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Air Exchange Rate Impact on Activity Equilibrium Factors and Inhalation Fractional Equilibrium Factors for Rn, Xe, Kr, Ar, Ne, and Their Progeny in Vapor Intrusion, Risk, and Dose Models

Exposure to the radioactive noble gasses, especially radon, is of high concern and poses a significant risk to humans in an indoor air environment as the second leading cause of lung cancer in the United States. To evaluate and minimize the risks posed by these gasses, it is important to understand their radiological and physical properties. The EPA’s Radon Vapor Intrusion Screening Level (RVISL) calculator calculates indoor air RVISLs based on target working levels (WLs), target excess lifetime cancer risk (ELCR), and annual dose limits for the actinon (Rn-219), thoron (Rn-220), and radon (Rn-222) decay series. The RVISLs are based on inhalation and submersion in gas cloud exposure routes for residential and commercial settings. The RVISLs are analogous to preliminary remediation goals (PRGs) and dose compliance concentrations (DCCs), where the isotope-specific values are in units of activity concentration (activity per unit volume). If the concentration of a parent isotope of radon or its progeny is found to exceed the RVISL, then further action to ensure cleanup of the contaminant may be necessary. In residential and commercial settings, the RVISLs will vary based on the air exchange rate present. The EPA’s Radionuclide PRG and DCC Calculators also assess the risk/dose from noble gases in the air due to household use of water like showering. In this study, a computational method in MATLAB was developed to determine the impact of the air exchange rate on the activity equilibrium factor (A eq ) and the inhalation fractional equilibrium factor (F eq ). Both factors are values that reflect the equilibrium concentrations of progeny to their parent in the air. These factors have a direct impact on the RVISL, PRG, and DCC calculations of WL, ELCR, and annual dose, respectively. This study builds on a previous report that only focused on actinon, thoron, and radon by revisiting the original A eq and F eq calculation methods, as well as including the values for the Rn-207, Rn-209, Rn-210, Rn-211, Rn-215, Rn-216, Rn-217, Rn-218, Rn-223, Ne-24, Ar-42, Ar-43, Ar-44, Kr-74, Kr-75, Kr-76, Kr-77, Kr-88, Kr-89, Xe-120, Xe-121, Xe-122, Xe-123, Xe-135m, and Xe-138 decay chains, which are not currently available in literature. The EPA’s RVISL calculator will be updated to include the new A eq and F eq values for the actinon, thoron, and radon decay chains, while the rest of the calculators will incorporate all the new A eq and F eq values as appropriate.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

User's Manual for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4: Vol. 2 - User's Guide for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4

The RESRAD-BUILD computer code is designed to assess radiological doses to individuals who live or work in a building contaminated with radioactive material. The code is equipped with a user-friendly interface that has many features to facilitate using the computer code and understanding the results. The design of the interface provides various options, from entering data and performing calculations to displaying calculation results. General and context-specific help are available, providing information on editing and viewing the radionuclide database, the definitions of input parameters and their use in the calculations, and the selection of the calculation results for placement into other applications. Two types of sensitivity analysis are supported by the code, i.e., deterministic and probabilistic, that can be used to study the influence of input parameters on the calculation results. This user’s guide provides instructions to help users on how to install the RESRAD-BUILD code, navigate the interface, and use the various features to set up a dose/risk analysis and to view/print the results in text and graphical outputs.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

An Assessment of Potential Dose Impacts from External Contamination on Naval Reactors Facility Waste Canisters (Special Analysis)

This Special Analysis (SA) was performed to address a request by Naval Reactors Facility (NRF) Waste Programs for a permanent exception to limits of removable surface contamination on the exterior of waste canisters shipped to the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility as specified in the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) (PLN-5446). The purpose of this SA is to determine if the NRF-requested levels for removable surface contamination on the exterior of all NRF waste canisters is within the bounds of the current performance assessment (PA). This was done by calculating the groundwater all-pathways dose contribution from surface contamination on the exterior of NRF canisters for the following cases: (1) the exteriors of all NRF waste canisters are contaminated to the 10 CFR 835 Appendix D allowable limits in the current WAC, and (2) the exteriors of all NRF waste canisters are contaminated to the limits requested by NRF Waste Programs. Dose impacts for each case were compared to each other and to the all pathways dose for the PA base case. Dose impacts were also compared to the all pathways dose limit specified in DOE O 435.1. A simple assessment of the potential impacts of the increase in surface contamination using the NRF-requested limits on the biotic, air, and inadvertent intruder pathways was also performed. Based on the results of this SA, the increase in canister exterior contamination limits requested by NRF are well within the bounds of the current PA and will not result in a violation of performance objectives. The results also show the increased limits do not reflect or necessitate a fundamental change to the PA conceptual model, nor a change to the way exterior contamination is not included in PA dose calculations. Therefore, it is recommended the NRF request for an exception to the current limits for external surface contamination be accepted and the revised limits for NRF-generated waste canisters be added to the WAC. The monitoring plan will also be revised to identify external canister contamination as a potential mobile source term that may be detected by monitoring earlier than potential releases from waste. The PA, composite analysis (CA), closure plan, and PA/CA maintenance plan do not require revision. Recommendations are also included for inclusion of NRF procedures used to limit water pool radionuclide variability (and thus canister surface contamination variability) to the waste generator certification process.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

In-Situ Liquid Cell Transmission Electron Microscopy of Nanoparticles from Spent Nuclear Fuel

Noble Metal Particles (NMP) that are present in SNF play an important role in the Fuel Matrix Degradation (FMD) Model that is being considered for predicting the release rate of radionuclides from a waste package. Previous characterization of chemically separated NMP from SNF showed that these were well-crystallized nanoparticles containing Mo, Tc, Ru, Rh, and Pd with some evidence of actinides. These same chemically separated particles were re-characterized following 10 years of storage as the separated material in water. Scanning Transmission Electron Microscopy (STEM) analysis revealed that significant alteration had occurred in this material during storage, resulting in the almost complete degradation of the NMP. We hypothesized that radiolytic damaged had occurred in the material. To support these concepts, we synthesized a mixed Ru-Pd nanoparticle and subjected it to irradiation in the electron microscope in an in-situ liquid cell. We demonstrated that intense radiation can lead to the decomposition of these metallic particles.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Chapter 1

This report documents the revised Performance Assessment (PA) analysis for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) at the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS). A PA analysis is required for DOE-operated facilities that dispose of low-level radioactive waste. PA analyses simulate (1) the release of radionuclides from the disposal site after facility closure, (2) transport of those contaminants through the environment, and (3) exposure/impacts to potential receptors. The purpose of the PA analysis is to demonstrate that the facility is operated in a manner that ensures long-term environmental protection after facility closure, thereby providing for the protection of public health and safety in limiting doses to a hypothetical member of the public (MOP) or an inadvertent human intruder (IHI). DOE Manual (M) 435.1-1, Chg. 3, Radioactive Waste Management (U.S. DOE, 2021b) establishes quantitative post-closure environmental impact limits and requires a facility-specific PA analysis to demonstrate compliance with these limits for DOE low-level waste (LLW) disposed of after September 26, 1988. These limits are defined in terms of human health (e.g., dose limits) with respect to radioactive constituents in the waste.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Chapter 8

This chapter, together with Appendix H, provides the necessary CWTS inventory limits and trigger values for every parent radionuclide not screened out in Sections 2.3.6, 2.3.7, and 2.3.8. Also provided are details associated with how generic and special waste forms are handled on a DU-specific basis, and a discussion of the conversion of preliminary inventory limits (via transport runs summarized in Chapter 5) into final inventory limits for use in the CWTS limits system. Using the final inventory limits, a projected 2065 CWTS inventory is generated for use in the PA closure analysis outlined in Chapter 9.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Appendix F

As a supplement to Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.3, Table F-1 through Table F-24 provide tabular results of the sensitivity analysis calculations for waste disposal timing (Sensitivity Case S6) in NR07E (Cases 3 and 4) and NR26E (Cases 1 through 4). The title of each table identifies the DU, sensitivity case, and performance measure. Section F.1.1 (Table F-1 through Table F-8) presents results for NR07E and Section F.1.2 (Table F-9 through Table F-24) presents results for NR26E. In each table, radionuclides are sorted from highest to lowest nominal concentration or dose factor. Nominal values are when waste disposal occurs at the start of operations; timeline values are when waste disposal occurs at the end of operations. The differences (Δ values) in the last column of each table equal the timeline concentration or dose factor minus the nominal concentration or dose factor, where DF and CF are shorthand designations for dose factor and concentration factor, respectively.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Appendix G

This appendix contains supporting information and key data used during the IHI analysis, including the following: • A list of parent radionuclides requiring IHI inventory limits (Section G.1) • Tables of IHI acute and chronic dose factors, inventory limits, and concentration limits for all DUs (Section G.2) • IHI acute and chronic dose history time profiles for all DUs (Section G.3)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Appendix I

As stated in Section 9.1.2.2, a final inventory of parent radionuclides is projected for every DU at the time of facility operational closure in 2065. These final closure inventories are upper-bound estimates wherein each DU is assumed to reach its activity capacity. Composition vectors based on existing DU inventories are employed to estimate the final compositions of all existing and future DUs. Specifically, (1) the existing DU compositions are assumed to remain constant; (2) future DUs are assigned averaged existing compositions based on appropriately averaged DUs. This information is detailed in Appendix H, Section H.7. In addition, the variability in composition among existing DUs is used to generate log-normal distributions for uncertainty quantification, which is detailed in Section I.1.1.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Modeling of Chemical Slurry Rheology in DWPF Sludge Batch (SB) 10 Simulants

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) treats high-activity radionuclides from sludge through a process called vitrification. This process converts radioactive liquid waste currently stored in tank farms into a solid glass form that is suitable for long-term storage and disposal. Due to the complexities involved in vitrifying this waste within each operation of the Chemical Processing Cell (CPC), waste rheology is studied to characterize the fluid-mechanical properties as it passes through the CPC and into the Melter. To better understand the waste and validate flow behavior, slurry rheology of simulants that represents the waste was studied at various acid stoichiometry percentages and solids concentrations to determine the simulant’s yield stress and viscosity. This research work has been supported by the DOE-FIU Science & Technology Workforce Development Initiative, an innovative program developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) and Florida International University’s Applied Research Center (FIU-ARC). During the spring of 2022, a DOE Fellow intern, Brendon Cintas, spent 10 weeks doing a summer internship at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRS) under the supervision and guidance of Dan Lambert, Chemical Flowsheet Development. The intern’s project was initiated on June 6, 2022, and continued through August 11, 2022 with the objective of assisting scientists at SRNL’s Rheology and Grout Laboratory at Aiken Country Technology Lab (ACTL) better understand the sludge composition on the rheology of a simulant slurry using a HAAKE RheoStress 6000 rheometer and extrapolate the results to the real-waste data.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2022 Long-Term Hydrologic Monitoring Program Report for the Rio Blanco, Colorado Site

This report presents the monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) during the 2022 sampling event at the Rio Blanco, Colorado, Site, where an underground nuclear test was conducted in 1973. The test resulted in residual radionuclide contamination at the detonation depth. The 2022 sampling event included the collection of samples from onsite groundwater wells to monitor for any potential contamination that might be attributed to the Rio Blanco nuclear tests. This report summarizes the laboratory results obtained from the sampling along with the historical results since monitoring began in the 1970s. This annual report and previous reports are available on the LM public website at https://www.energy.gov/lm/rio-blanco-colorado-site. Data collected during this and previous monitoring events are available on the Geospatial Environmental Mapping System (GEMS) website at https://gems.lm.doe.gov/#site=RBL.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Radon Survey of Los Alamos National Laboratory Buildings and Los Alamos County Residential Buildings

A radon survey of office spaces was of interest to LANL for several reasons. First, exposure to natural radon in LANL office spaces has been considered to be outside the regulatory reach of the federal regulations and the U.S. Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) orders, and thus has not been studied as extensively as occupational exposure to other radionuclides and is not subject to the same rigorous radiological controls. Second, a general survey of radon concentrations in LANL workspaces was of interest to management to ensure safe environments for workers and is in keeping with the intent of OSHA requirements. Though radon in LANL offices would not be derived from enhanced radioactive sources, radon exposure in general office spaces has the potential to significantly impact worker risk. The purpose of the 2009 radon survey was to measure and document indoor radon levels across a broad spectrum of office-type workspaces and neighboring homes. The measured concentrations were compared against those measured across the United States and across the world. The results were also compared against a wide variety of radiation protection thresholds such as (1) the action levels of 148 Bq m -3 (the U.S. EPA action level for public housing), (2) ≈1,200 Bq m -3 OSHA threshold for office spaces, (3) effective dose threshold of 1 mSv threshold for defining a radiological worker, (4) 50 mSv occupational effective dose limit, and (5) 0.1 mSv and 1 mSv limits for public exposures from the air pathway and all pathways, respectively.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Effects of Mineral Impurities and Heat on Uranium(VI) Sorption onto Bentonite (Final Report)

Most nuclear waste disposal options include compacted bentonite, consisting of montmorillonite clay, as part of a barrier system to minimize contaminant mobility. Uranium (U) is the primary element in spent nuclear fuel, and from an environmental perspective, a potential contaminant of water resources. Furthermore, uranium may control nuclear fuel degradation rates and the consequent release of other radioactive contaminants based on its diffusive transport away from waste canisters. Uranium sorption onto clay and other mineral surfaces is expected to limit U(VI) mobility in these systems. However, at this point a prediction of U(VI) sorption and transport behavior in performance assessment (PA) models is complicated by a series of factors, such as: (1) the presence of various U(VI) solution species with different charges and sorption characteristics; (2) the complex microstructure of montmorillonite clay resulting in two types of clay porosities and multiple sorption sites; (3) the largely unknown effects of bentonite mineral impurities on pore water chemistry, U(VI) sorption and diffusion behavior; and (4) the potential impacts of heat, generated by the decay of spent fuel, on mineralogical and microstructural transformations, and any subsequent effects on radionuclide sorption and mobility. In this project, we investigated the effects of calcite impurities on U(VI) sorption and diffusion onto montmorillonite before and after mineral exposure to heat. Overall, our main goals were to: 1. Gain a mechanistic understanding of the effects of calcite impurities on U(VI) sorption and diffusion in montmorillonite/bentonite at variable chemical conditions, and before and after mineral exposure to heat; and to 2. Work towards the development of new surface complexation and diffusion models to predict U(VI) sorption and mobility in montmorillonite/bentonite while accounting for the impacts of calcite impurities and heat. In order to achieve these goals, we pursued the following research objectives and tasks: 1. Characterize the effects of calcite impurities on U(VI) sorption onto Na-montmorillonite, and evaluate if and how these effects change due to solids’ exposure to heat (Task 1). 2. Characterize U(VI) surface speciation in solid samples from Task 1, with a particular focus on U(VI) precipitates and co-precipitates (Task 2). 3. Test the relevance of observed changes in U(VI) sorption characteristics for U(VI) diffusive transport behavior in bentonite barriers (Task 3). 4. Evaluate the exclusion of anionic U(VI) solution complexes from clay nanopores (Task 4). 5. Building on Tasks 1-4, start the development of new surface complexation and reactive transport models that can simulate and predict U(VI) sorption and diffusion in complex bentonite systems (Task 5). A detailed description of all tasks, and their specific results and conclusions is provided in this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Innovative Strategies for Long-Term Monitoring of Complex Groundwater Plumes at DOE’s Legacy Sites (Workshop Report)

Most remaining Department of Energy (DOE) sites will require extended periods of institutional control, especially at complex groundwater sites where attenuation-based strategies have been implemented to facilitate closure. The current practice of monitoring—obtaining and analyzing contaminant concentration in groundwater samples at numerous wells—will account for a large portion of the projected life-cycle at these DOE sites unless a new approach is adopted. State-of-the-art technologies are being developed, including in situ sensors, geophysics, radiation mapping, numerical modeling and AI/ML. These technologies can optimize monitoring strategies in space and time, provide spatially extensive information at vulnerable regions and/or provide more continuous monitoring at lower cost. As part of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM’s) efforts to advance long-term monitoring systems, an in-person/virtual hybrid workshop was hosted by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) on January 24 and 25, 2023, in Augusta, Georgia. Because DOE-EM’s complex sites will eventually be transferred to DOE’s Office of Legacy Management (DOE-LM), representatives of DOE-LM were important participants in the workshop. The purpose of the workshop was to identify challenges and opportunities for deploying advanced technologies for long-term monitoring at DOE sites. The key questions during the workshop were: 1) the regulatory acceptance of replacing a process that traditionally has used laboratory sampling and analysis of groundwater samples, and 2) the application of this strategy to the southwestern arid sites that include many of the remaining DOE-EM and DOE-LM complex groundwater plumes. Characteristics common to most arid sites present both limitations and opportunities for advanced technologies. DOE-EM has funded a National Laboratory team from SRNL, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to establish the overarching framework of long-term monitoring by systematically combining advanced hardware and software technologies. This project is titled “Advanced Long-Term Environmental Monitoring Systems (ALTEMIS)” and is sponsored by the DOE-EM Technology Development Program. The multi-laboratory team is currently developing and testing innovative monitoring strategies, including the use of in situ groundwater sensors, geophysics, drone/satellite-based remote sensing, reactive transport modeling, and artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML). The project’s demonstration testbed is at the Savannah River Site (SRS) F-Area Seepage Basins, where a well-characterized complex groundwater plume composed of uranium and other radionuclides is in the latter stages of remediation. The workshop included more than 70 participants, presentations, a field visit to F-Area, breakout working groups, and large group discussion. Participants developed recommendations on five topics: in situ sensors, spatially integrative tools, challenges to regulatory acceptance, AI/ML strategies, and transitioning sites to DOE-LM.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Health Hazards of Exposures to Radioiodine

Iodine is a chemical element with atomic number 53. Iodine-127 is stable (non-radioactive) and commonly found in nature. Elemental iodine is a purple-colored solid at room temperature and pressure, but spontaneously sublimates (turns into vapor). Iodine is an essential element for life, and is required for proper functioning of the thyroid. Iodine is present in many foods, and is readily absorbed by the body and concentrated in the thyroid gland. A fraction of iodine ingested or inhaled is rapidly removed by the kidneys. The rest of the inhaled or ingested iodine is absorbed the by thyroid and retained for many months. Iodine has a biological half-life of approximately 120 days in health individuals. The biological half-life can be shorter in individuals with hyperthyroidism, and longer in individuals with hypothyroidism. Iodine has a number of radioactive isotopes, most of which have relatively short half-lives (days or weeks). Short half-life iodine isotopes are useful for a variety of medical applications, including imaging and cancer therapy. For example, Iodine-123 (half-life 13 hours) is commonly used for medical imaging of the thyroid, while iodine-131 (half-life 8 days) is used for suppressing thyroid function in individuals with hyperthyroidism or ablating (killing) thyroid cells to treat thyroid cancer. Iodine-125 (half-life 59 days) is produced in nuclear reactors, and has medical uses. Although iodine-125 can be used for thyroid imaging, Iodine-123 is more commonly used for that purpose because of its shorter half-life and higher-energy emissions. Iodine-125 is more commonly used for cancer treatment, and can be processed into small metal pellets (seeds) inserted directly into a tumor. Iodine-125 emits low-energy x-rays which can kill tumor cells and generally cannot escape the tumor, sparing other tissues. Medical iodine for imaging or treatment is typically administered orally in the form a pill or liquid solution. A typical adult thyroid scan using iodine-123 involves having the patient swallow between one and four 0.1 millicuries pills, with the exact dose dependent on the patient’s weight. This results in a whole-body committed effective dose of 80 – 320 mrem, and a thyroid equivalent dose of 1443 – 5772 mrem. Note that the whole-body effective dose relates to the overall cancer risk, while the larger equivalent dose to the thyroid only indicates that most of this risk is the result of exposure to the thyroid. These doses are considered safe, although the procedure is not recommended for pregnant or breastfeeding women. In contrast, the quantities of iodine-131 used for treatment of hyperthyroidism and thyroid cancers are much higher. For treatment of hyperthyroidism, 4 – 10 millicuries are administered, while for thyroid cancer the administration can range from 50 – 150 millicuries of I-131. In addition to medical exposures, large populations were exposed to radioiodine as result of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, and the Chernobyl nuclear accident. These populations have been carefully followed for many years to assess the effect of their radiation exposures on cancer risk. As a result, a great deal is known about the cancer risks associated with radioiodine exposure. Because iodine is concentrated in the thyroid, the principal risk of exposure to radioiodine is thyroid cancer. Children have the highest risk of thyroid cancer after exposure to radioactive iodine. According to a large study of Japanese atomic bomb survivors, an effective dose of one Sievert (100,000 mrem) has been observed to increase the risk of thyroid cancer by a factor of 9.5 in children aged zero to nine years old, by a factor of 3 in children aged 10 to 19 years old, and by barely detectable amounts in adults. Another way of quantifying the risk from radioiodine exposure is from risk coefficients, which provide the risk per unit intake of radionuclides in terms of both morbidity (any cancer) and mortality (death). Both morbidity (risk of cancer) and mortality (death) risks are shown in the table below. Note that because thyroid cancer is almost never fatal, the morbidity coefficients are much larger than the mortality coefficients.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

U.S. Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi - November 2022 Meeting Notes and Information Request Status

Information obtained from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi) is required to inform future Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This information also has important implications for the safety and operation of U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. This document summarizes results from the Fiscal Year 2023 (FY2023) U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Fukushima-related information and associated discussions during these meetings benefit operating, new, and advanced reactors. Significant safety insights have been and are continuing to be obtained in several areas: system and component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Furthermore, Daiichi-related activities, such as code modeling improvements and analysis, testing, and new technology deployment efforts, have the potential to offer additional benefits to the operating fleet and new LWR and non-LWR designs. U.S. evaluations of obtained examination information and input regarding future Daiichi examinations are of interest to several organizations within Japan. Since its inception, the U.S. has provided consensus input for high priority time-sequenced examination tasks and supporting research activities. In their Mid-to-Long-term Examination Plan for 1F investigations, TEPCO included all remaining U.S. consensus information requests and additional information requests they identified. TEPCO periodically provides reports on the status of these requests (reflecting D&D priorities, new insights from investigations, and new technologies that become available). Hence, U.S. experts agreed that it was appropriate for TEPCO to track and prioritize these information requests as D&D progresses. U.S. experts will continue to review and comment on the information obtained from examinations and, as needed, provide additional details and relevant background material to support future examinations. As documented in this report, several other items, such as additional details on information requests pertaining to ex-vessel examinations, relevant references from prior research, additional documents to provide insights regarding recent investigation findings, and reviews of recently released documents, were agreed to during the FY2023 meeting.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗