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At least 1,027 records · Page 57

Qubit spin ice

Artificial spin ices are frustrated spin systems that can be engineered, in which fine tuning of geometry and topology has allowed the design and characterization of exotic emergent phenomena at the constituent level. Here, we report a realization of spin ice in a lattice of superconducting qubits. Unlike conventional artificial spin ice, our system is disordered by both quantum and thermal fluctuations. The ground state is classically described by the ice rule, and we achieved control over a fragile degeneracy point, leading to a Coulomb phase. The ability to pin individual spins allows us to demonstrate Gauss’s law for emergent effective monopoles in two dimensions. The demonstrated qubit control lays the groundwork for potential future study of topologically protected artificial quantum spin liquids.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Supplemental Cooling for Nitrate Salt Waste

In July 2015, Los Alamos National Laboratory completed installation of a supplemental cooling system in the structure where remediated nitrate salt waste drums are stored. Although the waste currently is in a safe configuration and is monitored daily,controlling the temperature inside the structure adds another layer of protection for workers, the public,and the environment.This effort is among several layers of precautions designed to secure the waste.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pathways for Disposal of Commercially-Generated Tritiated Waste

From a waste disposal standpoint, tritium is a major challenge. Because it behaves like hydrogen, tritium exchanges readily with hydrogen in the ground water and moves easily through the ground. Land disposal sites must control the tritium activity and mobility of incoming wastes to protect human health and the environment. Consequently, disposal of tritiated low-level wastes is highly regulated and disposal options are limited. The United States has had eight operating commercial facilities licensed for low-level radioactive waste disposal, only four of which are currently receiving waste. Each of these is licensed and regulated by its state. Only two of these sites accept waste from states outside of their specified regional compact. For waste streams that cannot be disposed directly at one of the four active commercial low-level waste disposal facilities, processing facilities offer various forms of tritiated low-level waste processing and treatment, and then transport and dispose of the residuals at a disposal facility. These processing facilities may remove and recycle tritium, reduce waste volume, solidify liquid waste, remove hazardous constituents, or perform a number of additional treatments. Waste brokers also offer many low-level and mixed waste management and transportation services. These services can be especially helpful for small-quantity tritiated-waste generators, such as universities, research institutions, medical facilities, and some industries. The information contained in this report covers general capabilities and requirements for the various disposal/processing facilities and brokerage companies, but is not considered exhaustive. Typically, each facility has extensive waste acceptance criteria and will require a generator to thoroughly characterize their wastes. Then a contractual agreement between the waste generator and the disposal/processing/broker entity must be in place before waste is accepted. Costs for tritiated waste transportation, processing and disposal vary based a number of factors. In many cases, wastes with very low radioactivity are priced primarily based on weight or volume. For higher activities, costs are based on both volume and activity, with the activity-based charges usually being much larger than volume-based charges. Other factors affecting cost include location, waste classification and form, other hazards in the waste, etc. Costs may be based on general guidelines used by an individual disposal or processing site, but final costs are established by specific contract with each generator. For this report, seven hypothetical waste streams intended to represent commercially-generated tritiated waste were defined in order to calculate comparative costs. Ballpark costs for disposition of these hypothetical waste streams were calculated. These costs ranged from thousands to millions of dollars. Due to the complexity of the cost-determining factors mentioned above, the costs calculated in this report should be understood to represent very rough cost estimates for the various hypothetical wastes. Actual costs could be higher or could be lower due to quantity discounts or other factors.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Long-Term Surveillance Plan for the Naturita, Colorado, Disposal Site

This Long-Term Surveillance Plan (LTSP) explains how the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) will fulfill general license requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 40.27 (10 CFR 40.27) as the licensee at the Naturita, CO, Disposal Site (site) and revises the original LTSP (DOE 1999). This revision incorporates changes that reflect the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concurrence on April 15, 2014, with a request from the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) to terminate groundwater monitoring at the site (Appendix D). In addition, the title of the LTSP has been changed from Long-Term Surveillance Plan for the Upper Burbank Disposal Cell, Uravan, Colorado , because the town of Uravan no longer exists and the Upper Burbank disposal cell is now referred to as the Naturita disposal cell. Appendix B has been revised to include documentation of a 2003 agreement in which the Bureau of Land Management provides a right-of-way to DOE for the east and west toe drains (identified in the agreement as two storm water drainage structures) and a 2011 agreement in which Umetco Minerals Corporation (Umetco) allows DOE access to the west toe drain outlet (identified in the agreement as a diversion channel). These agreements were put in place after acceptance of the original LTSP, and they are included in this revised LTSP as a best management practice to maintain protectiveness and to inform all stewards of site conditions and controls.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

History and State of the Art in Advanced Thermal Protection Systems

This report documents the current state of the art of thermal protection systems (TPS) relevant to missile application materials and MTCR control language. The information is intended to provide data on current TPS for determining the current state of development and identifying potential research directions. Various vehicle configurations and types of TPS are described, including the evolution of materials and systems. Vehicle configurations such as high drag rocket and capsule systems and low-drag air-breathers are discussed. TPS are complex, transitioning from often very low temperatures to temperatures exceeding 3000°C and heat fluxes of up to 30,000 W/cm 2 . They can take the form of blankets, sheets, tiles and fabricated rigid structures, and can be made from high temperature capable alloys, refractory metals, ceramics, ceramic matrix composites, ultra-high temperature ceramics, carbon-carbon composites or ablative carbonaceous materials. Current state of the art in TPS is based on materials any systems developed for the initial space program. TPS was upgraded to the point of the Space Shuttle development and has stagnated since them.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

The NREL Sensor Laboratory Detection of Hydrogen Emissions

The development of a functional hydrogen detection system is a multifaceted process that integrates hardware, deployments strategies, and analytics which can be supported by the NREL Sensor Laboratory: 1. Support of the design, validation and optimization of sensing prototypes; 2. Guide optimized sensing element development, including control electronics; 3. Laboratory testing to validate/optimize metrological performance (measurement range, detection limit, etc.); 4. Provide test sites for field deployments representative of real-world scenarios with controlled hydrogen releases; 5. Develop sensor placement and operation guidance; 6. Provide guidance on electronics to accommodate facility integration; 7. Electrical safety designs to allow for operation within restricted zones; 8. Integration into facility monitoring and control systems; 9. Guide incorporation of cyber security elements to protect facilities from malicious attacks; 10. Modeling and application of advanced analytics to detect and quantify emissions; 11. Higher Order dispersion models to guide sensor placement for reliable detection; 12. Advanced analytics for improved metrological performances, and to inform inverse modeling; 13. Market support and commercialization (national and international markets); 14. Commercial deployments in H2@SCALE markets (e.g., HUBs and other large-scale hydrogen markets); and 15. Leverage off international collaborations/partnerships (e.g., NREL is on the advisory board for the European initiative "pre-Normative Research on Hydrogen Releases Assessment"-NHyRA).

08 HYDROGEN↗

Maturation of Rhodobacter capsulatus Multicopper Oxidase CutO Depends on the CopA Copper Efflux Pathway and Requires the cutF Product

Copper (Cu) is an essential cofactor required for redox enzymes in all domains of life. Because of its toxicity, tightly controlled mechanisms ensure Cu delivery for cuproenzyme biogenesis and simultaneously protect cells against toxic Cu. Many Gram-negative bacteria contain extracytoplasmic multicopper oxidases (MCOs), which are involved in periplasmic Cu detoxification. MCOs are unique cuproenzymes because their catalytic center contains multiple Cu atoms, which are required for the oxidation of Cu 1+ to the less toxic Cu 2+ . Hence, Cu is both substrate and essential cofactor of MCOs. Here, we investigated the maturation of Rhodobacter capsulatus MCO CutO and its role in periplasmic Cu detoxification. A survey of CutO activity of R. capsulatus mutants with known defects in Cu homeostasis and in the maturation of the cuproprotein cbb 3 -type cytochrome oxidase ( cbb 3 -Cox) was performed. This revealed that CutO activity is largely independent of the Cu-delivery pathway for cbb 3 -Cox biogenesis, except for the cupric reductase CcoG, which is required for full CutO activity. The most pronounced decrease of CutO activity was observed with strains lacking the cytoplasmic Cu chaperone CopZ, or the Cu-exporting ATPase CopA, indicating that CutO maturation is linked to the CopZ-CopA mediated Cu-detoxification pathway. Our data demonstrate that CutO is important for cellular Cu resistance under both aerobic and anaerobic growth conditions. CutO is encoded in the cutFOG operon, but only CutF, and not CutG, is essential for CutO activity. No CutO activity is detectable when cutF or its putative Cu-binding motif are mutated, suggesting that the cutF product serves as a Cu-binding component required for active CutO production. Bioinformatic analyses of CutF-like proteins support their widespread roles as putative Cu-binding proteins for several Cu-relay pathways. Our overall findings show that the cytoplasmic CopZ-CopA dependent Cu detoxification pathway contributes to providing Cu to CutO maturation, a process that strictly relies on cutF .

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Study the Protection Improvements for a Weak Grid Area With High IBRs

NLR is collaborating with Florida Power & Light (FPL) and GE to investigate power system stability and protection reliability challenges in a weak-grid region with high penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs). This presentation will primarily focus on the protection aspects of the study. We will share key insights from this real-world project, including best practices for developing high-fidelity fault study models, establishing a controller-hardware-in-the-loop (CHIL) platform for testing physical relays, identifying system-level protection challenges, and designing enhanced protection schemes to address those issues. Through this discussion, the audience will gain practical understanding of protection studies in IBR-dominated systems, the emerging challenges associated with reduced fault current and altered transient behavior, and effective mitigation strategies. In particular, we will highlight the critical importance of IBR compliance with IEEE 2800-2022 to ensure dependable and secure protection relay operation in modern transmission systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) - U.S. Copyright TXu 1-901-039

Information security continues to evolve in response to disruptive changes with a persistent focus on information-centric controls and a healthy debate about balancing endpoint and network protection, with a goal of improved enterprise/business risk management. Economic uncertainty, intensively collaborative styles of work, virtualization, increased outsourcing and ongoing compliance pressures require careful consideration and adaptation. The Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) provides a measure (i.e., a quantitative indication) of reliability, performance, and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders interests in that requirement. For a given stakeholder, CSES accounts for the variance that may exist among the stakes one attaches to meeting each requirement. The basis, objectives and capabilities for the CSES including inputs/outputs as well as the structural and mathematical underpinnings contained in this copyright.

Cyber Security Econometrics System↗

Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES)

Information security continues to evolve in response to disruptive changes with a persistent focus on information-centric controls and a healthy debate about balancing endpoint and network protection, with a goal of improved enterprise/business risk management. Economic uncertainty, intensively collaborative styles of work, virtualization, increased outsourcing and ongoing complance pressures require careful consideration and adaption. The CSES provides a measure (i.e. a quantitative indication) of reliability, performance, and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders' interests in that requirement. For a given stakeholder, CSES accounts for the variance that may exist among the stakes one attaches to meeting each requirement.

Source record↗

Preliminary Design of Mu2E Spill Regulation System (SRS)

Direct μ→e conversion requires resonant extraction of a stream of pulsed beam, comprised of short micro-bunches (pulses) from the Delivery ring (DR) to the Mu2e target. Experimental needs and radiation protection apply strict re-quirements on the beam quality control and regulation of the spill. The objective of the Spill Regulation System (SRS) is to maintain the intensity uniformity of a stream of ~25k pulses as 1e12 protons are extracted at 590.08 kHz over a 43 ms spill period. To meet the specified perfor-mance, two regulation elements will be driven simultane-ously: a family of three zero-harmonic quadrupoles (tune ramp quads) and a RF Knock-Out (RFKO) system. The SRS will use two separate control loops to control each regulation element simultaneously. It will be critical to co-ordinate the SRS processes within the machine cycle and within each spill interval. The SRS has been designed to have a total Gain-Bandwidth product of 10 kHz, which can be used to mitigate several sources of ripple in the spill pro-file.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Understanding Community Microgrids

Increasing need for distribution circuit reliability and resilience prompt a clearer understanding of community microgrid interconnection and operational requirements. While customer-owned, behind-the-meter microgrid implementation is not always simple, increasing demand for reliability has commercialized many installation approaches. This rapid commercialization has broadened industry understanding of single-customer microgrid integration. Moreover, off-grid behaviors of such microgrids are not required to meet utility standard interconnection requirements. However, multi-customer community microgrids (utility- or third-party operated), are less well explored and introduce more complex design and operational challenges. The control of DER along with distribution automation devices, unmanned operation, protection coordination, and other aspects makes community microgrids challenging to implement and operate in both on-grid and off-grid modes. This whitepaper is a technical primer for understanding community microgrids. It provides a foundation for understanding the components, configurations, design, and operational considerations for community microgrids.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor passive safety system response to postulated events

The Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor (SMR) is an 800 MWt (>225 MWe) integral pressurized water reactor. This paper is part of a series of four describing the design and safety features of the Westinghouse SMR. This paper focuses in particular upon the passive safety features and the safety system response of the Westinghouse SMR. The Westinghouse SMR design incorporates many features to minimize the effects of, and in some cases eliminates the possibility of postulated accidents. The small size of the reactor and the low power density limits the potential consequences of an accident relative to a large plant. The integral design eliminates large loop piping, which significantly reduces the flow area of postulated loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs). The Westinghouse SMR containment is a high-pressure, compact design that normally operates at a partial vacuum. This facilitates heat removal from the containment during LOCA events. The containment is submerged in water which also aides the heat removal and provides an additional radionuclide filter. The Westinghouse SMR safety system design is passive, is based largely on the passive safety systems used in the AP1000{sup R} reactor, and provides mitigation of all design basis accidents without the need for AC electrical power for a period of seven days. Frequent faults, such as reactivity insertion events and loss of power events, are protected by first shutting down the nuclear reaction by inserting control rods, then providing cold, borated water through a passive, buoyancy-driven flow. Decay heat removal is provided using a layered approach that includes the passive removal of heat by the steam drum and independent passive heat removal system that transfers heat from the primary system to the environment. Less frequent faults such as loss of coolant accidents are mitigated by passive injection of a large quantity of water that is readily available inside containment. An automatic depressurization system is used to reduce the reactor pressure in a controlled manner to facilitate the passive injection. Long-term decay heat removal is accomplished using the passive heat removal systems augmented by heat transfer through the containment vessel to the environment. The passive injection systems are designed so that the fuel remains covered and effectively cooled throughout the event. Like during the frequent faults, the passive systems provide effective cooling without the need for ac power for seven days following the accident. Connections are available to add additional water to indefinitely cool the plant. The response of the safety systems of the Westinghouse SMR to various initiating faults has been examined. Among them, two accidents; an extended station blackout event, and a LOCA event have been evaluated to demonstrate how the plant will remain safe in the unlikely event that either should occur. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Tale of Two Domains: Cyber - Physical

As devices and systems continue to modernize and adopt integrated circuits, the use of cyber technology to deploy an application is the expectation. This deployment through cyber assets brings new cyber risk and cybersecurity is the practice of managing this risk. Cyber-risk is constantly changing due to the speed of technology advancement and the changing quality of the adversary. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) mitigates cyber-risk through engineering controls where as the traditional practice of cybersecurity mitigates cyber-risk through cybersecurity controls. By clearly defining the cyber-physical boundary, engineering controls and cybersecurity controls can clearly demonstrate their complementary nature to provide layered defenses and successfully mitigate cyber-risk through independent controls. In this paper, a layered model of device decomposition of the the cyber-physical boundary is presented to provide clarity where engineering controls are used to reduce cyber-risk within the physics, functional materials, electronic, or integrated circuit layers and where cybersecurity controls are used to reduce cyber-risk within the machine code and application layers. By implementing both traditional cybersecurity controls and engineering controls, a more holistic approach to cybersecurity is achieved in protecting modern devices and systems, as well as a clear awareness in identifying, documenting, and authorizing the system’s cybersecurity protection scheme is achieved.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Methodology for Evaluating Security Controls Based on Key Performance Indicators and Stakeholder Mission

Information security continues to evolve in response to disruptive changes with a persistent focus on information-centric controls and a healthy debate about balancing endpoint and network protection, with a goal of improved enterprise/business risk management. Economic uncertainty, intensively collaborative styles of work, virtualization, increased outsourcing and ongoing compliance pressures require careful consideration and adaptation. This paper proposes a Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) that provides a measure (i.e., a quantitative indication) of reliability, performance and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders interests in that requirement. For a given stakeholder, CSES reflects the variance that may exist among the stakes she/he attaches to meeting each requirement. This paper introduces the basis, objectives and capabilities for the CSES including inputs/outputs as well as the structural and mathematical underpinnings.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Predicting synthetic mRNA stability using massively parallel kinetic measurements, biophysical modeling, and machine learning

Abstract mRNA degradation is a central process that affects all gene expression levels, though it remains challenging to predict the stability of a mRNA from its sequence, due to the many coupled interactions that control degradation rate. Here, we carried out massively parallel kinetic decay measurements on over 50,000 bacterial mRNAs, using a learn-by-design approach to develop and validate a predictive sequence-to-function model of mRNA stability. mRNAs were designed to systematically vary translation rates, secondary structures, sequence compositions, G-quadruplexes, i-motifs, and RppH activity, resulting in mRNA half-lives from about 20 seconds to 20 minutes. We combined biophysical models and machine learning to develop steady-state and kinetic decay models of mRNA stability with high accuracy and generalizability, utilizing transcription rate models to identify mRNA isoforms and translation rate models to calculate ribosome protection. Overall, the developed model quantifies the key interactions that collectively control mRNA stability in bacterial operons and predicts how changing mRNA sequence alters mRNA stability, which is important when studying and engineering bacterial genetic systems.

Cetnar, Daniel P.↗

SU-G-TeP4-15: The Roucoulette: A Set of Quality Control Tests for Dynamic Trajectory (4Pi) Treatment Delivery Techniques

Purpose: To present and validate a set of quality control tests for trajectory treatment delivery using synchronized dynamic couch (translation and rotation), MLC and collimator motion. Methods: The quality control tests are based on the Picket fence test, which consist of 5 narrow band 2mm width spaced at 2.5cm intervals, and adds progressively synchronized dynamic motions. The tests were exposed on GafChromic EBT3 films. The first test is a regular (no motion and MLC static while beam is on) Picket Fence test used as baseline. The second test includes simultaneous collimator and couch rotation, each stripe corresponding to a different rotation speed. Errors in these tests were introduced (0.5 degree and 1 degree error in rotation synchronization) to assess the error sensitivity of this test. The second test is similar to the regular Picket Fence but now including dynamic MLC motion and couch translation (including acceleration during delivery) while the beam is on. Finally in the third test, which is a combination of the first and second test, the Picket Fence pattern is delivered using synchronized collimator and couch rotation and synchronized dynamic MLC and couch translation including acceleration. Films were analyzed with FilmQA Pro. Results: The distance between the peaks in the dose profile where measured (18.5cm away from the isocentre in the inplane direction where non synchronized rotation would have the largest effect) and compared to the regular Picket Fence tests. For well synchronized motions distances between peaks where between 24.9–25.4 mm identical to the regular Picket Fence test. This range increased to 24.4–26.4mm and 23.4–26.4mm for 0.5 degree and 1 degree error respectively. The amplitude also decreased up to 15% when errors are introduced. Conclusion: We demonstrated that the Roucoulette tests can be used as a quality control tests for trajectory treatment delivery using synchronized dynamic motion.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Cybersecurity for Distance Relay Protection

This project is a DOE follow-up effort on the CREDC workshop held on September 13, 2018 in Cambridge, MA to discuss cybersecurity of distance relays, which considered the benefits, vulnerabilities and risk mitigations for the use of communication systems in power system protection. The objectives of this project are to define the taxonomy of relay protection and associated communications; define use cases describing approaches to reduce the cyber-attack surface on those protective relays; and evaluate the loss of operational functional capability from changes to communication coverage. Mitigating controls will also be evaluated to understand if there are other approaches to reduce attack surfaces while maintaining communications or partial communications. Distance relays are used to protect transmission lines of approximately 10 to 300 miles in length, by detecting short circuits (i.e., faults) on the lines and then tripping circuit breakers in the substation. Such protection systems are a subset of the power system and they incorporate sensing, logic and communication functions. Protection system exposure to cyberattack could be drastically limited by disconnecting relays from all vulnerable communication systems, but this may adversely impact overall power system performance in the absence of cyberattack. This project began with a use case analysis of protection systems with communications, as summarized in this report. It continued with modeling, testing and evaluation in a miniature power system (MPS), located in the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) Electric Power Training Center (EPTC). The project also incorporated feedback from two industry meetings held in February and September 2019. The suggested next steps account for and complement the work already underway with DOE/CESER funding: 1. Study the performance of LCD and PC vs. PUTT, which is less reliant on communication system performance and GPS timing references. The PUTT scheme could prove to be more resilient to cyberattack or communications-related disruption. It could also be more tolerant of message re-routing with SDN/SDR communication systems. On the other hand, it will be more vulnerable to false tripping during dynamic events or to loss of the voltage signal. The optimum choice of scheme may depend on the specific power system and risk assessment. This study could provide a new template for evaluation based on business functions. 2. Research and develop new methods to detect and monitor distributed physical attacks, possibly using drones, video sensors, thermal sensors, machine learning and other advanced techniques. This will help mitigate the impact of cyberattack on the protection system, and will also help mitigate the impact of wild fires. 3. Implement a scalable PKI for use in electric utility protection systems. This will encourage widespread adoption of secure authentication methods that are already available, but not widely used at present. This will help secure engineering access to the relays. 4. Investigate the use of SDN in combination with SDR to achieve better cybersecurity and electromagnetic security of the network, incorporating path variability. This would help secure both engineering access and peer-to-peer GOOSE messaging. 5. Perform additional testing, with operator evaluation of “red button” scenarios, PUTT vs. LCD, relay mis-operations, and other cyberattacks in the EPTC. This is an important advantage of testing in the EPTC rather than by computer simulation or even hardware-in-the-loop simulation; the EPTC is already dedicated to managing the situational awareness, operator response times and other human impacts. One of the project objectives was to settle on a common nomenclature for this problem space. We have concluded that the OSI layer model, supplemented by ANSI device numbers and other IEEE standards, is already well-accepted by the industry. The IEEE PSRC knowledge base provides a great deal of public information

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗