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At least 1,045 records · Page 58

Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site (Rev.3)

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, requires that performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities be maintained by the responsible field office. This plan describes the activities performed to maintain the PA and the CA for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The plan is based on DOE Order 435.1 Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2007), DOE Manual 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual (DOE 2011), and DOE Standard DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation (DOE 2017). The facility’s Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) specifies conditions for the continuing operation of a LLW facility. The DAS is issued based on a review of the facility's PA, CA, the maintenance plan, preliminary closure plan, and preliminary monitoring plan. The DAS specifies the limits and conditions on construction, design, operations, and closure of the low-level waste facility based on these reviews. The Maintenance Plan uses an Unreviewed Disposal Question (UDQ)/Unreviewed Composite Analysis Question (UCAQ) change control process to identify, evaluate, and control planned or discovered changes affecting the PA, CA, DAS, or other documents composing the Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB). The UDQ/UCAQ process uses the PA and CA GoldSim models to calculate updated results, assess the significance of changes, and to assess the need to revise the PA, CA, or DAS. In addition to the change control process, the Maintenance Plan requires an annual review of all changes and an annual assessment of the need to revise RWMB documents, plans, and programs. The cumulative effect of all changes is assessed annually by preparing a revised PA and CA baseline model that is used to update PA and CA results. The updated results are used to assess compliance with the PA performance objectives and the CA dose constraint, and to assess the need to revise the PAs, CAs, and other documents, plans, and programs supporting the RWMB. An Annual Summary Report documenting the results and conclusions of the annual review is prepared and submitted to DOE.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Activated Metals at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Activated Metals (ORNLACTMETAL1, Revision 6 [ORNL 2018a]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the ORNL Activated Metals waste stream meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The ORNL Activated Metals waste stream is acceptable for disposal with the conditions that the total cobalt-60 ( 60 Co) activity shall not exceed 1.1E+14 Bq, the total niobium-94 ( 94 Nb) activity shall not exceed 4.5E+10 Bq, the total cesium-137 ( 137 Cs) activity shall not exceed 1.1E+12 Bq, the total lead-210 ( 210 Pb) activity shall not exceed 1.3E+09 Bq, and the total radium-226 ( 226 Ra) activity shall not exceed 5.0E+11 Bq.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Data Release Report for Source Physics Experiment 4Prime (SPE-4Prime) Nevada National Security Site (Revision 1)

The fourth test in the Source Physics Experiment series (SPE-4Prime) was conducted at a granite site in Nevada on May 21, 2015, at 18:35:44.000,003,989 ± 20 nanoseconds Coordinated Universal Time. The explosive source was 69.1 kilograms (kg) (including detonator assembly) of Composition C4 plastic explosive (89.14 kg TNT equivalent) detonated at a depth of 87.2 meters (m). The explosion was recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that includes sensors both at near-field (less than 100 m) and far-field (100 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component accelerometers installed at various depths from 7 to 99 m in boreholes positioned around the source hole, and a set of single-component vertical accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network was composed of a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, and three-component accelerometers at distances of 100 m to 25 kilometers. Infrasound data were collected from ground-based sensor arrays at distances out to 5 kilometers. This revised document includes a new Section 3.2.2, which is a discussion of clock timing issues discovered at four far-field stations.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Data Release Report for Source Physics Experiment 4Prime (SPE-4Prime) Nevada National Security Site

The fourth test in the Source Physics Experiment series (SPE-4Prime) was conducted at a granite site in Nevada on May 21, 2015, at 18:35:44.000,003,989 ± 20 nanoseconds Coordinated Universal Time. The explosive source was 69.1 kilograms (kg) (including detonator assembly) of Composition C4 plastic explosive (89.14 kg TNT equivalent) detonated at a depth of 87.2 meters (m). The explosion was recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that includes sensors both at near-field (less than 100 m) and far-field (100 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component accelerometers installed at various depths from 7 to 99 m in boreholes positioned around the source hole, and a set of single-component vertical accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network was composed of a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, and three-component accelerometers at distances of 100 m to 25 kilometers. Infrasound data were collected from ground-based sensor arrays at distances out to 5 kilometers.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Yield-Weighting Approaches for Calculating Radiologic Inventories for Individual Underground Nuclear Tests at the Nevada National Security Site

This memo supplements a set of notes developed in 2011 that outline two processes to identify and calculate unclassified radionuclide inventories for individual underground detonations conducted at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The calculations are meant to be based upon unclassified yield information listed in U.S. Department of Energy (2015) and the unclassified total radionuclide inventory data summarized in either Bowen et al. (2001) or Finnegan et al. (2016).

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

The Post-Closure Inspection Report For Closed Non- Resource Conservation And Recovery Act (RCRA) Corrective Action Units (CAUs) On The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), For Calendar Year 2018

This letter serves as the Calendar Year 2018 post-closure inspection letter report for the following Non-RCRA CAUs located on the NNSS, including CAUs located on the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) that are accessed through the NNSS Main Gate. Use restriction issues that were identified in the 2017 inspections were addressed in 2018.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Hydrologic Source Term Processes and Models for Underground Nuclear Tests at Rainier Mesa and Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site (Rev. 1.0)

Over 800 underground nuclear tests were conducted at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), roughly a third of which were beneath the water table. The total inventory of radionuclides associated with underground nuclear tests at NNSS has been estimated to include over 108 curies (Ci) of radioactivity associated with 43 long-lived radioisotopes. As a result, there has been mounting concern about environmental risks posed by residual radioactivity from these tests, and, in particular, the potential for radioactivity to enter and migrate in groundwater. The risks are dependent, in part, on the physical, chemical, and radiochemical mechanisms that control how radionuclides are generated and distributed in the subsurface during a test, how they become dissolved or otherwise incorporated in groundwater after a test, and how they migrate in groundwater away from a test.The subject of this report involves the development of quantitative information related to the Hydrologic Source Term (HST) for underground tests conducted in the Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) at the NNSS.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 424: Area 3 Landfill Complex, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0. with ROTC 1

This Closure Report provides the documentation for closure of the Area 3 Landfill Complex Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 424. The site is located on the Tonopah Test Range, approximately 225 kilometers (140 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The purpose of this CR is to: Document the closure activities and provide the information collected, as recommended in the CADD. (DOE, 1998a) and proposed in the CAP (DOE~ 1998b ); Provide a Post-Closure Inspection Plan; Obtain a Notice of Completion from the NDEP; Recommend the movement of CAU 424 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Site-Directed Research and Development Report (FY 2018 Annual Report)

This report compiles multiple articles describing activities developed and performed under the Site-Directed Research and Development Program for the benefit the Nation during Fiscal Year 2018. Sustained investment and ongoing core innovation are the keys to successful research and development programs. These elements drive the Site-Directed Research and Development (SDRD) Program and provide solutions to some of the most challenging problems our nation and our allies face. Our Nevada enterprise, consisting of both our management and operating entity and our NNSA field office, is aggressively investing in SDRD and injecting innovation through strategic partnerships. Our partnerships with universities, industry, and our sister institutions within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) build upon our core capabilities and allow us to create innovative solutions to support our mission requirements. In 2018, we raised the investment level of SDRD for only the second time in the history of the program. Nearly at our congressionally authorized limit, SDRD has substantial resources to successfully address numerous issues. Investment is only one part of the equation; innovation is generated through collaborations that bring discovery and provide the “technical differentiation” and the return on investment we seek. This report demonstrates an enduring theme of how partnerships help us drive the best outcomes and provide the maximum impact possible, while using our resources efficiently.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Nevada National Security Site 2018 Waste Management Monitoring Report: Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site. This report summarizes the 2018 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Multiyear Analysis of the Fate and Transport of Contaminated Soils at Plutonium Valley and the Smoky Site, Nevada National Security Site

Desert Research Institute (DRI) has collected approximately 10 years of atmospheric and hydrologic data at Plutonium Valley and the Smoky Site on the Nevada National Security Site to identify the potential for radionuclide-contaminated soils to be transported via wind and water. Plutonium preferentially binds to finer soil particles (Shinn et al., 1993; Miller et al., 2015), which can be transported through erosion processes. Data collected by DRI are used to determine the mechanisms and thresholds that result in the transport of radionuclide-contaminated soils, and climate model projections are used to understand how these mechanisms may change in the future. This work will help identify the parameters and threshold conditions that should be incorporated into post-closure monitoring plans for these and other Soils Corrective Action Unit (CAU) sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗