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Power Plant Water Risk and Adaptive Measures Database

Project objective was to understand water-related constraints affecting conventional powerplant operations, specifically coal-fired power plants. Of concern were threats related to drought and flood affecting both water supply and ability of plant to discharge wastewater. Also of interest were adaptive measures taken to mitigate identified threats. This spreadsheet contains the responses provided by the power plant operators and owners. Data have been "sanitized" (e.g., random plant ID, binned location and generation capacity information) to ensure anonymity of individual power plants.

Adaptive Measures↗

Inclusion of Scatter in HADES: Final Report

Covert nuclear attack is one of the foremost threats facing the United States and is a primary focus of the War on Terror. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is chartered to develop, and improve domestic systems to detect and interdict smuggling for the illicit use of a nuclear explosive device, fissile material or radiologica1 material. The CAARS (Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System) program is a major part of the DHS effort to enhance US security by harnessing cutting-edge technologies to detect radiological and nuclear threats at points of entry to the United States. DNDO has selected vendors to develop complete radiographic systems. It is crucial that the initial design and testing concepts for the systems be validated and compared prior to the substantial efforts to build and deploy prototypes and subsequent large-scale production. An important aspect of these systems is the scatter which interferes with imaging. Monte Carlo codes, such as MCNP (X-5 Monte Carlo Team, 2005 Revision) allow scatter to be calculatied, but these calculations are very time consuming. It would be useful to have a fast scatter estimation algorithm in a fast ray tracing code. We have been extending the HADES ray-tracing radiographic simulation code to model vendor systems in a flexible and quick fashion and to use this tool to study a variety of questions involving system performance and the comparative value of surrogates. To enable this work, HADES has been linked to the BRL-CAD library (BRL-CAD Open Source Project, 2010), in order to enable the inclusion of complex CAD geometries in simulations, scanner geometries have been implemented in HADES, and the novel detector responses have been included in HADES. A major extension of HADES which has been required by this effort is the inclusion of scatter in these radiographic simulations. Ray tracing codes generally do not easily allow the inclusion of scatter, because these codes define a source and a grid of detector pixels and only compute the attenuation along rays between these points. Scatter is an extremely complex set of processes which can involve rays which change directions many times between the source and detector. Scatter from outside the field of view of the imaging system, as well as within the field of view, can have an important role in image formation. In this report, we will describe how we implemented a treatment of scatter in HADES. We begin with a discussion of how we define scatter in Section 2, followed by a description of how single Compton scatter is now included in HADES in Section 3. In Section 4 we report a set of verification tests against MCNP and tests of how the technique scales with image size, number of scatters allowed and number of processors used in the calculations. In Section 5, we describe how we plan to extend this approach to other forms of scatter and conclude in Section 6. It should be emphasized that the purpose of this report is to show that a form of scatter has been implemented in HADES and has been verified against MCNP. Validation, the process of comparing simulation and experiment, is a future task.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Over the next 10-20 years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD. The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic. For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively without crippling the US economy. The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime domain awareness capability. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping, grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why this may be accomplished.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Very High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP)

This report documents the detailed background information that has been compiled to support the preparation of a much shorter white paper on the design features and fuel cycles of Very High-Temperature Reactors (VHTRs), including the proposed Next-Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP), to identify the important proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR&PP) aspects of the proposed concepts. The shorter white paper derived from the information in this report was prepared for the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Science and Technology for the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) VHTR Systems Steering Committee (SSC) as input to the GIF Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PR&PPWG) (http://www.gen-4.org/Technology/horizontal/proliferation.htm). The short white paper was edited by the GIF VHTR SCC to address their concerns and thus may differ from the information presented in this supporting report. The GIF PR&PPWG will use the derived white paper based on this report along with other white papers on the six alternative Generation IV design concepts (http://www.gen-4.org/Technology/systems/index.htm) to employ an evaluation methodology that can be applied and will evolve from the earliest stages of design. This methodology will guide system designers, program policy makers, and external stakeholders in evaluating the response of each system, to determine each system's resistance to proliferation threats and robustness against sabotage and terrorism threats, and thereby guide future international cooperation on ensuring safeguards in the deployment of the Generation IV systems. The format and content of this report is that specified in a template prepared by the GIF PR&PPWG. Other than the level of detail, the key exception to the specified template format is the addition of Appendix C to document the history and status of coated-particle fuel reprocessing technologies, which fuel reprocessing technologies have yet to be deployed commercially and have only been demonstrated in testing at a laboratory scale.

Moses, David Lewis↗

A new time-dependent analytic model for radiation-induced photocurrent in finite 1D epitaxial diodes

Photocurrent generated by ionizing radiation represents a threat to microelectronics in radiation environments. Circuit simulation tools such as SPICE can be used to analyze these threats, and typically rely on compact models for individual electrical components such as transistors and diodes. Compact models consist of a handful of differential and/or algebraic equations, and are derived by making simplifying assumptions to any of the many semiconductor transport equations. Historically, many photocurrent compact models have suffered from accuracy issues due to the use of qualitative approximation, rather than mathematically correct solutions to the ambipolar diffusion equation. A practical consequence of this inaccuracy is that a given model calibration is trustworthy over only a narrow range of operating conditions. This report describes work to produce improved compact models for photocurrent. Specifically, an analytic model is developed for epitaxial diode structures that have a highly doped subcollector. The analytic model is compared with both numerical TCAD calculations, as well as the compact model described in reference. The new analytic model compares well against TCAD over a wide range of operating conditions, and is shown to be superior to the compact model from reference.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

GTRI Remote Monitoring System: Training and Operational Needs Assessment Analysis Report

The mission of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA's) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is to identify, secure, recover and facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and high-risk radioactive materials around the world that pose a threat to the United States and the international community. The GTRI's unique mission to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide directly addresses recommendations of the 9/11 Commission1, and is a vital part of the President's National Security Strategy and the Global Initiative. The GTRI Remote Monitoring System (RMS) is a standalone security system that includes radiation and tamper alarms, and CCTV; which can be transmitted securely over the Internet to multiple on-site and off-site locations. Through our experiences during installation of the system at 162 sites, plus feedback received from Alarm Response Training course participants, site input to project teams and analysis of trouble calls; indications were that current system training was lacking and inconsistent. A survey was undertaken to gather information from RMS users across the nation, to evaluate the current level of training and determine what if any improvements needed to be made. Additional questions were focused on the operation of the RMS software. The training survey was initially sent electronically to 245 users at the RMS sites and achieved a 37.6% return rate. Analysis of the resulting data revealed that 34.6% of the respondents had not received training or were unsure if they had, despite the fact that vendor engineers provide training at installation of the system. Any training received was referred to as minimal, and brief, not documented, and nothing in writing. 63.7% of respondents said they were either not at all prepared or only somewhat prepared to use the RMS software required to effectively operate the system. As a result of this analysis, a formal training curriculum will be designed and implemented to include several blended learning delivery options. This training will be piloted at RMS sites; initial training will become a required element of RMS installation and refresher training will be considered for sustainability of operations.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Resilience: Theory and Application.

There is strong agreement among policymakers, practitioners, and academic researchers that the concept of resilience must play a major role in assessing the extent to which various entities - critical infrastructure owners and operators, communities, regions, and the Nation - are prepared to respond to and recover from the full range of threats they face. Despite this agreement, consensus regarding important issues, such as how resilience should be defined, assessed, and measured, is lacking. The analysis presented here is part of a broader research effort to develop and implement assessments of resilience at the asset/facility and community/regional levels. The literature contains various definitions of resilience. Some studies have defined resilience as the ability of an entity to recover, or 'bounce back,' from the adverse effects of a natural or manmade threat. Such a definition assumes that actions taken prior to the occurrence of an adverse event - actions typically associated with resistance and anticipation - are not properly included as determinants of resilience. Other analyses, in contrast, include one or more of these actions in their definitions. To accommodate these different definitions, we recognize a subset of resistance- and anticipation-related actions that are taken based on the assumption that an adverse event is going to occur. Such actions are in the domain of resilience because they reduce both the immediate and longer-term adverse consequences that result from an adverse event. Recognizing resistance- and anticipation-related actions that take the adverse event as a given accommodates the set of resilience-related actions in a clear-cut manner. With these considerations in mind, resilience can be defined as: 'the ability of an entity - e.g., asset, organization, community, region - to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance.' Because critical infrastructure resilience is important both in its own right and because of its implications for community/regional resilience, it is especially important to develop a sound methodology for assessing resilience at the asset/facility level. This objective will be accomplished by collecting data on four broadly defined groups of resilience-enhancing measures: preparedness, mitigation measures, response capabilities, and recovery mechanisms. Table ES-1 illustrates how the six components that define resilience are connected to the actions that enhance the capacity of an entity to be resilient. The relationships illustrated in Table ES-1 provide the framework for developing a survey instrument that will be used to elicit the information required to assess resilience at the asset/facility level. The resilience of a community/region is a function of the resilience of its subsystems, including its critical infrastructures, economy, civil society, governance (including emergency services), and supply chains/dependencies. The number and complexity of these subsystems will make the measurement of resilience more challenging as we move from individual assets/facilities to the community/regional level (where critical infrastructure resilience is only one component). Specific challenges include uncertainty about relationships (e.g., the composition of specific supply chains), data gaps, and time and budget constraints that prevent collection of all of the information needed to construct a comprehensive assessment of the resilience of a specific community or region. These challenges can be addressed, at least partially, by adopting a 'systems approach' to the assessment of resilience. In a systems approach, the extent to which the analysis addresses the resilience of the individual subsystems can vary. Specifically, high-level systems analysis can be used to identify the most important lower-level systems. In turn, within the most important lower-level systems, site assessment data should be collected only on the most critical asset-level components about which the least is known. Implementation of the strategies outlined here to assess resilience will facilitate the following four objectives: (1) Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the asset/facility level, (2) Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the critical infrastructure sector level, (3) Provide resilience-related information to critical infrastructure owners/operators to facilitate risk-based resource decision making, and (4) Provide resilience-related information to State and local mission partners to support their risk-based resource decision making.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Suspect/Counterfeit Items Information Guide for Subcontractors/Suppliers

Counterfeiting of industrial and commercial grade items is an international problem that places worker safety, program objectives, expensive equipment, and security at risk. In order to prevent the introduction of Suspect/Counterfeit Items (S/CI), this information sheet is being made available as a guide to assist in the implementation of S/CI awareness and controls, in conjunction with subcontractor's/supplier's quality assurance programs. When it comes to counterfeit goods, including industrial materials, items, and equipment, no market is immune. Some manufactures have been known to misrepresent their products and intentionally use inferior materials and processes to manufacture substandard items, whose properties can significantly cart from established standards and specifications. These substandard items termed by the Department of Energy (DOE) as S/CI, pose immediate and potential threats to the safety of DOE and contractor workers, the public, and the environment. Failure of certain systems and processes caused by an S/CI could also have national security implications at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Nuclear Safety Rules (federal Laws), DOE Orders, and other regulations set forth requirements for DOE contractors to implement effective controls to assure that items and services meet specified requirements. This includes techniques to implement and thereby minimizing the potential threat of entry of S/CI to LANL. As a qualified supplier of goods or services to the LANL, your company will be required to establish and maintain effective controls to prevent the introduction of S/CI to LANL. This will require that your company warrant that all items (including their subassemblies, components, and parts) sold to LANL are genuine (i.e. not counterfeit), new, and unused, and conform to the requirements of the LANL purchase orders/contracts unless otherwise approved in writing to the Los Alamos National Security (LANS) contract administrator/procurements specialist.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DHS Summary Report -- Robert Weldon

This summer I worked on benchmarking the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory fission multiplicity capability used in the Monte Carlo particle transport code MCNPX. This work involved running simulations and then comparing the simulation results with experimental experiments. Outlined in this paper is a brief description of the work completed this summer, skills and knowledge gained, and how the internship has impacted my planning for the future. Neutron multiplicity counting is a neutron detection technique that leverages the multiplicity emissions of neutrons from fission to identify various actinides in a lump of material. The identification of individual actinides in lumps of material crossing our boarders, especially U-235 and Pu-239, is a key component for maintaining the safety of the country from nuclear threats. Several multiplicity emission options from spontaneous and induced fission already existed in MCNPX 2.4.0. These options can be accessed through use of the 6th entry on the PHYS:N card. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) developed a physics model for the simulation of neutron and gamma ray emission from fission and photofission that was included in MCNPX 2.7.B as an undocumented feature and then was documented in MCNPX 2.7.C. The LLNL multiplicity capability provided a different means for MCNPX to simulate neutron and gamma-ray distributions for neutron induced, spontaneous and photonuclear fission reactions. The original testing on the model for implementation into MCNPX was conducted by Gregg McKinney and John Hendricks. The model is an encapsulation of measured data of neutron multiplicity distributions from Gwin, Spencer, and Ingle, along with the data from Zucker and Holden. One of the founding principles of MCNPX was that it would have several redundant capabilities, providing the means of testing and including various physics packages. Though several multiplicity sampling methodologies already existed within MCNPX, the LLNL fission multiplicity was included to provide a separate capability for computing multiplicity as well as including several new features not already included in MCNPX. These new features include: (1) prompt gamma emission/multiplicity from neutron-induced fission; (2) neutron multiplicity and gamma emission/multiplicity from photofission; and (3) an option to enforce energy correlation for gamma neutron multiplicity emission. These new capabilities allow correlated signal detection for identifying presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Therefore, these new capabilities help meet the missions of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which is tasked with developing nuclear detection strategies for identifying potential radiological and nuclear threats, by providing new simulation capability for detection strategies that leverage the new available physics in the LLNL multiplicity capability. Two types of tests were accomplished this summer to test the default LLNL neutron multiplicity capability: neutron-induced fission tests and spontaneous fission tests. Both cases set the 6th entry on the PHYS:N card to 5 (i.e. use LLNL multiplicity). The neutron-induced fission tests utilized a simple 0.001 cm radius sphere where 0.0253 eV neutrons were released at the sphere center. Neutrons were forced to immediately collide in the sphere and release all progeny from the sphere, without further collision, using the LCA card, LCA 7j -2 (therefore density and size of the sphere were irrelevant). Enough particles were run to ensure that the average error of any specific multiplicity did not exceed 0.36%. Neutron-induced fission multiplicities were computed for U-233, U-235, Pu-239, and Pu-241. The spontaneous fission tests also used the same spherical geometry, except: (1) the LCA card was removed; (2) the density of the sphere was set to 0.001 g/cm3; and (3) instead of emitting a thermal neutron, the PAR keyword was set to PAR=SF. The purpose of the small density was to ensure that the spontaneous fission neutrons would not further interact and induce fissions (i.e. the mean free path greatly exceeded the size of the sphere). Enough particles were run to ensure that the average error of any specific spontaneous multiplicity did not exceed 0.23%. Spontaneous fission multiplicities were computed for U-238, Pu-238, Pu-240, Pu-242, Cm-242, and Cm-244. All of the computed results were compared against experimental results compiled by Holden at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Integrating Multiple Data Views for Improved Malware Analysis [Slides]

Malicious programs continue to be a serious threat within the internet landscape. In 2011, 403 million variants of malware were detected, a 41% increase from 2010. Malware cost consumers $\$$2.3 billion in 2011. Cybercrime cost companies $\$$338 billion in 2011. Given recent trends, and how lucrative the cybercrime industry has become, we can expect malware to be an ongoing threat.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Second Line of Defense Program, Secondary Screening Operations Field Data Collection

Secondary screening is a key component of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program’s capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. The primary detection system—the radiation portal monitor—makes alarm decisions based on gross counts of gamma and neutron radiation; it is able to provide little other information regarding what may have caused an elevated radiation level. Conducting a proper secondary screening with an instrument capable of identifying radioisotopes is the only way to determine what radioactive material is present—most importantly if it is a threat material. Only by knowing the radioactive material can a prudent decision be made with regard to disposition and response—and can the mistaken release of a threat be avoided.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Spreader-Bar Radiation Detection System Enhancements: A Modeling and Simulation Study

An investigation of radiation detectors on crane-mounted platforms was performed to understand the limitations and optimal capability of these types of systems. Crane-mounted systems are primarily focused on crane-mounted radiation detector systems, where the detectors are mounted on a spreader-bar platform. Spreader bars are attached with cables to a crane at seaports to load and unload containers from cargo ships. The bars can spread from 20 feet to 53 feet using hydraulics, allowing a single bar to move a variety of container lengths. Spreader-bars are also used on straddle carriers, which move containers around the laydown yard in the port. Spreader bar radiation detection (SBRD) systems are commercially available from at least two companies. These systems employ a set of spectroscopic sensors placed on the underside of a gantry crane and held near the top of a cargo container for detection. These systems have been previously tested and some issues and limitations observed. Radiation detectors mounted on spreader-bars are single sided systems (observing cargo only from the top) and it is therefore challenging to obtain the same sensitivity as double-sided systems (for example, portal monitors) especially when considering the possible amounts of intervening cargo that could be present. The approximately exponential attenuation of gamma rays in intervening dense cargo presents an inherent limitation to detection. However, SBRD systems hold detectors closer to the container, have a longer dwell time, and may have lower background (over the ship); all of these aspects help mitigate the single-sided issue. In addition, there are operational considerations that make spreader-bar radiation systems attractive. These include scanning for radiation during other operations (loading, unloading or container movement) which minimizes additional time for scanning, incorporating the radiation detection into existing equipment to minimize initial cost, and in the case of ship unloading, scanning the containers before reaching the laydown yard. This study is focused on researching optimized configurations of SBRD systems, including number of detectors, locations, and best use of detector data, to determine a reasonable limit on the capability of these types of systems. The results will help support decisions on where and how these systems might be effectively deployed, and could be used for future specification development for SBRD acquisition. The next phase of this research and investigation into SBRD systems and quantification of the possible improved capability with an enhanced SBRD is the focus of this report. Supporting this investigation, detailed models of an enhanced SBRD system were created using a 3D radiation transport code, and models were run to simulate the data from sources and background for a realistic cargo-loading port environment. The enhanced SBRD had increased detector material (numbers of detectors) compared to the commercial systems, with a distribution providing more uniform coverage. Measurements using small industrial sources were made with an enhanced SBRD system developed by Sandia National Laboratory to support model validation to establish credibility for the simulations of these threat and background scenarios. A significant simulation effort was undertaken to simulate sources of interest within a 40-foot cargo container. In order to estimate the performance of a generalized SBRD system in scenarios including background and cargo, a highly enriched uranium (HEU) test source (with 3x10 -8 232 U by weight) within a wood cargo model was simulated for a 40-foot cargo container. This source was placed at a variety of locations, and the flux from the source was multiplied as necessary to create estimated minimal detectable quantities (MDQ) figures for various quantities of HEU. Simulated data sets were produced corresponding to a complete container offloading scenario for a large number of statistical realizations. Significant work was performed on both the algorithm development and the container cargo distributions entering the US, and the result of this modeling, validation, and simulation effort was a set of estimates of the performance of a variety of radiation detection algorithms in this cargo-screening environment. In the case of algorithms, a variety of contemporary radiation detection and identification approaches were employed, and the optimal approaches to selecting time and location subsets of detector data were explored. In all cases, algorithm performance was compared, and the best approaches were suggested along with the best expected performance from the enhanced SBRD. In general, template-matching schemes employing a limited set of regression parameters tend to provide best results. The improvements of an enhanced SBRD with increased detector material and improved algorithms result in an effective MDQ of 10 kg of HEU in ~50 percent of the imported cargo in 40-foot containers, assuming a random source location. This is approximately two times the capability of the estimated performance of the commercial systems. For an MDQ of the 10 kg HEU source located in the worst location (bottom of the 40-foot container), the volume of cargo scanned drops to 10% for the enhanced SBRD, again a factor of two or more larger than the commercial systems. Enhancing the SBRD systems by adding more detectors, providing a more uniform coverage, and incorporating more advanced algorithms will result in a significant increase in capability. Although this investigation provided some indication of the performance capabilities of an enhanced SBRD system, additional work is needed to estimate the capability for other container configurations, such as the 20 and 45 foot containers. Since the 20-foot container weight limit is similar to the 40-foot, more dense cargo is typically shipped in 20-foot containers. This will result in a smaller percentage of cargo scanned for the 20-foot containers (for a particular source quantity) compared to the 40-foot containers. In addition to other configuration, other source material needs to be investigated to understand the capabilities for the entire threat space, where only HEU is considered in this work.

crane-mounted↗

Development of a statistically based access delay timeline methodology.

The charter for adversarial delay is to hinder access to critical resources through the use of physical systems increasing an adversary s task time. The traditional method for characterizing access delay has been a simple model focused on accumulating times required to complete each task with little regard to uncertainty, complexity, or decreased efficiency associated with multiple sequential tasks or stress. The delay associated with any given barrier or path is further discounted to worst-case, and often unrealistic, times based on a high-level adversary, resulting in a highly conservative calculation of total delay. This leads to delay systems that require significant funding and personnel resources in order to defend against the assumed threat, which for many sites and applications becomes cost prohibitive. A new methodology has been developed that considers the uncertainties inherent in the problem to develop a realistic timeline distribution for a given adversary path. This new methodology incorporates advanced Bayesian statistical theory and methodologies, taking into account small sample size, expert judgment, human factors and threat uncertainty. The result is an algorithm that can calculate a probability distribution function of delay times directly related to system risk. Through further analysis, the access delay analyst or end user can use the results in making informed decisions while weighing benefits against risks, ultimately resulting in greater system effectiveness with lower cost.

Rivera, W. Gary↗

Genomics-enabled sensor platform for rapid detection of viruses related to disease outbreak.

Bioweapons and emerging infectious diseases pose growing threats to our national security. Both natural disease outbreak and outbreaks due to a bioterrorist attack are a challenge to detect, taking days after the outbreak to identify since most outbreaks are only recognized through reportable diseases by health departments and reports of unusual diseases by clinicians. In recent decades, arthropod-borne viruses (arboviruses) have emerged as some of the most significant threats to human health. They emerge, often unexpectedly, from cryptic transmission foci causing localized outbreaks that can rapidly spread to multiple continents due to increased human travel and trade. Currently, diagnosis of acute infections requires amplification of viral nucleic acids, which can be costly, highly specific, technically challenging and time consuming. No diagnostic devices suitable for use at the bedside or in an outbreak setting currently exist. The original goals of this project were to 1) develop two highly sensitive and specific diagnostic assays for detecting RNA from a wide range of arboviruses; one based on an electrochemical approach and the other a fluorescent based assay and 2) develop prototype microfluidic diagnostic platforms for preclinical and field testing that utilize the assays developed in goal 1. We generated and characterized suitable primers for West Nile Virus RNA detection. Both optical and electrochemical transduction technologies were developed for DNA-RNA hybridization detection and were implemented in microfluidic diagnostic sensing platforms that were developed in this project.

Brozik, Susan M↗

Interim Consequence Management Guidance for a Wide-Area Biological Attack

The Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) program is a collaborative, interagency effort co-chaired by the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense aimed at improving the nation‘s ability to respond to and recover from a large-scale, wide-area, domestic attack involving the release of an environmentally persistent biological warfare agent. The program is focused on understanding interactions between the civilian and military sectors, and in building mutual support to carry out such remediations. This Interim Consequence Management Guidance document provides guidance for decisionmakers in executing activities required to respond to and recover from a biological incident affecting a wide urban area insofar as information is currently available. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis is discussed as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the key threat agents. Most other biological threat agents are much easier to remediate, and in many cases, inactivation would occur naturally within days as a result of environmental exposure; however, the framework and operational questions that need to be addressed are expected to remain the same. The guidance in this document is applicable to (1) enclosed facilities, such as commercial, residential, and continental U.S. military facilities; (2) semi-enclosed facilities, such as subways and public transit facilities; (3) outdoor areas (both localized and wide area), such as building exteriors, streets, parks, and other open spaces; (4) drinking water facilities; and (5) drinking water sources. This document follows an interagency framework [Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents (DHS and EPA 2009)]—which considered Raber et al. (2002) in its development—but takes the framework to a more operational level and provides guidance at key action and decision points.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Global Security Program Management Plan

The Global Security Directorate mission is to protect against proliferant and unconventional nuclear threats –regardless of origin - and emerging new threats. This mission is accomplished as the Los Alamos National Laboratory staff completes projects for our numerous sponsors. The purpose of this Program Management Plan is to establish and clearly describe the GS program management requirements including instructions that are essential for the successful management of projects in accordance with our sponsor requirements. The detailed information provided in this document applies to all LANL staff and their subcontractors that are performing GS portfolio work. GS management is committed to a culture that ensures effective planning, execution, and achievement of measurable results in accordance with the GS mission. Outcomes of such a culture result in better communication, delegated authority, accountability, and increased emphasis on safely and securely achieving GS objectives.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Mini-SHINE/MIPS Experiment

The mission of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. The Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Reactor Conversion subprogram supports the conversion of domestic and international civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of weapons-of-mass-destruction- (WMD-) usable HEU fuel and targets to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and targets. These efforts result in permanent threat reduction because WMD-usable HEU in the civilian fuel cycle is minimized or eliminated. The main technology components of the program are (1) the development of advanced LEU fuels, (2) design and safety analysis for research reactor conversion, and (3) development of targets and processes for the production of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 ( 99 Mo )without using HEU.

Chemerisov, Sergey↗