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At least 1,063 records · Page 59

Methodology Used in the Radiological Assessment of a Coal-Fired Power Plant

A radiological assessment of the workers and the public potentially affected by the operation of the Teruel Coal-fired Power Plant (the UPT Teruel), was performed under realistic assumptions. This assessment is part of a wider study to characterize the potential radiological impact of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM), in which our team, integrated by University of Extremadura and CIEMAT, is carrying out the study on coal-fired power plants sponsored by the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council (CSN). The study comprises the four biggest coal-fired power plants in Spain. Taking into account the working conditions and the plant specifications, six groups of workers were defined, established considering the 17 working tasks that could be of any importance for this assessment. For the public, considering that the area is barely inhabited, two different recreational scenarios were defined. Therefore, in-plant and outside measurements, needed for the assessment of each scenario, were carried out. Where experimental data were not available or measurements ranged within the natural background radiation values, modelling has been used. Every measured or estimated activity concentration in coal and other used materials or in the by-products generated in the power plant, for every radionuclide in the natural chains of {sup 238}U, {sup 232}Th and {sup 40}K, were below 0.32 Bq g{sup -1}. Those values are under the 0.5 Bq g{sup -1} reference value for exemption and clearance of {sup 238}U, {sup 232}Th and {sup 226}Ra and the 5 Bq g{sup -1} for {sup 40}K recommended in Europe. In the dose evaluations for six groups of workers, a maximum of 21 {mu}Sv a{sup -1} was obtained (mainly due to the inhalation of resuspended particles). For both considered scenarios for the public, all the evaluated doses were below 4.3 {mu}Sv a{sup -1}. These results are considered negligible from a radiological point of view. In this work the models and assumptions used for the evaluation of workers and public doses, the assessment, as well as the most relevant experimental results and conclusions are presented.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Saltstone Waste Characterization Analysis - Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Waste Stream (Q4 CY2020)

The Saltstone Production and Disposal Facility is designed and permitted by the state of South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) to treat and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Low-level waste (LEW) aqueous streams from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP) and decontaminated solutions from the Tank Closure Cesium Removal Unit (TCCR) and the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) are stored in Tank 50 until the LEW can be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. In the past, decontaminated solution from the Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) was stored in Tank 50 until the LEW could be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. MCU is currently in a suspended operations state. LEW that meets the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) can be transferred, stored, and treated in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) for subsequent disposal as saltstone grout in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Sampling will be conducted as new waste streams are identified for treatment and disposal at the Saltstone Industrial Wastewater Treatment Facility (IWTF) and Z-Area Industrial Solid Waste Landfill (ISWLF), Facility ID# 025500-1603, General Condition B.9 or every six years in accordance with South Carolina (SC) Regulation 61-107.19 Parti C, “Solid Waste Management: Solid Waste Landfills and Structural Fill - General Requirements.”

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Marine Sciences Laboratory Radionuclide Air Emissions

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science (DOE-SC) Pacific Northwest Site Office has oversight and stewardship duties associated with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Marine Sciences Laboratory (MSL), located on Battelle Land-Sequim. The facility has two buildings with the potential to emit low levels of radioactive materials. DOE-SC contracted for exclusive use of its radiological operations effective October 1, 2012. This report is prepared to document compliance with the Code of Federal Regulation, Title 40, Protection of the Environment, Part 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants , Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities” and Washington Administrative Code Chapter 246-247, Radiation Protection–Air Emissions . Compliance is indicated by comparing the estimated effective dose equivalent (EDE) to the maximally exposed individual (MEI) with the 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standard. The MSL has only fugitive emissions sources. Despite the fact that the regulations are intended for application to point source emissions, fugitive emissions are included with regard to complying with the EPA standard. The EDE to the MSL MEI due to routine operations in 2016 was 5.7E-04 mrem (5.7E-06 mSv). No non-routine emissions occurred in 2016. The MSL is in compliance with the federal and state 10 mrem/yr standard.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

Stabilization of Preternatural Barium Oxidation States as an Unexpected Byproduct of β-Decay: Discovery of a New Halide Semiconductor Alloy

137 Cs has a wide range of roles in the nuclear industry. The solid material, safely encapsulated in CsCl as 137 CsCl, is stored as fission product waste from nuclear power production and legacy waste from nuclear weapons production; it has also served as a radiation source in food and sewage irradiators as well as medical devices. However, because of the solubility of the chloride salt and the relatively high specific activity of 137 Cs, damaged or broken capsules can lead to severe radiological accidents. Safe capsule design and material recycling are complicated by the unclear structural evolution during β-decay, which remains ambiguous due to the differing oxidation states of Cs (1+) and Ba (2+). Here, in this study, we use first-principles calculations to investigate the evolving structure–property relationships of Cs 1–x Ba x Cl during β-decay. Despite the well-established 2+ formal oxidation state of alkali-earth metals, we find that Ba 1+ can be stabilized in the form of a mixed-valence alloy at low concentrations. Specifically, we identify three regimes for the β-decay of 137 Cs into CsCl: Ba-doped CsCl (Ba ≤ 14%), wherein Ba has the expected 2+ oxidation state; Cs–Ba–Cl alloys, where Ba has a mix of the usual Ba 2+ and highly unusual Ba 1+ oxidation state in the form of a quasi-disordered mixed-valence alloy (Ba = 25%); and phase separation into a CsCl + BaCl 2 + Ba (m) mechanical mixture, where Ba reverts to its expected 2+ oxidation state (Ba > 25%). Surprisingly, the Cs 0.75 Ba 0.25 Cl mixed-valence alloy is a narrow indirect band gap semiconductor (1.05 eV) despite the insulating nature of both CsCl and BaCl 2 . It also exhibits strongly excitonic polarized optical properties, has glass-like ultralow thermal conductivity (directional average of 0.21 W/mK at 300 K), and shows greater resistance to deformation under both tensile and volumetric strengths compared with the original CsCl structure (e.g., shear and Young’s modulus of 9.04 and 31.62 GPa, respectively). These findings imply that transmutation of 137 Cs leads to highly unusual chemical bonding that stabilizes Ba 1+ in local regions of the quasi-disordered Cs 0.25 Ba 0.75 Cl, resulting in anomalous physical properties. Moreover, this discovery provides valuable insight for safe nuclear waste capsule design, which can aid in preventing environmental or human exposure to radioactive materials.

Fuhr, Addis S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORN↗

Fukushima Media Involvement: Lessons Learned and Challenges

Only days after the Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster on March 11, 2011, the Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, or PNNL, found itself in a maelstrom of media attention following announcement of the detection of minute levels of radioactive material originating from the damaged reactors 4,500 miles away. Within days, PNNL had set up a technical team in support of the U.S. government’s efforts to assist the devastated country. While a vast amount of information began to flow from Japan, the situation rapidly evolved challenging PNNL scientists and engineers, as well as news media and the general public to deal with a complex and often conflicting information stream. Over the course of about three weeks, PNNL’s News & Media Relations staff and its scientists and engineers responded to more than one hundred requests for information, and engaged in dozens of personal interviews with international, national, regional and local media. While many of the interviews and resulting stories were accurate and well done, to say that all communication went flawless would be far from the truth. In the midst of chaos and confusion, which are part of any significant crisis, hiccoughs are sure to occur. Even when communications guidelines are established and agreed-to ahead of time, and spokespeople promise to stay on message and within their areas of expertise, there is no guarantee the ball will not be dropped on occasion. Addressed here is “the rest of the story.”

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2016 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and its two Nevada-based support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. In addition to the NNSA itself, the six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for its multiple missions. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

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Development of Neutron Energy Spectral Signatures for Passive Monitoring of Spent Nuclear Fuels in Dry Cask Storage

Demand for spent nuclear fuel dry casks as an interim storage solution has increased globally and the IAEA has expressed a need for robust safeguards and verification technologies for ensuring the continuity of knowledge and the integrity of radioactive materials inside spent fuel casks. Existing research has been focusing on “fingerprinting” casks based on count rate statistics to represent radiation emission signatures. The current research aims to expand to include neutron energy spectral information as part of the fuel characteristics. First, spent fuel composition data are taken from the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Spent Fuel Libraries, representative for Westinghouse 17 x 17 PWR assemblies. The ORIGEN-S code then calculates the spontaneous fission and (α,n) emissions for individual fuel rods, followed by detailed MCNP simulations of neutrons transported through the fuel assemblies. A comprehensive database of neutron energy spectral profiles is to be constructed, with different enrichment, burn-up, and cooling time conditions. The end goal is to utilize the computational spent fuel library, predictive algorithm, and a pressurized 4 He scintillator to verify the spent fuel assemblies inside a cask. This work identifies neutron spectral signatures that correlate with the cooling time of spent fuel. Both the total and relative contributions from spontaneous fission and (α,n) change noticeably with respect to cooling time, due to the relatively short half-life (18 years) of the major neutron source 244 Cm. Identification of this and other neutron spectral signatures allows the characterization of spent nuclear fuels in dry cask storage.

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Modelling and mitigating dose to firefighters from inhalation of radionuclides in wildland fire smoke

Firefighters responding to wildland fires where surface litter and vegetation contain radiological contamination will receive a radiological dose by inhaling resuspended radioactive material in the smoke. This may increase their lifetime risk of contracting certain types of cancer. Using published data, we modelled hypothetical radionuclide emissions, dispersion and dose for 70th and 97th percentile environmental conditions and for average and high fuel loads at the Savannah River Site. We predicted downwind concentration and potential dose to firefighters for radionuclides of interest ( 137 Cs, 238 Pu, 90 Sr and 210 Po). Predicted concentrations exceeded dose guidelines in the base case scenario emissions of 1.0 × 10 7 Bq ha –1 for 238 Pu at 70th percentile environmental conditions and average fuel load levels for both 4- and 14-h shifts. Under 97th percentile environmental conditions and high fuel loads, dose guidelines were exceeded for several reported cases for 90 Sr, 238 Pu and 210 Po. Potential for exceeding dose guidelines was mitigated by including plume rise (>2 m s –1 ) or moving a small distance from the fire owing to large concentration gradients near the edge of the fire. As a result, our approach can quickly estimate potential dose from airborne radionuclides in wildland fire and assist decision-making to reduce firefighter exposure.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Disposal of Greater Than Class C Low-Level Radioactive Waste in Andrews County, Texas - 16408

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has recommended approval of an initiative to permit the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to license the disposal of commercial and co-mingled Greater Than Class C Low-Level Radioactive Waste (GTCC LLW) in Andrews County, Texas. Such a framework is clearly articulated in the Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The NRC staff also recommended approval to proceed with a rulemaking to align the Waste Classification Tables in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 61.55 with the paragraph 61.2 definition of 'waste' to provide a disposal pathway for waste containing certain alpha-emitting transuranic elements with concentrations exceeding 100 nanocuries per gram (nCi/g). A pathway for the disposal of commercial and co-mingled GTCC LLW, including waste with certain alpha emitting transuranic elements exceeding 100 nCi/g (TRU waste), might emerge if the initiative described in the Commissions' July 22, 2015 document, SECY-15-0094, Historical and Current Issues Related to Disposal of GTCC LLW, is approved. The NRC staff recommendations envisioned the NRC and TCEQ working together to review a site-specific performance assessment that would be submitted by Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) as part of an amendment to its existing Radioactive Materials License No. R04100. The TCEQ's recommendations were prompted by a petition for rulemaking filed by WCS to allow the disposal of GTCC waste in Texas. On September 10, 2014, the TCEQ Commissioners directed their staff to engage stakeholders and request input from the NRC and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) regarding actions needed to proceed with any future rulemaking. On January 30, 2015, the TCEQ requested clarification from the NRC regarding their legal authority and jurisdiction to regulate GTCC, GTCC-like, and TRU waste. The deliberations that have transpired over the past year have raised important legal, policy, and technical matters. This initiative could provide a safe disposal pathway for certain waste streams that have been orphaned over the past 30 years. One important realization that has emerged is the conservative assumptions used to establish the upper limits for Class C LLW when Part 61 was promulgated in 1981 would be much too restrictive when applied to a modern, highly engineered disposal facility located in arid west Texas. Waste that was not suitable for near surface disposal in 1981 could certainly be demonstrated to be safely disposed at the WCS Federal Waste Disposal Facility in Andrews County, Texas. This paper will address the legal, policy, and technical matters supporting this important topic currently under consideration both nationally and within the State of Texas. (authors)

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Deep Isolation-Development of the Safety Case for Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Horizontal Boreholes - 20028

Deep Isolation has developed a safe, secure, and permanent geological disposal method for high-level waste, including spent nuclear fuel as well as sealed sources and other highly radioactive materials. The method leverages well established directional drilling technology to create horizontal repositories deep underground. The combination of great depth (1-3 km) and the ability to precisely position repositories in a horizontal orientation provides access to geologic strata that are inaccessible for typical mined and deep vertical borehole repositories. A number of potential direct and indirect safety benefits accrue including:1) greater depth below regional freshwater aquifers; 2) increased flexibility and more geologic options for siting; 3) access to deep formations with persistent and sustained reducing conditions. In addition there are a number of safety elements related specifically to the horizontal repository geometry including: 1) passive direction of thermally driven fluid and radionuclide movement away from the vertical access hole and toward the 'dead end' portion of the repository; 2) mitigation of seismic hazards by orienting repositories parallel to local and regional fault structures. In this paper we explore and discuss some of the key technologic, geologic and hydrologic elements that support the deep horizontal borehole safety case. The stalemate seen across the globe on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste can be broken. Deep Isolation offers a novel option for safe, secure, and permanent deep geological disposal of nuclear waste that can be developed as centralized repositories or adapted to smaller regional or site-specific repositories located near waste sources. (authors)

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Safety Enhancements for TRU Waste Handling - 12258

For years, proper Health Physics practices and 'As Low As Reasonably Achievable' (ALARA) principles have fostered the use of glove boxes or other methods of handling (without direct contact) high activities of radioactive material. The physical limitations of using glove boxes on certain containers have resulted in high-activity wastes being held in storage awaiting a path forward. Highly contaminated glove boxes and other remote handling equipment no longer in use have also been added to the growing list of items held for storage with no efficient method of preparation for proper disposal without creating exposure risks to personnel. This is especially true for wastes containing alpha-emitting radionuclides such as Plutonium and Americium that pose significant health risks to personnel if these Transuranic (TRU) wastes are not controlled effectively. Like any good safety program or root cause investigation PFNW has found that the identification of the cause of a negative change, if stopped, can result in a near miss and lessons learned. If this is done in the world of safety, it is considered a success story and is to be shared with others to protect the workers. PFNW believes that the tools, equipment and resources have improved over the past number of years but that the use of them has not progressed at the same rate. If we use our tools to timely identify the effect on the work environment and immediately following or possibly even simultaneously identify the cause or some of the causal factors, we may have the ability to continue to work rather than succumb to the start and stop-work mentality trap that is not beneficial in waste minimization, production efficiency or ALARA. (authors)

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HLW Return from France to Germany - 15 Years of Experience in Public Acceptance and Technical Aspects - 12149

Since in 1984 the national reprocessing concept was abandoned the reprocessing abroad was the only existing disposal route until 1994. With the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act in 2001 spent fuel management changed completely since from 1 June 2005 any delivery of spent fuel to reprocessing plants was prohibited and the direct disposal of spent fuel became mandatory. Until 2005 the total amount of spent fuel to be reprocessed abroad added up to 6080 t HM, 5309 t HM thereof in France. The waste generated from reprocessing - alternatively an equivalent amount of radioactive material - has to be returned to the country of origin according to the commercial contracts signed between the German utilities and COGEMA, now AREVA NC, in France and BNFL, now INS in UK. In addition the German and the French government exchanged notes with the obligation of both sides to enable and support the return of reprocessing residues or equivalents to Germany. The return of high active vitrified waste from La Hague to the interim storage facility at Gorleben was demanding from the technical view i. e. the cask design and the transport. Unfortunately the Gorleben area served as a target for nuclear opponents from the first transport in 1996 to the latest one in 2011. The protection against sabotage of the railway lines and mass protests needed highly improved security measures. In France and Germany special working forces and projects have been set up to cope with this extraordinary situation. A complex transport organization was established to involve all parties in line with the German and French requirements during transport. The last transport of vitrified residues from France has been completed successfully so far thus confirming the efficiency of the applied measures. Over 15 years there was and still is worldwide no comparable situation it is still unique. Summing up, the exceptional project handling challenge that resulted from the continuous anti-nuclear civil disobedience in Germany over the whole 15-year long project running time could be faced efficiently. It has to be concluded that despite of all problems the anti-nuclear activities have caused so far, all transports of vitrified HLW have always been completed successfully by adapting the commonly established safety, security and public acceptance measures to the special conditions and needs in Germany and coordinating the activities of all parties involved but at the expense of high costs for industry and government and a challenging operational complexity. Apart from an anticipatory project planning a good communication between all involved industrial parties and the French and the German government was the key to the effective management of such shipments and to minimize the radiological, economic, environmental, public and political impact. The future will show how efficiently the gained experience can be used for further return projects which are to be realized since no reprocessed waste has yet been returned from UK and neither the medium-level nor the low-level radioactive waste has been transferred from France to Germany. (author)

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The INE-Beamline for actinide science at ANKA

Since its inauguration in 2005, the INE-Beamline for actinide research at the synchrotron source ANKA (KIT North Campus) provides dedicated instrumentation for x-ray spectroscopic characterization of actinide samples and other radioactive materials. R and D work at the beamline focuses on various aspects of nuclear waste disposal within INE's mission to provide the scientific basis for assessing long-term safety of a final nuclear waste repository. The INE-Beamline is accessible for the actinide and radiochemistry community through the ANKA proposal system and the European Union Integrated Infrastructure Initiative ACTINET-I3. Experiments with activities up to 1 x 10{sup +6} times the European exemption limit are feasible within a safe but flexible containment concept. Measurements with monochromatic radiation are performed at photon energies varying between {approx}2.1 keV (P K-edge) and {approx}25 keV (Pd K-edge), including the lanthanide L-edges and the actinide M- and L3-edges up to Cf. The close proximity of the INE-Beamline to INE controlled area labs offers infrastructure unique in Europe for the spectroscopic and microscopic characterization of actinide samples. The modular beamline design enables sufficient flexibility to adapt sample environments and detection systems to many scientific questions. The well-established bulk techniques x-ray absorption fine structure (XAFS) spectroscopy in transmission and fluorescence mode have been augmented by advanced methods using a microfocused beam, including (confocal) XAFS/x-ray fluorescence detection and a combination of (micro-)XAFS and (micro-)x-ray diffraction. Additional instrumentation for high energy-resolution x-ray emission spectroscopy has been successfully developed and tested.

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Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Concoction and Appraisal of Radiation Hardened Polyurethane Foams for DOE Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) Operations

Since World War 2, a number of nuclear facilities have been relocating their nuclear waste to long term storage, or final disposition. These facilities face monumental challenges in cleaning up the fixated transferrable radioactive waste that is left in these facilities after initial cleaning operations have ended. SRNL has identified a solution that is utilizing two-part epoxy foams with heavy metal additives for fixating and shielding transferable radioactive material that has accumulated in non uniform volumes. The purpose of this experiment is to make a library of data of physical characteristics of each foam and additive combination that will have data concerning how the material cures and performs in different environments with varying temperatures and how it will act and perform after being irradiated. Materials Being Tested: - Foam iT 7FR, Foam iT 23FR, 3M Fire Barrier foam, and Hilti CP620 foam; - Additives Bi, Bi2O{sub 3}, Na{sub 2}WO{sub 3}, and WO{sub 3} at 12.5% and 25%. What's being investigated: - Expansion data from each foam; - Radiation shielding data for each foam combination; - Peak temperatures for each foam. Utilized a FLIR thermal camera to find peak temperature and time it took the foam to reach it. No noticeable difference in volume or weight after blank foam samples sat in the environmental chamber for 24 hours except the 3M foam at the extreme relative humidity of 90% highlighted above. The more additives used in the foam, the more they were able to shield. The foams begin to saturate around 100% wt% where more additive used will not increase the shielding capability of the foam. Similar thermal dispersion in blanks and in samples with Bi additive. Time taken to peak temperature is very similar between the two. Similar peak temperatures in blanks and in Bi samples. Hilti had slightly elevated temperatures. All foams maintained their physical properties post environmental chamber except the 3M foam. With the increased sponginess from the high relative humidity's, 3M may be disqualified for further testing if its mechanical properties also suffer. While curing all foams had their peak temperature occur between 40 deg. C and 70 deg. C except the Hilti which occurred above 90 deg. C with and without additive. With this information, no foams would be disqualified. After radiation shielding studies, it was found that IT 14 with Bismuth and Bismuth Oxide Additives provided the best shielding of Co-60 with over 9% attenuation.

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De-Inventory Plan for Transuranic Waste Stored at Area G

This report describes the strategy and detailed work plan developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to disposition transuranic (TRU) waste stored at its Area G radioactive waste storage site. The focus at this time is on disposition of 3,706 m 3 of TRU waste stored above grade by June 30, 2014, which is one of the commitments within the Framework Agreement: Realignment of Environmental Priorities between the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the State of New Mexico Environment Department (NMED), Reference 1. A detailed project management schedule has been developed to manage this work and better ensure that all required activities are aligned and integrated. The schedule was developed in conjunction with personnel from the NNSA Los Alamos Site Office (LASO), the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO), the Central Characterization Project (CCP), and Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS). A detailed project management schedule for the remainder of the above grade inventory and the below grade inventory will be developed and incorporated into the De-Inventory Plan by December 31, 2012. This schedule will also include all newly-generated TRU waste received at Area G in FYs 2012 and 2013, which must be removed by no later than December 31, 2014, under the Framework Agreement. The TRU waste stored above grade at Area G is considered to be one of the highest nuclear safety risks at LANL, and the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board has expressed concern for the radioactive material at risk (MAR) contained within the above grade TRU waste inventory and has formally requested that DOE reduce the MAR. A large wildfire called the Las Conchas Fire burned extensive areas west of LANL in late June and July 2011. Although there was minimal to no impact by the fire to LANL, the fire heightened public concern and news media attention on TRU waste storage at Area G. After the fire, New Mexico Governor Susana Martinez also requested that LANL accelerate disposition of TRU waste stored above grade at Area G. The 3,706 m 3 volume of TRU waste stored above grade consists of 4,495 containers that include all above grade non-cemented waste as well as above grade cemented waste that was ready for characterization on October 1, 2011. This volume includes all newly-generated TRU waste currently stored at Area G as of October 1, 2011. This volume does not include the Bolas Grandes spheres, mixed low level waste (MLLW) containers, empty containers, cemented waste that requires remediation, projected newly generated TRU waste from FY 2012 and later, or TRU waste stored below grade. The 3,706 m 3 volume represents about 86 per cent of the total volume of TRU waste stored above grade on October 1, 2011. The De-Inventory Plan supports the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) goal to disposition 90% of the Legacy TRU waste within the DOE complex by the end of 2015 as stated in its Roadmap for EM’s Journey to Excellence (Reference 2). The plan also addresses precursor actions for disposition of TRU waste that are necessary for compliance with the Compliance Order on Consent issued by the NMED in 2005 (Reference 3).

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Performance and safety assessment of the co-location of the near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities and borehole disposal concept in the Philippines

The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) in collaboration with the interagency technical committee on radioactive waste has been undertaking a national project to find a final solution to the country's low to intermediate level radioactive waste. The strategy adopted was to co-locate 2 disposal concepts that will address the types of radioactive waste generated from the use of radioactive materials. This strategy is expected to compensate for the small volumes of waste generated in the Philippines as compared to countries with big nuclear energy programs. It will also take advantage of the benefits of a shared infrastructure and R and D work that accompany such project. The preferred site selected from previous site selection and investigations is underlain by highly fractured 'andesitic volcaniclastics' mantled by residual clayey soil which act as the aquifer or water bearing layer. Results of investigation show that the groundwater in the area is relatively dilute and acidic. Springs at the lower elevations of the footprint also indicate acidic waters. The relatively acidic water is attributed to the formation of sulfuric acid by the oxidation of the pyrite in the andesite. A preliminary post closure safety assessment was carried out using the GMS MODFLOW and HYDRUS softwares purchased through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) technical assistance. Results from MODFLOW modeling show that the radionuclide transport follows the natural gradient from the top of the hill down to the natural discharge zones. The vault dispersion model shows a circular direction from the vaults towards the faults and eventually to the creeks. The contaminant transport from borehole shows at least one confined plume from the borehole towards the creek designated as Repo1 and eventually follows downstream. The influx of surface water and rainfall to the disposal vault was modeled using the HYDRUS software. The pressure head and water content at the base of the foundation layer and the bottom of the concrete is where a significant reduction in water content can be observed. It is also noted that water content and pressure remain constant after one year. (authors)

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Investigation of INL Site Implementation of ARG-US

The Packaging Certification and Life Cycle Management department at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) developed a suite of monitoring systems collectively referred to here as ARG-US. ARG-US is used to provide necessary data for nuclear facility and system operation and maintenance. ARG-US has been previously demonstrated in hot cells, radioactive material (RAM) storage areas, and RAM shipment trucks. It has also been installed directly on RAM storage and shipment containers. ARG-US offers some unique advantages over other commercially available systems by using wireless data connections, battery power supplies, and customizable monitoring methods. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been tasked with investigating applications for ARG-US at INL site facilities, which are operated by several different contractors. The initial investigation scope centered on CPP-603 Wet & Dry Fuel Storage Facility in relation to the upcoming DOE Spent (SNF) Packaging Demonstration. The investigation has been led by the Used Fuel Management Department in the Nuclear Science and Technology Directorate. This investigation is expected to recommend processes or facilities at the INL site at which to implement ARG-US systems. INL has engaged local site technical and oversite representatives, security, nuclear safeguards, and program management to identify good candidates for ARG-US test implementations. INL has identified high-level goals for any INL site implementation of ARG-US: provide unique testing environments, prompt development of new monitoring methods/techniques for the ARG-US suite, and acquire useful monitoring for the user facility. To these ends, INL suggests 3 program areas for further investigation: CPP-603 Fuel Handling Cave (FHC), legacy mixed waste storage systems at Idaho Nuclear Technology & Engineering Center (INTEC) known as the “tank farm”, and periodic and emergency environmental monitoring. This progress report relates activities undertaken in this investigation, describes the preliminary areas of interest for limited scope ARG-US testing or implementation, and relays expected actions needed to complete the task scope. This report offers an opportunity to the program sponsor, technical leads at ANL, and INL site representatives to give feedback on the initial assessment and make recommendations on the forthcoming activities.

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