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At least 1,027 records · Page 57

Nevada National Security Site 2015 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data include direct radiation exposure, as well as radiation from the air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2015 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports developed by National Security Technologies, LLC. Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2015, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 0.9% above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 25% above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. The 1.8 inches of precipitation in September reached the lowest sensors at 180 cm on the Cell 5S and 5N covers, however the sensors on the floor do not indicate any signs of the precipitation percolating thru the waste to the floor. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 150 centimeters (cm) (5 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS. A second remedial revegetation trial was done on the southern portion of the North Cover. In March 2015 it was determined that germination occurred on both the mulched and non-mulched treatments that were irrigated, but that no germination occurred on the non-irrigated treatments. By June the seedlings observed in March were gone, possibly grazed by rabbits which were observed inside the rabbit-proof fence. In August the entire area was sprayed with the herbicide glyphosate in an attempt to minimize weed seed production. During 2015, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Thirty-one percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter, which received 3 times the natural precipitation. All 2015 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Secure ICCP Final Report

Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP), defined by the IEC 60870-6 TASE.2 standard, was developed to enable data exchange over wide area networks between electric system entities, including utility control centers, Independent System Operators (ISOs), Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs) and Independent Power Producers (IPP) also known as Non-Utility Generators (NUG). ICCP is an unprotected protocol, and as a result is vulnerable to such actions as integrity violation, interception or alteration, spoofing, and eavesdropping. Because of these vulnerabilities with unprotected ICCP communication, security enhancements, referred to as Secure ICCP, have been added and are included in the ICCP products that utilities have received since 2003 when the standard was defined. This has resulted in an ICCP product whose communication can be encrypted and authenticated to address these vulnerabilities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Second Quarter Transportation Report Fiscal Year 2019 Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 3 and Area 5. This report summarizes the second quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2019 and serves as a quarterly report for the following types of shipments: Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW), Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste (MLLW), Classified Non-Radioactive (CNR) Waste, Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous (CNRH) Waste.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY2017 Waste Shipments To and From the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. This report summarizes the 3rd quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2017 low-level radioactive waste (LLW), mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW), which includes classified LLW and MLLW, classified non-radioactive (CNR) and classified non-radioactive hazardous (CNRH) shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment from a NNSS facility and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY2017. Tabular summaries are provided, which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW, MLLW and CNR/CNRH shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW, MLLW and CNR/CNRH shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW, MLLW and CNR/CNRH shipments.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Renewable Energy to Support Energy Security

Renewable energy plays an important role in supporting energy security through contributing to the protection and continued provision of energy services when a disruption occurs. Sources of disruption to energy services can be natural, technological, and human-caused - such as weather events, cyber-attacks, and global market disturbances. This fact sheet covers renewable energy actions to support energy security.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

IRAD-MPE Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats (Day 1) [Slides]

This module is designed to enhance awareness regarding radiological and nuclear security threats and the types of radioactive materials that can be used for criminal purposes or terrorist acts. The goals are to: (1) Review the Threat Assessment Process for MPEs, (2) Recognize Potential Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats, (3) Understand the basics of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and Radiological Exposure Devices (RED), (4) Learn about Medical, Commercial, and Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) sources, and (5) Understand the term Material Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Campaign Guidelines: Security Starts With You [Slides]

The Security Starts With You Campaign Guidelines have been prepared by the CEA-CAS Visual Design team for use primarily by DSOs, FODs, and/or any LANL employee who wishes to extend the messaging to new and existing buildings. By adhering to this guidance, you will be a responsible steward of the “One Lab, one voice” mentality and successfully implement the Lab’s brand and security messaging on all of your communications.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Historic Context, Character-Defining Elements, And Photographic Record For A 26.45-Mile Segment Of The 138-Kilovolt Power Transmission System, Areas 3, 5, 6, And 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The subject of this report is the 138-kilovolt (kV) power transmission line on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (see Figure 1). The NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), was the main continental nuclear test site for the United States between 1951 and 1992. Known as the battleground of the Cold War, the NNSS hosted a total of 928 nuclear tests during that period. It also served as the location of numerous scientific advancements in the fields of rocketry, big-hole drilling, nuclear waste management, and defense. From its construction in the 1960s through the present day, the 138 kV line has provided electrical power to the numerous buildings, facilities, experiments, and tests on the NNSS. The Department of Energy (DOE), in consultation with the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), has determined that it may contribute to the character and significance of the Mercury Historic District (MHD) on the NNSS, as well as other historic districts that have not been recorded or evaluated yet. The purpose of this report is to fulfill two of the stipulations in the Memorandum of Agreement DEGM58-22NA25553 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Installation of a 138-kilovolt Transmission Line from the Mercury Switching Station to the U1a Facility and the Removal of the Historic 138-kilovolt Transmission Line from the Mercury Switching Station to the U1a Facility in Areas 1, 3, 5, 6, and 23 of the Nevada National Security Site (MOA). The MOA was executed as part of the DOE’s obligations under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) to mitigate the adverse effects of two undertakings on historic properties. In particular, this report fulfills MOA Stipulations III.C.1-3, which state that the Department of Energy (DOE) will prepare the following: A historic context for the 138 kV transmission line and identification of the line’s characterdefining elements; High-quality digital images of the 26.45-mile segment of the 138 kV transmission line that is subject to the two undertakings for which the MOA was executed; and Photograph catalogs and map keys showing photograph viewpoints and directions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Fundamentals of Energy Security and Resilience [Slides]

This slide deck was developed for and presented at an Energy Fundamentals Course hosted by the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) in October 2022. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) helped organize this course in partnership with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The students in this four-day course were postgraduates and working professionals in the energy sector or related industries in Bangladesh. While some of the content in the slide deck is tailored to Bangladesh specifically, this presentation is intended to be a general primer on energy security and resilience that can be utilized for similar purposes by other universities or organizations throughout the world. The content of this slide deck is not intended to be fully comprehensive of all energy security and resilience concepts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Submission of Mitigation Documentation Related to the Demolition of Building 12-7, Area 12 Camp, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to submit documentation related to the mitigation of the demolition of Building 12-7 (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B18287) in the Area 12 Camp Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D372) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Building 12-7 is a contributing element to the historic district. This submission is intended to comply with the stipulations in the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25555 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding the Removal of Buildings 12-7 and 12-30 in the Area 12 Camp of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the MOA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Submission of Mitigation Documentation Related to the Demolition of Building 12-30, Area 12 Camp, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to submit documentation related to the mitigation of the demolition of Building 12-30 (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B18289) in the Area 12 Camp Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D372) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Building 12-30 is a contributing element to the historic district. This submission is intended to comply with the stipulations in the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25555 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding the Removal of Buildings 12-7 and 12-30 in the Area 12 Camp of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the MOA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Module 6: Exercise 1: Fresh Fuel Receipt for a Nuclear Facility: Nuclear Security Controls [Slides]

This module presents an operational scenario to illustrate the NMAC functions that are recommended for nuclear security. After completing this module, participants should be able to: 1) Describe the role NMAC plays in implementing recommended nuclear security practices. 2) Discuss the coordination between other departments during a primarily NMAC operation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Security Self-Assessment Toolkit for Nuclear Materials Facilities: Focus on Insider Threat Mitigation

Theft or sabotage of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a global concern. To minimize this threat, establishing and maintaining an effective nuclear security regime is required to protect against criminal or other negligent acts. Use of a formalized insider threat mitigation program is one such security measure. Individuals who have or held authorized access to an organization's critical assets, such as nuclear materials, are considered "insiders." Insider threats, or insider adversaries, are motivated individuals who possess access, authority, and knowledge to conduct a malicious act or facilitate that of an external party. To thwart insider threats (both intentional and unintentional), organizations can formalize an enterprise-wide approach to identify and mitigate the unique risks presented by insiders. This report provides an approach to evaluate an insider threat mitigation program at facilities with nuclear materials. Formal program evaluations serve many purposes and can be designed using several different methods and techniques. This report presents a self-assessment approach to program evaluation whereby an organization can assess its strengths, identify key gaps, and set priorities for ongoing improvement efforts to mitigate insider threats. Results of the self-assessment can provide critical information to contribute to the continuous improvement of an organization’s insider threat mitigation program within eight specific domain areas.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School: Fiscal Year 2024 Report

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) hosts the Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security (RDNS) Summer School. This unique course provides students with an overview of nuclear security missions, the technical foundation of applied radiation detection technology, and interactive demonstrations and exercises to connect theory to practice in an evolving research and development area. Fiscal year 2024, an off-year year for the school, included reviewing course content, and sharing about the school in a student engagement session at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. Planning is underway for the 10 th RDNS summer school is planned for the summer of 2025.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Sampling Plan for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 2

The purpose of this groundwater sampling plan (referred to herein as “the Plan”) is to describe the approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity. The Plan is focused on the Central and Western Pahute Mesa corrective action units (CAUs 101 and 102), which are currently in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) stage of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) UGTA Strategy. The remaining UGTA CAUs are in the final stage of the UGTA strategy (Closure Report [CR] stage), and monitoring requirements for these CAUs are described in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan (DOE/EMNV, 2024a). The Plan supersedes the Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan and its ensuing Record of Technical Change (ROTC) (DOE/EMNV, 2019b).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC-1

CR loaded to this OSTI record. Just adding new file which includes CR plus new ROTC 1 and update the metadata to the following: This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). CAU 116 consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 consisted of Building 3210 and the attached concrete shield wall. CAS 25-23-20 consisted of the nuclear furnace piping and tanks. Closure activities began in January 2007 and were completed in August 2011. Activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 116 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2008). This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provides data confirming that closure objectives for CAU 116 were met. Site characterization data and process knowledge indicated that surface areas were radiologically contaminated above release limits and that regulated and/or hazardous wastes were present in the facility. The Record of Technical Change 1 updated the use restriction information.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Ultra Safe And Secure Blasting System

The Ultra is a blasting system that is designed for special applications where the risk and consequences of unauthorized demolition or blasting are so great that the use of an extraordinarily safe and secure blasting system is justified. Such a blasting system would be connected and logically welded together through digital code-linking as part of the blasting system set-up and initialization process. The Ultra's security is so robust that it will defeat the people who designed and built the components in any attempt at unauthorized detonation. Anyone attempting to gain unauthorized control of the system by substituting components or tapping into communications lines will be thwarted in their inability to provide encrypted authentication. Authentication occurs through the use of codes that are generated by the system during initialization code-linking and the codes remain unknown to anyone, including the authorized operator. Once code-linked, a closed system has been created. The system requires all components connected as they were during initialization as well as a unique code entered by the operator for function and blasting.

42 ENGINEERING↗