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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2018

Analysis of Influence of UAS Speed Range and Turn Performance on Detect and Avoid Sensor Requirements

In support of NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System project and RTCA Special Committee 228, an analysis has been performed to provide insight in to the trade space between unmanned aircraft speed and turn capability and detect and avoid sensor range requirements. The work was done as an initial part of the effort to understand low size, weight, and power sensor requirements for aircraft that have a limited speed envelope or can limit the envelope for portions of their mission and may be able to turn at higher than “standard rate.” Range and timeline reductions coming from limiting speed range and from increasing available turn rate in some speed ranges are shown.

Jack, Devin P.↗
NASA NTRS2019

A Detect and Avoid System in the Context of Multiple-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations

NASA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration into the National Airspace System (UAS in the NAS) project examines the technical barriers associated with the operation of UAS in civil airspace. For UAS, the removal of the pilot from onboard the aircraft has eliminated the ability of the ground-based pilot in command (PIC) to use out-the-window visual information to make judgements about a potential threat of a loss of well clear with another aircraft. NASA's Phase 1 research supported the development of a Detect and Avoid (DAA) system that supports the ground-based pilot's ability to detect potential traffic conflicts and determine a resolution maneuver, but existing display/alerting requirements did not account for multiple UAS control (1:N). Demands for increased scalability of UAS in the NAS operations are expected to create a need for simultaneous control of UAs, and thus, a new DAA HMI design will likely be necessary. Previous research, however, has found performance degradations as the number of vehicles under operator control has increased. The purpose of the current human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation was to examine the viability of 1:N operations with the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance. Sixteen UAS pilots flew three scenarios with varying number of UAs under their control (1:1, 1:3, 1:5). In addition to their supervisory and sensor mission responsibilities, pilots were to utilize the DAA system to remain DAA well clear (DWC) during scripted conflicts of mixed severity. Measured response times, separation performance, mission task data, and subjective feedback were collected to assess how the multi-UAS control configuration impacted pilots' ability to maintain DAA well clear and perform the mission tasks. Overall, the DAA system proved surprisingly adaptive to multi-UAS control for preventing losses of DAA well clear (LoDWC). The findings suggest that, while multi-UAS operators are able to maintain safe separation (DWC) from other traffic, their ability to efficiently perform missions drastically decreases with their number of controlled vehicles. Pilot feedback indicated that, for this context, the use of automation support tools for completing and managing mission tasks would be appropriate and desired, especially for ensuring efficient use of assets. Finally, human-machine interface (HMI) design considerations for multi-UAS operations are discussed.

Monk, Kevin J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Examination of Two Non-Cooperative Detect and Avoid Well Clear Definitions

NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration into the National Airspace System (UAS in the NAS) project examines the technical barriers associated with the operation of UAS in civil airspace. The present study explored the differential effects of two candidate non-cooperative Detect-and-Avoid Well Clear (DWC)definitions on pilot and system performance in a human-in-the-loop simulation. Active-duty UAS pilots were recruited to maintain DWC against representative Class 4 encounter types with a low size, weight, and power (SWaP) radar declaration range of 3.5 nautical miles (nmi). Objective performance indicated that pilots could consistently maintain DWC against non-cooperative intruders with either DWC candidate, with negligible differences in response times and separation performance against caution and warning-level threats. While losses of DWC were avoided at rates comparable to Phase 1 findings, pilots uploaded their responses to caution-level alerts over 5 seconds faster in the current setup relative to Phase 1. Encounters with faster closure rates were susceptible to shortened caution-level alert durations, especially when employing the DWC criterion with the additional ‘Tau’ (temporal) component. Consequently, caution-level threats frequently elevated to warning-level status (nearly twice as often with theTau candidate). The variable caution alert durations appeared to impact pilots’ coordination with air traffic control (ATC), as ATC approval rates were lower with the ‘Tau’and ‘Disc’ candidates relative to Phase 1 research. Ultimately, the increased alerting time enabled by the Disc candidate deemed it more suitable for any reductions to the assumed radar declaration range requirement, which was re-evaluated in a follow-on study. Findings from this study will inform Phase 2 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)development for UAS with alternative surveillance equipment and performance capabilities.

Kevin J Monk↗
NASA NTRS2007

Propulsion Health Management System Development for Affordable and Reliable Operation of Space Exploration Systems

The constraints of future Exploration Missions will require unique integrated system health management capabilities throughout the mission. An ambitious launch schedule, human-rating requirements, long quiescent periods, limited human access for repair or replacement, and long communication delays, all require an integrated approach to health management that can span distinct, yet interdependent vehicle subsystems, anticipate failure states, provide autonomous remediation and support the Exploration Mission from beginning to end. Propulsion is a critical part of any space exploration mission, and monitoring the health of the propulsion system is an integral part of assuring mission safety and success. Health management is a somewhat ubiquitous technology that encompasses a large spectrum of physical components and logical processes. For this reason, it is essential to develop a systematic plan for propulsion health management system development. This paper provides a high-level perspective of propulsion health management systems, and describes a logical approach for the future planning and early development that are crucial to planned space exploration programs. It also presents an overall approach, or roadmap, for propulsion health management system development and a discussion of the associated roadblocks and challenges.

Melcher, Kevin J.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Simulation of a steady-state integrated human thermal system.

The mathematical model of an integrated human thermal system is formulated. The system consists of an external thermal regulation device on the human body. The purpose of the device (a network of cooling tubes held in contact with the surface of the skin) is to maintain the human body in a state of thermoneutrality. The device is controlled by varying the inlet coolant temperature and coolant mass flow rate. The differential equations of the model are approximated by a set of algebraic equations which result from the application of the explicit forward finite difference method to the differential equations. The integrated human thermal system is simulated for a variety of combinations of the inlet coolant temperature, coolant mass flow rate, and metabolic rates. Two specific cases are considered: (1) the external thermal regulation device is placed only on the head and (2) the devices are placed on the head and the torso. The results of the simulation indicate that when the human body is exposed to hot environment, thermoneutrality can be attained by localized cooling if the operating variables of the external regulation device(s) are properly controlled.

Hsu, F. T.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Simulation of a steady-state integrated human thermal system.

The mathematical model of an integrated human thermal system is formulated. The system consists of an external thermal regulation device on the human body. The purpose of the device (a network of cooling tubes held in contact with the surface of the skin) is to maintain the human body in a state of thermoneutrality. The device is controlled by varying the inlet coolant temperature and coolant mass flow rate. The differential equations of the model are approximated by a set of algebraic equations which result from the application of the explicit forward finite difference method to the differential equations. The integrated human thermal system is simulated for a variety of combinations of the inlet coolant temperature, coolant mass flow rate, and metabolic rates.

Hsu, F. T.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Initial SVS Integrated Technology Evaluation Flight Test Requirements and Hardware Architecture

This document presents the flight test requirements for the Initial Synthetic Vision Systems Integrated Technology Evaluation flight Test to be flown aboard NASA Langley's ARIES aircraft and the final hardware architecture implemented to meet these requirements. Part I of this document contains the hardware, software, simulator, and flight operations requirements for this light test as they were defined in August 2002. The contents of this section are the actual requirements document that was signed for this flight test. Part II of this document contains information pertaining to the hardware architecture that was realized to meet these requirements as presented to and approved by a Critical Design Review Panel prior to installation on the B-757 Airborne Research Integrated Experiments Systems (ARIES) airplane. This information includes a description of the equipment, block diagrams of the architecture, layouts of the workstations, and pictures of the actual installations.

Harrison, Stella V.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Overview of Integrated Random Vibration Testing of the NASA Orion Crew Survival Suit

The launch ascent and abort random vibration environments from NASA’s Orion spacecraft drove the need to test the NASA Orion Crew Survival Suit as an integrated system with exposure to the design levels. In order to properly characterize component responses, a series of integrated tests were designed to incorporate the interaction between a crew member, suit, seat, and the attenuation system. The first Development Test (2017) included human subjects, and was performed with early development seat and suit components, and low level inputs. It provided a baseline for frequency response and behavior of the integrated system. The next two tests, Development Test (2019) and Qualification Test (2020), used manikin surrogates to represent the crew member and increasing levels of component hardware fidelity in order to test to higher input levels. Testing was performed at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Vibration Labs and provided the input levels required to represent the ascent and abort vehicle profiles as well as recorded component response behavior from accelerometer instrumentation and high speed cameras. Inspection of the suit and related components showed that for all seat orientations, and input environments, no damage occurred. Additional pre and post-test checks confirmed the functionality of all suited hardware. Response data of the suited components generally showed heavy attenuation across most of the tested frequency range. Transmissibility plots showed some amplification of components at lower frequency ranges. Overall this series of integrated tests showed that 1) the use of surrogate manikins in the tests were adequate for representing crew in a vibration environment, 2) full vibration levels for ascent and abort were heavily attenuated in the suit components and were non-damaging, and 3) the suit and related components are qualified for the Orion random vibration environments.

Jeffrey D Suhey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Overview of Integrated Random Vibration Testing of the NASA Orion Crew Survival Suit

The launch ascent and abort random vibration environments from NASA’s Orion spacecraft drove the need to test the NASA Orion Crew Survival Suit as an integrated system with exposure to the design levels. In order to properly characterize component responses, a series of integrated tests were designed to incorporate the interaction between a crew member, suit, seat, and the attenuation system. The first Development Test (2017) included human subjects, and was performed with early development seat and suit components, and low level inputs. It provided a baseline for frequency response and behavior of the integrated system. The next two tests, Development Test (2019) and Qualification Test (2020), used manikin surrogates to represent the crew member and increasing levels of component hardware fidelity in order to test to higher input levels. Testing was performed at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Vibration Labs and provided the input levels required to represent the ascent and abort vehicle profiles as well as recorded component response behavior from accelerometer instrumentation and high speed cameras. Inspection of the suit and related components showed that for all seat orientations, and input environments, no damage occurred. Additional pre and post-test checks confirmed the functionality of all suited hardware. Response data of the suited components generally showed heavy attenuation across most of the tested frequency range. Transmissibility plots showed some amplification of components at lower frequency ranges. Overall this series of integrated tests showed that 1) the use of surrogate manikins in the tests were adequate for representing crew in a vibration environment, 2) full vibration levels for ascent and abort were heavily attenuated in the suit components and were non-damaging, and 3) the suit and related components are qualified for the Orion random vibration environments.

Jeffrey Suhey↗
NASA NTRS1973

An integrated human thermal system and its unsteady-state simulation

Consideration of an integrated human thermal system consisting of a human thermal system proper and an external thermal device. A mathematical model of the integrated system has been used in a computer simulation, and the simulation results have been verified through comparison with the results of experiments carried out on nine human subjects. The comparison indicates that the model simulates the system reasonably well.

Hsu, F. T.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Development of Liquid Propulsion Systems Testbed at MSFC

As NASA, the Department of Defense and the aerospace industry in general strive to develop capabilities to explore near-Earth, Cis-lunar and deep space, the need to create more cost effective techniques of propulsion system design, manufacturing and test is imperative in the current budget constrained environment. The physics of space exploration have not changed, but the manner in which systems are developed and certified needs to change if there is going to be any hope of designing and building the high performance liquid propulsion systems necessary to deliver crew and cargo to the further reaches of space. To further the objective of developing these systems, the Marshall Space Flight Center is currently in the process of formulating a Liquid Propulsion Systems testbed, which will enable rapid integration of components to be tested and assessed for performance in integrated systems. The manifestation of this testbed is a breadboard engine configuration (BBE) with facility support for consumables and/or other components as needed. The goal of the facility is to test NASA developed elements, but can be used to test articles developed by other government agencies, industry or academia. Joint government/private partnership is likely the approach that will be required to enable efficient propulsion system development. MSFC has recently tested its own additively manufactured liquid hydrogen pump, injector, and valves in a BBE hot firing. It is rapidly building toward testing the pump and a new CH4 injector in the BBE configuration to demonstrate a 22,000 lbf, pump-fed LO2/LCH4 engine for the Mars lander or in-space transportation. The value of having this BBE testbed is that as components are developed they may be easily integrated in the testbed and tested. MSFC is striving to enhance its liquid propulsion system development capability. Rapid design, analysis, build and test will be critical to fielding the next high thrust rocket engine. With the maturity of the BBE testbed, MSFC propulsion engineering will bring forward a national capability that enables growth of both commercial and government interests.

Alexander, Reginald↗
NASA NTRS1981

Development of Advanced Czochralski Growth Process to produce low cost 150 KG silicon ingots from a single crucible for technology readiness

The modified CG2000 crystal grower construction, installation, and machine check-out was completed. The process development check-out proceeded with several dry runs and one growth run. Several machine calibrations and functional problems were discovered and corrected. Several exhaust gas analysis system alternatives were evaluated and an integrated system approved and ordered. A contract presentation was made at the Project Integration Meeting at JPL, including cost-projections using contract projected throughput and machine parameters. Several growth runs on a development CG200 RC grower show that complete neck, crown, and body automated growth can be achieved with only one operator input. Work continued for melt level, melt temperature, and diameter sensor development.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1989

Robotic sampling system for an unmanned Mars mission

A major robotics opportunity for NASA will be the Mars Rover/Sample Return Mission which could be launched as early as the 1990s. The exploratory portion of this mission will include two autonomous subsystems: the rover vehicle and a sample handling system. The sample handling system is the key to the process of collecting Martian soils. This system could include a core drill, a general-purpose manipulator, tools, containers, a return canister, certification hardware and a labeling system. Integrated into a functional package, the sample handling system is analogous to a complex robotic workcell. Discussed here are the different components of the system, their interfaces, forseeable problem areas and many options based on the scientific goals of the mission. The various interfaces in the sample handling process (component to component and handling system to rover) will be a major engineering effort. Two critical evaluation criteria that will be imposed on the system are flexibility and reliability. It needs to be flexible enough to adapt to different scenarios and environments and acquire the most desirable specimens for return to Earth. Scientists may decide to change the distribution and ratio of core samples to rock samples in the canister. The long distance and duration of this planetary mission places a reliability burden on the hardware. The communication time delay between Earth and Mars minimizes operator interaction (teleoperation, supervisory modes) with the sample handler. An intelligent system will be required to plan the actions, make sample choices, interpret sensor inputs, and query unknown surroundings. A combination of autonomous functions and supervised movements will be integrated into the sample handling system.

Chun, Wendell↗
NASA NTRS2003

Reducing the Risk of Human Space Missions with INTEGRITY

The INTEGRITY Program will design and operate a test bed facility to help prepare for future beyond-LEO missions. The purpose of INTEGRITY is to enable future missions by developing, testing, and demonstrating advanced human space systems. INTEGRITY will also implement and validate advanced management techniques including risk analysis and mitigation. One important way INTEGRITY will help enable future missions is by reducing their risk. A risk analysis of human space missions is important in defining the steps that INTEGRITY should take to mitigate risk. This paper describes how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of human space missions will help support the planning and development of INTEGRITY to maximize its benefits to future missions. PRA is a systematic methodology to decompose the system into subsystems and components, to quantify the failure risk as a function of the design elements and their corresponding probability of failure. PRA provides a quantitative estimate of the probability of failure of the system, including an assessment and display of the degree of uncertainty surrounding the probability. PRA provides a basis for understanding the impacts of decisions that affect safety, reliability, performance, and cost. Risks with both high probability and high impact are identified as top priority. The PRA of human missions beyond Earth orbit will help indicate how the risk of future human space missions can be reduced by integrating and testing systems in INTEGRITY.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Performance Support System to Aid in Anomaly Resolution: Concept of Operations

As missions progress into deep space, communication delays and disruptions will disenable the crew’s reliance on Earth experts. There are also limitations in the amount of data that can be downlinked to the ground. It is prudent to assume that critical, complex vehicle or habitat sub-systems will malfunction at a time when a lunar or Mars’ crew cannot rely on the Earth-Support team to detect, diagnose and resolve the problem and it is impractical to expect a small crew to step-in with the same level of expertise as 50+ authorities. The crew will need novel processes and advanced technological support to independently identify and resolve safety- and time-critical anomalies. That a self-reliant crew is unable to respond appropriately to time-critical anomalies is a significant risk to crew safety and mission success. This risk is driven by several factors; novel and unanticipated anomalies would not have been trained pre-flight, the crew could forget their pre-flight training or spaceflight stressors could impair the crew’s problem-solving ability. At last year’s IWS, Beard reported that a single spaceflight stressor (elevated CO2) could undermine the crew’s ability to independently respond to emergencies. Concept of Operations (ConOps) provide a common view of future system functions to all stakeholders. For the current project, a ConOps was developed that describes the operational processes, practices and capabilities needed by a crew of astronauts on deep space missions to autonomously respond to anticipated and unanticipated anomalies. It is crucial to recognize that, as of August 2018 existing technologies are unable to effectively support crew anomaly response to unanticipated events. “Intelligent technology” has not reached a maturity level that permits generalizing a solution to novel situations. For example, to train intelligent technology requires volumes of data that do not exist. The complexities involved in a manned mission to Mars cannot be compared to sending rovers to Mars using scripted software. This ConOps proposes a Crew Performance Support System (CPSS) that will push NASA and its industry partners toward what will be required for a safe and successful manned mission to Mars. Anomaly resolution during a deep space mission will take place within a dynamic, or changing, context. The figure to the left shows five broad contextual variables: the organizational culture, mission context, system characteristics, team characteristics and individual characteristics. The yellow arrow indicates that spaceflight and task-related stressors can affect system, team and individual crewmember characteristics and therefore anomaly response potential. The figure depicts a protective umbrella of Human-System Integration (HSI) principles that should be instituted during CPSS development including a balanced workload, shared situation awareness and building an appropriate level of trust in the automation. The figure also depicts two interrelated and cooperative components, an HSI Data System and other Enabling Capabilities will be required to support crew anomaly response and Earth-Support situation awareness. As we journey from ISS to Gateway to Mars, multiple, simultaneous and integrated research and development efforts (i.e., support systems co-evolution) must be implemented to meet the problem-solving challenges a self-reliant crew will face on a Mars’ mission. The crossovers between the capabilities are just as important as the discrete capabilities themselves. As the capabilities mature, the lines between the support subdomains will blur and an integrated system will emerge. The ConOps summarizes current knowledge about how highly trained people solve anomalies in safety- and time-critical situations, describes a group of capabilities that could help to reduce the extant risk and documents requirements levied on additional systems that provides critical inputs to the CPSS. Scenarios are used to promote a shared understanding of processes, practices and technological goals needed for safe and productive manned missions beyond LEO.

HSIA risk↗
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗