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At least 1,027 records · Page 57

A Framework for Building Security into the Design Process

This report presents guidance to support the implementation of security objectives during the design process for nuclear facilities using an organization’s quality management system. The guidance in this document is intended for design vendors and operators of nuclear power facilities. Additionally, this guidance document can be beneficial to regulatory bodies, industry partners, customers, and other stakeholders within the nuclear power market. This report aims to ensure security consequences are identified before designs are completed, which may lead to reduced costs and higher security effectiveness and efficiency.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Corridor Design and Analysis for UAM Operations

The Urban Air Mobility (UAM) concept is a part of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), a joint initiative between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NASA, and industry to develop an air transportation system that uses new electric (i.e., green) air vehicles in geographical areas previously underserved by traditional aviation. Market forecast studies predict that there will be demand for alternate modes of air transportation using electric Vertical Take-off and Landing aircraft. UAM expands transportation networks by introducing short flights to move people and goods around metropolitan areas​. UAM is expected to improve mobility for the public, decongest road traffic, reduce trip time, and decrease strain on existing public transportation networks. Various challenges exist to make the introduction of UAM operations successful in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS). These include but are not limited to integration with existing airports and airspace, provision of air traffic services (e.g., separation), vehicle design and certification, and community acceptance. The focus of this paper is on integration of UAM operations into the NAS via introduction of new airspace structures. UAM will operate within a regulatory, operational, and technical environment that is incorporated into the NAS​. As per the UAM Concept of Operations (ConOps), the FAA retains regulatory authority and is responsible for establishing operational parameters and maintaining oversight. The FAA’s UAM ConOps describes flights at low altitudes (below 5,000 ft) with minimal disruption to established conventional aircraft traffic and limited voice interactions with the Air Traffic Control (ATC). Early stages of UAM may use existing procedures to safely integrate UAM with conventional flights. This would involve flying under Part 91 Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and using voice for communications. The initial UAM ecosystem will utilize the current infrastructure such as routes, helipads, and ATC services, where practicable. ​A NASA study explored the use of existing helicopter routes in Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) airspace for initial UAM operations with a Letter of Agreement (LOA) that included procedures to request a Class B (controlled airspace) clearance. The research showed that the chosen approach was feasible for near-term, low-demand UAM traffic, but was not scalable. The growth of operations in today’s aviation system has resulted in airspace reorganization and procedures to ensure safety and efficiency as traffic rates increase. One proposed operating innovation that can help with the scalability of UAM is establishing routes and corridors. This may look similar to the Area Navigation (RNAV) procedures used today to streamline operations into busy airports. However, instead of FAA automation systems and ATC managing the flow of traffic, some UAM concepts envision a third-party service provider performing this role as part of the Provider of Services for UAM (PSU) network. The FAA’s UAM ConOps posits that new airspace structures such as UAM corridors include the following design criteria: 1) Minimal impact on existing NAS operations, 2) no or minimal additional ATC services, 3) public interest considerations such as noise, safety, and security, and 4) customer needs. The airspace available in urban environments is limited by the height of buildings, the effect of weather including wind gusts, privacy needs, and a clearance envelope. The new airspace structure would need to be designed around large airports and urban areas where the initial market demand is likely to exist. NASA has started evaluating airspace in the Dallas Fort Worth area to design new airspace structures, keeping the first two design criteria in mind. It is assumed that there will be an on-board pilot-in-command, and the flights will operate under VFR in Visual Meteorological Conditions. Corridors will be required in controlled airspace, whereas UAM operations can fly in uncontrolled Class G and E airspace using current day rules. Keeler et. al identified factors and heuristics for development of routes for UAM operations for integration with airspace close to large airports such as Dallas Fort Worth and Dallas Love Field. This paper describes the heuristics applied to define the corridors, analyzes them with respect to legacy traffic and presents key results.

Urban Air Mobility↗

A Review of Visualization Methods for Cyber-Physical Security: Smart Grid Case Study

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are becoming increasingly complex and interconnected as they attempt to meet the demands of evolving society. As a result, monitoring and maintaining them becomes a more complex and demanding task for control system operators and cyber defenders. While the literature on visualization techniques in the context of cybersecurity is extensive, the same cannot be said for studies on visualization for the security of cyber-physical systems. This paper aims to fill that gap by: 1) defining the main features of a visualizations workflow for security visualizations in cyber-physical systems. The workflow includes the acquisition of cyber and physical data, processing of data, selection, and configuration of both visualization tools and end-user interactions. 2) Providing an overview of cyber-physical security visualization systems, with a focus on smart grids as a case study. Finally, we use the perspectives gained from this analysis to provide insights and directions for future research and design of cyber-physical visualization techniques.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Mission planning for Shuttle Imaging Radar-C (SIR-C) with a real-time interactive planning software

The Shuttle Imaging Radar-C (SIR-C) mission will operate from the payload bay of the space shuttle for 8 days, gathering Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) data over specific sites on the Earth. The short duration of the mission and the requirement for realtime planning offer challenges in mission planning and in the design of the Planning and Analysis Subsystem (PAS). The PAS generates shuttle ephemerides and mission planning data and provides an interactive real-time tool for quick mission replanning. It offers a multi-user and multiprocessing environment, and it is able to keep multiple versions of the mission timeline data while maintaining data integrity and security. Its flexible design allows one software to provide different menu options based on the user's operational function, and makes it easy to tailor the software for other Earth orbiting missions.

Potts, Su K.↗

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Modular Software Interfaces for Revolutionary Flexibility in Space Operations

To make revolutionary improvements in exploration, space systems need to be flexible, realtime reconfigurable, and able to trade data transparently among themselves and mission operations. Onboard operations systems, space assembly coordination and EVA systems in exploration and construction all require real-time modular reconfigurability and data sharing. But NASA's current exploration systems are still largely legacies from hastily-developed, one-off Apollo-era practices. Today's rovers, vehicles, spacesuits, space stations, and instruments are not able to plug-and-play, Lego-like: into different combinations. Point-to-point dominates - individual suit to individual vehicle, individual instrument to rover. All are locally optimized, all unique, each of the data interfaces has been recoded for each possible combination. This will be an operations and maintenance nightmare in the much larger Project Constellation system of systems. This legacy approach does not scale to the hundreds of networked space components needed for space construction and for new, space-based approaches to Earth-Moon operations. By comparison, battlefield information management systems, which are considered critical to military force projection, have long since abandoned a point-to-point approach to systems integration. From a system-of-systems viewpoint, a clean-sheet redesign of the interfaces of all exploration systems is a necessary prerequisite before designing the interfaces of the individual exploration systems. Existing communications and Global Information Grid and middleware technologies are probably sufficient for command and control and information interfaces, with some hardware and time-delay modifications for space environments. NASA's future advanced space operations must also be information and data compatible with aerospace operations and surveillance systems being developed by other US Government agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Defense. This paper discusses fundamental system-of-systems infrastructure: approaches and architectures for modular plug-and-play software interfaces for revolutionary improvements in flexibility, modularity, robustness, ease of maintenance, reconfigurability, safety and productivity. Starting with middleware, databases, and mobile communications technologies, our technical challenges will be to apply these ideas to the requirements of constellations of space systems and to implement them initially on prototype space hardware. This is necessary to demonstrate an integrated information sharing architecture and services. It is a bottom-up approach, one that solves the problem of space operations data integration. Exploration demands uniform software mechanisms for application information interchange, and the corresponding uniformly available software services to enhance these mechanisms. We will examine the issues in plug-and-play, real-time-configurable systems, including common definition and management and tracking of data and information among many different space systems. Different field test approaches are discussed, including the use of the International Space Station and terrestrial analog mission operations at field sites.

Glass, Brian↗

A 15-Mev/nucleon Iso-Cyclotron for Security and Radioisotope Production

Cargo inspection systems exploit the broad bremsstrahlung spectrum from a 6-10 MeV, low-duty cycle electron accelerator which in the presence of significant backgrounds presents challenges in image and material identification. An alternative approach is to use ions which can excite nuclear states either directly, or through generation of secondary high-energy signature gammas produced from nuclear interactions in a target. RadiaBeam is designing a compact sector isocyclotron 1.25 m in radius, with high-gradient cavities to accelerate multi-ion species up to 15-20 MeV/u with large turn-to turn, centimeter-level separation for low-loss extraction without lossy foil stripping. A strong-focusing radial field profile will be optimized in a separated-sector format for control over machine tune simultaneous with isochronous orbist requirements for high-current (~0.5 milliamp) operation. Innovation in injection will be introduced to replace the high-loss central region. Non-security applications of the cyclotron include medical isotope production, ion radiobiology, as well as material science research and ion instrumentation development.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Software to Manage the Unmanageable

In 1995, NASA s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) contracted Redmond, Washington-based Lucidoc Corporation, to design a technology infrastructure to automate the intersection between policy management and operations management with advanced software that automates document workflow, document status, and uniformity of document layout. JPL had very specific parameters for the software. It expected to store and catalog over 8,000 technical and procedural documents integrated with hundreds of processes. The project ended in 2000, but NASA still uses the resulting highly secure document management system, and Lucidoc has managed to help other organizations, large and small, with integrating document flow and operations management to ensure a compliance-ready culture.

Source record↗

An Architectural Survey of the Pluto Test Bunker Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to reactivate Building 26-2205 as part of a project to detect foundry-type operations with remote sensing. The project is known as the Signals Exploration Testbed, or SET for short. Building 26-2205 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B11558) is the former Compressor Building for the Pluto Program in Area 26 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Proposed actions at Building 26-2205 include removal of exterior building and site features, such as fencing, concrete pads, a large steel tank, and visible utilities, as well as interior changes to the building’s floor plan. These activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

System for Secure Integration of Aviation Data

The Aviation Data Integration System (ADIS) of Ames Research Center has been established to promote analysis of aviation data by airlines and other interested users for purposes of enhancing the quality (especially safety) of flight operations. The ADIS is a system of computer hardware and software for collecting, integrating, and disseminating aviation data pertaining to flights and specified flight events that involve one or more airline(s). The ADIS is secure in the sense that care is taken to ensure the integrity of sources of collected data and to verify the authorizations of requesters to receive data. Most importantly, the ADIS removes a disincentive to collection and exchange of useful data by providing for automatic removal of information that could be used to identify specific flights and crewmembers. Such information, denoted sensitive information, includes flight data (here signifying data collected by sensors aboard an aircraft during flight), weather data for a specified route on a specified date, date and time, and any other information traceable to a specific flight. The removal of information that could be used to perform such tracing is called "deidentification." Airlines are often reluctant to keep flight data in identifiable form because of concerns about loss of anonymity. Hence, one of the things needed to promote retention and analysis of aviation data is an automated means of de-identification of archived flight data to enable integration of flight data with non-flight aviation data while preserving anonymity. Preferably, such an automated means would enable end users of the data to continue to use pre-existing data-analysis software to identify anomalies in flight data without identifying a specific anomalous flight. It would then also be possible to perform statistical analyses of integrated data. These needs are satisfied by the ADIS, which enables an end user to request aviation data associated with de-identified flight data. The ADIS includes client software integrated with other software running on flight-operations quality-assurance (FOQA) computers for purposes of analyzing data to study specified types of events or exceedences (departures of flight parameters from normal ranges). In addition to ADIS client software, ADIS includes server hardware and software that provide services to the ADIS clients via the Internet (see figure). The ADIS server receives and integrates flight and non-flight data pertaining to flights from multiple sources. The server accepts data updates from authorized sources only and responds to requests from authorized users only. In order to satisfy security requirements established by the airlines, (1) an ADIS client must not be accessible from the Internet by an unauthorized user and (2) non-flight data as airport terminal information system (ATIS) and weather data must be displayed without any identifying flight information. ADIS hardware and software architecture as well as encryption and data display scheme are designed to meet these requirements. When a user requests one or more selected aviation data characteristics associated with an event (e.g., a collision, near miss, equipment malfunction, or exceedence), the ADIS client augments the request with date and time information from encrypted files and submits the augmented request to the server. Once the user s authorization has been verified, the server returns the requested information in de-identified form.

Kulkarni, Deepak↗

Hydrotreating pine-derived catalytic fast pyrolysis oil to jet fuel: Process durability and impact of operating conditions

Hydrotreating woody biomass-derived catalytic fast pyrolysis (CFP) oil to jet fuel has the potential to enhance energy security due to the large abundance of forest and woody resources. CFP oil produced from pine over ZSM-5 was hydrotreated over sulfided NiMo/Al 2 O 3 for 410 h to study the impact of hydrotreating conditions (pressure, temperature, and weight hourly space velocity (WHSV)). The degree of deoxygenation remained high across the tested hydrotreating conditions, and the products contained < 0.01 wt% oxygen. Increasing hydrotreating pressure from 84 to 125 bar enhanced hydrogenation of aromatic rings and the formation of cycloalkanes and increasing the temperature from 385 to 400 degrees C enhanced cracking and the formation of jet-range molecules. Decreasing the weight hourly space velocity from 0.2 to 0.1 g/(g cat h) further enhanced cracking and led to higher gasoline- and lower jet fuel-range fractions. The highest jet fuel fraction (49 wt%) was obtained at 400 degrees C, 125 bar, 0.2 g/(g cat h) WHSV. CFP oils produced from pine over phosphorous-modified ZSM-5 were hydrotreated at this condition for 588 h to investigate the process durability. The hydrogenation performance of the catalyst gradually stabilized in approximately 300 h after which the product composition remained constant. Of the final hydrotreated CFP oil, 53 wt% fell in the jet fuel range with most of the tested fuel properties meeting ASTM D4054 and/or ASTM D7566 specifications. The freeze points were < -50 degrees C vs. guideline of < -40 degrees C and the viscosities at -20 degrees C were 3.8-4.1 mm 2 /s vs guideline of 8 mm 2 /s. Increasing the fraction of cycloalkanes could increase the cetane number and heating value, which did not meet the guidelines.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction, A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

UKy-CAER Heat Integrated Transformative CO 2 Capture Process in Pulverized Coal Power Plants

The goal of this Phase II Topical Report is to summarize the work for public domain conducted on project DE-FE0031583. Building upon the Design Basis completed during Phase I and in accordance with the Statement of Project Objectives (SOPO), the University of Kentucky (UK) Center for Applied Energy Research (CAER) (Recipient) along with team members has completed the Front End Engineering Design (FEED) for its advanced, versatile post-combustion CO 2 capture system (CCS) at the 10 MWe large pilot scale to be installed at the Wyoming (WY) Integrated Test Center (ITC), using a heat integrated process with split-rich fed, two-stage stripping and any advanced solvent to enhance the CO 2 absorber performance and lower the cost of CO 2 capture. The proposed project (Phases I-III) involves the design, fabrication, installation, testing and evaluation of a large pilot scale facility that will demonstrate the UK CAER transformative CCS integrated with an operating power plant. The work performed in Phase I, detailed in the Phase I Topical Report that was submitted in March 2019, included formation of a project team, securing the host site, and completing pre-FEED design basis, a cost estimation, a preliminary techno-economic analysis (TEA) and an environmental information volume (EIV). The work performed in Phase II, detailed in this Phase II Topical Report, includes completion of FEEDs, completion of a process risk analysis (PRA), obtaining necessary permits, updating the EIV and TEA, updating the cost and schedule estimate for the Phase III scope of work (SOW) and securing the necessary cost share. Updated information is provided on the current status of the UK CAER CCS technology and the project is ready to begin immediately detailed design, construction and operation of the proposed pilot.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan

The requirements of the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit are fulfilled through execution of LANL's fourth strategic goal: “Enabling mission delivery through next-generation facility, infrastructure, and operational excellence.” With input from our stakeholders, we will continue to fulfill those requirements and to improve our waste operations. In 2015, the Laboratory purpose statement focused waste management efforts by directing delivery of mission success through operational effectiveness and scientific excellence. This Plan advances that purpose through community involvement. In the process of achieving our national security mission, Los Alamos National Laboratory generates some hazardous and mixed waste. Hazardous waste is solid waste that is dangerous or potentially harmful to human health or the environment. Hazardous wastes can be liquids, solids, gases, or sludges. They can be discarded as commercial products, such as cleaning fluids or pesticides, or as the byproducts of operations. Specific substances are listed in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 261: 40 CFR Part 261. Hazardous waste management activities are regulated by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) pursuant to New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (HWA; Chapter 74, Article 4 NMSA 1978) and regulations under the Act. In 1989, NMED issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (EPA ID Number NM0890010515-1) that established standards for the Laboratory to manage, store, and treat hazardous wastes on-site and to undertake the closure, post closure care, and cleanup as necessary, of permitted waste management units. On November 30, 2010, NMED renewed the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (the Permit). In June 2020 the Permittees submitted a permit renewal application to the NMED for their review and approval. The Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan (CRP) describes the scope of public involvement in the activities of the Permit. The CRP is specifically designed to facilitate the community outreach, engagement, and relations activities concerning the Laboratory’s Hazardous Waste Facility Permit and coordinates with but does not include public involvement for other Laboratory programs, initiatives, or environmental activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Mars 2020 Ground Data System Architecture

The Mars 2020 Mission’s primary objective is to collect 20 geographically unique samples during its prime mission of one and a quarter Martian years, or just over 2 Earth years. Mission planners determined the project needed to develop a system that would enable the operations team to analyze engineering and science data, make science decisions, select viable rover targets at a millimeter resolution and validate an uplink bundle for a car sized rover with more complex science instruments than any previous Mars surface mission. All this had to be done within a five hour time frame. Doing this with a small team would be a challenge, but this had to be accomplished by a large team of engineers and scientists located across North America and Europe. Achieving this level of operational efficiency was unheard of in the prime mission. In addition, the mission had another set of requirements that had nothing to do with surface operations; the Mars 2020 Ground Data System (GDS) was also expected to comply with a new set of security requirements to keep up with the ever changing cybersecurity landscape. The Mars 2020 Ground Data System (GDS) is a re-architected version of the Mars Science Laboratory GDS. The primary goal was to integrate the lessons learned from previous Mars surface missions, accommodate a set of new requirements and capabilities required to ensure mission success, and comply with a new set of cybersecurity controls. The new architecture includes several unique qualities including a data lake, language-agnostic system-wide event-based operations, containerization, automated deployment, network segmentation, infrastructure-as-code, API-driven interfaces, and the first Mars surface GDS to operate primarily in the cloud. The new architecture enabled greater access to the system’s data, tighter integration with the operations team, and a higher level of traceability. The availability of the data also enabled a new set of capabilities previously not possible on surface missions. These new capabilities include an autonomous data to information, pipeline for downlink analysis, horizontal scaling of science data processing capabilities, autonomous round trip data tracking of science and engineering data, integration of flight system state into the tactical planning cycle, high fidelity targeting utilizing kinematic data, and hierarchical image and 3d meshes data representations. This paper will introduce the requirements for the Mars 2020 Mission, the heritage architecture, and the rationale for the changes to achieve the new architecture. The paper will continue to describe the fundamental changes made to the GDS architecture, how these changes enabled a more tightly integrated GDS, and the new capabilities that were enabled by the new architecture. The paper will conclude with the lessons learned from the process of rearchitecting a heritage GDS system and from the first 200 days of operations supporting over 800 users from around the world.

Lopez-Roig, Reynaldo↗

Technical Challenges and Opportunities of Centralizing Space Science Mission Operations (SSMO) at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

The NASA Goddard Space Science Mission Operations project (SSMO) is performing a technical cost-benefit analysis for centralizing and consolidating operations of a diverse set of missions into a unified and integrated technical infrastructure. The presentation will focus on the notion of normalizing spacecraft operations processes, workflows, and tools. It will also show the processes of creating a standardized open architecture, creating common security models and implementations, interfaces, services, automations, notifications, alerts, logging, publish, subscribe and middleware capabilities. The presentation will also discuss how to leverage traditional capabilities, along with virtualization, cloud computing services, control groups and containers, and possibly Big Data concepts.

Science↗