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At least 1,045 records · Page 58
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

Security Evaluation of Two Intrusion Detection Systems in Smart Grid SCADA Environment

The increased complexity and interconnectivity of SCADA infrastructure in the power system have exposed it to the multitude of vulnerabilities. There is a growing emphasis towards developing an efficient intrusion detection system (IDS) to strengthen the security of the SCADA control system. This is a research-in-progress paper which presents the application of two anomaly-based intrusion detection systems (AIDS) in detecting the stealthy cyber-attack on the SCADA control system. We have applied the IDS tools Snort and Bro, in designing the IDS and later, compared their performances in terms of detection rate and latency in the alert packets with a motive of selecting better IDS for the SCADA security. Specifically, the timing-based rule is applied to identify the malicious packets based on the high temporal frequency in the network traffic. For the case study, we have implemented the SCADA based protection scheme which performs an autonomous protection to mitigate the system disturbances. We first implemented the stealthy cyber-attack which compromised the SCADA controller followed by data integrity attack on the system generator. Next, we perform the impact analysis during the attack followed by performance evaluation of IDS tools. Our experimental results show that the IDS tools are efficient in detecting cyber-attacks within an acceptable time frame for different sizes of network packets.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2015

Co-Simulation Platform For Characterizing Cyber Attacks in Cyber Physical Systems

Smart grid is a complex cyber physical system containing a numerous and variety of sources, devices, controllers and loads. Communication/Information infrastructure is the backbone of the smart grid system where different grid components are connected with each other through this structure. Therefore, the drawbacks of the information technology related issues are also becoming a part of the smart grid. Further, smart grid is also vulnerable to the grid related disturbances. For such a dynamic system, disturbance and intrusion detection is a paramount issue. This paper presents a Simulink and OPNET based co-simulated test bed to carry out a cyber-intrusion in a cyber-network for modern power systems and smart grid. The effect of the cyber intrusion on the physical power system is also presented. The IEEE 30 bus power system model is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the simulated testbed. The experiments were performed by disturbing the circuit breakers reclosing time through a cyber-attack in the cyber network. Different disturbance situations in the proposed test system are considered and the results indicate the effectiveness of the proposed co-simulated scheme.

cyber attack characterization↗
DOE OSTI2021

Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids: A Semi-Supervised Deep Learning Approach

The dependence on advanced information and communication technology increases the vulnerability in smart grids under cyber-attacks. Recent research on unobservable false data injection attacks (FDIAs) reveals the high risk of secure system operation, since these attacks can bypass current bad data detection mechanisms. To mitigate this risk, this paper proposes a data-driven learning-based algorithm for detecting unobservable FDIAs in distribution systems. We use autoencoders for efficient dimension reduction and feature extraction of measurement datasets. Further, we integrate the autoencoders into an advanced generative adversarial network (GAN) framework, which successfully detects anomalies under FDIAs by capturing the unconformity between abnormal and secure measurements. Also, considering that the datasets collected from practical power systems are partially labeled due to expensive labeling costs and missing labels, the proposed method only requires a few labeled measurement data in addition to unlabeled data for training. Numerical simulations in three-phase unbalanced IEEE 13-bus and 123-bus distribution systems validate the detection accuracy and efficiency of this method.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Decentralized Signal Processing and Distributed Control of Collaborative Autonomous Networks (17-ERD-101 LDRD Final Report)

Intelligent autonomous sensor networks, often comprised of large numbers of sensors, must be capable of jointly exploiting data collected at each agent in the network, and using that data to optimize their future actions towards multiple mission objectives. Centralized signal processing and optimization solutions process all data and determine all future actions at a single agent, and the resulting information and commands are disseminated back to the network. The communications bandwidth this requires and the single point of failure the central agent represents often make these solutions untenable for national security applications. In this project, several fundamental algorithms for solving both the decentralized signal processing and network optimization were developed, as well as simulation software to validate the results of these algorithms at scale. Specifically, novel algorithms for Bayesian decentralized estimation and decentralized detection and optimization based on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) were developed for autonomous sensor networks and published in the literature. The first large scale simulation of autonomous sensor networks (1000 agents) was conducted on this project, validating the performance of the developed algorithms. These algorithms and simulation tools are critical components of any decentralized autonomous network and have current and future national security applications, including distributed sensor networks for detection, estimation, and tracking problems, and large decentralized cyber-physical infrastructure such as the power grid.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity for Grid Connected eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) Station (CyberX) (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

This report summarizes the activities conducted under the DOE VTO funded project DE- EE0008451, where ABB Inc. (ABB), in collaboration with Idaho National Laboratory (INL), APS Global (APS), and XOS Trucks (XOS) pursued the development of a cyber-resilient extreme fast charging (XFC) management system. This project entitled Cybersecurity for Grid Connected eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) Station (CyberX) focuses on a resilient architecture for smart charging EV Supply Equipment (EVSE) device control and Coordinated Anomaly Detection System (CADS) features that can be added at the charging site depot level to increase cybersecurity. The project was split into two budget periods focused first on developing the threat model and resilient control concepts and second on testing, improving, and validating those developed resilient control algorithms and features with a focus on key vulnerabilities identified during the threat assessment portion of the project. During the first budget period of the CyberX project, the ABB led team focused on activities to identify, model, and quantitatively prioritize high-impact attack scenarios with potential cyber-physical effects while also modeling and developing concepts for a resilient control system that could securely address integration of DERs and other resources with EV charging. Development of the security focused XFC management system (XMS) was accomplished first by offline simulation using a developed XFC station or depot with 480V input level and simulating measurement inputs to monitoring and control systems in concept development. A representative distribution grid model was developed supporting an EV charging site model with BESS and 6 general EV charging models. These EV charging models allowed multiple configurations of charging level, multiple connected protection and measurement devices, and simulation function to show general compromise of EV, BESS, and protection features based on parallel threat analysis. During the second budget period, the EV site and supporting systems model was developed in more detail and converted from offline model to real-time to real-time with EV charging hardware in the loop (HIL). The resilient control architecture developed as concept in the first part of the project was further tested and validated for integration of local energy resources and XFC charging station site equipment while maintaining cybersecure operating principles. The proposed resilient architecture for smart charging and cybersecurity features consists of two main concepts developed and tested within the project. The first concept is an XFC management system (XMS) consisting of a hardware gateway, software platform, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) or Distribution Management System integration components. The second concept is a Coordinated Anomaly Detection System (CADS) which forms a primarily software-related subsystem of the total CyberX solution focused on monitoring system measurements, estimation of measurement states, and predicting current at the utility point of interaction based on machine learning for anomaly detection.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering Adoption in University Engineering Programs: An Overview of CIE Integration Successes at Nine U.S. Educational Institutions

This report examines the adoption of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in university engineering programs, driven by the need to protect critical energy infrastructure from adversarial threats. CIE equips current and future engineers and technicians with the necessary mindset, skills, and competencies to enhance the resilience of engineered systems against cyber attacks. This report highlights nine academic partners who are incorporating CIE into their curricula through various approaches, including lectures, courses, and certificates.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Responsible Adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Electric Grid Operations

The future of the grid will be powered by AI—or undermined by it. Artificial intelligence is rapidly reshaping grid operations, improving fault detection, forecasting accuracy, and real-time optimization. As AI systems move closer to operational decision loops, however, they introduce new consequence pathways: expanded attack surfaces, model integrity risks, regulatory exposure, and human-automation challenges. This talk presents a consequence-driven framework for deploying AI responsibly in the electric grid. Attendees will gain practical strategies to strengthen resilience, boost reliability, and deploy AI securely — ensuring the grid of the future is not only smarter but safer.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Provable Security and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure – Next Steps

With the conclusion of the Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project on Provable Security and Resilience (PSaR) in Critical Infrastructure, we present forward-looking technical concepts and strategies that build on the project’s outcomes and INL’s long-standing expertise in infrastructure protection. The challenge is to protect critical infrastructure and functions much more efficiently at scale than capable adversaries can attack at scale. After summarizing progress and ongoing work we’ll discuss what are the challenges that remain and what are new/emerging technologies, strategies, and processes to meet those challenges. Finally, we’ll layout concepts that integrate with other protection work in the coming year and beyond. For example, building secure function-specific platforms based on the seL4 microkernel, and considering the successes of Cyber-Informed Engineering as a model for engage, collaboration, and adoption. We look forward to your feedback and collaboration as we refine and expand this vision.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

AI-based Cyber Event OSINT via Twitter Data

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is largely regarded as a necessary component for cybersecurity intelligence gathering to secure network systems. With the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and increasing usage of social media, like Twitter, we have a unique opportunity to obtain and aggregate information from social media. In this study, we propose an AI-based scheme capable of automatically pulling information from Twitter, filtering out security-irrelevant tweets, performing natural language analysis to correlate the tweets about each cybersecurity event (e.g., a malware campaign), and validating the information. This scheme has many applications, such as providing a means for security operators to gain insight into ongoing events and helping them prioritize vulnerabilities to deal with. To give examples of the possible uses, we present three case studies demonstrating the event discovery and investigation processes.

Dale, Dakota↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

Cyber threats are a constant present-day reality for any type of business -- Space exploration is not excluded from these threats either. The Gateway Program is one of NASA’s latest initiatives that extend space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Gateway allows for NASA to prove technologies and mature systems necessary to live and work on another celestial body before embarking on multi-year missions to Mars. The Gateway is a small, human-tended space station in orbit around the Moon. With the increased autonomy, distance and criticality of systems, cybersecurity is one of the critical subsystems that touches and integrates with most if not all subsystems of the Gateway. Building a gateway to the lunar orbit is no simple task. In this presentation, we outline an approach that the Gateway team adopted in creating a cyber safe and robust vehicle to support operations and assure protection of the critical functions. Gateway Program is required to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines to adhere to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). NIST provides a framework for managing and controlling cybersecurity risks by defining cybersecurity controls and methodologies for implementation. The NIST framework is based upon the system, data within the system, integrations with external systems, and risk assessments to determine impacts for each of those systems. The goals and objectives are to identify appropriate security controls that fulfill and map to the NIST 800-53 framework. The implementation process involves developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. NIST Security controls are interpreted and defined within the Gateway vehicle requirements subsystems specifications. This paper details the approach, implementation, and challenges faced during the development and design phases to address cyber threats during the Gateway vehicle operations.

Svetlana Hanson↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

Cybersecurity threats are a constant present-day reality for any type of business -- Space exploration is not excluded from these threats either. The Gateway Program is one of NASA’s latest initiatives that extend space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Gateway allows for NASA to prove technologies and mature systems necessary to live and work on another celestial body before embarking on multi-year missions to Mars. The Gateway is a small, human-tended space station in orbit around the Moon. With the increased autonomy, distance and criticality of systems, cybersecurity is a critical discipline that touches and integrates with most if not all subsystems of the Gateway. Building a gateway to the lunar orbit is no simple task. In this presentation, we outline an approach that the Gateway team adopted in creating a cyber safe and robust vehicle to support operations and assure protection of the critical functions. Gateway Program is required to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines to adhere to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). NIST provides a framework for managing and controlling cybersecurity risks by defining cybersecurity controls and methodologies for implementation. The NIST framework is based upon the system, data within the system, integrations with external systems, and risk assessments to determine impacts for each of those systems. The goals and objectives are to identify appropriate security controls that fulfil and map to the NIST 800-53 framework. The implementation process involves developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. NIST Security controls are interpreted and defined within the Gateway vehicle requirements subsystems specifications. This paper details the approach, implementation, and challenges faced during the development and design phases to address cyber threats during the Gateway vehicle operations.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2023

Transactive Energy System Deployment Over Insecure Communication Links

Here, in this paper, the privacy and security issues associated with the transactive energy system (TES) deployment over insecure communication links are addressed. In particular, it is ensured that 1) individual agents’ bidding information is kept private throughout hierarchical market-based interactions; and 2) any extraneous data injection attack can be quickly and easily detected. An implementation framework is proposed to enable the cryptography-based enhancement of privacy and security for the deployment of any general hierarchical systems including TESs. Under the proposed framework, a unified cryptography-based approach is developed to achieve both privacy and security simultaneously. Specifically, privacy preservation is realized by an enhanced Paillier encryption scheme, where a block design is proposed to significantly improve computational efficiency. Attack detection is further achieved by an enhanced Paillier digital signature scheme, where a stamp-concatenation mechanism is proposed to enable detection of data replace and reorder attacks. Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed cyber-resilient design for transactive energy systems. Note to Practitioners—This paper is motivated by addressing the issues of cyber resiliency for practically deploying transactive energy system (TES) but it is also applicable to the problem of enhancing the privacy and security for any general hierarchical control systems. TES is an emerging control approach that engages energy suppliers and customers through market operations and uses the price to optimally allocate energy resources. While it has been shown to be promising for power system applications, the underlying market-based interactions raise significant concerns of privacy (data leakage) and security (data tampering). However, existing TES works only focus on the coordination mechanism instead of privacy and security issues. This paper proposes a new cryptography-based TES design for practical deployment. Specifically, to protect privacy, individual supply and demand amounts to be exchanged are all encrypted in a particular way such that the original amounts cannot be inferred from the encrypted amounts, while the desired computation for setting the market clearing price can be carried out over the encrypted amounts, thus generating an encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches that of the same computation over the original amounts. To achieve security, for each exchanged data, its sender generates a particular digital signature which is exchanged together with the data. This enables the receiver to automatically detect the integrity by checking whether a mathematical relationship holds for the pair of data and signature. In our future research, we will investigate more challenging scenarios where some suppliers and customers themselves could be corrupted and purposely submit distorted amounts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber-Physical Risks for Advanced Reactors

Cybersecurity for industrial control systems is an important consideration that advance reactor designers will need to consider. How cyber risk is managed is the subject of on-going research and debate in the nuclear industry. This report seeks to identify potential cyber risks for advance reactors. Identified risks are divided into absorbed risk and licensee managed risk to clearly show how cyber risks for advance reactors can potentially be transferred. Absorbed risks are risks that originate external to the licensee but may unknowingly propagate into the plant. Insights include (1) the need for unification of safety, physical security, and cybersecurity risk assessment frameworks to ensure optimal coordination of risk, (2) a quantitative risk assessment methodology in conjunction with qualitative assessments may be useful in efficiently and sufficiently managing cyber risks, and (3) cyber risk management techniques should align with a risked informed regulatory framework for advance reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

TITANS Strategic Intern Pipeline: Best Practices and Resource Guide

This guide is a compilation of best practices and resources from three of Sandia's leading strategic intern programs which make up the Technical Internships to Advance National Security (TITANS) program. TITANS consist of the Center for Analysis Systems and Applications (CASA), the Center for Cyber Defenders (CCD), and the Monitoring Systems & Technology Intern Center (MSTIC).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Authentication Protocol for ICS without Encryption

Industrial control systems (ICS) describes the different types of control systems and associated instrumentation, which includes the devices, systems, networks, and controls used to operate and/or automate industrial processes. Depending on the industry, each ICS functions differently and are built to electronically manage tasks efficiently. Historically, industrial plants have included networking, and changes have been made over time without consideration for security. Many ICS devices currently have inadequate security features. Adding encryption in ICS is undesirable because many of the new detection method involves deep packet inspection. Therefore, we propose to develop a method of providing authentication between devices without encrypting the data. This testbed design will allow rapid development and experimentation with Cyber Physical Systems. Modbus connects to a supervisory computer with a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Our project seeks to enhance security in the ICS environment by adding device authentication to the lower levels of the plant floor. This approach was selected as it allows verification of the sender of data from level 1/level 0 devices up to supervisory systems. This addition is desirable as it adds enhanced verification to the integrity of system data without obscuring (via encryption) the data being transmitted across the network. This is important because many ICS systems are real time critical (decryption adds to latency) and many other good security options require deep packet inspection (which encryption completely defeats). To accomplish this, a proof of concept of adding an authentication scheme was designed and will be tested with a common ICS protocol. The setup includes a single serial cable connecting the serial ports on two devices, a Master and a Minion. Authentication will occur in the following methods: - Data layer involving Transport Layer Security/Secure Socket Layer (TLS/SSL); - TCP/IP route implementation; - Key exchange algorithm; - Raspberry Pi programming for authentication. A portion of the setup includes adding Raspberry Pi into the system as the device is handling the authentication for the network traffic. Modbus is the chosen ICS protocol. It is used to transmit signals from instrumentation and control devices back to a main controller or data gathering system. Typically, the device identity is assumed but not verified. For verifying device identity, we constructed a digital signature architecture with TLS. A novel adaptation of this is to use only the digital signature that is provided and not the encryption capability. This allows ICS traffic to flow unobscured while still providing verification for the integrity of the data. Verification of this process will involve adding additional I/O level network devices with spoofed IP addresses and detecting the authenticated versus unauthenticated traffic. Our TLS implementation will have encryption disabled but should still allow for digital signing of data. This will enable our system to distinguish between real end devices and spoofed end devices. This experiment is presently building the test setup. It is focusing on a small setting to identify authenticated and unauthenticated devices on the network. This should allow for scaling to a larger network size after the initial proof of concept. One concern with this scheme is a certificate deployment has a large scale key management. Network size will thus increase the key management task for security. In addition, we believe that further research should be done on exploring the use of this method to defeat man-in-the-middle attacks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Cybersecurity Assessments on Emulated DER Communication Networks

An increasing number of public utility commissions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. The recently updated national standard, IEEE 1547-2018, requires all DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5, or IEEE 1815 communication interface in order to provide local and bulk power system services. Those communication protocols and associated information models will ensure system interoperability for PV and storage systems, but these new utility-to-DER communication networks must be deployed with sufficient cybersecurity to protect the U.S. power system and other critical infrastructure reliant on dependable power. Unlike bulk generators, DER are commonly connected to grid operators via public internet channels. These DER networks are exposed to a large attack surface that may leverage sophisticated techniques and infrastructure developed on IT systems, including remote exploits and distributed attacks. Although DER make up a growing portion of the national generation mix, they have limited processing capabilities and do not typically support modern security features such as encryption or authentication. In this work, Sandia National Laboratories constructed simulated DER communication net- works with a range of security features in order to study the security posture of different communication approaches. The experimental test environment was created in a Sandia-developed co-simulation platform, called SCEPTRE, which emulated Sun Spec-compliant DER equipment, the utility DER management system, communication network, and distribution power system. Adversary-based assessments were conducted and a quantitative scoring criteria was applied to evaluate the resilience of various architectures against cyber attacks and to measure the systemic impact during such attacks. The team found that network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defense improved the security of these networks and would be recommended for utility, aggregator, and local DER networks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗