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DOE OSTI2022

Final Status Report Confirming Completion of Mechanical Testing of HFIR Irradiated Nanocomposite Materials

This report provides a final status report on the in-cell mechanical testing of High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR)-irradiated nanodispersion-strengthened materials at the Irradiated Materials Examination and Testing (IMET) facility. All tension tests were performed at room temperature with a nominal strain rate of 0.018 mm/mm/min using shoulder-loading grip sets by following the standard testing procedure in ASTM E8/E8M. Round 1 (unirradiated) and round 2 (0.7 dpa) testing was completed in FY 2021. This report confirms completion of round 3 (1.4 dpa) and round 4 (2.1 dpa) tensile testing in FY 2022 with examples of test data collected on select sample conditions. Additionally, the report includes IDs of samples selected for shipment to Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for additional characterization.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

United States Nuclear Data Program Annual Report for FY2021

The US Nuclear Data Program (USNDP) Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY21) summarizes the work of USNDP for the period of October 1, 2020 through September 30, 2021, with respect to the Work Plan for FY21 that was prepared in 2019. The Work Plan and Final Report for USNDP are prepared for the DOE Office of Science, Office of Nuclear Physics. The support for the nuclear data activity from sources outside the nuclear data program is described in the staffing table and in Appendix A. This leverage amounts to about 3.24 FTE scientific, to be compared with 25.095 FTEs at USNDP units funded by the DOE Office of Science, Office of Nuclear Physics. Since it is often difficult to separate accomplishments funded by various sources, some of the work reported in the present report was accomplished with nuclear data program support leveraged by other funding.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Wabash CarbonSAFE. Final Report

This document summarizes work detailed in separate Wabash CarbonSAFE reports; the report describes the data collection efforts of the project and consolidates the geologic characterization, well testing, and storage complex modeling results for the Mt. Simon Sandstone and Potosi Dolomite, two distinct reservoirs characterized at the Wabash CarbonSAFE project site. Also presented are summaries of work to characterize the CO 2 source and infrastructure network, as well as summaries of reports analyzing stakeholder engagement options, policy, regulatory and legal considerations, and risk assessment associated with the Wabash CarbonSAFE project site. The report then presents recommendations for the next steps for site characterization, identifies data gaps for future activities, and provides an overall assessment of site potential.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Status Report on Regulatory Criteria Applicable to the Use of Digital Twins

This report describes the research results to date to identify regulatory implications of DT technologies and their uses. Specifically, this report reviews current regulatory guidance relevant to the application of predictive maintenance DTs, artificial intelligence (AI), and automation. The focus of this review included determination of constraints on the application of DT technology, identification of any regulatory gaps or uncertainties, and clarification of anticipated technical basis information likely to be important for regulatory acceptance of these technologies. The research included review of topical reports and other submissions to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on technologies relevant to using DTs for predictive maintenance, NRC safety evaluation (SE) reports, and other relevant literature to identify specific regulatory concerns.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

ECP Software Technology Capability Assessment Report V3.0

The Exascale Computing Project (ECP) Software Technology (ST) focus area is responsible for (1) developing critical software capabilities that will enable the successful execution of ECP applications and (2) providing key components of a productive and sustainable exascale computing ecosystem that will position the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the broader high-performance computing (HPC) community with a firm foundation for future extreme-scale computing capabilities. This ECP ST Capability Assessment Report (CAR) provides an overview and assessment of current ECP ST capabilities and activities, giving stakeholders and the broader HPC community information that can be used to assess ECP ST progress and plan their own efforts accordingly. ECP ST leaders commit to updating this document on regular basis (every 6–12 months). Highlights from this version of the report are presented here. This version of the CAR contains the following updates relative to the previous revision: (1) This report highlights the progress with the Extreme-scale Scientific Software Stack (E4S) efforts. In particular, this report discusses how E4S continues to gain traction as a first-class entity in the HPC ecosystem, enabling new conversations with users, facilities, vendors, other US agencies, and international partners. (2) The several-page summaries of each ECP Level 4 project were updated to reflect recent progress and next steps (Section 4). Of particular note are the experiences of our teams on early-access systems for Frontier. (3) The E4S is described further. E4S is now updated via quarterly releases. E4S is the primary integration and delivery vehicle for ECP ST capabilities (Section 2.1.1). (4) The ECP ST software development kit (SDK) effort further refined its groupings (Section 2.1.2). The ECP ST focus area represents the key bridge between exascale systems and the scientists developing applications that will run on those platforms. ECP ST efforts contribute to approximately 70 software products (Section 2.1.3) in six technical areas (Table 1). Since publishing the previous revision of the CAR, the team has continued to evolve the product dictionary of official product names, which enables more rigorous mapping of ECP ST deliverables to stakeholders (Section 2.1.4).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2021 (Revision 1)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report will address all monitoring requirements noted in the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101, except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Intelligent Process Visualization through Nuclear Operation Process Modeling, Reasoning, and Object Detection from Field Videos (Final Report)

This report is a deliverable for the “Final Report” task of DOE NEET Project 19-16790, "Context-Aware Safety Information Display for Nuclear Field Workers." This project's overall goal is to test the hypothesis that integrating computer vision and process reasoning methods will enable proactive visualization of the safe operation and maintenance processes of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) for field workers. Augmented Reality (AR) glasses adopting such proactive safety information visualization techniques can significantly increase personnel safety and reduce the NPP’s operating costs. The current practice of monitoring NPPs requires workers to switch between digital models, data, and physical workspaces in identifying relevant but potentially occluded objects and in assessing the risks of operation and maintenance processes. On the other hand, frequently changed field conditions require field workers to report to supervisors for real-time guidance. Such guidance is essential to ensure that changing conditions will not invalidate or endanger the work order and other ongoing processes that may jeopardize NPP operations. Additionally, incorrect recognition of equipment objects can result in communication errors and safety problems. AR techniques can assist engineers in viewing the physical workspaces with objects labeled with detailed operation procedures and safety reminders during field operations. The project team developed an “Intelligent Context-Aware Safety Information Display” (ICAD) for supporting Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) field workers in achieving safe and efficient execution of a series of operational tasks in uncertain and changing workspaces of an NPP. Before designing the ICAD-AR prototype, the project team synthesized NPP operational knowledge models through literature review studies, surveys, interviews with domain experts, and knowledge modeling. The project team conducted an extensive study of the operational procedures of various NPPs, and digital technologies that can support the safe and efficient execution of those procedures in different NPP operational contexts. This literature review helped the project team conduct surveys and interviews with nuclear engineers and field workers to identify three categories of information. The NPP knowledge modeling efforts reveal that the three categories of information identified have different levels of importance in a typical procedure of carrying out a series of tasks to achieve a specific NPP operation goal (e.g., shutdown, mode changes). These three categories of information include 1) Workspace dynamics – the changing spatial arrangements of workspaces, tools, protection equipment, and supporting materials, 2) Workflow prognostics – the dynamic dependencies between different parts of an NPP that functionally support and influence each other in terms of safety and efficiency, and 3) Hazards – objects and spaces that contain hazardous materials or physical conditions that can pose risks to workers or mechanical systems. The project team has profiled the importance levels of these categories of information into a knowledge model. This knowledge model specifies what types of information are more critical for a given task in a given workspace so that computers can automatically identify critical objects and sensors in a scene for delivering context-ware safety information to field workers through AR devices. Significant research development of this project results in technical research outcomes and a prototyping system that illustrates the technical feasibility of establishing an ICAD-AR system supporting the proactive safety information display for nuclear field workers. This final report summarizes the project team’s technological achievements in the past three years. Overall, the project team completed the development and integration of five techniques into a prototype ICAD Augmented Reality (ICAD-AR) system and demonstrated the developed system’s real-time execution in a mechanical room. The project team completed the analysis of using this prototype in other types of workspaces based on 3D image data and digital design models collected from two additional workspaces (a water treatment plant and a flow loop training facility). The integrated techniques include 1) Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms supporting the generation and updates of nuclear fieldwork process models based on text analysis of work packages and operation manuals; 2) sensor log analysis for predicting control actions in given sensor reading contexts; 3) computer vision algorithms for automatic localization and navigation of workers; 4) object detection algorithms for identifying task-related objects and correlated sensors for safety checking; 5) AR technique as a platform for supporting the integration. The testing results of these five techniques have shown that 1) the sensor log analysis model can predict the next control action with an accuracy of 0.883; 2) the trained natural language processing model can extract more than 80% of the critical information from paper-based procedures (PBPs); 3) the navigation algorithm with the integration of Visual Inertial Odometry (VIO) and Non-Recursive Bayesian Filter methods make operator’s trajectory estimation resilient to drift error; 4) the computer vision algorithm can detect task-specific and safety-critical objects with an average accuracy of 95.3%. The project team used work procedures collected from a flow loop training facility and two datasets collected from two mechanical rooms simulating the workspaces of NPPs to demonstrate the technical capabilities of the developed ICAD-AR prototype. The demonstration validated the technical feasibility of establishing the ICAD-AR system for nuclear field workers and identified the challenges in 1) automatic text analysis of work packages; 2) use of limited samples of sensor logs for predicting the proper timings of control actions; 3) reliably tracking workers and their task progress in mechanical rooms with many similar objects.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Criticality Accident Alarm System Shielding Benchmark: Integral Experiment Request 498, Critical Engineering Decision 1 Report

This report supports Critical/Subcritical Experiment Decision 1 (CED-1) for Integral Experiment Request (IER) 498, a shielding benchmark produced using the Godiva IV critical assembly at the National Critical Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Shielding benchmarks are datasets collected to provide a comparison for computer models that simulate the effect of shielding on radiation transmission from a source to a detector. The purpose of a CED-1 report is to produce a conceptual design for an integral experiment and to identify the long lead-time items. The design presented in this report favors certain detailed design options such as material selections. However, alternative options can be selected as the project evolves. Dimensions are specified only as needed to evaluate feasibility and performance. Development of Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) shielding benchmarks supports two main programmatic needs. The first need is to improve confidence in models of facilities that house nuclear material handling operations. Better models can support effective CAAS detector placement when criticality may result in dose, and it enables more accurate analysis of criticality accident impacts at various locations in a facility. A key quantity that can be verified is the secondary gamma production caused by neutron interactions with various materials. The second programmatic need supported by shielding benchmarks is the ongoing development of methods being integrated into nuclear simulation codes such as the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code and the SCALE code system used in efforts funded by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). Previous work performed under the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experimental Program (ICSBEP) to produce shielding benchmark data is primarily limited to a set of measurements at the SILENE critical assembly at the Valduc facility in France. The experiment used an open configuration and a burst mode operation, which limited detector options to thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and activation foils. Because TLDs do not record gamma spectra, it was difficult to verify the gamma energy spectrum from the experiment. In this work, the Godiva IV assembly will be used because it is a fast system capable of producing a wide range of source strengths, including super-prompt critical bursts. The room return for the facility is expected to be substantial and challenging to characterize, so a more closed, shielded experimental configuration is considered. Furthermore, because the physics of radiation transport outside the assembly does not change between the burst mode and the delayed critical mode, it is anticipated that most measurements will be made with the Godiva IV assembly in delayed critical mode, operating within a range that will allow electronic counters to collect accurate data. Scoping calculations concluded that a workable room return shield is comprised of 40 cm of 5% borated polyethylene backed by 7 cm of lead. This configuration was shown to produce a ratio of signal–to–room return of over 100 for up to 2 mean free paths of shield sample material, and over 10 for up to 4 mean free paths of shield sample material, ensuring that useful results can be obtained. With no shielding sample in the room return shield, it was shown that the neutron and gamma spectra do not appreciably change with a change in room size. This scoping calculation does not preclude the use of tungsten powder in a binder, some other effective gamma shielding material, or a hybrid design. Dose rates for various source intensities at an unshielded detector are listed herein to inform detector selection during CED-2, and calibration chains are identified. Preliminary estimates of costs and schedules are outlined but remain to be verified. Values could double or triple as estimates become more accurate and are principally included here to demonstrate feasibility. Preliminary estimates indicate that the apparatus can be installed within a feasible schedule and budget. Two measurements per day are assumed. Producing a shielding benchmark at NCERC using the Godiva IV assembly has been shown to be feasible, with manageable uncertainties and risks. A clear, continuing need for shielding benchmark data remains present, and this report identifies and evaluates a method for creating integrated shielding benchmark datasets.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

2022 Long-Term Hydrologic Monitoring Program Report for the Rio Blanco, Colorado Site

This report presents the monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) during the 2022 sampling event at the Rio Blanco, Colorado, Site, where an underground nuclear test was conducted in 1973. The test resulted in residual radionuclide contamination at the detonation depth. The 2022 sampling event included the collection of samples from onsite groundwater wells to monitor for any potential contamination that might be attributed to the Rio Blanco nuclear tests. This report summarizes the laboratory results obtained from the sampling along with the historical results since monitoring began in the 1970s. This annual report and previous reports are available on the LM public website at https://www.energy.gov/lm/rio-blanco-colorado-site. Data collected during this and previous monitoring events are available on the Geospatial Environmental Mapping System (GEMS) website at https://gems.lm.doe.gov/#site=RBL.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

PR100 One-Year Progress Summary Report: Preliminary Modeling Results and High-Resolution Solar and Wind Data Sets

The Puerto Rico Grid Resilience and Transitions to 100% Renewable Energy Study (PR100) is a 2-year study by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Grid Deployment Office and six national laboratories to comprehensively analyze stakeholder-driven pathways to Puerto Rico's clean energy future. In Year 1 of the study, the PR100 team rigorously modeled and analyzed scenarios that meet Puerto Rico's renewable energy targets and achieve short-term recovery goals and long-term energy resilience. This report, which summarizes PR100 progress in Year 1, provides considerations that can inform potential funding and implementation decisions by key federal and local agencies and stakeholders. The summary report follows the publication in July 2022 of a PR100 Six-Month Progress Update (in English and Spanish), as well as public webinars in February 2022 to kick off the study and in July 2022 to present the 6-month update. A final written report and web-based visuals will be published in late 2023. All publications and public events associated with the study will be available in Spanish and English. This report is also available in Spanish https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy23osti/85144.pdf.

100%↗
DOE OSTI2023

Workshop on Establishing and Operating a National Nuclear Security Support Centre Hypothetical Scenario: "Republic of Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre Feasibility Report"

[This is part of a hypothetical, scenario-based exercise for workshop participants, based on the fictitious country "Centralia."] This report serves as official record of the coordinated process completed by competent authorities and other organizations with nuclear security responsibilities in the Republic of Centralia to determine the feasibility of establishing and operating a national nuclear security support centre (NSSC). The report summarizes all sustainability needs and available resources identified during the feasibility determination process, including consideration of possible NSSC institutional models, in line with the systematic approach recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Centralia Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNRA), as the designated lead organization for coordinating the feasibility determination process, has prepared this report in collaboration with members of the Committee on Nuclear Security (CNS) and based on input gathered among relevant national stakeholders. The report has been presented to the National Security Advisor (NSA), for final review and decision-making as to whether Centralia should proceed with establishing an NSSC.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Calendar Year 2020 Underground Test Area Annual Sampling Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This CY 2020 annual sampling report presents the background of the FFACO and Sampling Plan implementation, sampling and analysis methods, sampling results, quality assurance and quality control, regulatory requirements, and analytical data for the CY 2020. Appendix A presents data from samples collected in CY 2020 from the YF/CM CAU and the RM/SM CAU. This sampling was conducted in support of the Sampling Plan at these CAUs prior to approval of the final CRs. Appendix B presents the well completion diagrams for the wells sampled in CY 2020. Appendix C presents data from samples collected in CY 2019. These results were not reported in the previous sampling report because they were not available from the specialized laboratories at the time of the report’s publication.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

HEPA Filter Age Evaluation Report

In 2020, PNNL completed a literature search for high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter age information. HEPA filters are used in many operations to remove particulate matter from effluent exhaust streams. They are thought to degrade over time both during proper storage and during normal operational service; however, the rate at which the filters degrade remains unknown. This brings into question if age is an adequate indicator of HEPA filter performance. Data from six previous reports were obtained from the literature search and combined to create a data set of 1600 operating filters. Filter usage was identified from multiple facilities. The various types of filters (e.g., axial flow, self-contained, and standard 24 x 24 x 11.5 inches; and both separator and separatorless) reported were constructed to the requirements Section FC (HEPA Filters) or Section FK (Special HEPA Filters) of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers AG-1 code. Filters were presumed to have continuously met the operational criteria and in particular passed both annual efficiency tests and annual DP measurements. The environmental conditions within the exhaust system were also assumed adequate for long-term filter operation. The data, by the nature of the reports, excludes rejected filters from quality assurance evaluations, intake, or installation testing. The collective data set shows over half of were operating past the current 10-year Department of Energy (DOE) limit. Data was evaluated for age lifetime using a linear trendline, survival function, probability functions, and failure rate; financial impacts were also addressed. This report supports the notion that HEPA filters can operate safely and efficiently under proper maintenance well past the 10-year lifetime established by DOE. Using the results of the four age evaluation approaches, they collectively point to the reasonableness of an operating HEPA filter lifetime of 20 years. The results are not necessarily definitive, but nevertheless, they are promising. The analysis provides reasonable assurance that when implemented using a graded approach with well-defined performance and operational requirements, extending the service life for HEPA filters beyond 10 years is low risk.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

2022 LANL Radionuclide Air Emissions Report (Rev. 2)

This report describes the emissions of airborne radionuclides from operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for calendar year 2022 and the resulting off-site dose from these emissions. This document fulfills the requirements established by the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants in 40 CFR 61, Subpart H – Emissions of Radionuclides other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities, commonly referred to as the Radionuclide NESHAP or Rad-NESHAP. Compliance with this regulation and preparation of this document is the responsibility of LANL’s Rad NESHAP compliance program, which is part of the Environmental Protection and Compliance (EPC) Division. The information in this report is required under the Clean Air Act and is being submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Headquarters and EPA Region 6. The highest effective dose equivalent (EDE) to an off-site member of the public was calculated using procedures specified by the EPA and described in this report. LANL’s EDE was 0.45 for 2022. The annual limit is 10 millirem per year, established by the EPA in 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. All measured air emissions are modeled to a single location, known as the Maximally Exposed Individual (MEI). During calendar year 2022, LANL continuously monitored radionuclide emissions at 27 “major” release points, or stacks. The Laboratory estimates emissions from an additional 34 “minor” release points using radionuclide usage source terms in lieu of stack monitoring. Also, LANL uses an EPA approved network of air samplers around the Laboratory perimeter to monitor ambient airborne levels of radionuclides. To provide data for dispersion modeling and dose assessment, LANL maintains and operates several meteorological monitoring towers. From these various systems, a comprehensive evaluation is conducted to calculate the MEI dose for the Laboratory. The MEI can be any member of the public at any off-site location where there is a residence, school, business, or office. In 2022, this MEI location was a business at 95 Entrada Drive, located in the eastern end of Los Alamos town site. The primary contributors to the off-site dose at this location are the ambient air data at that location combined with radioactive gas emissions from the LANSCE facility and the collected potential emissions from unmonitored (minor) sources. Overall, the MEI dose in 2022 is similar to that which has been observed in recent years, and it remains well below the EPA’s 10 millirem per year limit. Doses reported to the EPA for the past 10 years are shown in Table E1.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

2016 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The site was the location of an underground nuclear test in 1968, which resulted in residual contamination at and near the detonation depth of approximately 3200 feet (ft) below ground surface (bgs) that requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (State of Nevada et al. 1996) (as amended) (FFACO) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (LMS/CNT/S12760) (DOE 2016a) (Closure Report) describes LM’s plan for the long-term postclosure monitoring of radioisotope concentrations and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2016a).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

2018 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018a), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018a).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

2020 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended 1996 Nevada Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (State of Nevada et al. 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗