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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 1,045 records · Page 58

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2002

Earth to Moon Transfers - Direct vs Via Libration Points (L1, L2)

Recommend Direct Remote Ocean Area impact disposal for caseswithout hazardous (e.g., radioactive) material on LTV kickstage Controlled Earth contact. Relatively small disposal AV. Avoids close encounter with Moon. Trajectories can be very sensitive to initial conditions (at disposalmaneuver).V to correct for errors is small. Recommend Heliocentric Orbit disposal for cases with hazardousmaterial on LTV kickstage. No Earth or Lunar disposal issues (e.g.. impact location, debris footprint,litter). Relatively low disposal AV cost. Further study required to determine possibility of re-contact with Earth.

Condon, Gerald L.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Subscale Validation of the Subsurface Active Filtration of Exhaust (SAFE) Approach to NTP Ground Testing

Brief History of NTP: Project Rover Began in 1950s by Los Alamos Scientific Labs (now Los Alamos National Labs) and ran until 1970s Tested a series of nuclear reactor engines of varying size at Nevada Test Site (now Nevada National Security Site) Ranged in scale from 111 kN (25 klbf) to 1.1 MN (250 klbf) Included Nuclear Furnace-1 tests Demonstrated the viability and capability of a nuclear rocket engine test program One of Kennedys 4 goals during famous moon speech to Congress Nuclear Engines for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA) Atomic Energy Commission and NASA joint venture started in 1964 Parallel effort to Project Rover was focused on technology demonstration Tested XE engine, a 245-kN (55-klbf) engine to demonstrate startup shutdown sequencing. Hot-hydrogen stream is passed directly through fuel elements potential for radioactive material to be eroded into gaseous fuel flow as identified in previous programs NERVA and Project Rover (1950s-70s) were able to test in open atmosphere similar to conventional rocket engine test stands today Nuclear Furance-1 tests employed a full scrubber system Increased government and environmental regulations prohibit the modern testing in open atmosphere. Since the 1960s, there has been an increasing cessation on open air testing of nuclear material Political and national security concerns further compound the regulatory environment

Test Facilities↗

NASA NTRS2018

Low Power Radioisotope Conversion Technology and Performance Summary

This work presents a summary of low-power radioisotope-based power sources. This includes systems that use direct energy conversion from radioactive decay such as betavoltaics and systems that convert heat generated by the isotope decay. These types of power systems have terrestrial and space-based applications. Their main application is to provide low levels of power in remote environments where long life and reliability are the main objectives. This work looked at the potential performance of these types of systems and the range of output power they can achieve. Also considered was the amount of power that could be achieved from these different conversion technologies, while remaining under the critical limit acceptable for space flight without the need for special handling and controls. This is of interest for space missions where low power levels can be used for operating sensors or other devices, but the expense associated with the incorporation of radioactive material above this critical level would be cost prohibitive.

Colozza, Anthony J.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Information and Best Practices Related to NASA Nuclear Flight Safety for Space Flights Involving Space Nuclear Systems

The purpose of this handbook is to facilitate a repeatable and robust process that promotes clear and effective interfaces between activities and stakeholders focused on meeting nuclear flight safety requirements for missions utilizing space nuclear systems (SNS), within the context of NASA’s broader nuclear-related activities and interfaces. NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety, requires that the NASA project manager “incorporate nuclear flight safety considerations starting with program or project formulation through the point at which the SNS or other radioactive material no longer has the potential to affect Earth’s biosphere.” NASA’s use of SNS inherently involves partnering with other stakeholders to conduct a range of related activities that interface with nuclear flight safety. From a categorical perspective these include: (i) meeting the authorities and licensing requirements for possession and use of nuclear material, as governed by other Federal authorities; (ii) conducting National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) activities for nuclear-enabled missions; (iii) meeting Federal nuclear launch authorization requirements; (iv) conducting radiological contingency planning activities, including those associated with international commitments; (v) performing risk communication and public outreach activities; and (vi) ensuring decommissioning and disposal strategies reflect National policies and interests. It is the intent of this handbook to promote an effective interface between nuclear flight safety and these interrelated categorical activities. In addition to activities undertaken with partnering agencies, there are individual nuclear-related activities and programs that have a nexus to nuclear flight safety, and these include: (i) applicable NASA Standing Review Boards; (ii) the US Department of Energy nuclear safety activities conducted in partnership with NASA under Memoranda of Understanding; (iii) the Department of Defense’s Range Safety activities; (iv) NASA’s general involvement in interagency and international dialogues regarding nuclear safety; (v) the NASA-administered Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board; (vi) NASA’s program and project governance activities and nuclear-specific Technical Discipline Team activities under the Office of the Chief Engineer; and others. It is the intent of this handbook to promote effective leveraging of these additional interrelated organizational activities, as appropriate.

Donald Helton↗

DOE OSTI2011

Current Trends in Gamma Ray Detection for Radiological Emergency Response

Passive and active detection of gamma rays from shielded radioactive materials, including special nuclear materials, is an important task for any radiological emergency response organization. This article reports on the current trends and status of gamma radiation detection objectives and measurement techniques as applied to nonproliferation and radiological emergencies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2012

Reliability Estimation for Double Containment Piping

Double walled or double containment piping is considered for use in the ITER international project and other next-generation fusion device designs to provide an extra barrier for tritium gas and other radioactive materials. The extra barrier improves confinement of these materials and enhances safety of the facility. This paper describes some of the design challenges in designing double containment piping systems. There is also a brief review of a few operating experiences of double walled piping used with hazardous chemicals in different industries. This paper recommends approaches for the reliability analyst to use to quantify leakage from a double containment piping system in conceptual and more advanced designs. The paper also cites quantitative data that can be used to support such reliability analyses.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2013

Revolution in Detection Affairs

The detection of nuclear or radioactive materials for homeland or national security purposes is inherently difficult. This is one reason detection efforts must be seen as just one part of an overall nuclear defense strategy which includes, inter alia, material security, detection, interdiction, consequence management and recovery. Nevertheless, one could argue that there has been a revolution in detection affairs in the past several decades as the innovative application of new technology has changed the character and conduct of detection operations. This revolution will likely be most effectively reinforced in the coming decades with the networking of detectors and innovative application of anomaly detection algorithms.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2014

Characterization of Fuel-Cladding Bond Strength Using Laser Shock

This paper describes new laser-based capabilities for characterization of fuel-cladding bond strength in nuclear fuels, and presents preliminary results obtained from studies on as-fabricated monolithic fuel consisting of uranium-10 wt.% molybdenum alloys clad in 6061 aluminum by hot isostatic pressing. Two complementary experimental methods are employed, laser-shock testing and laser-ultrasonic imaging. Measurements are spatially localized, non-contacting and require minimum specimen preparation, and are therefore ideally suited for applications involving radioactive materials, including irradiated materials. The theoretical principles and experimental approaches employed in characterization of nuclear fuel plates are described. The ability to measure layer thicknesses, elastic properties of the constituents, and the location and nature of laser-shock induced debonds is demonstrated, and preliminary bond strength measurement results are discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2013

Enhancing Staging Capabilities at the Device Assembly Facility

The radioactive material limits allowed by the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Device Assembly Facility (DAF) can support larger quantities than the floor space will accommodate. In order to maximize the full staging bunker capability, National Security Technologies, LLC, (NSTec) is developing a plan to take advantage of these high inventory limits and evaluate staging options such as shelves, racks, and mezzanines. This plan will investigate cost and evaluate U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex-wide alternatives used at other sites (Highly Enriched Uranium Manufacturing Facility, Pantex, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, etc.) that addressed similar situations.

staging, NMMP, nuclear material, DAF↗

DOE OSTI2014

Remote Sensing Laboratory - RSL

One of the primary resources supporting homeland security is the Remote Sensing Laboratory, or RSL. The Laboratory creates advanced technologies for emergency response operations, radiological incident response, and other remote sensing activities. RSL emergency response teams are on call 24-hours a day, and maintain the capability to deploy domestically and internationally in response to threats involving the loss, theft, or release of nuclear or radioactive material. Such incidents might include Nuclear Power Plant accidents, terrorist incidents involving nuclear or radiological materials, NASA launches, and transportation accidents involving nuclear materials. Working with the US Department of Homeland Security, RSL personnel equip, maintain, and conduct training on the mobile detection deployment unit, to provide nuclear radiological security at major national events such as the super bowl, the Indianapolis 500, New Year's Eve celebrations, presidential inaugurations, international meetings and conferences, just about any event where large numbers of people will gather.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2015

System and method for the identification of radiation in contaminated rooms

Devices and methods for the characterization of areas of radiation in contaminated rooms are provided. One such device is a collimator with a collimator shield for reducing noise when measuring radiation. A position determination system is provided that may be used for obtaining position and orientation information of the detector in the contaminated room. A radiation analysis method is included that is capable of determining the amount of radiation intensity present at known locations within the contaminated room. Also, a visual illustration system is provided that may project images onto the physical objects, which may be walls, of the contaminated room in order to identify the location of radioactive materials for decontamination.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2015

Understanding the Value of a Computer Emergency Response Capability for Nuclear Security

The international nuclear community has a great understanding of the physical security needs relating to the prevention, detection, and response of malicious acts associated with nuclear facilities and radioactive material. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC_225_Rev 5) outlines specific guidelines and recommendations for implementing and maintaining an organization’s nuclear security posture. An important element for inclusion into supporting revision 5 is the establishment of a “Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT)” focused on the international communities cybersecurity needs to maintain a comprehensive nuclear security posture. Cybersecurity and the importance of nuclear cybersecurity require that there be a specific focus on developing an International Nuclear CERT (NS-CERT). States establishing contingency plans should have an understanding of the cyber threat landscape and the potential impacts to systems in place to protect and mitigate malicious activities. This paper will outline the necessary components, discuss the relationships needed within the international community, and outline a process by which the NS-CERT identifies, collects, processes, and reports critical information in order to establish situational awareness (SA) and support decision-making

CERT↗

DOE OSTI2015

MODELING OF THE GROUNDWATER TRANSPORT AROUND A DEEP BOREHOLE NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY

The concept of disposal of high-level nuclear waste in deep boreholes drilled into crystalline bedrock is gaining renewed interest and consideration as a viable mined repository alternative. A large amount of work on conceptual borehole design and preliminary performance assessment has been performed by researchers at MIT, Sandia National Laboratories, SKB (Sweden), and others. Much of this work relied on analytical derivations or, in a few cases, on weakly coupled models of heat, water, and radionuclide transport in the rock. Detailed numerical models are necessary to account for the large heterogeneity of properties (e.g., permeability and salinity vs. depth, diffusion coefficients, etc.) that would be observed at potential borehole disposal sites. A derivation of the FALCON code (Fracturing And Liquid CONvection) was used for the thermal-hydrologic modeling. This code solves the transport equations in porous media in a fully coupled way. The application leverages the flexibility and strengths of the MOOSE framework, developed by Idaho National Laboratory. The current version simulates heat, fluid, and chemical species transport in a fully coupled way allowing the rigorous evaluation of candidate repository site performance. This paper mostly focuses on the modeling of a deep borehole repository under realistic conditions, including modeling of a finite array of boreholes surrounded by undisturbed rock. The decay heat generated by the canisters diffuses into the host rock. Water heating can potentially lead to convection on the scale of thousands of years after the emplacement of the fuel. This convection is tightly coupled to the transport of the dissolved salt, which can suppress convection and reduce the release of the radioactive materials to the aquifer. The purpose of this work has been to evaluate the importance of the borehole array spacing and find the conditions under which convective transport can be ruled out as a radionuclide transport mechanism. Preliminary results show that modeling of the borehole array, including the surrounding rock, predicts convective flow in the system with physical velocities of the order of 10-5 km/yr over 105 years. This results in an escape length on the order of kilometers, which is comparable to the repository depth. However, a correct account of the salinity effects reduces convection velocity and escape length of the radionuclides from the repository.

Modeling↗

DOE OSTI2015

Aerial Radiological Measurement Compatibility in Emergency Response

In the event of a large atmospheric release of radioactive material, aerial radiological measurements (aerial gamma spectroscopy) may be employed to show where the activity has deposited on the ground. If there are multiple organizations conducting aerial measurements, there will be certain requirements for the detection systems and data collection procedures that should be considered, so that the data from all systems can be effectively combined to present a unified map of the contamination. The presentation will detail some of these requirements.

Okada, Colin E.↗

DOE OSTI2016

Turbo FRMAC 2016 Version 7.1.0

The Turbo FRMAC (TF) software program is the software implementation of the science and methodologies utilized in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). The software automates the calculations described in volumes 1 of "The Federal Manual for Assessing Environmental Data during a Radiological Emergency" (2015 version). In the event of the intentional or accidental release of radioactive material, the software is used to guide and govern the response of the Federal, State, Local, and Tribal governments. The manual, upon which the software is based, is unclassified and freely available on the Internet.

Fulton, John↗

DOE OSTI2017

Turbo FRMAC 2016 v. 7.3.0

Madrid, Gregory J.↗

DOE OSTI2017

Turbo FRMAC 2016 v. 7.2.0

Madrid, Gregory J.↗

DOE OSTI2015

Impacts of Vehicle (In)Security

Nuclear and radioactive material is routinely transported worldwide every day. Since 2010, the complexity of the transport vehicle to support such activities has grown exponentially. Many core functions of a vehicle are now handled by small embedded computer modules with more being added each year to enhance the owner’s experience and convenience. With a system as complex as today’s automobile, the potential for cyber security issues is certain. Hackers have begun exploring this new domain with public information increasingly disseminated. Because vehicles are allowed into and around secure nuclear facilities, the potential for using a vehicle as a new cyber entry point or vector into the facility is now plausible and must be mitigated. In addition, compromising such a vehicle could aide in illicit removal of nuclear material, putting sensitive cargo at risk. Because cyber attacks can now be introduced using vehicles, cyber security, needs to be integrated into an organization’s design basis threat document. Essentially, a vehicle now extends the perimeter for which security professionals are responsible.Electronic Control Units (ECU) responsible for handling all core and ancillary vehicle functions are interconnected using the controller area network (CAN) bus. A typical CAN network in a modern automobile contains 50 or more ECUs. The CAN protocol now supports a wide variety of areas, including automotive, road transportation, rail transportation, industrial automation, power generation, maritime, military vehicles, aviation, and medical devices. In many ways, the nuclear industry is employing the CAN bus protocol or other similar broadcast serial networks. This paper will provide an overview of the current state of automobile and CAN Bus security, as well as an overview of what has been publicly disclosed by many research organizations. It will then present several hypotheses of how vehicle security issues may impact nuclear activities. An initial discussion of how a vehicle can be used as a new threat vector to penetrate secure facilities will be presented. This includes how a modern automobile can be used as the exploitation mechanism for nearby devices such as laptops, cell phones, and wireless access points. Additional discussion will highlight how vehicle security might impact transportation of nuclear material through remote exploitation of a moving vehicle. The final discussion will include what possible implications might be relative to the physical protection systems at nuclear facilities. The audience will also be given details regarding the complexity of attack, thus implying the likelihood of successful exploitation, and information on how such attacks may be mitigated. Emerging security products for automobiles will be discussed and other mitigation methods will be detailed (e.g. disabling vehicle cellular modems). As a result, the audience will have a greater understanding of how to add vehicle security as a part of a comprehensive nuclear security policy.Finally, this paper will highlight the similarities between CAN Bus and other broadcast serial bus networks such as Profibus or DeviceNet, helping educate the reader on how susceptible this type of networking is to nefarious attacks and how it might affect components connected to many different nuclear systems, including control systems, safety systems, emergency systems, and support systems.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗