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At least 1,063 records · Page 59

Developing Deep Learning Models for System Remaining Useful Life Predictions: Application to Aircraft Engines

Prognostics and health management (PHM) is an important part of ensuring reliable operations of complex safety- critical systems. System-level remaining useful life (RUL) estimation is a much more complex problem than making estimations at the component level, and system-level RUL methodologies remain sparse in the literature. Model-based approaches have traditionally worked in the past for components such as capacitors, MOSFETs, batteries, or hard-drives (to name a few examples), but developing high fidelity dynamics models of cyber physical systems that can be used to study the effects of multiple degrading components in the system remains a challenging task. Some initial work on model-based System RUL predictions was demonstrated in Khorasgani, et al [1], but, to generalize the system-level prognostics problem, we have to resort to pure data driven and hybrid approaches. In this work, we propose an end-to-end data- driven framework for developing deep learning models to predict remaining useful life of cyber physical systems operating under unknown faulty conditions. The raw data is organized with a data schema that improves the model development process and down stream data analysis tasks. Due to the unknown faulty conditions, the raw sensor data is transformed into signals that expose the underlying degradation processes, which are then used for model development. Bayesian Optimization is used to tune the model parameters prior to training and validation. We show that this approach results in accurate predictions within 3 cycles to end of life (EOL). We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by applying it to the N-CMAPSS turbofan engine dataset recently released by NASA, which includes high fidelity degradation modeling, real world operating conditions, and a large set of fault operating modes.

Prognostics↗

Gateway Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

Cybersecurity threats are a constant present-day reality for any type of business -- Space exploration is not excluded from these threats either. The Gateway Program is one of NASA’s latest initiatives that extend space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Gateway allows for NASA to prove technologies and mature systems necessary to live and work on another celestial body before embarking on multi-year missions to Mars. The Gateway is a small, human-tended space station in orbit around the Moon. With the increased autonomy, distance and criticality of systems, cybersecurity is a critical discipline that touches and integrates with most if not all subsystems of the Gateway. Building a gateway to the lunar orbit is no simple task. In this presentation, we outline an approach that the Gateway team adopted in creating a cyber safe and robust vehicle to support operations and assure protection of the critical functions. Gateway Program is required to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines to adhere to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). NIST provides a framework for managing and controlling cybersecurity risks by defining cybersecurity controls and methodologies for implementation. The NIST framework is based upon the system, data within the system, integrations with external systems, and risk assessments to determine impacts for each of those systems. The goals and objectives are to identify appropriate security controls that fulfil and map to the NIST 800-53 framework. The implementation process involves developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. NIST Security controls are interpreted and defined within the Gateway vehicle requirements subsystems specifications. This paper details the approach, implementation, and challenges faced during the development and design phases to address cyber threats during the Gateway vehicle operations.

Cybersecurity↗

Development of a Computational Framework for the Design of Resilient Space Structures

Cyber-physical testing provides a unique platform to enable the design of resilient space structures. This hybrid approach requires the development of a structural model that accounts for various hazards (e.g., micrometeorite and debris impact) and interacts with physical tests and other sub-system models (e.g., thermal) of the space habitat. A two-dimensional finite element analysis code was developed in MATLAB to facilitate the evaluation of potential designs under operating and unexpected loads and prepare the computational framework for eventually performing cyber-physical testing. The code’s efficiency was enhanced by using an object-oriented programming approach that reduced data transfer between functions. In this study, the code is implemented to predict the response of a dome-style structure made of regolith concrete to impact loading and identify the force magnitude that will cause the tensile strength to be exceeded in domes with different thicknesses.

Tensile strength↗

Quantifying Cybersecurity Risk for NASA Missions

An end-to-end cyber risk assessment process is presented that is based on the combination of guidelines from the National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), the standard 5x5 risk matrix, and quantitative methods for generating loss exceedance curves. The NIST guidelines provide a framework for cyber risk assessment, and the standard 5x5 matrix is widely used across the industry for the representation of risk across multiple disciplines. Loss exceedance curves are a means of quantitatively assessing the loss that occurs due to a given risk profile. Combining these different techniques enables us to follow the guidelines, adhere to standard 5x5 risk management practices and develop quantitative metrics simultaneously. Our quantification process is based on the consideration of the NASA and JPL Cost Risk assessment modeling techniques as we define the cost associated with the cybersecurity risk profile of a mission as a function of the mission cost.

Miller, Robert L.↗

Differential Equation Approximation Using Gradient-Boosted Quantile Regression

The operation of cyber-physical-human (CPH) systems is subject to various epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. Overall trustworthiness of CPH systems relies on the trustworthiness of its components and their interactions. It is important that computational models comprising the cyber component of CPH provide predictions accompanied by a measure of confidence in model outcomes. Uncertainty quantification (UQ) and propagation are especially important in safety critical CPH systems. Gradient-boosted trees is a modeling approach capable both of learning the dynamics of a system and performing UQ. In this paper, we devise a method for using gradient boosting to learn the dynamics of a second order differential equation and estimate uncertainty at the same time. We do this by creating a custom loss function that trains the model to approximate the second derivative of a noisy time series, and to penalize based on a parameter that corresponds to the desired quantile. The resulting gradient boosting model can simulate stochastic trajectories of the system given a single starting point, that is, it can estimate both the expected trajectory and its uncertainty. We show that the uncertainty estimation is well calibrated and that the model can learn the dynamics even in the presence of noise. We demonstrate the approach on a simple cartpole system.

Autonomous systems↗

Recommended Functionalities for Improving Cybersecurity of Distributed Energy Resources: Preprint

The legacy electric grid is transitioning into a 'present' modern grid due to increasing penetration of intermittent renewable generation at the distribution side, also known as distributed energy resources (DERs). Monitoring and control of such DERs requires extensive data-exchange and bidirectional communication networks. This bidirectional communication paves the way to cyber vulnerabilities and risks for new kinds of cyber-attacks that may have destructive impacts on power system operations. Since IEEE Std. 1547-2018 does not discuss cybersecurity measures for DERs, cybersecurity controls should be developed for securing DER systems at all three levels: device level, communications level, and applications level. This paper discusses the current industry's best practices related to DER cybersecurity and proposes recommended functionalities for improving the cybersecurity posture of DERs. These practical recommended functionalities have been discussed and verified with the industry through a DER cybersecurity working group and are meant to improve the device level security of DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Hazard Contribution Modes of Machine Learning Components

Amongst the essential steps to be taken towards developing and deploying safe systems with embedded learning-enabled components (LECs)—i.e., software components that use machine learning (ML)—are to analyze and understand the contribution of the constituent LECs to safety, and to assure that those contributions have been appropriately managed. This paper addresses both steps by, first, introducing the otion of hazard contribution modes (HCMs)—a categorization of the ways in which the ML elements of LECs can contribute to hazardous system states; and, second, describing how argumentation patterns can capture the reasoning that can be used to assure HCM mitigation. Our framework is generic in the sense that the categories of HCMs developed i) can admit different learning schemes, i.e., supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning, and ii) are not dependent on the type of system in which the LECs are embedded, i.e., both cyber and cyber-physical systems. One of the goals of this work is to serve a starting point for systematizing LEC safety analysis towards eventually automating it in a tool.

Smith, Colin↗

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 1 of 2 – Using a Cloud Solution to Compress the Timely Detection Model

The design and implementation of new security technologies must account for numerous and complex operational challenges. For example, traditionally isolated systems must now survive amid the proliferation of network connectivity and endure the dynamic environments created by organizations tolerating bring-your-own-device policies. When evaluating the cyber, physical, or cyber-physical security of an asset, a common practice in the security industry is to apply the Timely Detection Model (TDM)—a versatile concept that relates the security functions of detection, delay, and response to the progression of an oppositional force’s attack timeline. If implemented correctly, security enhancements can compress the TDM to offer efficiencies to the stakeholders responsible for adjudicating threat scenarios. The efficiencies gained by the response force allow for more effective protection strategies to be realized. One such enhancement, deployed within the radiological security domain—the Sentry-Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS)—is a stand-alone security system that detects, assesses, and communicates priority alarms as a means of thwarting internal and external threats. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform—an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS—is being developed to facilitate more efficient alarm adjudication by site stakeholders and, if necessary, a faster response by law enforcement. This Cloud-hosted platform receives protected information from deployed Sentry-RMS units and relays it to stakeholders that have vested interests in maintaining an elevated level of situational awareness. Operationally, this enables real-time delivery of high-priority alarm and video imagery directly to an identified response stakeholder, such as local law enforcement or site management, via natively developed mobile applications or full platform integration. The Sentry-SECURE platform, as implemented by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Radiological Security, is an example of an innovative security technology that compresses the TDM by (1) enabling a more efficient time to target and (2) better informing a response force’s predetermined tactics, techniques, and procedures. This paper explores the platform’s operational roles, highlights its principal functions, and presents a use case that demonstrates how the platform provides enhanced situational awareness when adjudicating priority alarms.

Sentry-RMS, Timely Detection Model, Sentry-SECURE↗

Flexible and Adaptive Malware Identification Using Techniques from Biology

The holy grail in cyber analytics is to find new ways to understand the information we already have access to. One way to do that is to characterize the data into reasonable sizes and then leverage any known information to generate new insights. Biologists have been using a similar process for decades. This paper introduces the MLSTONES tool set that was developed by leveraging biology and bioinformatics, high performance computing, and statistical algorithms applied to cyber data and specifically to malware. Furthermore, the paper discusses the tool suite, its applications, and how it compares or can work with other related tools.

Peterson, Elena S.↗

Multi-layered Resilient Microgrid Networks

Distribution grid resilience, especially when the grid is under high penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER), e.g. PV and energy storage, is essential to ensure the quality of electric power services. The resiliency aspect is particularly important for critical loads that typically include hospitals, police/fire stations, and national security facilities. Networks of multiple interconnected reconfigurable microgrids help to increase renewable energy penetration and may be used as basic building blocks for implementing future resilient power grids. However, this integration requires additional layers of communications, both horizontal and vertical, which may substantially increase the potential cyber attack surfaces as well as escalate risks for wide-spread malfunctions of automation systems. The Mulit-layered Resilient Microgrid Networks project is an industry-academic collaboration between ABB, Duke Energy and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) that has developed and demonstrated a cyber-physical resilient control and communication architecture for deployment of multiple microgrid networks, as well as retrofitting the existing distribution grids by increasing DER penetration levels.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Advanced Reactor Fragility Considerations

This presentation describes advanced reactor concepts at a high level and discusses them with respect to their implications on failure modes, criticality safety, and proliferation. The presentation is meant to give cyber security specialists with no nuclear background a high level overview of future technologies and how they may be impacted by cyber security concerns. The conference will be held on Wednesday, July 21st so the presentation needs to be approved by the morning on July 20th.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cybersecurity for Fast Charging EV Infrastructure

The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into electric grid operations can potentially leave the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks from both legacy and new equipment and protocols, including extreme fast-charging infrastructure. This paper introduces a co-simulation platform to perform cyber vulnerability analysis of EV charging infrastructure and its dependencies on communications and control systems. Grid impact scenarios through linkages to power system simulation tools such as OpenDSS and vehicle infrastructure-specific attack paths are discussed. An adaptive platform that assists with predicting and solving evolving cybersecurity challenges is demonstrated with a cyber-energy emulation that accelerates the analysis of cyberattacks and system behavior.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,POWER TRANSMISSION AND↗

Cybersecurity Standards for Photovoltaic Operations

Solar energy plays an important role in securing a more resilient, cyber-secure electrical grid in Pennsylvania. Solar's ability to be widely "distributed" on residential and large roofs, marginal lands, and many other locations across Pennsylvania - as opposed to being centralized - offers a strong option for addressing the myriad of potential disruptions that can occur to the grid's infrastructure. And when combined with energy storage, local energy needs can be met immediately without having to wait on the delivery of an off-site fuel source. As more and more distributed solar electricity generation is brought online, researchers, technology developers, solar developers and grid operators are paying close attention to the potential for solar to enhance grid cybersecurity. Although nobody may know when, where, or how the next cyberattack will take place, there are security measures, technical solutions, and management practices that are being implemented across the industry to protect against network control issues and grid operations. Everyone participating in the solar value chain stands to gain from a coordinated, iterative approach to protect against cyber vulnerabilities and build deeper resilience into the architecture of our grid.

cybersecurity↗

Cyberattack Scenarios for the Rancor Microworld Simulator

The digitization of new generation nuclear power plants increases the risk of cyber-physical attacks. Hence, the collection of data from operators that respond to realistic cyberattacks can provide a paramount insight on the correlation of cyber evidence and physical alerts. The simplicity and configurability of the Rancor Microworld Simulator, enables the training of non-expert operators in a PWR environment, and the extensive and tailored collection of data. Therefore, we develop the necessary tools and infrastructure in Rancor that allow such attacks to take place. Additionally, we perform these attacks to examine the attention and situation awareness of operators during malicious infiltrations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Generating SBoMs Utilizing Structured Threat Information Expression JSON bundles

With cyber-attacks on the rise, information is one of the first lines of defense. Now more than ever, security experts and developers need efficient ways to know if their software may be outdated or vulnerable to emerging threats. By generating a Software Bill of Material based on STIX2/JSON bundles, security experts and developers can ensure that they know where to find what can go wrong with their systems before the hackers do. As part of the Infrastructure Expression project, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is currently working on ways that can aid in the development of efficient SBOMs using Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX). Doing so can provide an efficient first line of defense for detection and monitoring that can be easily used by cyber personnel from beginners to highly skilled experts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

CyTRICS Impact-Based Prioritization Process

Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems™ (CyTRICS™) is the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) program for cybersecurity vulnerability testing, digital subcomponent enumeration, and forensic assessment. CyTRICS leverages best-in-class test facilities and analytic capabilities at six DOE National Laboratories and strategic partnerships with key stakeholders including technology developers, manufacturers, asset owners and operators, and interagency partners. During the program’s development, CyTRICS established a unique methodology for prioritizing digital components within operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) in the Energy Sector Industrial Base (ESIB) for cyber vulnerability testing. The CyTRICS prioritization process leverages multiple characteristics of systems, components, and their contextual deployment to calculate a quantification of individual digital components for CyTRICS testing. The initial version of the CyTRICS prioritization process was premised largely upon the impact which could result to an energy sector industrial control system if the digital component under testing was compromised, either through malicious means, faulty engineering, or other modes. CyTRICS has termed this process the “CyTRICS Impact-based Prioritization Process.” This paper describes the factors identified for use in the Impact-based Prioritization process and identifies the rationale for inclusion. During development, three National Laboratories piloted this prioritization process and generated prioritization scores for seven systems. Following the piloting of the process, laboratory subject matter experts (SME) validated that the numerical scores generated by the prioritization process were consistent with their knowledge of the impact that may occur should any of these systems be disrupted. The following document explains how to perform the prioritization process to generate prioritization scores for energy sector systems. After outlining assumptions required to conduct the process, it describes how to identify and elicit data which can be leveraged to evaluate a system and assign numerical values for each factor. The prioritization process uses different weights on different factors; rationale for each weight is included within the paper. Additionally, the paper includes some recommendations for future enhancements to prioritization, including lessons learned from developing and piloting the process. Finally, a comprehensive appendix includes example documents to be leveraged by those looking to execute the prioritization process.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Micro Baselines for Operational Technology Environments

Critical infrastructure stakeholders need to baseline their networks to understand expected communications. Top-down approaches to baselining rely on observables that are generally available but lack properties upon which traditional statistical tools depend. We propose to construct micro-baselines: signatures within operational networks based on observables associated with specific events. Such observables are informed by precursor analysis reports of historical cyber attacks on operational environments developed by Cybersecurity for Operational Technology Environments (CyOTE). Baseline measurements depend upon context beyond the cyber domain. An energy plant's baseline running in the summer may statistically differ from a similar facility in a colder region. Domain knowledge must be integrated to apply general micro-baselining algorithms to a facility-specific context. Therefore, we propose to explore the feasibility of transferring micro baselining algorithms across different facilities. Facilities that implement the same processes in different geographic locations will be compared relative to observable measurements used in micro-baselining for comparable events. One evaluation approach would condition or augment dynamic observables measured within a facility network testbed with additional observables derived from geographic context or infrastructure dependencies such as those provided by the All-Hazards Analysis tool.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Disrupting EV Charging Sessions and Gaining Remote Code Execution with DoS, MITM, and Code Injection Exploits using OCPP 1.6

Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 1.6 is widely used in the electric vehicle (EV) charging industry to communicate between Charging System Management Services (CSMSs) and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). Unlike OCPP 2.0.1, OCPP 1.6 uses unencrypted websocket communications to exchange information between EVSE devices and an onpremise or cloud-based CSMS. In this work, we demonstrate two machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on OCPP sessions to terminate charging sessions and gain root access to the EVSE equipment via remote code execution (RCE). Second, we demonstrate a malicious firmware update with a code injection payload to compromise an EVSE. Lastly, we demonstrate two methods to prevent availability of the EVSE or CSMS. One of these, originally reported by SaiFlow, prevents traffic to legitimate EVSE equipment using a DoS-like attack on CSMSs by repeatedly connecting and authenticating several CPs with the same identities as the legitimate CP. These vulnerabilities were demonstrated with proof-of-concept exploits in a virtualized Cyber Range at Wright State University and/or with a 350 kW Direct Current Fast Charger (DCFC) at Idaho National Laboratory. The team found that OCPP 1.6 could be protected from these attacks by adding secure shell (SSH) tunnels to the protocol, if upgrading to OCPP 2.0.1 was not an option. Index Terms—Electric vehicle charging, cybersecurity, OCPP, cyberattack, cyber-resilience. INSPEC Accession Number: 23981565

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗