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Calendar Year 2016 Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report.

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) is a government-owned/contractoroperated laboratory. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., manages and operates SNL/NM for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. Two types of groundwater surveillance monitoring are conducted at SNL/NM: (1) on a site-wide basis as part of the SNL/NM Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program’s Groundwater Monitoring Program (GMP) Groundwater Surveillance Task and (2) on a site-specific groundwater monitoring at LTS/Environmental Restoration (ER) Operations sites with ongoing groundwater investigations. This Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report summarizes data collected during groundwater monitoring events conducted at GMP locations and at the following SNL/NM sites through December 31, 2016: Burn Site Groundwater Area of Concern (AOC); Chemical Waste Landfill; Mixed Waste Landfill; Technical Area-V Groundwater AOC; and the Tijeras Arroyo Groundwater AOC. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) and DOE Order 436.1, Departmental Sustainability, and DOE Order 231.1B, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report Calendar Year 2015

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) is a government-owned/contractor-operated laboratory. Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, manages and operates SNL/NM for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. Sandia conducts two types of groundwater surveillance monitoring at SNL/NM: (1) on a site-wide basis as part of the SNL/NM Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program's Groundwater Monitoring Program (GMP) Groundwater Surveillance Task and (2) as site-specific groundwater monitoring at LTS/Environmental Restoration (ER) Operations sites with ongoing groundwater investigations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report (Calendar Year 2014)

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) is a government-owned/contractor-operated laboratory. Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, manages and operates SNL/NM for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. Sandia conducts two types of groundwater surveillance monitoring at SNL/NM: (1) on a site-wide basis as part of the SNL/NM Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program’s Groundwater Monitoring Program (GMP) Groundwater Surveillance Task and (2) as site-specific groundwater monitoring at LTS/Environmental Restoration (ER) Operations sites with ongoing groundwater investigations. This Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report summarizes data collected during groundwater monitoring events conducted at GMP locations and at the following SNL/NM sites through December 31, 2014: Burn Site Groundwater Area of Concern (AOC); Chemical Waste Landfill; Mixed Waste Landfill; Solid Waste Management Units 8/58, 49, 68, 116, 149, and 154; Technical Area-V Groundwater AOC; and the Tijeras Arroyo Groundwater AOC. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) and DOE Order 436.1, Departmental Sustainability , and DOE Order 231.1B, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting .

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Calendar Year 2013 Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) is a government-owned/contractoroperated laboratory. Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, manages and operates SNL/NM for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. Sandia conducts two types of groundwater surveillance monitoring at SNL/NM: (1) on a site-wide basis as part of the SNL/NM Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program’s Groundwater Monitoring Program (GMP) Groundwater Surveillance Task and (2) as site-specific groundwater monitoring at LTS/Environmental Restoration (ER) Operations sites with ongoing groundwater investigations. This Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report documents the results of the groundwater monitoring activities at SNL/NM for Calendar Year (CY) 2013. This report has been prepared to meet the environmental reporting requirements for the CY 2013 Annual Site Environmental Report, providing an annual update of groundwater data to regulators, stakeholders, and outside agencies. In addition, it serves as a valuable tool to inform the public about the groundwater quality at SNL/NM. This report includes both water quality sampling results and water level measurements.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Site Environmental Report for 2015 Sandia National Laboratories, California

Sandia National Laboratories, California (SNL/CA) is a government-owned/contractor-operated laboratory. Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, manages and operates the laboratory for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. This Site Environmental Report for 2015 was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1B, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting (DOE 2012b). The report provides a summary of environmental monitoring information and compliance activities that occurred at SNL/CA during calendar year 2015, unless noted otherwise. General site and environmental program information is also included.

Larsen, Barbara L.↗

Expedited Walkdowns and Preparation of Cost Estimates for Decontamination and Demolition of Excess Facilities - 20335

Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) is the prime contractor responsible for managing and operating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The mission of the LLNL is to strengthen security of the United States through development and application of world-class science and technology to enhance the nation's defense, reduce the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and respond with vision, quality, integrity, and technical excellence to scientific issues of national importance. To accomplish its mission, LLNL must plan and manage its campus space and facilities to optimize use of its relatively small one-square-mile footprint. LLNL currently has numerous excess facilities that require decontamination and demolition (D and D). The LLNL Legacy Facility Program is responsible for stewardship and risk reduction programs to effectively manage these excess assets at LLNL. The Legacy Facility Program identified 10 excess facilities at LLNL that were candidates for demolition based on risks from further degradation of the facilities, potential exposure to hazardous materials, or need for removal to make way for new program facilities. The buildings range from a structure built in 1943 to serve as a US Navy drill hall during World War II, to a facility that provided neutrons to study material properties for the fusion energy program. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appropriated FY19 funding for the development of Class 3 estimates for these 10 excess facilities that would be used to develop a Program Management Plan for funding consideration. Class 3 estimates are not conceptual, nor overly detailed, but adequate to be used for budget and appropriation purposes. Using existing strategic sourcing agreements, LLNL was able to organize a team of senior subject matter experts (SMEs) with diverse technical backgrounds across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex to complete extensive process knowledge (PK) reviews and walk-downs of each excess facility and to deliver accurate and complete estimates under an expedited schedule (i.e., within eight weeks). To facilitate the expedited schedule, LLNL was fully prepared for the arrival of the JGMS team, which consisted of the following companies: J.G. Management Systems, Inc. (JGMS); Strata-G, LLC; and Michael Baker International. LLNL provided background and PK information on the excess facilities, pictures, supporting historical documentation, and radiological survey history as well as escorted access to the facilities. The JGMS team has previous experience supporting Program Management Plans for excess facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The team mobilized to LLNL and performed the facility walk-downs from January 22-25, 2019. Using a methodical evaluation process, expertise, and experience, the team was able to deliver walk-down draft reports and estimates to LLNL before their February 8, 2019 deadline. LLNL then in turn reviewed, completed the estimates by adding waste management costs and other LLNL costs, and delivered the estimates to NNSA by February 15, 2019. The completed final reports, including draft D and D estimates, were delivered to LLNL before their March 6, 2019 deadline. The work was successfully completed ahead of the expedited schedule required by LLNL, resulting in a commendation from the client. This paper describes how the partnership and collaboration as a fully integrated team comprised of the prime contractor, LLNS, and the JGMS team successfully met the needs of the US government, resulting in the performance of expedited site walk-downs, the development of summary evaluation reports, and the preparation of draft Class 3 estimates and preliminary schedules for the D and D of 10 excess facilities at LLNL. The efforts of the team will enable the D and D of the first excess facility in the 2020-2021 time frame. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Re-designing the PhEDEx Security Model

PhEDEx, the data-placement tool used by the CMS experiment at the LHC, was conceived in a more trusting time. The security model provided a safe environment for site agents and operators, but offerred little more protection than that. Data was not sufficiently protected against loss caused by operator error or software bugs or by deliberate manipulation of the database. Operators were given high levels of access to the database, beyond what was actually needed to accomplish their tasks. This exposed them to the risk of suspicion should an incident occur. Multiple implementations of the security model led to difficulties maintaining code, which can lead to degredation of security over time. In order to meet the simultaneous goals of protecting CMS data, protecting the operators from undue exposure to risk, increasing monitoring capabilities and improving maintainability of the security model, the PhEDEx security model was redesigned and re-implemented. Security was moved from the application layer into the database itself, fine-grained access roles were established, and tools and procedures created to control the evolution of the security model over time. In this paper we describe this work, we describe the deployment of the new security model, and we show how these enhancements improve security on several fronts simultaneously.

Huang, C.-H.↗

Crossroads Workflows

The Department of Energy (DOE) compute facilities operate as resources for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Office of Science. In this document we describe a subset of scientific work flows which are run on current platforms. There is significant commonality to how Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), Lawrence Liver- more National Laboratory (LLNL) and the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center (NERSC) operate and conduct scienti c inquiry with supercomputers. In addition to presenting the commonality between the sites, we believe that opportunities exist to significantly optimize the operation of our facilities and more rapidly advance our scientific goals. In describing how our scientific work flows move from inception to realization we believe that we can enable significant improvements in how computer architectures support real scientific work flows. Briefly, in order for a team of scientists to access the large supercomputers at these facilities, the team must be granted an allocation. Allocations last for a fixed amount of time (usually 6 or 12 months), and a large number of teams will have overlapping allocations ensuring that a large amount of work is available in the scheduling queue. During the allocation, the scientists will construct work flows as described in this document. Many simultaneous allocations may use identical work flows with different data and scientific goals.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Recovery of Information from the Fast Flux Test Facility for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative

The Fast Flux Test Facility is the most recent Liquid Metal Reactor to operate in the United States. Information from the design, construction, and operation of this reactor was at risk as the facilities associated with the reactor are being shut down. The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative is a program managed by the Office of Nuclear Energy of the U.S. Department of Energy with a mission to develop new fuel cycle technologies to support both current and advanced reactors. Securing and preserving the knowledge gained from operation and testing in the Fast Flux Test Facility is an important part of the Knowledge Preservation activity in this program.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Regulatory Considerations for Nuclear Energy Applications of Digital Twin Technologies

Digital twins (DTs) in complex industrial and engineering applications have potential benefits that include increased operational efficiencies, enhanced safety and reliability, improved security engineering, reduced errors, faster information sharing, and better predictions. The interest in DT technologies continues to grow, and many of these advanced technologies are expected to experience rapid and wide industry adoption in the near future. Some of the potential application areas for DTs in the nuclear industry are design, licensing, plant construction, training simulators, predictive operations and maintenance, autonomous operation and control, failure and degradation prediction, physical protection modeling and simulation, and safety and reliability analyses. The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has initiated a future-focused research project to assess the regulatory viability of DTs for nuclear power plants and other NRC-regulated activities, such as fuel cycle facilities and operations. This report explores the potential impact of DT technologies in nuclear applications on NRC-regulated activities of interest. This report describes a nuclear DT system and its capabilities for nuclear power plant applications, followed by identification and discussion of some regulated activities that merit special consideration and present opportunities in implementing DT-enabling technologies and capabilities.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Resourcing Strategies for the NRU Reactor Shutdown Planning and Execution - 19218

The National Research Universal Reactor (NRU) was commissioned in 1957. The NRU was fundamental for the development of the Candu reactors and, until 2016, quietly responsible for producing 40 percent of the world's supply of medical isotopes for diagnosis and cancer therapy. The Government of Canada decided in 2015 to discontinue operation as of March 31, 2018 due to challenges associated with running a 60-year old nuclear reactor. Anticipating this closing date allowed the Permanent Safe Shutdown Project (PSSP) to transition the NRU from an operating reactor to a state suitable for Storage with Surveillance. One of the biggest challenges to address was human resource management, which was rightly identified as the key to keeping the project within schedule and budget. The dilemma was, how to keep the work force motivated to contribute with the preparation of the shutdown while addressing job security concerns. This paper summarises Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) challenges and strategies to secure specialized subject matter experts, trades and operators for planning and executing the NRU reactor shutdown Project. The discussion also includes the solutions and lessons learned to date. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Cybersecurity Resiliency of Marine Renewable Energy Systems Part 2: Cybersecurity Best Practices and Risk Management

Marine renewable energy (MRE) is an emerging source of power for marine applications, marine devices, and coastal communities. This energy source relies on industrial control systems and IT to support operations and maintenance activities, which create a pathway for an adversary to gain unauthorized access to systems and data and disrupt operations. Incorporating cybersecurity risk prevention measures and mitigation capabilities from inception, development, operation, to decommissioning of the MRE system and components is paramount to the protection of energy generation and the security of network architecture and infrastructure. To improve the resilience of MRE systems as a predictable, affordable, and reliable source of energy, cybersecurity guidance was developed to enable operators to assess cybersecurity risks and implement security measures commensurate with the risk. This publication is the second of a two-part series, with Part 1 addressing a framework to determine cybersecurity risk by assessing the vulnerability of an MRE system to potential cyber threats and the consequences a cyberattack would have on the end user. This Part 2 publication describes an approach to select appropriate cybersecurity best practices commensurate with the MRE system's cybersecurity risk. The guidance includes 86 cybersecurity best practices, which are associated with 36 cybersecurity domains and grouped into nine categories. The best practices follow the core functions of the National Institute of Science and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (e.g., identify, detect, protect, respond, and and recover) and insights from both maritime and energy industry guidance documents to identify security measures effective in protecting information and operational technology assets prevalent in MRE systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Resilient off-grid microgrids: Capacity planning and N-1 security

Over the past century the electric power industry has evolved to support the delivery of power over long distances with highly interconnected transmission systems. Despite this evolution, some remote communities are not connected to these systems. These communities rely on small, disconnected distribution systems, i.e., microgrids to deliver power. However, as microgrids often are not held to the same reliability standards as transmission grids, remote communities can be at risk for extended blackouts. To address this issue, we develop an optimization model and an algorithm for capacity planning and operations of microgrids that include N-1 security and other practical modeling features like AC power flow physics, component efficiencies and thermal limits. Lastly, we demonstrate the computational effectiveness of our approach on two test systems; a modified version of the IEEE 13 node test feeder and a model of a distribution system in a remote community in Alaska.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Work With Us to Advance Cybersecurity for the Current and Future Grid

The energy sector is undergoing rapid change. Advanced technologies and controls, digitally connected devices, and a mix of generation sources offer increased energy reliability and security, reduced energy costs, and enhanced grid operations. But they can also carry physical and cybersecurity risks that are not yet fully understood. With deep expertise in advanced energy technologies, the National Laboratory of the Rockies is examining the cybersecurity implications of evolving systems and developing cutting-edge tools, novel approaches, and innovative research capabilities to address sector-wide challenges. Together with our partners, we are working to achieve a more secure, defensible, and reliable grid.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Application of Kalman Filter to Improve Model Integrity for Securing Electricity Delivery

Power system model integrity is essential to many planning and operation tasks to ensure the safety and reliability of electricity delivery. Inaccurate system models would result in unreliable assessment of system security conditions and cause large-scale blackouts such as the 2003 Northeast Blackout. This dictates a strong need for model calibration and verification, which should be done periodically and preferably, in an automatic manner. Our previous work has demonstrated the feasibility of applying Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) to calibrate generator parameters using disturbance data recorded by phasor measurement units (PMU). This paper proposes to use Riccati equation to investigate EKF’s performance, especially regarding parameter identifiability. The covariance, which can be derived from the Riccati equation, offers insight into the uncertainties of parameters estimated by the EKF-based method. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

calibration↗

Space in 21st Century Conflict: Calibrating Risks, Tailoring Strategies (Workshop Summary)

U.S. strategic thinking on outer space security has been slow to evolve since the 1990s and the DoD finds itself struggling to develop an adaptive and cohesive strategy for the domain. Russia and China, however, have been thinking about space in a holistic and integrated way for some time. Both countries recognize that U.S. conventional strength relies heavily on technologies and systems enabled by space-based assets. Thus, holding those assets at risk represents an opportunity to asymmetrically counter America’s ability to project power. China and Russia been developing a suite of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities to accomplish this, to include direct-ascent weapons, space-based weapons, jammers, and cyber capabilities; both countries have also incorporated these systems into their respective tactical and strategic planning. This represents a serious threat to U.S. power projection and assurance of our regional allies and partners. Assuring the U.S.’s ability to operate in space is paramount for supporting regional security missions in both Europe and East Asia. Assuring DoD operations and capabilities in outer space, however, remains a challenge for the defense community. One solution offered by strategists is to enhance U.S. resiliency in space to turn the domain from offense dominant to defense dominant. This, they argue, can be achieved by improving space situational awareness (SSA), protecting space assets with active and passive countermeasures, disaggregating assets and leveraging new commercial space capabilities, and integrating allied space capabilities. However, many barriers remain to accomplishing these objectives. For example, some think that the classified nature of many U.S. space activities is an obstacle to deepening cooperation with commercial partners and allies. Others acknowledge the lack of a working model for incorporating cheaper, diverse, and scalable commercial space systems. Identifying where space fits into broader U.S. deterrence strategies is a subject of contention. While discussions over the past few years have focused on the practicability of deterring attacks on space assets via cross-domain threats, this line of thinking has yielded few useful insights. Consequently, defense practitioners have more recently shifted to thinking of space as part of an integrated deterrence concept, one that envisions building resiliency and defenses into our space architecture while simultaneously holding an adversary’s space-based assets at risk to enhance deterrence more broadly. However, both approaches illuminate a larger problem in the discussion of the relationship between space and deterrence: there is a lack of consensus on what it is we are trying to deter, how space fits into broader deterrence and strategic constructs, and the role of space in extended deterrence and assurance of allies. For example, is the United States’ priority to discourage attacks in space, to ensure regional power projection and alliance support capabilities, to deter broader global conflict or all of the above? Answering such questions will be an important step toward integrating space into a comprehensive defense strategy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

OSRP Source Repatriations-Case Studies: Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) began recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources) in 1999. As of February 2012, the project had recovered over 30,000 sources totaling over 820,000 Ci. OSRP grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover disused excess Plutonium- 239 (Pu-239) sources that were distributed in the 1960's and 1970's under the Atoms for Peace Program. Source recovery was initially considered a waste management activity. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the interagency community began to recognize that excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources pose a national security threat, particularly those that lack a disposition path. After OSRP's transfer to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, its mission was expanded to include all disused sealed sources that might require national security consideration. Recognizing the transnational threat posed by porous borders and the ubiquitous nature of sources, GTRI/OSRP repatriates U.S. origin sources based on threat reduction prioritization criteria. For example, several recent challenging source repatriation missions have been conducted by GTRI/OSRP in South America. These include the repatriation of a significant amount of Cs-137 and other isotopes from Brazil; re-packaging of conditioned Ra-226 sources in Ecuador for future repatriation; and, multilateral cooperation in the consolidation and export of Canadian, US, and Indian Co-60/Cs-137 sources from Uruguay. In addition, cooperation with regulators and private source owners in other countries presents opportunities for GTRI/OSRP to exchange best practices for managing disused sources. These positive experiences often result in long-term cooperation and information sharing with key foreign counterparts. International source recovery operations are essential to the preservation of U.S. national security interests. They are also mutually beneficial for fostering positive relationships with other governments and private industry, and demonstrate that responsible end-of-life options are given to legacy U.S.-origin sources in other countries. GTRI/OSRP does not take back sources that have a viable path for commercial disposal. Most US origin sources were sold commercially and were not provided by the US government. Below is a synopsis of cooperative efforts with Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Bilateral and multilateral efforts have been successful in removing hundreds of U.S.origin sealed radioactive sources from Latin American countries to the U.S. As many disused sources remain in the region, and since repatriation is not always an option, GTRI will continue to work with those countries to ensure that these sources are stored securely for the long-term. Successful Latin America operations should serve as a model for other regional cooperation in the repatriation of sealed sources, encouraging other source exporting countries to implement similar programs. Securing and removing sources, both domestically and internationally, is crucial to strengthening the life-cycle management of radioactive sources worldwide. Such efforts not only prevent these materials from being used maliciously, but also address public health and safety concerns, and under-gird the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗