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Building 9206 at the Y-12 National Security Complex was constructed in 1944 for the Manhattan Project as a predecessor to the much larger Building 9212. The purpose of Building 9206 was to perform chemical recycle, metal production, and recover of highly enriched uranium, as well as process product from the electromagnetic separation process.
The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will process and stabilize waste that is stored in underground tanks on the Hanford Site. Currently, the first phase of the planned WTP startup and operation, called Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW), involves directly feeding only the liquid portion of the waste to electric melters in the WTP Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Vitrification Facility without full pretreatment. A second portion of the tank waste, called high-level waste (HLW), is set to contain most of the radioactivity inventory.
For the GW and air pathways described in Sections 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7, POs are evaluated for MOPs based on a 100-meter POA for all DUs. In this chapter, POs are assessed for the IHI who may physically disrupt the facility at some time after the end of IC and when the POA is at the DUs (Aleman et al., 2021).
Tank 48H currently holds legacy material containing organic tetraphenylborate (TPB) compounds from the operation of the In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) process. TPB was added during the ITP process to precipitate the otherwise soluble cesium as insoluble cesium TPB (CsTPB), but excessive benzene generation from TPB degradation curtailed this treatment method. The contents of Tank 48H, which include approximately 26.000 kg of potassium TPB (KTPB) and trace CsTPB, are not compatible with the waste treatment facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) since the organic content and the associated flammability issues pose a challenge to the salt processing and sludge processing facilities within the liquid waste system. An in-tank process to remove (or decompose) TPB safely would be of great value. Previous testing at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) demonstrated the destruction of glycolate via chemical oxidation using sodium permanganate with simulated and radioactive waste. Scoping tests were performed to study the destruction of TPB to determine if the contents of Tank 48H would be amenable to the same type of destruction. Partial destruction of TPB was observed in Tank 48H simulants under mild conditions (e g., pH 11, room temperature) with no definitive indication of benzene generation. To build upon the success of the scoping tests, an additional study was requested to provide a better understanding of the underlying chemistry for Tank 48H content destruction using sodium permanganate. Three experiments were performed with Tank 48H simulants at 40 °C to determine the efficacy of using sodium permanganate for TPB destruction. Three starting pH values were selected: 1) pH 11 for comparison with the previous work at room temperature, 2) pH 10 as the minimum pH recommended by the Corrosion Control Program (CCP) for in-tank processing, and 3) pH 8 to determine the effectiveness of TPB destruction at near neutral pH. While below the allowable pH for the CCP, the experiment at pH 8 was performed to study the TPB-Permanganate reaction under more extreme conditions and further verify the potential for out-of-tank processing.
Virtually all activities conducted in the TA-55 FOD (Facility Operations Division) (TA-55, TA-50,RLWTF[Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility], RLUOB[Radiological Laboratory/Utilities/Office Building], TWF, TA-63 [Transuranic Waste Facility], RANT, TA-54 West [Radioassay Nondestructive Testing Facility], WCRRF [Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility]and CMR[Chemistry and Metallurgy Research])facilities generate waste. Generation and management of waste arecomplex activitiessubject toFederal and State regulations as well as DOE(Department of Energy)and Laboratory requirements. Improper management of waste can result in civiland/or criminal penalties as well as potential significant impacts to operations.
The updated Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) (DOE/RL-2019-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau (FY 2020)) provides an all-pathways dose projection to a hypothetical future member of the public from all planned low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities and potential contributions from all other projected end-state sources of radioactive material left at the Hanford Site following site closure. Its primary purpose is to support the decision-making process of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under DOE O 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management, related to managing low-level waste disposal facilities at the Hanford Site. A key aspect of conducting a CA is selecting the radionuclides to be analyzed. This document describes the selection process for radionuclides to be included in the quantitative analysis.
This panel focused on the US DOE High-Level radioactive Waste (HLW) definition interpretation. Discussion integrated topics such as the issuance of the HLW interpretation Federal Registration Notice, the status of the draft Environmental Assessment that analyzes the treatment and commercial disposal of up to 10,000-gallons of SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility recycle wastewater in South Carolina, and the path forward. Panelists with presentations: Status on the Environmental Assessment for the Commercial Disposal of Defense Waste Processing Facility Recycle Wastewater from SRS (Theresa Kliczewski); Enhancing Stakeholder Engagement on the HLW interpretation (Kara Colton, Rick McLeod); Technical Aspects of Potential Disposal of SRS DWPF Recycle Wastewater (Kent Rosenberger)
This report examines the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for insider threat mitigation (ITM) programs in nuclear security facilities. Insider threat detection presents unique challenges due to the subtle and adaptive nature of these threats, the complex signatures involved, and the scarcity of available data for analysis. Traditional human-centered approaches, while essential, face limitations in processing large amounts of data continuously and detecting subtle patterns across multiple systems. AI technologies can potentially address these limitations by providing 24/7 monitoring capabilities, identifying complex patterns that might escape human observation, and offering consistent application of security criteria. However, the deployment of AI in nuclear security contexts introduces significant new risks, including workflow disruption, expanded attack surfaces, potential for misuse, and ethical concerns regarding privacy, fairness, transparency, safety, and security. The high-consequence nature of nuclear security decisions demands careful consideration of these risks and systematic approaches to their mitigation.
This calculation is to be used for accident analysis at the Waste Storage Facilities (WSF). The objective of this analysis is to determine: The 95th percentile dose to the public and co-located workers used for accident analysis consistent with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145 Position 3 using MACCS2 and five years (2010-2014) of LLNL meteorological data.
This document provides guidelines, whereby the physical parameters associated with postulated flammable/combustible liquid pool fires are determined (thermal analysis) in order to estimate the number of waste containers impacted. Pool fire damage to waste containers may occur due to a container being fully engulfed (within the periphery of the pool), partially engulfed, or within the critical heat flux distance. The methodology described here for estimating the size of the pool fire is developed using spill characteristics outlined in Chapter 65 of the SFPE Handbook (Ref. 7) and testing done by Hansen (Ref. 25). For exposures, the critical flux height is determined using the detailed method of Shokri and Beyler (Ref. 8) from the flame height, calculated as described by Heskestad (Ref. 7) and the average black body emissive power, determined using the method of Shokri and Beyler (Ref. 8). Three types of liquid pool fires should be considered; unconfined crash/instantaneous spill fires, unconfined continuously flowing (also called metered leak) spill fires, and confined spill fires. All fuel sources should be considered consistent with the facility Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). However, the most likely liquid fuel sources present in TRU waste facilities are those present on TRU waste handling vehicles (forklifts, pallet movers, transport trucks, etc.). This method can also be used for assessing damage to items other than waste containers or other methods of analysis may be used with appropriate justification.
This calculation is to be used when developing accident analysis scenarios involving aircraft fuel fires at the Waste Storage Facility (WSF). The objectives of the calculation are to determine (1) the Source Term from releases of TRU waste involved in impacts, impacts with fuel fire, and fuel fire with no impact; and (2) the plume sensible heat from various sizes of gasoline pool fires.
An expert panel consisting of the document authors was assembled by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) and tasked with (1) identifying technical and regulatory limitations to treating and disposing of grouted low-activity waste (LAW), and (2) with identifying and evaluating a wide range of technical solutions to these limitations. The analysis included technologies to allow inventory management and/or improve retention of iodine, technetium, and nitrate either in the waste packages, or within the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF), and, technologies to ensure regulated organics are below Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) Land Disposal Restriction (LDR) levels.
Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) contracted Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in support of their maturation testing and analysis to develop and deploy an ambient temperature solidification/stabilization process for low-activity waste (LAW) (referred to as “grout” in this report). The intent of this effort is to support a sample-and-send regulatory and processing strategy in the Hanford 200 West Area, specifically considering grout waste forms disposal at Hanford in the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). Currently the disposal of grouted LAW is not an option because the IDF is not permitted to receive this waste form. The material presented in this report is intended to help inform the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the site operating contractors, regulatory agencies, and stakeholders of the future implications of IDF disposal of a grouted LAW waste form, specifically for the behavior of nitrate (NO 3 - ) and nitrite (NO 2 - ) at the Hanford. The only calculation of nitrate release from a hypothetical grouted LAW inventory in the IDF showed that the overall release was slightly above the compliance limit of 45 mg/L nitrate and 3.32 mg/L nitrate after 1000 years (Asmussen et al. 2019). As such, uncertainty around the impact of nitrate and nitrite release from the IDF was identified in the recent National Academies of Sciences study of Hanford supplemental LAW by both the national laboratory team and Hanford stakeholders (Bates et al. 2023). However, these calculations (and others for the IDF involving secondary waste grout) may be conservative as no nitrate and nitrite retention in the grout waste form was assumed, nor any attenuation in the subsurface. There is evidence from the literature of processes that can attenuate nitrate migration both in the waste form and in the Hanford subsurface. If found to be technically defensible and likely to occur in the IDF and associated subsurface, then these processes should be included in modeling of the IDF to represent the behavior of nitrate and nitrite more accurately. Doing so would remove unnecessary conservatism in the modeling projections and reduce the uncertainty in assessments of facility compliance of a grouted LAW waste form in the IDF.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Hanford Field Office’s primary mission is to safely and effectively treat Hanford’s tank waste and deliver environmental remediation. Mixed radioactive waste is stored in the underground tanks at the Hanford Site. It was recently estimated that retrieval of the waste in the 200 West Area underground tanks in the SY, S, SX, and U Tank Farms will result in about 41 million gallons of mixed low-level waste (MLLW) (RPP-RPT-65147, Rev. 1). The current plan is to retrieve at least 22 S, SX, and U Farm tanks and pretreat1 to produce pretreated tank waste (PTW) which will be further treated (including solidification /immobilization) for Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Land Disposal Restriction (LDR) organics and inorganics before being transferred to an offsite out-of-state facility for disposal (RPP-PLAN-66135, Rev. 2). In addition, solidified PTW from the 200 East Area may also be transferred to an offsite out-of-state facility for disposal to ensure availability of critical Double-Shell Tank space, meet retrieval obligations, and optimize 200 East Area operations.
All waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) is subject to one or more types of regulations and must be managed properly. This document describes LANL requirements for waste generated and managed by waste generators and Treatment and Storage Facilities (TSFs) to ensure compliance with legal mandates and Laboratory requirements as necessary to protect human health, safety, and the environment. This document has been revised as part of a process in which the Laboratory systematically plans, documents, executes, and evaluates its management of regulated waste streams.
Process acceptable knowledge (AK) is a waste stream characterization method that can be used to meet all or part of the waste analysis requirements appropriate for the waste. The method may include documented knowledge of process (KOP), additional characterization data, and/or facility records of analysis. LANL will use process AK to ensure chemical compatibility; assign matrix parameter categories and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) hazardous waste numbers (HWNs) commonly referred to as EPA codes to waste streams; and determine the waste material parameters and radionuclides present in waste streams.
The objective of this report is to provide a literature review relevant to the question of whether colloid facilitated transport of plutonium is enhanced in a cementitious groundwater system on the Savannah River Site (SRS). Contaminant transport is commonly described as taking place in a system with a mobile aqueous phase and an immobile solid phase. There has been an increasing awareness of a third phase, a mobile solid phase, also referred to as a mobile colloidal phase. Mobile colloids consist of organic and/or inorganic submicron-particles that move with groundwater flow. When radionuclides are associated with the mobile colloids, the net effect is that radionuclides can move faster through the subsurface system than would be predicted by transport models that do not include mobile colloids. It is important to distinguish between subsurface colloids and subsurface mobile colloids. The subsurface environment includes an enormous reservoir of colloids, but only a tiny fraction, if any, are mobile. Mobile colloid formation is commonly described as involving a three-step process: genesis, stabilization, and transport. It was concluded that there is a strong likelihood that submicron colloids of plutonium exist near the source term, (i.e., the genesis step is likely completed). While such particles have not been directly detected, it is highly likely that plutonium could either attach to submicron particles in the sediment or that submicron plutonium fragments exist at the source. However, the tendency for these plutonium colloids to move in the SRS subsurface is extremely low, especially in engineered cementitious environments where the ionic strength of the solution and the elevated concentrations of divalent cations greatly curtails colloid suspension stability (i.e., the stabilization step is likely not completed). Together these data strongly indicate that plutonium-bearing colloids would likely exist in the near field of a tank closure facility, but the colloids would be unlikely to be mobile, thereby providing a vector for enhanced transport. Under cementitious leachate impacted groundwater conditions, it is reasonable to assume plutonium transport occurs primarily as a two-phase system, a mobile aqueous phase and an immobile solid phase.
Table A-1, Table A-2, and Table A-3, respectively, list SAs, UDQEs, and other analyses and assessments prepared in support of the ELLWF since the previous ELLWF PA was issued in early 2008.