Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “atomization energy”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,027 records · Page 57

Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

Bari, Robert A.↗

Zone Freezing Study for Pyrochemical Process Waste Minimization

Pyroprocessing technology is a non-aqueous separation process for treatment of used nuclear fuel. At the heart of pyroprocessing lies the electrorefiner, which electrochemically dissolves uranium from the used fuel at the anode and deposits it onto a cathode. During this operation, sodium, transuranics, and fission product chlorides accumulate in the electrolyte salt (LiCl-KCl). These contaminates change the characteristics of the salt overtime and as a result, large volumes of contaminated salt are being removed, reprocessed and stored as radioactive waste. To reduce the storage volumes and improve recycling process for cost minimization, a salt purification method called zone freezing has been proposed at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

From the Lab to the real world: sources of error in UF 6 gas enrichment monitoring

Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities is a serious concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards methods have changed over the years, most recently switching to an improved safeguards model that calls for new technologies to help keep up with the increasing size and complexity of today’s gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). One of the primary goals of the IAEA is to detect the production of uranium at levels greater than those an enrichment facility may have declared. In order to accomplish this goal, new enrichment monitors need to be as accurate as possible.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

HTR –Proteus Pebble Bed Experimental Program Cores 1, 1A, 2, and 3: Hexagonal Close Packing with a 1:2 Moderator-to-Fuel Pebble Ratio (Rev. 1)

In its deployment as a pebble bed reactor (PBR) critical facility from 1992 to 1996, the PROTEUS facility was designated as HTR-PROTEUS. This experimental program was performed as part of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on the Validation of Safety Related Physics Calculations for Low Enriched HTGRs. Within this project, critical experiments were conducted for graphite moderated LEU systems to determine core reactivity, flux and power profiles, reaction-rate ratios, the worth of control rods, both in-core and reflector based, the worth of burnable poisons, kinetic parameters, and the effects of moisture ingress on these parameters. Four benchmark experiments were evaluated in this report: Cores 1, 1A, 2, and 3. These core configurations represent the hexagonal close packing (HCP) configurations of the HTR-PROTEUS experiment with a moderator-to-fuel pebble ratio of 1:2. Core 1 represents the only configuration utilizing ZEBRA control rods. Cores 1A, 2, and 3 use withdrawable, hollow, stainless steel control rods. Cores 1 and 1A are similar except for the use of different control rods; Core 1A also has one less layer of pebbles (21 layers instead of 22). Core 2 retains the first 16 layers of pebbles from Cores 1 and 1A and has 16 layers of moderator pebbles stacked above the fueled layers. Core 3 retains the first 17 layers of pebbles but has polyethylene rods inserted between pebbles to simulate water ingress. The additional partial pebble layer (layer 18) for Core 3 was not included as it was used for core operations and not the reported critical configuration. Cores 1, 1A, 2, and 3 were determined to be acceptable benchmark experiments.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Market Research Survey of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Portable MS Systems for IAEA Safeguards Applications

This report summarizes the results for the market research survey of mass spectrometers that are deemed pertinent to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs and strategic objectives. The focus of the report is on MS instruments that represent currently available (or soon to be) commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technology and weigh less than 400 pounds. A compilation of all available MS instruments (36 COTS and 2 R&D) is presented, along with pertinent information regarding each instrument.

COTS↗

HTR-PROTEUS Pebble Bed Experimental Program Core 4: Random Packing With a 1:1 Moderator-to-Fuel Pebble Ratio

In its deployment as a pebble bed reactor (PBR) critical facility from 1992 to 1996, the PROTEUS facility was designated as HTR-PROTEUS. This experimental program was performed as part of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on the Validation of Safety Related Physics Calculations for Low Enriched HTGRs. Within this project, critical experiments were conducted for graphite moderated LEU systems to determine core reactivity, flux and power profiles, reaction-rate ratios, the worth of control rods, both in-core and reflector based, the worth of burnable poisons, kinetic parameters, and the effects of moisture ingress on these parameters. One benchmark experiment was evaluated in this report: Core 4. Core 4 represents the only configuration with random pebble packing in the HTR-PROTEUS series of experiments, and has a moderator-to-fuel pebble ratio of 1:1. Three random configurations were performed. The initial configuration, Core 4.1, was rejected because the method for pebble loading, separate delivery tubes for the moderator and fuel pebbles, may not have been completely random; this core loading was rejected by the experimenters. Cores 4.2 and 4.3 were loaded using a single delivery tube, eliminating the possibility for systematic ordering effects. The second and third cores differed slightly in the quantity of pebbles loaded (40 each of moderator and fuel pebbles), stacked height of the pebbles in the core cavity (0.02 m), withdrawn distance of the stainless steel control rods (20 mm), and withdrawn distance of the autorod (30 mm). The 34 coolant channels in the upper axial reflector and the 33 coolant channels in the lower axial reflector were open. Additionally, the axial graphite fillers used in all other HTR-PROTEUS configurations to create a 12-sided core cavity were not used in the randomly packed cores. Instead, graphite fillers were placed on the cavity floor, creating a funnel-like base, to discourage ordering effects during pebble loading. Core 4 was determined to be acceptable benchmark experiment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technical Assessment of the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM) for an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is exploring the potential roles of an Unattended Cylinder Verifications Station (UCVS) in a new generation of safeguards technology for uranium enrichment plants. The UCVS is envisioned to combine an operator accountancy scale, a nondestructive assay (NDA) system such as the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM), a cylinder identification system, and a surveillance system for verification of product, feed, and tails cylinders as well as continuity of knowledge at material balance area boundaries. The IAEA has identified several preliminary requirements and development questions for the UCVS. Specifically, the IAEA has identified the accuracy of the enrichment assay as the key metric for the NDA system with uncertainty targets of 3%, 6%, and 9% on product, feed, and tails cylinders, respectively. The NDA system should also provide full volume interrogation of the cylinders in order to ensure detection of partial defects within the cylinder. The development questions are concerned primarily with the sources and magnitude of the uncertainty and quantitative analysis of the interrogation depth and partial defect sensitivity. The objective of this report is to address these requirements and questions based on Monte Carlo modeling and field trial experience with the PNEM.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Technosocial Modeling for Determining the Status and Nature of a State’s Nuclear Activities

The International Atomic Energy Agency State Evaluation Process: The Role of Information Analysis in Reaching Safeguards Conclusions (Mathews et al. 2008), several examples of nonproliferation models using analytical software were developed that may assist the IAEA with collecting, visualizing, analyzing, and reporting information in support of the State Evaluation Process. This paper focuses on one of the examples a set of models developed in the Proactive Scenario Production, Evidence Collection, and Testing (ProSPECT) software that evaluates the status and nature of a state’s nuclear activities. The models use three distinct subject areas to perform this assessment: the presence of nuclear activities, the consistency of those nuclear activities with national nuclear energy goals, and the geopolitical context in which those nuclear activities are taking place. As a proof-of-concept for the models, a crude case study was performed. The study, which attempted to evaluate the nuclear activities taking place in Syria prior to September 2007, yielded illustrative, yet inconclusive, results. Due to the inconclusive nature of the case study results, changes that may improve the model’s efficiency and accuracy are proposed.

Gastelum, Zoe N.↗

Proceedings of the Scientific Visit on Crystalline Rock Repository Development

A scientific visit on Crystalline Rock Repository Development was held in the Czech Republic on September 24-27, 2012. The visit was hosted by the Czech Radioactive Waste Repository Authority (RAWRA), co-hosted by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The purpose of the visit was to promote technical information exchange between participants from countries engaged in the investigation and exploration of crystalline rock for the eventual construction of nuclear waste repositories. The visit was designed especially for participants of countries that have recently commenced (or recommenced) national repository programmes in crystalline host rock formations. Discussion topics included repository programme development, site screening and selection, site characterization, disposal concepts in crystalline host rock, regulatory frameworks, and safety assessment methodology. Interest was surveyed in establishing a "club", the mission of which would be to identify and address the various technical challenges that confront the disposal of radioactive waste in crystalline rock environments. The idea of a second scientific visit to be held one year later in another host country received popular support. The visit concluded with a trip to the countryside south of Prague where participants were treated to a tour of the laboratory and underground facilities of the Josef Regional Underground Research Centre.

Mariner, Paul E.↗

Security by Design Handbook

This document is a draft Security-by-Design (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to “encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.” The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PAS-PP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessons-learned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the system-level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A four-element strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.

Snell, Mark Kamerer↗

Global Cylinder Identification and Monitoring System: Nonproliferation Concerns and Baseline Definition

With growing nuclear commerce and new safeguards initiatives, the international safeguards system continues to face ever-increasing demands to verify nuclear materials. Emerging proliferation threats from both state and non-state actors are also leading to increased concerns over the diversion of nuclear materials—for example, the loss of cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) during transport or the introduction of undeclared feed into enrichment plants. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) goal for detecting the diversion of a significant quantity (SQ) of natural or low-enriched uranium (LEU) is 1 year. If a proliferant state were able to obtain a cylinder containing natural or low-enriched UF 6 , it could produce a SQ of highly enriched uranium (HEU) (25 kilograms) in less than a year using a moderately sized enrichment facility.

White-Horton, Jessica L.↗

Building an Effective Nonproliferation Program: US Support of IAEA Safeguards

A central pillar of international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. From the inception of the IAEA, the United States has supported the development and evolution of both the safeguards system itself and devices and systems approaches used by inspectors. The IAEA safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States to the IAEA about their nuclear programs. From Iran to Syria, to the more than 190 other countries that accept IAEA safeguards, the IAEA safeguards system enhances international security, seeking to assure compliance with international nuclear agreements. The cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime is the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA safeguards largely have evolved to ensure non-nuclear weapon state compliance with the NPT.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Measurement of Spent Fuel Assemblies [Slides]

This presentation provides an overview of the status of the technology for the measurement of the fissile material content of spent nuclear reactor fuel. The emphasis is on how the needs of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency are met by the available technology and what more needs to be done in this area.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Determination Of Reportable Radionuclides For DWPF Sludge Batch 7B (Macrobatch 9)

The Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) 1.2 require that “The Producer shall report the inventory of radionuclides (in Curies) that have half-lives longer than 10 years and that are, or will be, present in concentrations greater than 0.05 percent of the total inventory for each waste type indexed to the years 2015 and 3115”. As part of the strategy to comply with WAPS 1.2, the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) will report for each waste type, all radionuclides (with half-lives greater than 10 years) that have concentrations greater than 0.01 percent of the total inventory from time of production through the 1100 year period from 2015 through 3115. The initial listing of radionuclides to be included is based on the design-basis glass as identified in the Waste Form Compliance Plan (WCP) and Waste Form Qualification Report (WQR). However, it is required that this list be expanded if other radionuclides with half-lives greater than 10 years are identified that may meet the greater than 0.01% criterion for Curie content. Specification 1.6 of the WAPS, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Reporting for High Level Waste (HLW), requires that the ratio by weights of the following uranium and plutonium isotopes be reported: U-233, U-234, U-235, U-236, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, and Pu-242. Therefore, the complete set of reportable radionuclides must also include this set of U and Pu isotopes. The DWPF is receiving radioactive sludge slurry from HLW Tank 40. The radioactive sludge slurry in Tank 40 is a blend of the heel from Sludge Batch 7a (SB7a) and Sludge Batch 7b (SB7b) that was transferred to Tank 40 from Tank 51. The blend of sludge in Tank 40 is also referred to as Macrobatch 9 (MB9). This report develops the list of reportable radionuclides and associated activities as a function of time. The DWPF will use this list and the activities as one of the inputs for the development of the Production Records that relate to radionuclide inventory.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tonopah Test Range Air Monitoring: CY2012 Meteorological, Radiological, and Airborne Particulate Observations

In 1963, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), predecessor to the US Department of Energy (DOE), implemented Operation Roller Coaster on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and an adjacent area of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range (NAFR)). Operation Roller Coaster consisted of four tests in which chemical explosions were detonated in the presence of nuclear devices to assess the dispersal of radionuclides and evaluate the effectiveness of storage structures to contain the ejected radionuclides. These tests resulted in dispersal of plutonium over the ground surface downwind of the test ground zero. Three tests, Clean Slate 1, 2, and 3, were conducted on the TTR in Cactus Flat; the fourth, Double Tracks, was conducted in Stonewall Flat on the NTTR.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Safeguards Approaches for Very Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel

Many States are considering interim very long-term storage (VLTS) strategies for spent fuel storage while final disposition options are developed. Under the VLTS approach, spent fuel will be stored for periods that could exceed 50 to 100 years. The long-term storage of spent fuel — and the increasing stockpile of plutonium contained in this spent fuel — exacerbate the international safeguards and verification needs for spent fuel. In particular, significant delays in any verification of the contents of spent fuel assemblies prior to disposition may cause even further delays in the final disposition (or reprocessing) of spent fuel. As a result, the resources required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard the increasing stockpile of spent fuel will increase. Safeguarding these interim storage facilities and subsequently, the transportation of long-term stored fuel, will place additional demands on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, is to be continued. Current IAEA approaches to safeguarding above ground dry storage sites do not take into account the challenges associated with longer-term storage and are also very dependent on inspector presence. The IAEA is moving toward remote and unattended monitoring systems for safeguards and these systems should be utilized at VLTS facilities as much as possible. The research and development of various monitoring systems should be continued.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Opportunities for Process Monitoring Techniques at Delayed Access Facilities

Except for specific cases where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains a continuous presence at a facility (such as the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant), there is always a period of time or delay between the moment a State is notified or aware of an upcoming inspection, and the time the inspector actually enters the material balance area or facility. Termed by the authors as “delayed access,” this period of time between inspection notice and inspector entrance to a facility poses a concern. Delayed access also has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of measures applied as part of the Safeguards Approach for a facility (such as short-notice inspections). This report investigates the feasibility of using process monitoring to address safeguards challenges posed by delayed access at a subset of facility types.

Delayed access↗

2013 Snapshot of NGSI Human Capital Development and Future Roadmap

Since its creation in 2008, the Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogram of NNSA’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has been striving to develop sustainable academic and technical programs that support the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals. This effort endeavors to develop additional human resources to equip a new cadre of safeguards and nonproliferation experts to meet the needs of both the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for decades to come, specifically in response to data that indicates that 82% of the 2009 safeguards experts at U.S. Laboratories will have left the workforce within 15 years. This paper provides an update on the status of the program since its last presentation at the INMM Annual Meeting in 2010, including strengthened and integrated efforts in the areas of graduate and post-doctoral fellowships, young and mid-career professional support, additional short safeguards coursework, and expanded university engagement. In particular, the paper will cover the NGSI Human Capital Roadmap currently being developed in safeguards and nonproliferation education, training, and knowledge retention. The NGSI Human Capital Roadmap aims to provide additional data points and metrics on where the human capital demand lies, which disciplines and skill sets are needed in the field, and how NGSI HCD can best address these issues to meet future demand.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗