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NASA NTRS2010

TBCC TSTO Design for the NASA-AFRL Joint System Study

NASA and the Air Force Research Laboratory are involved in a Joint System Study (JSS) on Two-Stage-to-Orbit (TSTO) vehicles. The JSS will examine the performance, operability and uncertainty of unmanned, fully reusable, airbreathing-based TSTO launch vehicle concepts. NASA is providing a concept using turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) propulsion on the booster stage and an all-rocket orbiter. The Air Force supplied two vehicle concepts, both utilizing an all-rocket booster; one with an all-rocket orbiter, the other using a rocket-based combined cycle orbiter. For NASA, this study is being used for tool assessment and development, and to identify generic technology gaps, not to choose vehicle types or concepts. This presentation starts with an overview of the major JSS ground rules and assumptions. Second, the NASA TSTO concept, Reusable Airbreathing Launch Vehicle - iteration B (RALV-B) is introduced, including its mission profile and, the vehicle (booster and orbiter) layout and packaging. The high speed propulsion concept is then briefly discussed, including the work performed and lessons learned. The low speed TBCC propulsion system is covered next in some detail. An overview for the low speed system is given; then its development is discussed (starting with initial layout and leading to more detailed analyses performed and results). The low speed system portion is wrapped up with lessons learned and summary. Finally, an overall summary and lessons learned so far for the JSS are given as well as work planned to complete the study.

Snyder, Christopher A.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Insights and Observations from Operating a Geostationary Laser Communication Relay Mission: Operational Lessons from NASA’s Laser Communications Relay Demonstration (LCRD) and Associated Optical Ground Stations (OGSs)

The NASA Laser Communications Relay Demonstration (LCRD) has operated on orbit for the last two years. The LCRD Mission consists of a geostationary payload and two optical ground stations. This technology demonstration mission is NASA’s first two-way, end-to-end optical communications relay. LCRD has performed an extensive experiment campaign to analyze laser communication performance for extended operations. This paper discusses various lessons learned while operating the optical relay mission from early commissioning through two years of operation. Before launch, engineers and operators performed analyses to generate operational procedures based on expected LCRD performance. However, only operation on orbit can supply actual performance data. Additional topics covered in this paper include pre-launch and commissioning testing, ephemeris generation and cadence, environmental configurations, and accommodation concerns. The addition of Integrated Laser Communications Relay Demonstration Low Earth Orbit User Modem and Amplifier Terminal (ILLUMA-T) to the optical network supplemented the LCRD team’s operational experiences and enabled them to garner new lessons learned. The authors of this paper include day-to-day flight leads who consulted with on-console operators, engineers, and subject matter experts analyzing data and experiment results to gather the lessons learned described in this paper. LCRD is a joint project involving NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT LL).

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRS2011

Accident Case Study of Organizational Silence Communication Breakdown: Shuttle Columbia, Mission STS-107

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ESMD Risk and Knowledge Management team. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of key lessons learned derived from the official Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document. This report is accompanied by a video that will be sent at request

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRS2017

Practical Applications of Cables and Ropes in the ISS Countermeasures System

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses exercise countermeasures on the International Space Station (ISS) to maintain crew health and combat the negative effects of long-duration spaceflight on the human body. Most ISS exercise countermeasures system (CMS) equipment rely heavily on the use of textile and wire ropes to transmit resistive loads and provide stability in a microgravity environment. For a variety of reasons, including challenges in simulating microgravity environments for testing and limits on time available for life cycle testing, the textiles and wire ropes have contributed significantly to on-orbit planned and unplanned maintenance time. As a result, continued ground testing and on-orbit experience since the first expedition on the ISS in 2000 provide valuable data and lessons learned in materials selection, applications, and design techniques to increase service life of these ropes. This paper will present a review of the development and failure history of textile and wire ropes for four exercise countermeasure systems-the Treadmill with Vibration Isolation and Stabilization (TVIS) System, Cycle Ergometer with Vibration Isolation and Stabilization (CEVIS) System, Interim Resistive Exercise Device (IRED), and the Advanced Resistive Exercise Device (ARED)-to identify lessons learned in order to improve future systems. These lessons learned, paired with thorough testing on the ground, offer a forward path towards reduced maintenance time and up-mass for future space missions.

Svetlik, Randall G.↗

NASA NTRS2023

The Trash Compaction Processing System (TCPS) Technology Demonstrations Science Objectives and Requirement Definitions

Throughout the Next STEP Phase A and Phase B, the Trash Compaction Processing System (TCPS) is being developed for a technology demonstration (TD) on the International Space Station (ISS) in 2025. For Phase A, two contractors built proof-of-concept hardware. One contractor was chosen to build the TD hardware for Phase B. Both Phase A lessons learned and risk reduction activities at Ames Research Center (ARC) were used to write the TD science objectives, scope, and requirements. The work at ARC aims to retire technical risks and provide design data to TCPS developers and the ISS system integrators. This paper will summarize the lessons learned from the proof-of-concept hardware, the risk reduction activities, and how these lessons learned form the basis of the TD requirement matrix.

TCPS↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Final Count Down: A Review of Three Decades of Flight Controller Training Methods for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex; therefore, the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. An overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are trained and certified, reveals that while the training methodology for developing flight controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. Changes in methodology and tools have been driven by many factors, including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. Flight controllers share their experiences in training and operating the space shuttle. The primary training method throughout the program has been mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly train like you fly. A review of lessons learned from flight controller training suggests how they could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors, including missions to the moon or to Mars. The lessons learned from operating the space shuttle for over thirty years will help the space industry build the next human transport space vehicle.

Dittermore, Gary↗

NASA NTRS1988

Artificial intelligence costs, benefits, risks for selected spacecraft ground system automation scenarios

In response to a number of high-level strategy studies in the early 1980s, expert systems and artificial intelligence (AI/ES) efforts for spacecraft ground systems have proliferated in the past several years primarily as individual small to medium scale applications. It is useful to stop and assess the impact of this technology in view of lessons learned to date, and hopefully, to determine if the overall strategies of some of the earlier studies both are being followed and still seem relevant. To achieve that end four idealized ground system automation scenarios and their attendant AI architecture are postulated and benefits, risks, and lessons learned are examined and compared. These architectures encompass: (1) no AI (baseline), (2) standalone expert systems, (3) standardized, reusable knowledge base management systems (KBMS), and (4) a futuristic unattended automation scenario. The resulting artificial intelligence lessons learned, benefits, and risks for spacecraft ground system automation scenarios are described.

Truszkowski, Walter F.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Artificial intelligence costs, benefits, and risks for selected spacecraft ground system automation scenarios

In response to a number of high-level strategy studies in the early 1980s, expert systems and artificial intelligence (AI/ES) efforts for spacecraft ground systems have proliferated in the past several years primarily as individual small to medium scale applications. It is useful to stop and assess the impact of this technology in view of lessons learned to date, and hopefully, to determine if the overall strategies of some of the earlier studies both are being followed and still seem relevant. To achieve that end four idealized ground system automation scenarios and their attendant AI architecture are postulated and benefits, risks, and lessons learned are examined and compared. These architectures encompass: (1) no AI (baseline); (2) standalone expert systems; (3) standardized, reusable knowledge base management systems (KBMS); and (4) a futuristic unattended automation scenario. The resulting artificial intelligence lessons learned, benefits, and risks for spacecraft ground system automation scenarios are described.

Truszkowski, Walter F.↗

NASA NTRS2022

Tri-Agency Reliability Engineering Guidance: Post Mission Disposal and Extension Assessment

The Trilateral partners — the European Space Agency (ESA), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the United States Government (USG) in their execution of safe and successful missions, have a long-standing history of sustaining the shared space environment of operational Earth-Moon orbits with their global space-stewardship, or spacekeeping, of these areas. This has driven missions to limit the generation of new and long-lived debris, control debris releases, minimize accidental explosions and collisions, and ensure Post-Mission Disposal of space systems, so that the environment remains safe for future operations and explorations. Given the continued need for space systems to support global mandatory infrastructure and commercial enterprise, spacefarers are extending beyond the Trilateral partners, more and smaller satellites are being deployed, and current assets are being utilized much longer than expected. This is making space more congested than ever; therefore, the Trilateral partners are evaluating potential future debris mitigation strategies, evolving technology, developing on-orbit servicing capabilities, and advancing their abilities to assess disposal and mission extension plans. They are also sharing their lessons learned and identifying opportunities for future state-of-the-art advancements for current and future space enterprises. Sustaining the space environment cannot be ensured by any one agency or country. Thus, the Trilateral authors have shared their lessons learned, insights, and guidance, herein, on disposal and mission extension assessment strategies with the gratitude of each agency. As such, this document is not prescriptive, but was formulated to enhance value-and-risk-balanced operational decision-making, support policy refinement, and guide spacefaring partners beyond these agencies to assess their activities in space with safety and a global space-stewardship, or spacekeeping, in mind. This includes not only the disposal and mission extension assessment addressed herein, but also preserving space history, ensuring collaboration/interoperability of technology, supporting fellow operators without interfering, and the utilization of in-situ resources for the common benefit of humankind. It is the intention of the Trilateral partners that this document evolves based on community lessons learned and the introduction of new assessment methodologies. So, all readers are encouraged to share their insights with the authors from their own application of this guidance or other strategies to ensure each mission has a successful, safe, and judicious life and conclusion.

ESA↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew Launch Vehicle Approach Builds on Lessons from Past and Present Missions

The United States Vision for Space Exploration, announced in January 2004, outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives, including retiring the Space Shuttle and replacing it with a new human-rated system suitable for missions to the Moon and Mars. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that the new Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) lofts into space early next decade will initially ferry astronauts to the International Space Station and be capable of carrying crews back to lunar orbit and of supporting missions to Mars orbit. NASA is using its extensive experience gained from past and ongoing launch vehicle programs to maximize the CLV system design approach, with the objective of reducing total lifecycle costs through operational efficiencies. To provide in-depth data for selecting this follow-on launch vehicle, the Exploration Systems Architecture Study was conducted during the summer of 2005, following the confirmation of the new NASA Administrator. A team of aerospace subject matter experts used technical, budget, and schedule objectives to analyze a number of potential launch systems, with a focus on human rating for exploration missions. The results showed that a variant of the Space Shuttle, utilizing the reusable Solid Rocket Booster as the first stage, along with a new upper stage that uses a derivative of the RS-25 Space Shuttle Main Engine to deliver 25 metric tons to low-Earth orbit, was the best choice to reduce the risks associated with fielding a new system in a timely manner. The CLV Project, managed by the Exploration Launch Office located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is leading the design, development, testing, and operation of this new human-rated system. The CLV Project works closely with the Space Shuttle Program to transition hardware, infrastructure, and workforce assets to the new launch system . leveraging a wealth of lessons learned from Shuttle operations. The CL V is being designed to reduce costs through a number of methods, ranging from validating requirements to conducting trades studies against the concept design. Innovations such as automated processing will build on lessons learned from the Shuttle, other launch systems, Department of Defense operations experience, and subscale flight tests such as the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DCXA) vehicle operations that utilized minimal touch labor, automated cryogen ic propellant loading , and an 8-hour turnaround for a cryogenic propulsion system. For the CLV, the results of hazard analyses are contributing to an integrated vehicle health monitoring system that will troubleshoot anomalies and determine which ones can be solved without human intervention. Such advances will help streamline the mission operations process for pilots and ground controllers alike. In fiscal year 2005, NASA invested approximately $4.5 billion of its $16 bill ion budget on the Space Shuttle. The ultimate goal of the CLV Project is to deliver a safe, reliable system designed to minimize lifecycle costs so that NASA's budget can be invested in missions of scientific discovery. Lessons learned from developing the CLV will be applied to the growth path for future systems, including a heavy lift launch vehicle.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗

NASA NTRS2010

A Modular Instrumentation System for NASA's Habitat Demonstration Unit

NASA's human spaceflight program is focused on developing technologies to expand the reaches of human exploration and science activities beyond low earth orbit. A critical aspect of living in space or on planetary surfaces is habitation, which provides a safe and comfortable space in which humans can live and work. NASA is seeking out the best option for habitation by exploring several different concepts through the Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) project. The purpose of this HDU is to develop a fully autonomous habitation system that enables human exploration of space. One critical feature of the HDU project that helps to accomplish its mission of autonomy is the instrumentation system that monitors key subsystems operating within a Habitat configuration. The following paper will discuss previous instrumentation systems used in analog habitat concepts and how the current instrumentation system being implemented on the HDU1-PEM, or pressurized excursion module, is building upon the lessons learned of those previous systems. Additionally, this paper will discuss the benefits and the limitations of implementing a wireless sensor network (WSN) as the basis for data transport in the instrumentation system. Finally, this paper will address the experiences and lessons learned with integration, testing prior to deployment, and field testing at the JSC rock yard. NASA is developing the HDU1-PEM as a step towards a fully autonomous habitation system that enables human exploration of space. To accomplish this purpose, the HDU project is focusing on development, integration, testing, and evaluation of habitation systems. The HDU will be used as a technology pull, testbed, and integration environment in which to advance NASA's understanding of alternative mission architectures, requirements, and operations concepts definition and validation. This project is a multi-year effort. In 2010, the HDU1-PEM will be in a pressurized excursion module configuration, and in 2011 the module will be reconfigured for a pressurized core module configuration. Each year the HDU configurations will undergo testing at NASA's Desert Research and Technology Studies (D-RaTS) in Arizona [1]. As part of this project, a modular instrumentation system is developed to meet the monitoring needs of the HDU subsystems and to integrate with the current command and data handling infrastructure that has been developed for the project. The main objective of this study is to provide for the monitoring needs of the HDU. The requirements necessary to meet this objective are developed by working with the subsystem managers of the HDU to understand their monitoring needs. Additionally, the instrumentation system design leverages knowledge and lessons learned from previous studies, such as the inflatable habitat health monitoring system that was deployed in Antarctica [2], the integrated health monitoring system developed for NASA's Microhab [3], and the JSC Lunar Habitat Wireless Testbed to demonstrate a "standardsbased" approach to a wireless instrumentation system [4]. The HDU also requires flexibility in reconfiguration options, and it is necessary to demonstrate and evaluate a modular approach to an instrumentation system. Thus, the instrumentation system is designed in two parts: the primary system employs a standard WSN configuration, and the secondary system employs a wired USB hub. The WSN design provides for reconfiguration or replacement of sensors due to malfunctions or upgrades by using a wireless node that accepts ten instrument inputs and wirelessly transmits the data to the command and data handling system. The USB hub is necessary for those instruments that operate using a wired USB connection, although the design attempts to limit the amount of sensors that need to be wired connections.

Rojdev, Kristina↗

NASA NTRS2024

X-Plane Knowledge Capture Workshop Summary Report

The history of experimental aircraft research and development at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) provides a large body of work for current and future team members to learn from and apply. NASA values the knowledge it gains from all the research it performs and desires to have that knowledge grow with each new project, incrementally adding to the collective knowledge base. To support this knowledge growth and sharing, in May 2019, NASA convened over 60 engineers; researchers; and other personnel (internal and external to NASA) for the X-plane1 Knowledge Capture Workshop to discuss their over 50-years’ worth of experiences in developing, operating, and managing experimental aircraft. Over the course of a two-day workshop, the group not only focused, primarily, on current X-plane development but also discussed a wide range of topics about experimental aircraft and flight research. In addition to the discussions, senior NASA aeronautics leaders shared their personal lessons learned with the workshop audience. Broadly, these discussions centered around the topics of organizational and cultural practices, the project lifecycle, flight, and risk and safety. Many of the observations offered by participants are applicable to other NASA team-based projects, demonstrating the value in sharing lessons learned and best practices across projects regardless of their research focus. To share the most valuable lessons learned as broadly as possible, a summary of these discussions has been compiled into the following report. These discussions are mostly included in their entirety, with some light editing for clarity and privacy. NASA is sharing this knowledge internally and making it available to the public in hopes that others can learn from the experimental aircraft challenges and successes at NASA. Note: this document represents the perspectives, experiences, and opinions of others but does not necessarily represent the official view of NASA.

Steven R Hirshorn↗

NASA NTRS2011

Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) Pressurized Excursion Module (PEM) Systems Integration Strategy

The Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) project team constructed an analog prototype lunar surface laboratory called the Pressurized Excursion Module (PEM). The prototype unit subsystems were integrated in a short amount of time, utilizing a rapid prototyping approach that brought together over 20 habitation-related technologies from a variety of NASA centers. This paper describes the system integration strategies and lessons learned, that allowed the PEM to be brought from paper design to working field prototype using a multi-center team. The system integration process was based on a rapid prototyping approach. Tailored design review and test and integration processes facilitated that approach. The use of collaboration tools including electronic tools as well as documentation enabled a geographically distributed team take a paper concept to an operational prototype in approximately one year. One of the major tools used in the integration strategy was a coordinated effort to accurately model all the subsystems using computer aided design (CAD), so conflicts were identified before physical components came together. A deliberate effort was made following the deployment of the HDU PEM for field operations to collect lessons learned to facilitate process improvement and inform the design of future flight or analog versions of habitat systems. Significant items within those lessons learned were limitations with the CAD integration approach and the impact of shell design on flexibility of placing systems within the HDU shell.

Gill, Tracy↗

NASA NTRS2010

Orion Abort Flight Test

The purpose of NASA's Constellation project is to create the new generation of spacecraft for human flight to the International Space Station in low-earth orbit, the lunar surface, as well as for use in future deep-space exploration. One portion of the Constellation program was the development of the Orion crew exploration vehicle (CEV) to be used in spaceflight. The Orion spacecraft consists of a crew module, service module, space adapter and launch abort system. The crew module was designed to hold as many as six crew members. The Orion crew exploration vehicle is similar in design to the Apollo space capsules, although larger and more massive. The Flight Test Office is the responsible flight test organization for the launch abort system on the Orion crew exploration vehicle. The Flight Test Office originally proposed six tests that would demonstrate the use of the launch abort system. These flight tests were to be performed at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and were similar in nature to the Apollo Little Joe II tests performed in the 1960s. The first flight test of the launch abort system was a pad abort (PA-1), that took place on 6 May 2010 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. Primary flight test objectives were to demonstrate the capability of the launch abort system to propel the crew module a safe distance away from a launch vehicle during a pad abort, to demonstrate the stability and control characteristics of the vehicle, and to determine the performance of the motors contained within the launch abort system. The focus of the PA-1 flight test was engineering development and data acquisition, not certification. In this presentation, a high level overview of the PA-1 vehicle is given, along with an overview of the Mobile Operations Facility and information on the White Sands tracking sites for radar & optics. Several lessons learned are presented, including detailed information on the lessons learned in the development of wind placards for flight. PA-1 flight data is shown, as well as a comparison of PA-1 flight data to nonlinear simulation Monte Carlo data.

Hayes, Peggy Sue↗

NASA NTRS2015

The OSIRIS-REx Asteroid Sample Return Mission Operations Design

OSIRIS-REx is an acronym that captures the scientific objectives: Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, and Security-Regolith Explorer. OSIRIS-REx will thoroughly characterize near-Earth asteroid Bennu (Previously known as 1019551999 RQ36). The OSIRIS-REx Asteroid Sample Return Mission delivers its science using five instruments and radio science along with the Touch-And-Go Sample Acquisition Mechanism (TAGSAM). All of the instruments and data analysis techniques have direct heritage from flown planetary missions. The OSIRIS-REx mission employs a methodical, phased approach to ensure success in meeting the mission's science requirements. OSIRIS-REx launches in September 2016, with a backup launch period occurring one year later. Sampling occurs in 2019. The departure burn from Bennu occurs in March 2021. On September 24, 2023, the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) lands at the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR). Stardust heritage procedures are followed to transport the SRC to Johnson Space Center, where the samples are removed and delivered to the OSIRIS-REx curation facility. After a six-month preliminary examination period the mission will produce a catalog of the returned sample, allowing the worldwide community to request samples for detailed analysis. Traveling and returning a sample from an Asteroid that has not been explored before requires unique operations consideration. The Design Reference Mission (DRM) ties together spacecraft, instrument and operations scenarios. Asteroid Touch and Go (TAG) has various options varying from ground only to fully automated (natural feature tracking). Spacecraft constraints such as thermo and high gain antenna pointing impact the timeline. The mission is sensitive to navigation errors, so a late command update has been implemented. The project implemented lessons learned from other "small body" missions. The key lesson learned was 'expect the unexpected' and implement planning tools early in the lifecycle. This paper summarizes the ground and spacecraft design as presented at OSIRIS-REx Critical Design Review(CDR) held April 2014.

mission operations↗

NASA NTRS2005

ESMD Risk Management Workshop: Systems Engineering and Integration Risks

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the Systems Engineering Team. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of key lessons learned derived from the SE RFP Development process. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

Systems Engineering↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automated Software for Manned Spacecraft - Bridging the Gap from Sci Fi to Reality

With a voice command or a few taps on the console, the spacecraft pivots on a dime at high velocity and gently docks to an orbiting space platform. This is the image most people have of the complex software computations and integrated hardware performance necessary for a spacecraft to successfully perform an automated launch, rendezvous, and docking. Today’s reality is that while computer operations are advancing rapidly, science fiction over-simplifies and over-sells current capabilities. This paper discusses the integration of spacecraft computer automation into the operation of one of the United States’ new Commercial Crew vehicles - the Boeing CST-100 Starliner. Lessons learned by the Boeing Mission Operations team, a private-public partnership with NASA, from conceptual design through real-time operation of the first test flight will be discussed. Focus will center on how operations has learned to use the automated software to their advantage while also knowing how to adjust the automation in response to spacecraft or mission anomalies. One goal of advanced spacecraft automation is the ability to reduce both the crew workload and the ground control footprint while at the same time increasing spacecraft and mission flexibility. Historically, crewed spacecraft required a large number of operators on the ground to use a plethora of tools to compute nominal and contingency mission trajectories. Moving those sophisticated software tools to being onboard the vehicle can reduce the need for such complex ground support. Given that today’s spacecraft software is not yet as capable or as flexible in all circumstances as the computers depicted in movies, there is usually a trade-off between software automation cost and the flexibility of that software resulting in a trade-off between what is performed on the spacecraft and what is left to onboard crew or ground control. For missions that go beyond the Moon, software that autonomously controls nearly every aspect of a crewed mission will become a necessity given the long time delays between the spacecraft and Earth’s ground control teams. The lessons learned by Boeing and its Mission Operations team, through the design and implementation of Starliner’s hardware and software automation, will be able to inform future public and private spacecraft design. As the technologies and capabilities evolve, incorporating lessons learned in successful low Earth orbit commercial crew vehicle missions, spacecraft designs will continue to improve and be able to better enable safe execution of human missions to the Moon and beyond.

Robert C Dempsey↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automated Software for Manned Spacecraft - Bridging the Gap from Sci Fi to Reality

Robert C. Dempsey↗