) addresses both the risks to plant (to avoid costly repair or replacement) and the risks to normal operating time (to avoid loss of productivity and the return on investment). The plasma-related Machine Protection issues involve measurement and control of plasma stability, plasma purity, and plasma-wall interactions. Machine Protection aims to avoid hitting catastrophic limits by using early warning alarm systems, and controlled termination or avoidance, involving coordinated actions of the magnets, gas and auxiliary heating or current-drive systems. This article outlines the key processes, some of which are used in present-day tokamaks and some of which are new specifically for DEMO (e.g. First wall and divertor power handling) and reveals the need to research and develop new science and technology for Machine Protections in DEMO's high radiation and thermal fields. This work was funded by the RCUK Energy Programme under grant EP/I501045 and the European Communities under the contract of Association between EURATOM and CCFE and conducted partly under EFDA PPPT (WP13-DAS04). The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2015

Measurements of SNAC2 area dosimeters placed in different configurations around the PROSPERO reactor and comparison with TRIPOLI-4 calculations

In the context of criticality accident alarm system tests, several experiments were carried out in 2013 on the PROSPERO reactor to study the response to neutron and gamma of different devices and dosimeters, particularly on the SNAC2 dosimeter. This article presents the results of this criticality dosimeter in different configurations, and compares the experimental measurements with the results of calculation performed with the TRIPOLI-4 Monte-Carlo Neutral Particles transport code. PROSPERO is a metallic critical assembly managed by the Criticality, Neutron Science and Measurement Department located at the French CEA Research Center of Valduc. The core, surrounded by a reflector of depleted uranium, is composed of 2 horizontal cylindrical blocks made of a highly enriched uranium alloy which can be placed in contact, and of 4 depleted uranium control rods which allow the reactor to be driven. This reactor, placed in a cell 10 m x 8 m x 6 m high, with 1.4-meter-thick concrete walls, is used as a fast neutron spectrum source and is operated at stable power level in delayed critical state, which can vary from 3 mW to 3 kW. PROSPERO is extensively used for electronic hardening or to study the effect of the neutrons on various materials. The SNAC2 criticality dosimeter is a zone dosimeter allowing the off line measurement of criticality accident neutron doses. This dosimeter consists of the pile up of seven activation foils embedded into a 23 mm diameter x 21 mm height cadmium container. The activation measurement of each foil, using a gamma spectroscopy technique, gives information about the neutron reaction rates. The SNAC2 software allows the spectrum unfolding from these values, taking into account the hypothesis of a particular spectrum shape, in three components: a Maxwell spectrum component for the thermal range, a 1/E component for the epithermal range, and a Watt spectrum component for the high energy range. Moreover, from the neutron spectrum, the SNAC software can calculate the neutron fluence integrated by the dosimeter and the neutron dose. During the 3 weeks measurement campaign many radioprotection devices were used. To modify the spectrum seen by these devices, several shields of various thicknesses made of concrete or polyethylene, with or without cadmium covers, were placed in the PROSPERO cell. These devices allow the study of criticality accident spectra in several environments: from metal to pseudo liquid. The fluxes measured by the SNAC2 devices were compared with TRIPOLI-4 calculations. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Establishing no credible risk of inadvertent criticality for the K-25 demolition project - 14310

Demolition of the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant required establishing a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality because a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) could not be reliably maintained operable as the building was being torn down. Preparation for, and demolition of, the facility was a multi-year long effort with significant changes in approach. The most significant change was to demolish the facility with as much of the process gas equipment and piping left in the facility as possible, rather than removing all process gas equipment and piping from the facility prior to demolishing the building structure only. The contractor had to adapt their approach to accommodate these changes. The normal approach to demolition was to remove all process gas equipment and piping prior to demolition, using Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls based on the double contingency principle, while CAAS coverage was intact. Then, the building structure was demolished with no requirement for a CAAS. This was the method used to demolish the K-33 Building, for example. In the case of K-25 demolition, all equipment and piping that met the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) disposal cell Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) was left in the building and removed as part of the building demolition process. This resulted in significant quantities of fissionable material remaining in the building and being handled during demolition. The NCS Organization worked closely with several groups during preparation activities. A Data Management organization was established to specifically identify every piece of process gas equipment and piping in the facility so that it could be accounted for and characterized. Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) personnel conducted internal visual inspections, by remote camera, of all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3' diameter, to reveal any large deposits that would require removal. Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) of the vast majority of equipment and piping was required to quantify the amount of fissionable material remaining. Finally, all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3'' diameter was internally filled with foam, which was credited by NCS with immobilizing the remaining fissionable material such that large migration and accumulation could not occur during demolition activities. NCS personnel worked closely with all of these groups in order to acquire the data and information needed to establish a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality during building demolition. Good communication and a close working relationship between NCS, the various D and D/characterization personnel, and the Department of Energy (DOE) ensured the success of the modified approach to building demolition. The same successful approach is currently underway in the K-27 Building as well. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Grid Operational Technology Edge-Level Threat Detection

This report presents a deployable solution to improve the cybersecurity situational awareness of the legacy SCADA system infrastructure in power grids. The main goal of this project is to provide system owners and operators a highly trusted, intelligent alarm system and comprehensive situational awareness of ongoing or potential cybersecurity threats on the grid network. The key contributions of this project include: (1) the development of software, the Intrusion Detection Visualizer for the Operational Technology Network (IViz-OT), to visualize and locate intrusions on the grid network; (2) testing the signature-based Hybrid Intrusion Detection for Energy Systems (HIDES) for different types of intrusions; (3) the integration of HIDES and IViz-OT into the visualization dashboard; and (4) real-time testing using a hardware-in-the-loop test bed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2018

Creation of a Robust and Generalizable Machine Learning Classifier for Patient Ventilator Asynchrony

Background: As healthcare increasingly digitizes, streaming waveform data is being made available from an variety of sources, but there still remains a paucity of performant clinical decision support systems. For example, in the intensive care unit (ICU) existing automated alarm systems typically rely on simple thresholding that result in frequent false positives. Recurrent false positive alerts create distrust of alarm mechanisms that can be directly detrimental to patient health. To improve patient care in the ICU, we need alert systems that are both pervasive, and accurate so as to be informative and trusted by providers. Objective: We aimed to develop a machine learning-based classifier to detect abnormal waveform events using the use case of mechanical ventilation waveform analysis, and the detection of harmful forms of ventilation delivery to patients. We specifically focused on detecting injurious subtypes of patient-ventilator asynchrony (PVA).Methods: Using a dataset of breaths recorded from 35 different patients, we used machine learning to create computational models to automatically detect, and classify two types of injurious PVA, double trigger asynchrony (DTA), breath stacking asynchrony (BSA). We examined the use of synthetic minority over-sampling technique (SMOTE) to overcome class imbalance problems, varied methods for feature selection, and use of ensemble methods to optimize the performance of our model. Results: We created an ensemble classifier that is able to accurately detect DTA at a sensitivity/specificity of 0.960/0.975, BSA at sensitivity/specificity of 0.944/0.987, and non-PVA events at sensitivity/specificity of .967/.980. Conclusions: Our results suggest that it is possible to create a high-performing machine learning-based model for detecting PVA in mechanical ventilator waveform data in spite of both intra-patient, and inter-patient variability in waveform patterns, and the presence of clinical artifacts like cough and suction procedures. Our work highlights the importance of addressing class imbalance in clinical data sets, and the combined use of statistical methods and expert knowledge in feature selection.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

AI-Enabled Operations at Fermi Complex: Multivariate Time Series Prediction for Outage Prediction and Diagnosis

The Main Control Room of the Fermilab accelerator complex continuously gathers extensive time-series data from thousands of sensors monitoring the beam. However, unplanned events such as trips or voltage fluctuations often result in beam outages, causing operational downtime. This downtime not only consumes operator effort in diagnosing and addressing the issue but also leads to unnecessary energy consumption by idle machines awaiting beam restoration. The current threshold-based alarm system is reactive and faces challenges including frequent false alarms and inconsistent outage-cause labeling. To address these limitations, we propose an AI-enabled framework that leverages predictive analytics and automated labeling. Using data from $2,703$ Linac devices and $80$ operator-labeled outages, we evaluate state-of-the-art deep learning architectures, including recurrent, attention-based, and linear models, for beam outage prediction. Additionally, we assess a Random Forest-based labeling system for providing consistent, confidence-scored outage annotations. Our findings highlight the strengths and weaknesses of these architectures for beam outage prediction and identify critical gaps that must be addressed to fully harness AI for transitioning downtime handling from reactive to predictive, ultimately reducing downtime and improving decision-making in accelerator management.

Jain, Milan [PNL, Richland] (ORCID:000000021676111↗
NASA NTRS1999

BIO-Plex Information System Concept

This paper describes a suggested design for an integrated information system for the proposed BIO-Plex (Bioregenerative Planetary Life Support Systems Test Complex) at Johnson Space Center (JSC), including distributed control systems, central control, networks, database servers, personal computers and workstations, applications software, and external communications. The system will have an open commercial computing and networking, architecture. The network will provide automatic real-time transfer of information to database server computers which perform data collection and validation. This information system will support integrated, data sharing applications for everything, from system alarms to management summaries. Most existing complex process control systems have information gaps between the different real time subsystems, between these subsystems and central controller, between the central controller and system level planning and analysis application software, and between the system level applications and management overview reporting. An integrated information system is vitally necessary as the basis for the integration of planning, scheduling, modeling, monitoring, and control, which will allow improved monitoring and control based on timely, accurate and complete data. Data describing the system configuration and the real time processes can be collected, checked and reconciled, analyzed and stored in database servers that can be accessed by all applications. The required technology is available. The only opportunity to design a distributed, nonredundant, integrated system is before it is built. Retrofit is extremely difficult and costly.

Jones, Harry↗
NASA NTRS1991

Integration of the TDWR and LLWAS wind shear detection system

Operational demonstrations of a prototype TDWR/LLWAS (Terminal Doppler Weather Radar/Low Level Wind shear Alarm System) integrated wind shear detection system were conducted. The integration of wind shear detection systems is needed to provide end-users with a single, consensus source of information. A properly implemented integrated system provides wind shear warnings of a higher quality than stand-alone LLWAS or TDWR systems. The algorithmic concept used to generate the TDWR/LLWAS integrated products and several case studies are discussed, indicating the viability and potential of integrated wind shear detection systems. Implications for integrating ground and airborne wind shear detection systems are briefly examined.

Cornman, Larry↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sulfur Pellets Responses to a Bare and Steel Reflected Pulse of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Health Physics Research Reactor

The experiments analyzed in this report were conducted at the Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR), also known as the $\textit{Fast Burst Reactor}$. The reactor was designed and built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 1961. The HPRR was an unmoderated, unshielded fast reactor that used highly enriched uranium and molybdenum alloy as fuel. The reactor was initially sent to the Nevada Test Site in 1962, where it was used to evaluate radiation doses received as a result of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings during World War II. A few years later, the reactor was sent back to ORNL to be part of the Dosimetry Application Research (DOSAR) facility shown in Figure 1, which included a reactor building shown on the left (west) of the picture and a control and laboratory building in the upper right corner (northeast). The critical assembly was used for numerous technical studies, including systems calibration, dosimetry, radiobiology of plants and animals, testing of radiation alarms, as well as teaching and training in radiation dosimetry and nuclear engineering. Between 1963 and 1987, the HPRR was operated for thousands of hours, achieving criticality close to 10,000 times and motivating many publications. The HPRR was decommissioned in 1987. The goal of this effort was to use historical data from operation of the HPRR to create a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) benchmark to be included in the $\textit{International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments}$ (ICSBEP Handbook). A thorough inspection was performed of all available documentation and information available. The most promising experiments that were selected for evaluation were those described in the 1987 ORNL report entitled $\textit{Health Physics Research Reactor Reference Dosimetry}$, ORNL-6240. The report includes reference dosimetry results of the shielded and unshielded configurations of the HPRR after burst operations. Because of changes to the reactor positioning and storage systems that were made in 1985, the previous dosimetry reports became obsolete, and the newly designed experiments were needed to create the HPRR’s adjusted dosimetry data. The various results reported in ORNL-6240 include reference doses and dose equivalents from different conventions at different distances and elevations as determined using the detected neutron fluence and conversion factors. The HPRR neutron fluence was obtained through different methods, including sulfur pellet analysis and threshold detector unit data. Information about the HPRR spectrum was also obtained through Bonner sphere measurements. This benchmark is focused on a part of the measured sulfur fluences reported in Appendix H of ORNL-6240. Standard commercial sulfur pellets were placed at different distances from the HPRR centerline during burst operation and were activated due to the 32 S(n,p) 32 P reaction. The resulting 32 P activity was then measured and the information about the corresponding sulfur fluence and/or neutron dose could be extracted. Many of those measurements have 7 been performed with the HPRR in its bare configuration or with different shields (combinations of Lucite, concrete, steel). All the necessary, precise information about material and/or dimensions of the different shields was not found, so it was decided to focus only on the unshielded and steel-shielded configurations to minimize the benchmark uncertainty. A total of 31 cases (24 unshielded and 7 shielded cases at different positions) of sulfur fluence were selected before evaluation to develop the benchmark.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

A HUMAN AUTOMATION INTERACTION CONCEPT FOR A SMALL MODULAR REACTOR CONTROL ROOM

Many advanced nuclear power plant (NPP) designs incorporate higher degrees of automation than the existing fleet of NPPs. Automation is being introduced or proposed in NPPs through a wide variety of systems and technologies, such as advanced displays, computer-based procedures, advanced alarm systems, and computerized operator support systems. Additionally, many new reactor concepts, both full scale and small modular reactors, are proposing increased automation and reduced staffing as part of their concept of operations. However, research consistently finds that there is a fundamental tradeoff between system performance with increased automation and reduced human performance. There is a need to address the question of how to achieve high performance and efficiency of high levels of automation without degrading human performance. One example of a new NPP concept that will utilize greater degrees of automation is the SMR concept from NuScale Power. The NuScale Power design requires 12 modular units to be operated in one single control room, which leads to a need for higher degrees of automation in the control room. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) researchers and NuScale Power human factors and operations staff are working on a collaborative project to address the human performance challenges of increased automation and to determine the principles that lead to optimal performance in highly automated systems. This paper will describe this concept in detail and will describe an experimental test of the concept. The benefits and challenges of the approach will be discussed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1994

Heat Stress Monitor

The heavy, cumbersome body protection suits worn by members of hazardous materials response teams cause marked elevation of body temperatures, which can reduce effectiveness and lead to heat stress and injury. The CorTemp System, marketed by Human Technologies, Inc., provides the basis for a body temperature monitoring alarm system. Encased in a three-quarter-inch ingestible capsule, the system includes a mini-thermometer, miniature telemetry system, a microbattery and temperature sensor. It makes its way through the digestive system, continuously monitoring temperature. Findings are sent to the recorder by telemetry, and then displayed and stored for transfer to a computer.

Source record↗