Results for “Risk informed approach” — Page 59

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SWIPE: Spectral Water Inversion Processor and Emulator

Degradation of Earth’s inland water resources due to anthropogenic perturbations and climate anomalies at both local and global scales continues to place human health at substantial risk. There is now a growing necessity to develop pragmatic approaches that allow timely and effective extrapolation of local processes, to spatially resolved global products, and to promote operational and sustainable resource policy management. This presentation will be discussing the progress made developing SWIPE: Spectral Water Inversion Processor and Emulator. SWIPE is a platform for advanced modeling of coastal and inland aquatic habitats. The goal is create a comprehensive and cohesive system to leverage recent advancements in computation and machine learning to develop a synthetic training ground for sensitivity studies and algorithm development. The four principal facets of SWIPE include: 1. Advanced two-layer coated sphere bio-optical modeling and GPU radiative transfer modeling, 2. Big Data involving massive synthetic spectral libraries of optical properties of various global aquatic particles, surface reflectance, and top-of-atmosphere reflectance, all at hyperspectral resolution leveraging high-end computing systems at NASA Ames Research Center, 3. Deep Learning for algorithm development for water quality inversion of concentrations of common biogeophysical variables as well as optics, full uncertainty characterization by water type, and forward emulation, and lastly, 4. Image Processing for application of developed retrieval algorithms for both hyperspectral and multispectral sensors with experimental corrections for global adjacency, noise, sunglint, and benthic reflectance. This presentation will demonstrate the Equivalent Algal Populations (EAP) two-layer coated sphere scattering model which has been used develop spectral libraries of hyperspectral inherent optical properties of roughly 80 species of phytoplankton, covering 15 different classes and nine taxonomic functional types. The EAP model was also used to derive spectral properties of 10 different non-algal particle functional types. Examples of how the SMART-G (Speed-up Monte-carlo Advanced Radiative Transfer using GPU) radiative transfer code is used to model optically complex aquatic signals will be presented and discussed in the context of creating a massive synthetic database which can leverage the full power of next generation machine learning techniques and high end computing for water quality inversion. We will discuss our active investigation in things like appropriate model architectures, dimensionality reduction techniques such as PCA and autoencoders, uncertainty quantification and abstaining, and which variables actually benefit most from hyperspectral information versus multispectral resolution. We are also curious about questions relating to cost/benefit analysis in terms of computation resources, neural network complexity, and data volumes. Answers to these questions will hopefully elaborate on cost efficiency for potential future sensor design considerations.

SWIPE↗

DOE OSTI2021

A Functional All-Hazard Approach to Critical Infrastructure Dependency Analysis

The critical infrastructures protection landscape is a vast and varied pattern of independent, but interconnected infrastructure systems that are essential to the function of our modern society. The U.S. policy on critical infrastructure protection has been continually evolving since the “President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection” was published in 1997. In response to these policies, federal, state, and local governments, along with research institutions, have invested a substantial amount of time and effort into identifying and analyzing critical infrastructure, their functions, and dependencies/interdependencies to better understand their vulnerabilities. To date, the ability to assess vulnerabilities, resiliency, and priorities for protecting interdependent critical infrastructure systems from an all-hazards perspective remains a difficult problem. In this paper we introduce the All-Hazards Analysis (AHA) methodology, which provides an integrated functional basis across infrastructure systems, through the implementation of a common language and a scalable level of decomposition to effectively evaluate the resilience of interconnected infrastructure systems. AHA models infrastructure systems as directed multidimensional graphs, which enable the evaluation of cross-sector interdependencies prior to, during, and after disruptive events. Finally, and by design, AHA enables the cross linking of data taxonomies to enable more effective data sharing, such as the National Critical Functions (NCF) and Infrastructure Data Taxonomy (IDT).

02 PETROLEUM↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spaceflight Biospecimen and Data Sharing in Support of Science Discovery and Exploration

For decades, NASA and international partners have conducted biological experiments in space to understand effects of spaceflight and address potential hazards. To enable spaceflight back to the Moon, and then to Mars and beyond, it is imperative to further understand basic science and health risks associated with spaceflight, along with developing countermeasures. The sending of experiments and organisms into space is a costly endeavor. To maximize scientific return, sharing with the scientific community both space-flown biospecimens and data from completed experiments is essential. New fundamental, applied, and bioinformatic science insights can be gained from specimen and data sharing efforts. Data reuse enables spaceflight health risk modeling, analyzing adverse outcomes across spaceflight hazards, and deep space autonomous support for the flight medical officer. Space-flown biospecimens not required by mission Principal Investigators are regularly archived and made available for scientific request. The largest biorepository of these samples are found within NASA’s Institutional Scientific Collection at Ames Research Center (ISC-ARC), which stores over 32,000 specimens mostly from Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) missions, but also some ground-based analog samples. The Ames Life Sciences Data Archive manages the ISC-ARC. Tissues are predominantly from mice and rats, though samples are also available from bacteria and quail. Only a handful of other similar collections exist worldwide. Rodent biospecimens exposed to simulated space radiation at Brookhaven National Laboratory are archived under the purview of NASA HRP Space Radiation Element. Microbial collection and analyses from 20 years of routine environmental monitoring of air, surfaces, and water systems of the ISS were performed to ensure a safe environment for astronauts. Samples from the ISC-ARC, space radiation and microbial collections are searchable and requestable through the NASA Life Sciences Data Archive (LSDA). Decades of planetary protection microbial isolates derived from spacecraft bioburden are archived in JPL’s microbial collection. Rodent biospecimens from spaceflight investigations conducted by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) are archived and available at the JAXA Biorepository at Tsukuba Space Center. The Russian Institute of Biomedical Problems also has a collection of animal, microbial, cellular, and fungi available for research from ground analog experiments. Several data repositories exist for scientists to utilize. The LSDA is the primary NASA source of life sciences research data and information. It contains decades of spaceflight and ground-analog research involving human, microbial, cellular, plant, and animal subjects. Data is collected from NASA-funded investigations through the Human Research Program and the Space Biology Program. The NASA Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health collects and grants access to clinical and occupational health monitoring data from astronauts, with a list and description of data collected available for request through the LSDA. NASA GeneLab at ARC collects genomic, transcriptomic, proteomic, and metabolomic data from any species. It is a repository and platform for collaborative open-science bioinformatic approaches. JAXA is establishing an ‘omics-based repository in collaboration with the Tohoku Medical Megabank (ToMMo), called the JAXA-ToMMo Integrated Biobank for Space Life Science. Overall, the sharing of these biospecimen and data resources can assist researchers worldwide in understanding spaceflight effects on biology, along with enabling next generation data science applications for space exploration platforms. Websites: https://lsda.jsc.nasa.gov/ ; https://www.nasa.gov/ames/research/space-biosciences/isc-bsp ; https://www.nasa.gov/ames/research/space-biosciences/alsda

Ryan T. Scott↗

DOE OSTI2024

Idaho National Laboratory Integrated Multisite SSHAC Level 3: Probabilistic Volcanic Hazards Assessment

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) resides on the eastern Snake River Plain (ESRP), part of the Snake River Plain (SRP) with a complex origin and geologic history of volcanism. Much of the Quaternary (last 2.58 million years) volcanism within 400 km of INL is genetically associated with a major thermal anomaly referred to as the Yellowstone hotspot, which is currently located more than 180 km northeast of INL. Near INL, local volcanic sources include silicic domes near its southern border, and numerous dike-fed basaltic vents of the ESRP, some of which are near or within the INL boundaries. Quantitative probabilistic assessments of screened-in volcanic hazardous phenomena for nine different facility complexes at the INL are presented for a Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 3 (SL3) study. The comprehensive, integrated multisite SSHAC study consists of a single regional Probabilistic Volcanic Hazards Assessment (PVHA) that pertains to all nine INL facility complexes, with site-specific information developed at each respective area of interest (AOI), referred to as the "INL facility AOI" (Figure ES-1). Hazard products are generated for specified INL facility AOIs for use by multiple stakeholders from different agencies in risk-informed decision-making regarding site selection, operations, and design of nuclear facilities at INL, consistent with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulatory guidance. The study also serves as the basis for future periodic safety assessments required for existing DOE facilities, such as 10-year evaluations of natural-phenomena hazards. Elements of the INL PVHA including initial characterization, screening, quantitative assessments of eruption and hazard potential, and consideration of facility needs are conducted using the three phases of the SSHAC process: evaluation, integration, and documentation. As per regulatory guidance, the SSHAC framework provided the necessary processes and procedures for the PVHA Technical Integration (TI) team, at three workshops, five formal working meetings and many TI team remote meetings, to conduct initial characterization, screen the volcanic hazards, create PVHA model inputs, exercise those models in the PVHA, consider facility-specific volcanic hazard needs, and perform final hazard calculations. The Participatory Peer Review Panel (PPRP) provided independent oversight and performed process and technical reviews of the PVHA throughout its duration. The study included an extensive New Data Collection and Analyses (NDCA) program developed by the PVHA TI team to reduce uncertainties in hazard-significant elements in the PVHA model. NDCA activities generated 20 reports providing important contributory datasets and results to the project database for characterizing the ESRP. For example, a report compiling the dimensions of ESRP shield volcanoes and lava fields was used to construct volcanic footprints (areas of impact), was compared with data from INL subsurface cores, and was used to validate the results of lava-flow inundation modeling on the contemporary terrain. Another example is the acquisition of aeromagnetic data over INL and its surrounding area, with maps of buried magmatic features (e.g., subsurface volcanoes and swarms of feeder dikes) that informed the PVHA conceptual model of volcanism. The SSHAC evaluation process was used to conduct all elements of the PVHA including initial characterization and screening. Existing data and NDCA activities provided the foundation to develop the tectonomagmatic conceptual model of volcanism for the region of geographical interest in the SRP and Yellowstone hotspot volcanic system, and for considering volcanoes in the western US. Considering Quaternary volcanic sources active during this period, the screening approach identified and evaluated magma compositions, types of eruptive and intrusive phenomena, types of hazardous phenomena, and proximity of sources to INL. The PVHA TI team evaluated 18 types of magmatic sources in terms of 20 potentially hazardous phenomena, resulting in 360 screening decisions. The screening process resulted in 140 screened-in hazardous volcanic phenomena for Quaternary volcanic sources 1) proximal to INL facility complexes in the ESRP (64 basaltic and 54 silicic), 2) regional sources associated with the Yellowstone caldera system and Blackfoot Reservoir volcanic field (7), and 3) more distal sources from thirteen Cascade volcanoes and two volcanoes at Long Valley caldera (CA).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NSCOR for Evaluating Risk Factors and Biomarkers for Adaptation and Resilience to Spaceflight: Emotional Valence and Social Processes in ICC/ICE Environments

Space exploration class missions, such as a mission to Mars, will require optimization of human performance, adaptability, and resilience. This NASA Specialized Center of Research (NSCOR) utilizes the NIMH Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework to identify biological and behavioral markers of individual social adaptation and emotional resilience (as well as vulnerability) to spaceflight-relevant stressors such as living in extended isolation. The overarching goal of this NSCOR is to obtain novel information to help identify biomarkers of individuals who are resilient and/or adaptable to the stressors of isolated, confined, and controlled (ICC) and isolated, confined, and extreme (ICE) environments.A total of N=90 healthy adult astronaut surrogates are being studied in three spaceflight-analog environments: (1) n=40 healthy adults in the Isolation and Confinement Analog Research Unit (ICARUS), an ICC at the University of Pennsylvania, during 7-day missions, for a target total of 280 subject days; (2) n=32 healthy adult astronaut surrogates studied in NASA’s Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA), an ICC at Johnson Space Center during 45-day missions, for a target total of 2,112 subject days; and (3) n=18 healthy adults in the Alfred-Wegener-Institute’s Neumayer Station III, an ICE in Antarctica, during 14-month missions, for a target total of 7,560 subject days. Dr. Nindl’s Laboratory at the University of Pittsburgh is analyzing a priori selected protein biomarkers in blood, saliva, and urine. Complementary rodent models of exposure to early life stressors, confinement, and isolation are being evaluated at Dr. Hensch’s Laboratory to further validate the neurobehavioral and biological findings from the human studies.Given the inconsistency and varied definition of resilience/adaptation in the scientific literature, the NSCOR team developed a composite resilience/adaptation measure that reflects the most relevant outcomes to resilience/adaptation across psychosocial and neurobehavioral functions, as well as neurocognitive and spaceflight-relevant operational performance. To achieve this, group consensus was attained from subject matter experts to produce a rank-order of importance for each input variable. The final resilience/adaptation score included 36 variables that were collected across spaceflight analogs. As of 10/1/2021, the NSCOR project acquired data on n=27 subjects at ICARUS, n=16 at HERA, and n=18 at Neumayer. The COVID-19 pandemic delayed data acquisition at ICARUS and HERA.Among subjects studied to date, 99% of neural and neurobehavioral data (e.g., neuroimaging for structure and function, behavioral measures) as well as blood, saliva, and urine for biochemical assays have been acquired. For rodent models, Dr. Hensch’s laboratory has established biochemical and behavioral parameters reflecting confinement stress in social networks of mice for comparison to stress responses in the human spaceflight analog environments.Group social behaviors were measured with a Social Network Analysis (SNA) approach to define objective parameters associated with sociability and its plasticity by sex. This analytic approach may help identify a network of individuals who are more effective teammates or more likely to generate new social relationships. Data acquisition, biomarker assessment, and data quality control will continue through September 2022.

D F Dinges↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

DOE OSTI2020

The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP) model: Extending the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Across Organizational Security

Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Advancement of Entry System Modeling to Support Exploration of Giant Planets

This paper describes NASA’s efforts to advance entry system modeling and simulation capabilities to support future exploration of Giant planets. The Giant planets are key destinations of interest to the planetary science community for their potential to provide insight into the formation and evolution of our Solar System, as well as extrasolar planetary systems. To date, the Galileo atmospheric probe is the only purpose-built entry probe to a Giant planet. Post-flight analysis of Galileo’s performance showed that there was significant recession of the thermal protection system (TPS), well beyond what was anticipated on the flank, and this was due in part to insufficiently accurate capability for estimating the flight environment and TPS response. While Galileo ultimately survived its flight, the example serves to highlight the great challenge of designing successful missions for environments that are poorly understood or where models have not yet been validated. An important means to reduce mission risks is the incorporation of physics-based modeling with well-quantified uncertainties. The emphasis on physics-based modeling – in contrast to empirically-driven models – is motivated by the fact that it is impossible to completely replicate entry environments through ground tests and, therefore, extrapolation to the flight environment is required. Basing analysis in fundamental physics removes the bias of ground test limitations, though one must then be careful to properly characterize model inputs, simplifying assumptions, and the limits wherein the model is valid. NASA’s Entry Systems Modeling (ESM) Project is tasked with investigating such considerations for planetary science missions across the Solar System, and in recent years has begun to do so for Giant planets. The most distinctive features of the Giant planets, from an entry system perspective, are the atmospheres composed primarily of hydrogen and helium. The entry velocities of proposed missions are generally very large and can therefore be expected to result in significant convective and radiative heating generated by the vehicle’s shock layer. Yet thermochemical behavior of the hydrogen-helium system is not well understood under such conditions. The ESM project is leading efforts to develop accurate thermochemical databases based on state-of-the-art measurements in the Electric Arc Shock Tube and detailed computational chemistry. The large heat fluxes anticipated by missions has driven interest in new TPS materials, in particular woven materials, which may be enabling but have never been flown before. Consequently, multiscale models are in development to describe properties and performance of the materials from micro- to system-scale. The goal is to not only provide accurate thermal response but also to inform thermostructural reliability predictions for extreme entries. Additionally, new computational models have been developed to evaluate performance of non-destructive evaluation techniques which are vital to establishing acceptance of systems to be free of manufacturing faults like material cracking, voids, and debonding. Finally, in the area of guidance and control, aerocapture has been shown conceptually to provide a number of mission benefits, including reducing transit time and increasing payload fraction. The ESM project is building a launch-to-landing trajectory simulation capability to enable detailed studies of aerocapture maneuvers in the context of Giant planets missions. The final presentation and paper will describe each of these topics in detail, including discussion of specific gaps and the technical approach to solving them. In addition, the final paper will briefly discuss ongoing coordination between ESM project work and an ESA-funded technology development activity comprised of validation testing in the Oxford T6, IRS PWK and IST ESTHER tunnels, as well as state-to-state modeling of the shock layer to better represent non-Boltzmann energy distributions leading to non-equilibrium radiation.

Entry systems↗

NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗

DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Data Catalog Software for Hanford Site Environmental Datasets

Environmental information and data underpin achievement of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) mission at the Hanford Site. The Hanford Environmental Data Management (HEDM) Program is the DOE Richland Operations Office (RL) approach to develop and implement a formal program for managing environmental data and the associated records, materials, and systems at the Hanford Site. The current project, contract, organization, and contractor-specific efforts at managing environmental data sets are insufficient to provide orderly, long-term, site-wide access. A vital element to be created within the HEDM program plan is a catalog of data sources, called the Hanford Environmental Information and Data Index (HEIDI), that will enable long-term access and retrievability for the multiple independent sources of data that might otherwise be difficult to discover. This report compares leading open source and commercial data catalog platforms using criteria to assess the functionality needed to develop the HEIDI catalog of Hanford data sources that connects and exchanges data with established Hanford Local Area Network (HLAN) enterprise information technology systems. Proprietary platforms evaluated included ArcGIS Enterprise Sites, Junar, OpenDataSoft, and Socrata, and non-proprietary platforms included Energy Data eXchange (EDX), Comprehensive Knowledge Archive Network (CKAN), and DKAN (a Drupal-based open data portal based on CKAN). Capabilities supporting data discoverability, retrieval, and archival, as well as metadata standard requirements and integration into the HLAN were rated as either failing to meet requirements (F), meeting requirements (M), or exceeding requirements by delivering additional desired features (E). The lowest rating for any capability area was assigned as the overall rating for the platform. These findings enable DOE-RL and the contractors implementing the HEDM plan to focus on candidate tools likely to meet the requirements for implementing HEIDI. All of the platforms receiving an overall rating of ‘F’ were unable to be deployed on Hanford infrastructure or within dedicated cloud resources. A propriety software-as-a-service (SaaS) model of delivering a data catalog (e.g., found in software such as Junar and OpenDataSoft) favors consistency across customers at the expense of customization and configurable roles that are needed for Hanford work. Hosting data on a shared commercial platform places limits on dataset size (maximum of 240 Mb for OpenDataSoft), a significant limitation for HEIDI implementation. EDX, a government data catalog based on CKAN, received the ‘F’ rating due to an inability to incorporate authentication from HLAN into the system. Among platforms rated ‘M’ or ‘E’, only the Socrata platform had a SaaS delivery model. In contrast to other SaaS platforms, Socrata provided custom roles and gateways that allow local datasets to be incorporated into an online catalog. Socrata also complies with the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program, a significant benefit for cloud-based management of Hanford data. The other platforms rated ‘M’ or ‘E’, ArcGIS Enterprise Sites, CKAN, and DKAN, provide fully self-hosted options, allowing for greater control and flexibility with the HEIDI catalog. These widely used tools have supportive communities of practice, extensive customization options, and demonstrated deployments that provide evidence that they can meet requirements, often deliver additional desired features, and work well with federal government systems. Completely customized alternatives built on a collection of applications were not evaluated because achieving similar performance to CKAN or DKAN requires substantial resources, especially in the absence of the active communities that have grown to support these tools. ArcGIS Enterprise Sites, Socrata, CKAN, and DKAN were evaluated as strong candidates for successful implementation with HEIDI.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

How Can We Efficiently Build A Spacecraft That Has Longevity? Experiences From the GSFC Perspective to Inform Lunar Exploration and Science Orbiter’s Architecture

Recent successes in NASA planetary science missions has shown that long-lived missions can yield significant science return. These missions, despite their longevity, were not planned to operate beyond their deign life. For example, the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter has a design life of 2-3 years, and yet we are entering its 14th year on orbit. Spacecraft longevity in practice has been related to: 1) mission class; 2) did we test it long enough and resolve all the anomalies to be beyond the early failure curve; 3) consumables budgets, and 4) how components are de-signed and tested. Mission class has been perceived as one of the primary ways to drive longevity. But higher mission class is a significant cost and mission driver. Parts selection only from the limited military standard parts and extensive parts qualification adds to development time and cost. Largely redundant (often erroneously interpreted as fully redundant) adds to launch mass and increases testing complexity (which may reduce the amount of testing in the nominal con-figuration). Lower Risk Posture (reflected in a higher mission class) drives significant additional processes and quality assurance analyses. Higher mission class also drives significantly greater sparing and life testing costs. This discussion focuses on whether this is indeed the best way to achieve longevity efficiently or whether there are more efficient ways to achieve longevity. Empirical evidence shows that lower mission classes that implement effective risk reduction and selective redundancy generally results in long life at a lower Spacecraft bus cost. By evaluating redundancy careful-ly, spacecraft cost can be lowered which can enable a more capable payload. Risk of the mission is highly dependent on the complexity of the mission and is only loosely dependent on Class of Mission. High complexity missions can have many single point failures and require the development of new technology, while lower class mission can have lower risk by baselining or incorporating: (selective) redundancy, fault-tolerant design, design for minimum risk, ability to reset, and/or design for graceful degradation. The team met with Goddard Space Flight Center Space Systems Mission Operations leaders to discuss which avionics have proven in flight to be the most reliable and which have had lifetime issues. The paper proposes a list of components to focus on for redundancy for a long-lived lunar mission. Reliability numbers are presented for both single string and dual string missions. The history of life-time performance versus planned mission life according to mission class is presented. A mission with well thought out selective redundancy and effective on the ground test program, can be expected to last well beyond its mission lifetime and provided enhanced return for the community. This approach minimizes project expenditures that do not retire significant risk and allows the project to focus risk mitigation efforts on those risks that will have a significant likelihood of threatening mission success. This is aided by keeping the amount of technology maturation and mission complexity low, while focusing effort on ensuring all component stress-ing parameters well within the bounds of their capabilities.

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRS2001

Enabling Advanced Automation in Spacecraft Operations with the Spacecraft Emergency Response System

True autonomy is the Holy Grail of spacecraft mission operations. The goal of launching a satellite and letting it manage itself throughout its useful life is a worthy one. With true autonomy, the cost of mission operations would be reduced to a negligible amount. Under full autonomy, any problems (no matter the severity or type) that may arise with the spacecraft would be handled without any human intervention via some combination of smart sensors, on-board intelligence, and/or smart automated ground system. Until the day that complete autonomy is practical and affordable to deploy, incremental steps of deploying ever-increasing levels of automation (computerization of once manual tasks) on the ground and on the spacecraft are gradually decreasing the cost of mission operations. For example, NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA-GSFC) has been flying spacecraft with low cost operations for several years. NASA-GSFC's SMEX (Small Explorer) and MIDEX (Middle Explorer) missions have effectively deployed significant amounts of automation to enable the missions to fly predominately in 'light-out' mode. Under light-out operations the ground system is run without human intervention. Various tools perform many of the tasks previously performed by the human operators. One of the major issues in reducing human staff in favor of automation is the perceived increased in risk of losing data, or even losing a spacecraft, because of anomalous conditions that may occur when there is no one in the control center. When things go wrong, missions deploying advanced automation need to be sure that anomalous conditions are detected and that key personal are notified in a timely manner so that on-call team members can react to those conditions. To ensure the health and safety of its lights-out missions, NASA-GSFC's Advanced Automation and Autonomy branch (Code 588) developed the Spacecraft Emergency Response System (SERS). The SERS is a Web-based collaborative environment that enables secure distributed fault and resource management. The SERS incorporates the use of intelligent agents, threaded discussions, workflow, database connectivity, and links to a variety of communications devices (e.g., two-way paging, PDA's, and Internet phones) via commercial gateways. When the SERS detects a problem, it notifies on-call team members, who then can remotely take any necessary actions to resolve the anomalies.The SERS goes well beyond a simple '911' system that sends out an error code to everyone with a pager. Instead, SERS' software agents send detailed data (i.e., notifications) to the most appropriate team members based on the type and severity of the anomaly and the skills of the on-call team members. The SERS also allows the team members to respond to the notifications from their wireless devices. This unique capability ensures rapid response since the team members no longer have to go to a PC or the control center for every anomalous event. Most importantly, the SERS enables safe experimentation with various techniques for increasing levels of automation, leading to robust autonomy. For the MIDEX missions at NASA GSFC, the SERS is used to provide 'human-in-the-loop' automation. During lights-out operations, as greater control is given to the MIDEX automated systems, the SERS can be configured to page remote personnel and keep them informed regarding actions taking place in the control center. Remote off-duty operators can even be given the option of enabling or inhibiting a specific automated response in near real time via their two-way pagers. The SERS facilitates insertion of new technology to increase automation, while maintaining the safety and security of mission resources. This paper will focus on SERS' overall functionality and how SERS has been designed to handle the monitoring and emergency response for missions with varying levels of automation. The paper will also convey some of the key lessons learned from SERS' deployment across of variety of missions, highlighting this incremental approach to achieving 'robust autonomy'.

Breed, Julie↗

DOE OSTI2024

Enhancing Cloud Cybersecurity: Prescriptive Controls for Operational Technology

This whitepaper provides strategic insights and recommendations into security cloud-based solutions for electric utilities, encompassing operational technology (OT), virtual power plants (VPP), distributed energy resources (DERs), applications, networks, and data storage as they transition to and leverage cloud infrastructure through managed service providers (MSPs) and cloud service providers (CSPs). Principles derived from established frameworks serve as a foundation for best practices across cybersecurity projects and remove the constraints of settling on a single framework. For organizations that prefer not to integrate a specific framework altogether, elements of the proposed approach could be adopted or tailored to best fit defined requirements and expected functionalities. The Cirrus assessment, a utility cloud feasibility tool, and the roadmap it provides serve as a precursor to this paper, which seeks to be a valuable resource for defining next steps following cloud technology integration feasibility appraisal. With its comprehensive approach to adoption, the Cirrus framework offers strategic guidance on responsibly preparing for or deploying a utility cloud solution. The previously published whitepaper, “Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration,” details the guiding strategy, research, and deployment of cloud solutions within electric and interconnected grid systems. Before implementing the controls suggested in this document, it is recommended that stakeholders complete Cirrus's cloud integration assessment and pair the results with their unique cybersecurity controls to form a comprehensive cloud-based utility cybersecurity plan. The Cirrus outcome will consider a series of future architectures for the grid before and after the energy transition and evaluate the arguments for and against cloud applications for each electric and interconnected grid layer. This document is a companion to the original whitepaper, "Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration" to further identify and recommend security controls based on Cirrus’s cloud integration assessment output. The following whitepaper outlines the cybersecurity controls that secure cloud-service models pertinent to the electric sector using the predefined categories identify, protect, detect, and respond and recover. The objective is to outline prescriptive security controls based on the type of architecture and data stored in the cloud. The focus includes dissecting the shared responsibility model and elucidating what on-premises Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) entail. A pivotal consideration in this context is allocating responsibility for foundational cybersecurity aspects—having used Cirrus for the cloud integration assessment. The ensuing controls detailed herein also represent a checklist of controls necessary for a secure cloud transition, equipping utilities with the knowledge to navigate this digital transformation with confidence and strategic foresight in a safe and responsible manner.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Utilization of Machine Learning Techniques for Managing the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite Constellation

National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) operates a constellation of ten geosynchronous Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS). The TDRS constellation consists of multiple geosynchronous communication relay satellites located around the equator so they can provide continual coverage of any mission in low earth orbit. The TDRS are located primarily in three oceanic regions around the earth. NASA’s White Sands Complex provides the ground communication support for TDRS located over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Another TDRS ground station in Guam supports the TDRS over the Indian Ocean. With these satellites the TDRS network can provide continuous coverage of satellites in low-earth orbit. The NASA Space Network (SN) project office at GSFC manages the constellation of spacecraft. Major customers of the TDRS constellation include, but are not limited to, the International Space Station and the Hubble Space Telescope. The TDRS constellation has three generations of satellites and has been active for over 30 years providing reliable communication links between customer satellites and corresponding ground stations. However, one of the major concerns for TDRS, and in any space mission, is to ensure the health and safety of the spacecraft. Generally, engineers use telemetry data to monitor and analyze the performance and state of health of the spacecraft. Telemetry data contains hundreds of parameters that monitor each important component in the spacecraft, which can be utilized to recognize and characterize the behavior of the spacecraft. Each parameter contains considerable information to represent time-dependent properties of each spacecraft subsystem and component. During the entire life of a TDRS spacecraft, thousands of gigabytes of telemetry data are transmitted in real-time from the spacecraft to the ground station at the White Sands Complex in Las Cruces, New Mexico, and recorded as historical data sets for engineers to process and analyze the events that occurred on-orbit. These parameters contain the function of multiple spacecraft subsystems, such as the attitude control system (ACS), Thermal, Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS), etc. . The first and second generations have exceeded their required lifetime and NASA is keen to manage these spacecrafts carefully in order to maximize the remaining life using the spacecraft telemetry. The challenge is to know when the risk of losing a spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit exceeds the benefit of continued operations for customer support. In the TDRS fleet, the EPS is the most critical subsystem related to spacecraft operations. Failure of the EPS would strand a spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit. Since EPS provides power to the spacecraft, component failures ultimately lead to the inability to support the spacecraft loads and the communications payload. For instance, TDRS-8 has several anomalies in EPS including the Bus Voltage Limiter (BVL) shunt current, solar array loss of circuits, and failed battery cells. Any of these anomalies can cause critical issues to the spacecraft. Therefore, developing a system to analyze and perform early detection of a potential anomaly is an important issue in telemetry data analysis. In recent years, Telemetry Mining (TM) has been proposed to process telemetry data by using Data Mining (DM) techniques such as classification, clustering, regression and anomaly detection. Anomaly detection, also known as outlier detection, has been widely used in many data mining areas such as remote sensing, medical data processing and digital image processing. The goal of anomaly detection is to detect abnormal data, which contains a relatively low probability of occurrence among the entire data set. Early detection of anomalies is one of the most significant issues in managing the spacecraft configuration. If anomalies can be detected early enough, then the redundant resources can be used to extend the life of the operational spacecraft. We present an unsupervised anomaly detection method to process the EPS data extracted from TDRS-8. This is different from traditional analytical methods, which use telemetry data to illustrate behavior and physical meaning of each spacecraft component. TM connects multiple parameters as a vector and then conducts data analysis on this high dimension telemetry vector. This method is looking at the properties of a high dimensional vector that is able to consider the relationship between different parameters in the anomaly detection problem. This kind of method performs much better than the traditional limit checking method. In addition, we propose a new approach of real-time anomaly detection to process telemetry data in real-time, which can then be applied to spacecraft monitoring with high reliability, low cost and high accuracy.

Machine Learning (ML)↗

NASA NTRS2014

Assessing the Risk of Crew Injury Due to Dynamic Loads During Spaceflight

Spaceflight requires tremendous amounts of energy to achieve Earth orbit and to attain escape velocity for interplanetary missions. Although the majority of the energy is managed in such a way as to limit the accelerations on the crew, several mission phases may result in crew exposure to dynamic loads. In the automotive industry, risk of serious injury can be tolerated because the probability of a crash is remote each time a person enters a vehicle, resulting in a low total risk of injury. For spaceflight, the level of acceptable injury risk must be lower to achieve a low total risk of injury because the dynamic loads are expected on each flight. To mitigate the risk of injury due to dynamic loads, the NASA Human Research Program has developed a research plan to inform the knowledge gaps and develop relevant tools for assessing injury risk. The risk of injury due to dynamic loads can be further subdivided into extrinsic and intrinsic risk factors. Extrinsic risk factors include the vehicle dynamic profile, seat and restraint design, and spacesuit design. Human tolerance to loads varies considerably depending on the direction, amplitude, and rise-time of acceleration therefore the orientation of the body to the dynamic vector is critical to determining crew risk of injury. Although a particular vehicle dynamic profile may be safe for a particular design, the seat, restraint, and suit designs can affect the risk of injury due to localized effects. In addition, characteristics intrinsic to the crewmember may also contribute to the risk of injury, such as crewmember sex, age, anthropometry, and deconditioning due to spaceflight, and each astronaut may have a different risk profile because of these factors. The purpose of the research plan is to address any knowledge gaps in the risk factors to mitigate injury risk. Methods for assessing injury risk have been well documented in other analogous industries and include human volunteer testing, human exposure to dynamic environments, post-mortem human subject (PMHS) testing, animal testing, anthropomorphic test devices (ATD), dynamic models of the human, numerical models of ATDs, and numerical models of the human. Each has inherent strengths and limitations. For example, human volunteer testing is advantageous because a population can be selected that is similar to the astronaut corps; however, because of the inherent ethical limitations, only sub-injurious conditions can be tested. PMHSs can be tested in a variety of conditions including injurious levels, but the responses are not completely analogous to living human subjects. In addition, it is exceedingly difficult to select a PMHS population that is similar to the astronaut corps. ATDs are currently widely used in the automotive industry and military because they are highly repeatable and durable. Unfortunately, because they are mechanical models of the human body, the biofidelity of the responses are limited to dynamic conditions used to validate the ATD. Numerical models of the ATD, in addition to the strengths and limitations for ATDs, are easy to use for a variety of designs before a design is fabricated, but also have additional limitations for ATDs, are easy to use for a variety of designs before a design is fabricated, but also have additional uncertainty. Dynamic models are simple and easy to use, but do not account for localized effects of the seat and suit. Finally, numerical models of the human have the potential to have the most advantages; however, the current models are not validated for the conditions expected during spaceflight. To properly assess spaceflight conditions with numerical human models, human data would be needed to optimize the model responses for those conditions. Using the appropriate assessment method with the knowledge gained for each risk factor, an appropriate approach for mitigating the risk of injury due to dynamic loads can be developed ensuring crew safety in future NASA vehicles.

Somers, J. T.↗

DOE OSTI2022

Coastal Acoustic Buoy for Offshore Wind: Project Synthesis

The population of North Atlantic right whales is critically endangered and their habitat overlaps with offshore windfarm leases. It is therefore imperative that effective mitigation strategies be used to avoid impacts on right whales during the construction of offshore windfarms. The Department of Energy issued FOA Number DE-FOA-0001924 to encourage the development of technology that could monitor large exclusion zones for right whales in order to mitigate potential impact of construction noise on right whales. This report summarizes the past two years of the development and evaluation of the Coastal Acoustic Buoy for Offshore Wind (CABOW) project which aimed to develop technology to monitor large exclusion zones for North Atlantic right whales. Over the course of the project SMRU Consulting have implemented a rigorous design process including comparison of different approaches (e.g., single sensor vs multiple sensors), as well as consideration of placement and timing of acoustic monitoring. We have evaluated critical components of the CABOW system including, reliability, detection range, and bearing accuracy in areas adjacent to offshore windfarm leases in Maryland by conducting 3,536 playbacks of simulated right whale upcalls. The maximum call detection range was 7.5 km when noise was 99 dB re 1µPa rms (50-225 Hz), but this reduced to < 1 km when ambient noise levels were high. Our detection probability in the field was measured as a function of range as well as the source-to-noise level ratio allowing us to build a model to predict the probability of detection under various scenarios (sample size: 3,536 calls x 5 buoys = 17,680). The median bearing error was -0.25° but this is likely an underestimate of error due to experimental design. Using the published recall and precision of the two detectors we implemented in the CABOW system, we estimate that at a recall of 80%, our precision was > 80%, within the range of what we were aiming for in this project. To estimate our exclusion zone false negative and false positive rates, we built a simulation model using the empirical data from our field trial. We modelled three to nine CABOW units placed on the 10 km exclusion zone and estimated our false negative rate to be 1% or less (which was our project goal) and our false positive rate to be between seven and nine percent, slightly above our goal of 5%. However, we also modelled an equivalent PAM system that does not have bearing capabilities and found the false positive rates for that system to be six to eight times higher than the CABOW rate. This higher false positive rate of PAM systems with low spatial information could have significant cost repercussions for offshore wind developers by adding work shutdowns or delays without providing additional protection for right whales. The model we built allows us to explore the placement of PAM systems under various scenarios and will thus help facilitate planning of PAM mitigation systems to meet NOAA Incidental Harassment Authorizations for specific windfarms. We achieved an average system uptime of 98.3%, just below our goal of 99%. The issues that caused these short losses of data have been identified and fixed. Right whale detections and audio clips were typically transferred via radio from the buoys to the base station in two to four seconds. We therefore believe we have developed a highly robust real-time PAM system. Based on the above, we feel we have achieved the stated funding goal of developing a cost-effective and robust real-time PAM system that enables the monitoring of large exclusion zones for right whales during the constructions of offshore windfarms. This should lead to decreased costs and risks for the offshore wind sector while providing robust mitigation for right whales. It is important to state that PAM mitigation will need to be implemented with other mitigation strategies (e.g., visual observers) to provide a complete mitigation strategy to ensure that any effects on right whales from offshore windfarm construction is minimized.

17 WIND ENERGY↗