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At least 1,027 records · Page 57

Evidence Report: Risk of Inadequate Human-Computer Interaction

Human-computer interaction (HCI) encompasses all the methods by which humans and computer-based systems communicate, share information, and accomplish tasks. When HCI is poorly designed, crews have difficulty entering, navigating, accessing, and understanding information. HCI has rarely been studied in an operational spaceflight context, and detailed performance data that would support evaluation of HCI have not been collected; thus, we draw much of our evidence from post-spaceflight crew comments, and from other safety-critical domains like ground-based power plants, and aviation. Additionally, there is a concern that any potential or real issues to date may have been masked by the fact that crews have near constant access to ground controllers, who monitor for errors, correct mistakes, and provide additional information needed to complete tasks. We do not know what types of HCI issues might arise without this "safety net". Exploration missions will test this concern, as crews may be operating autonomously due to communication delays and blackouts. Crew survival will be heavily dependent on available electronic information for just-in-time training, procedure execution, and vehicle or system maintenance; hence, the criticality of the Risk of Inadequate HCI. Future work must focus on identifying the most important contributing risk factors, evaluating their contribution to the overall risk, and developing appropriate mitigations. The Risk of Inadequate HCI includes eight core contributing factors based on the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS): (1) Requirements, policies, and design processes, (2) Information resources and support, (3) Allocation of attention, (4) Cognitive overload, (5) Environmentally induced perceptual changes, (6) Misperception and misinterpretation of displayed information, (7) Spatial disorientation, and (8) Displays and controls.

Kritina Holden↗

Applications and Performance of a Lightning Risk Assessment using Geostationary Lightning Mapper (GLM) Data

Lightning is a hazard globally, particularly in lesser-developed countries. Cloud-to-ground lightning strikes are a threat to human safety, motivating a desire to monitor location-based lightning risk to mitigate harm. A lightning risk assessment for human safety was created that uses a combination of probabilistic risk calculation and spatial lightning mapping data to produce a risk magnitude. This risk magnitude evolves with time and changing conditions and is compared to tolerability thresholds in order to evaluate safety. The risk assessment using lightning mapping array (LMA) flash extent density (FED) data was found to perform comparatively (with respect to issuing lightning warnings) to a more standard method of monitoring lightning safety where National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN) flashes were monitored within a 5 nautical mile radius of a location of interest. This research investigates the replacement of LMA FED with FED from the Geostationary Lightning Mapper (GLM) within the risk assessment framework. Using GLM FED would allow for risk to be calculated outside of LMA domains and anywhere within the GLM field of view, including areas outside of the United States (US). A few applications of the risk method with GLM FED are shown and discussed for locations both in and outside of the US. Additionally, the performance of the risk method is compared based on the type of lightning input source (LMA vs GLM). The end goal of this work is to provide forecasters and end users with a tool to help monitor lightning risk in decision support scenarios.

Kelley Murphy↗

Risk Reduction for the System Design of an Enhanced MMRTG

Engineering of an enhanced Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (eMMRTG) began 3 years ago with agreement between the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is leading the transfer of skutterudite thermoelectric couple technology to industry and leading the systems engineering of the proposed eMMRTG. Should NASA fund the flight development of an eMMRTG, the DOE would lead the flight system development. The analytical models and design of the MMRTG have been enhanced to use skutterudite couples developed at Jet Propulsion Laboratory over the last two decades. This required a thorough evaluation of the MMRTG design, and concurrent engineering of an enhanced MMRTG to shed light on potential design issues or risks. At the end of the U.S. fiscal year (FY) 2015, a complete catalog of risks was produced. Tests, hardware development, and analyses have now been put in place to mitigate those risks to acceptable levels. Few risks can ever be truly eliminated unless a design is modified to eliminate specific risks and not introduce more severe risks. The design imperative for the eMMRTG is to change only a few MMRTG features; therefore, risks can largely only be mitigated, not eliminated, through design changes. However, many risks can be effectively - though not totally - eliminated without design changes. This paper briefly describes some of the documented risks and mitigations or reduction approaches to be applied in the coming 3 years, on the way to completing the eMMRTG concept.

eMMRTG↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

The NASA Continuous Risk Management Process

As an intern this summer in the GRC Risk Management Office, I have become familiar with the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process. In this process, risk is considered in terms of the probability that an undesired event will occur and the impact of the event, should it occur (ref., NASA-NPG: 7120.5). Risk management belongs in every part of every project and should be ongoing from start to finish. Another key point is that a risk is not a problem until it has happened. With that in mind, there is a six step cycle for continuous risk management that prevents risks from becoming problems. The steps are: identify, analyze, plan, track, control, and communicate & document. Incorporated in the first step are several methods to identify risks such as brainstorming and using lessons learned. Once a risk is identified, a risk statement is made on a risk information sheet consisting of a single condition and one or more consequences. There can also be a context section where the risk is explained in more detail. Additionally there are three main goals of analyzing a risk, which are evaluate, classify, and prioritize. Here is where a value is given to the attributes of a risk &e., probability, impact, and timeframe) based on a multi-level classification system (e.g., low, medium, high). It is important to keep in mind that the definitions of these levels are probably different for each project. Furthermore the risks can be combined into groups. Then, the risks are prioritized to see what risk is necessary to mitigate first. After the risks are analyzed, a plan is made to mitigate as many risks as feasible. Each risk should be assigned to someone in the project with knowledge in the area of the risk. Then the possible approaches to choose from are: research, accept, watch, or mitigate. Next, all risks, mitigated or not, are tracked either individually or in groups. As the plan is executed, risks are re-evaluated, and the attribute values are adjusted as necessary. Metrics are established and monitored as tools for risk tracking. Also a trigger or threshold should be set on the metric data that indicates when an action is needed. Results of this tracking are usually evaluated and reported in a relevant format at weekly or monthly meetings. Choosing controls is the subsequent step, which involves the effects of the tracking. The three basic controls are: close, continue tracking, and re- plan. Finally communicate & document is the last step, but occurs throughout the process. It is vital that main risks, plans, changes, and progress are known by everyone in the project. A good way to keep everyone updated and inform other projects of common issues is by thoroughly documenting project risks. NASA sees value in risk management and believes that projects have greater probability or success by using the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process.

Pokorny, Frank M.↗

TPSAS-NF1676L-31853-DND

Risk that Orion arrives later than Space Launch System (SLS). MSO mitigates this risk by using a mass simulator for SLS’ tests. An Orion simulator for the Integrated Modal Test (IMT) and Umbilical Release and Retraction Tests (URRT) mitigates schedule risk by significant timeframe. A clean sheet alternate being pursued - analysis shows matching modal characteristics unnecessary; rigid simulator is acceptable wrt existing SLS accelerometer locations and shaker placement/size. Key Simulator Requirements: Representative mass, CG, rigid modal characteristics, high fidelity interface at MSA. Pre-test analyses show that MSO vertical CG could be up to 40” low without affecting IMT.

Steve Cutright↗

Pursuing Energy Efficiency as a Hedge against Carbon Regulatory Risks: Current Resource Planning Practices in the West

Uncertainty surrounding the nature and timing of future carbon regulations poses a fundamental and far-reaching financial risk for electric utilities and their ratepayers. Long-term resource planning provides a potential framework within which utilities can assess carbon regulatory risk and evaluate options for mitigating exposure to this risk through investments in energy efficiency and other low-carbon resources. In this paper, we examine current resource planning practices related to managing carbon regulatory risk, based on a comparative analysis of the most-recent long-term resource plans filed by fifteen major utilities in the Western U.S. First, we compare the assumptions and methods used by utilities to assess carbon regulatory risk and to evaluate energy efficiency as a risk mitigation option. Although most utilities have made important strides in beginning to address carbon regulatory risk within their resource plan, we also identify a number of opportunities for improvement and offer recommendations for resource planners and state regulators to consider. We also summarize the composition and carbon intensity of the preferred resource portfolios selected by the fifteen Western utilities, highlighting the contribution of energy efficiency and its impact on the carbon intensity of utilities' proposed resource strategies. Energy efficiency and renewables are the dominant low-carbon resources included in utilities' preferred portfolios. Across the fifteen utilities, energy efficiency constitutes anywhere from 6percent to almost 50percent of the preferred portfolio energy resources, and represents 22percent of all incremental resources in aggregate.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Risk Assessment at the Edge: Applying NERC CIP to Aggregated Grid-Edge Resources

Distributed energy resources (DERs) promise to deliver benefits for both utilities and consumers by dynamically interoperating utility systems with customer-owned grid-edge technologies. These small energy-consuming devices are increasingly being aggregated for participation in grid markets, planning and operations. A cyber attack penetrating the control system of aggregated DERs could negatively impact the operation of the grid. In the worst case, the power grid could be severely damaged and physical safety compromised. In this paper we analyze cybersecurity risks associated with the aggregation of DERs and develop an approach to mitigating that risk. The approaches to both cyber risk analysis and mitigation were developed during a recent research project that serves as an example of how the approaches could be applied. However, both the risk analysis and mitigation are applicable to the broader domain of all DERs. An important conclusion is that the successful cyber compromise of aggregated DERs could have a significant impact on the bulk power system. This is the case even if each individual DER falls below the threshold of compliance with bulk-grid cybersecurity standards. For this reason, we specifically investigate how National Electricity Reliability Corporation's Critical Infrastructure Protection requirements could flow down to interactions between DER aggregators and the DERs themselves in order to protect the grid from these bulk-scale cyber attack impacts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Identification and Evaluation of Integration and Cross Cutting Issues Across HRP Risks

The HRP Integrated Research Plan contains the research plans for the 32 risks requiring research to characterize and mitigate. These risks to human health and performance in spaceflight are identified by evidence and each one focuses on a single aspect of human physiology or performance. They are further categorized by aspects of the spaceflight environment, such as altered gravity or space radiation, that that play a major role in their likelihood and consequence. From its inception the "integrate" in the Research Plan has denoted the integrated nature of risks to human health and performance, the connectedness of physiological systems within the human body regardless of the spaceflight environment, and the integrated response of the human body to the spaceflight environment. Common characteristics of the spaceflight environment include altered gravity, atmospheres and light/dark cycles, space radiation, isolation, noise, and periods of high or low workload. Long term exposure to this unique environment produces a suite of physiological effects such as stress; vision, neurocognitive and anthropometric changes; circadian misalignment; fluid shifts, deconditioning; immune dysregulation; and altered nutritional requirements. Matrix diagraming was used to systematically identify, analyze and rate the many-to-many relationships between environmental characteristics and the suite of physiological effects. It was also to identify patterns in the relationships of common physiological effects to each other. Analyses of patterns or relationships in these diagrams help to identify issues that cut across multiple risks. Cross cutting issues benefit from a multidisciplinary approach that synthesizes concepts or data from two or more disciplines to identify and characterize risk factors or develop countermeasures relevant to multiple risks. They also help to illuminate possible problem areas that may arise when a countermeasure impacts risks other than those which it was developed to mitigate, or identify groupings of physiological changes that are likely to occur that may impact the overall risk posture.

Steinberg, S. L.↗

The Impact of Apollo-Era Microbiology on Human Space Flight

The microbiota of crewmembers and the spacecraft environment contributes significant risk to crew health during space flight missions. NASA reduces microbial risk with various mitigation methods that originated during the Apollo Program and continued to evolve through subsequent programs: Skylab, Shuttle, and International Space Station (ISS). A quarantine of the crew and lunar surface samples, within the Lunar Receiving Laboratory following return from the Moon, was used to prevent contamination with unknown extraterrestrial organisms. The quarantine durations for the crew and lunar samples were 21 days and 50 days, respectively. A series of infections among Apollo crewmembers resulted in a quarantine before launch to limit exposure to infectious organisms. This Health Stabilization Program isolated the crew for 21 days before flight and was effective in reducing crew illness. After the program developed water recovery hardware for Apollo spacecraft, the 1967 National Academy of Science Space Science Board recommended the monitoring of potable water. NASA implemented acceptability limits of 10 colony forming units (CFU) per mL and the absence of viable E. coli, anaerobes, yeasts, and molds in three separate 150 mL aliquots. Microbiological investigations of the crew and spacecraft environment were conducted during the Apollo program, including the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project and Skylab. Subsequent space programs implemented microbial screening of the crew for pathogens and acceptability limits on spacecraft surfaces and air. Microbiology risk mitigation methods have evolved since the Apollo program. NASA cancelled the quarantine of the crew after return from the lunar surface, reduced the duration of the Health Stabilization Program; and implemented acceptability limits for spacecraft surfaces and air. While microbial risks were not a main focus of the early Mercury and Gemini programs, the extended duration of Apollo flights resulted in the increased scrutiny of impact of the space flight environment on crew health. The lessons learned during that era of space flight continue to impact microbiology risk mitigation in space programs today.

Elliott, T. F↗

SU-F-T-246: Evaluation of Healthcare Failure Mode And Effect Analysis For Risk Assessment

Purpose: To evaluate the differences between the Veteran Affairs Healthcare Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and the AAPM Task Group 100 Failure and Effect Analysis (FMEA) risk assessment techniques in the setting of a stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) procedure were compared respectively. Understanding the differences in the techniques methodologies and outcomes will provide further insight into the applicability and utility of risk assessments exercises in radiation therapy. Methods: HFMEA risk assessment analysis was performed on a stereotactic radiosurgery procedure. A previous study from our institution completed a FMEA of our SRS procedure and the process map generated from this work was used for the HFMEA. The process of performing the HFMEA scoring was analyzed, and the results from both analyses were compared. Results: The key differences between the two risk assessments are the scoring criteria for failure modes and identifying critical failure modes for potential hazards. The general consensus among the team performing the analyses was that scoring for the HFMEA was simpler and more intuitive then the FMEA. The FMEA identified 25 critical failure modes while the HFMEA identified 39. Seven of the FMEA critical failure modes were not identified by the HFMEA and 21 of the HFMEA critical failure modes were not identified by the FMEA. HFMEA as described by the Veteran Affairs provides guidelines on which failure modes to address first. Conclusion: HFMEA is a more efficient model for identifying gross risks in a process than FMEA. Clinics with minimal staff, time and resources can benefit from this type of risk assessment to eliminate or mitigate high risk hazards with nominal effort. FMEA can provide more in depth details but at the cost of elevated effort.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT WASTE PROCESSING ANNUAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008

The Office of Waste Processing identifies and reduces engineering and technical risks and uncertainties of the waste processing programs and projects of the Department of Energy's Environmental Management (EM) mission through the timely development of solutions to technical issues. The risks, and actions taken to mitigate those risks, are determined through technology readiness assessments, program reviews, technology information exchanges, external technical reviews, technical assistance, and targeted technology development and deployment. The Office of Waste Processing works with other DOE Headquarters offices and project and field organizations to proactively evaluate technical needs, identify multi-site solutions, and improve the technology and engineering associated with project and contract management. Participants in this program are empowered with the authority, resources, and training to implement their defined priorities, roles, and responsibilities. The Office of Waste Processing Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP) supports the goals and objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) - Office of Environmental Management Engineering and Technology Roadmap by providing direction for technology enhancement, development, and demonstration that will lead to a reduction of technical risks and uncertainties in EM waste processing activities. The MYPP summarizes the program areas and the scope of activities within each program area proposed for the next five years to improve safety and reduce costs and environmental impacts associated with waste processing; authorized budget levels will impact how much of the scope of activities can be executed, on a year-to-year basis. Waste Processing Program activities within the Roadmap and the MYPP are described in these seven program areas: (1) Improved Waste Storage Technology; (2) Reliable and Efficient Waste Retrieval Technologies; (3) Enhanced Tank Closure Processes; (4) Next-Generation Pretreatment Solutions; (5) Enhanced Stabilization Technologies; (6) Spent Nuclear Fuel; and (7) Challenging Materials. This report provides updates on 35 technology development tasks conducted during calendar year 2008 in the Roadmap and MYPP program areas.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

WASTE PROCESSING ANNUAL NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED R AND D REPORT FOR CY2008

The Engineering and Technology Office of Waste Processing identifies and reduces engineering and technical risks associated with key waste processing project decisions. The risks, and actions taken to mitigate those risks, are determined through technology readiness assessments, program reviews, technology information exchanges, external technical reviews, technical assistance, and targeted technology development and deployment (TDD). The Office of Waste Processing TDD program prioritizes and approves research and development scopes of work that address nuclear safety related to processing of highly radioactive nuclear wastes. Thirteen of the thirty-five R&D approved work scopes in FY2009 relate directly to nuclear safety, and are presented in this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA Strategy to Safely Live and Work in the Space Radiation Environment

In space, astronauts are constantly bombarded with energetic particles. The goal of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the NASA Space Radiation Project is to ensure that astronauts can safely live and work in the space radiation environment. The space radiation environment poses both acute and chronic risks to crew health and safety, but unlike some other aspects of space travel, space radiation exposure has clinically relevant implications for the lifetime of the crew. Among the identified radiation risks are cancer, acute and late CNS damage, chronic and degenerative tissue decease, and acute radiation syndrome. The term "safely" means that risks are sufficiently understood such that acceptable limits on mission, post-mission and multi-mission consequences can be defined. The NASA Space Radiation Project strategy has several elements. The first element is to use a peer-reviewed research program to increase our mechanistic knowledge and genetic capabilities to develop tools for individual risk projection, thereby reducing our dependency on epidemiological data and population-based risk assessment. The second element is to use the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory to provide a ground-based facility to study the health effects/mechanisms of damage from space radiation exposure and the development and validation of biological models of risk, as well as methods for extrapolation to human risk. The third element is a risk modeling effort that integrates the results from research efforts into models of human risk to reduce uncertainties in predicting the identified radiation risks. To understand the biological basis for risk, we must also understand the physical aspects of the crew environment. Thus, the fourth element develops computer algorithms to predict radiation transport properties, evaluate integrated shielding technologies and provide design optimization recommendations for the design of human space systems. Understanding the risks and determining methods to mitigate the risks are keys to a successful radiation protection strategy.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗

A Strategy to Safely Live and Work in the Space Radiation Environment

The goal of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the Space Radiation Project is to ensure that astronauts can safely live and work in the space radiation environment. The space radiation environment poses both acute and chronic risks to crew health and safety, but unlike some other aspects of space travel, space radiation exposure has clinically relevant implications for the lifetime of the crew. The term safely means that risks are sufficiently understood such that acceptable limits on mission, post-mission and multi-mission consequences (for example, excess lifetime fatal cancer risk) can be defined. The Space Radiation Project strategy has several elements. The first element is to use a peer-reviewed research program to increase our mechanistic knowledge and genetic capabilities to develop tools for individual risk projection, thereby reducing our dependency on epidemiological data and population-based risk assessment. The second element is to use the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory to provide a ground-based facility to study the understanding of health effects/mechanisms of damage from space radiation exposure and the development and validation of biological models of risk, as well as methods for extrapolation to human risk. The third element is a risk modeling effort that integrates the results from research efforts into models of human risk to reduce uncertainties in predicting risk of carcinogenesis, central nervous system damage, degenerative tissue disease, and acute radiation effects. To understand the biological basis for risk, we must also understand the physical aspects of the crew environment. Thus the fourth element develops computer codes to predict radiation transport properties, evaluate integrated shielding technologies and provide design optimization recommendations for the design of human space systems. Understanding the risks and determining methods to mitigate the risks are keys to a successful radiation protection strategy.

Corbin, Barbara J.↗

Root Cause Analysis of the Data Refinement Process – Medical Conditions Capability Resource Tables

The medical system for spaceflight thus far has been designed to support missions in low earth orbit (LEO). Crew capabilities are limited and heavily dependent on the team of medical support staff at Mission Control Center (MCC) to guide diagnosis and management. However, missions to the Moon and Mars will suffer from several constraints that will make this ground support focused approach to care ineffective. In order to update and modify medical system design, NASA has relied on Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) modeling to mitigate medical risk through trade space analysis. Specifically, capability resource tables (CRT’s) were developed to create a dataset of resources required to manage a list of accepted medical conditions significant in exploration spaceflight. With 120 conditions, this dataset contained hundreds of capabilities and thousands of resources with tens of thousands of cells of data. Initially these tables were built in excel for high throughput during development, but ultimately had to be transferred, managed, and modified into the Evidence Library database for modeling purposes. The process of collating and reviewing the Evidence Library revealed numerous errors in the dataset that had to be corrected through iterative changes. Several error types emerged during this process and can be broken into specific classifications defined as “input”, “transcription”, “structural”, “branching”, and “information”. In reviewing these error types through the root cause analysis (RCA) approach, we were able to identify the contributors to these errors which included single data review points, changing product end goals, limited software selection, time constraints and several others. By reviewing and evaluating the underlying causes we can provide possible system improvements that can be implemented for current and future data management in PRA model inputs.

A. Anderson↗

Prototype HB650 Transportation Validation For The PIP-II Project

The PIP-II Project at Fermilab is centered around a superconducting 800 MeV proton linac to upgrade and modernize the Fermilab accelerator complex, allowing increased beam current to intensity frontier experiments such as LBNF-DUNE. PIP-II includes strong international collaborations, including the delivery of 12 cryomodules from European labs to FNAL (3 from STFC-UKRI in the UK and 9 from CEA in France). The transatlantic shipment of these completed modules is identifed as a serious risk for the project. To mitigate this risk, a rigorous and systematic process has been developed to design and validate a transport system, including specifcation, procedures, logistics, and realistic testing. This paper will detail the engineering process used to manage this effort across the collaboration and the results of the first major validation testing of the integrated shipping system prior to use with a cryomodule.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗