Capacity Markets for Transactive Energy Systems
Capacity markets provide important incentives for resource adequacy in electricity markets and may become more important for providing sufficient revenue and generation capacity with changes to energy market prices driven by increasing levels of zero marginal cost resources. However, current capacity market designs also have important shortfalls that may limit the benefits they can provide to the future grid. Current capacity markets are primarily designed for participation from conventional thermal generators, but markets are evolving with increasing levels of variable renewable energy resources. However, further reforms may be necessary to enable more participation from DERs and demand-side resources. To understand the benefits and shortfalls of current capacity market design, we review the historical reasons electricity markets have needed capacity markets or capacity payments for resource adequacy, and how current capacity market designs may create challenges for incorporating increasing levels of DERs and demand-side resources. We then consider how transactive systems, which allow the coordination of bids and offers for DERs and demand-side resources through a market interaction approach, administered by a Distribution System Operator (DSO), can address traditional resource adequacy problems due to inelastic consumer demand. We also consider the need for a DSO-level capacity market in helping to meet resource adequacy, reliability, and other electricity market objectives. We find that because the missing money in electricity markets is largely driven by incentives to meet resource adequacy goals, and the bulk grid would always supply power to the DSO, that resource adequacy is unlikely to be a determining factor in the need for a DSO-level capacity market. Many current reliability problems could also be addressed by the incorporation of more flexible demand enabled with transactive energy systems. However, other DSO objectives, including resilience, reactive power, voltage control, environmental policies, and energy equity could lead to specific challenges that could be aided by a DSO-level capacity market. We consider the possibility of a DSO-level capacity market in addressing these challenges as well as its potential role in coordinating with the Independent System Operator (ISO) who operates the wholesale market. We conclude with suggestions for future research, including the need to develop analytical models of DSO-level capacity market designs to address these potential objectives and examine their implications for DSOs and consumers.