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DOE OSTI2025

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022

The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Vulcan-Forge: Architecture and Design of a Multi-Modal Forensic Analysis Plugin for CALDERA

Forge and VULCAN together describe an open-architecture cybersecurity analysis ecosystem that unifies forensic artifact processing, detection engineering, and vulnerability intelligence within integrated platforms. Forge operates as a plugin for MITRE CALDERA, ingesting diverse evidence formats—including EVTX, PCAP/PCAPNG, CSV, JSON, YAML, XML, binaries, and archives—to construct a unified artifact graph enriched with severity scoring, TLP classification, and audit trails. It provides subsystems for artifact parsing, streaming structured-data visualization, NetworkMiner-based packet inspection, PE/.NET binary analysis, and LLM-assisted triage and rule generation, with outputs validated against CCCS-YARA and pySigma schemas. VULCAN complements this by serving as a cybersecurity analyst platform that integrates a Neo4j knowledge graph, Qdrant vector retrieval, SSVC-based triage, and a local LLM to deliver CVE intelligence and forensic analysis through a multi-source ingest pipeline drawing from NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, MITRE ATT&CK, and CAPEC. Together, they bridge structured threat intelligence with automated forensic analysis and detection workflows.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

MACCS User Guide - Version 5.2

MACCS is used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This user guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/MACCS-UI User Interface (UI) model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 5.2, model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

SIERRA Code Coupling Module: Arpeggio User Manual - Version 5.30

The SNL Sierra Mechanics code suite is designed to enable simulation of complex multiphysics scenarios. The code suite is composed of several specialized applications which can operate either in standalone mode or coupled with each other. Arpeggio is a supported utility that enables loose coupling of the various Sierra Mechanics applications by providing access to Framework services that facilitate the coupling. More importantly Arpeggio orchestrates the execution of applications that participate in the coupling. This document describes the various components of Arpeggio and their operability. The intent of the document is to provide a fast path for analysts interested in coupled applications via simple examples of its usage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Workforce Training for SMR Integration into Distribution Grids: A Competency Framework and Containerized Hands-On Lab for the SMR/DER/Microgrid Boundary

Small modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors are entering the U.S. distribution grid as synchronous generation on feeders designed for loads and inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs). No existing cybersecurity training program addresses this intersection of nuclear operations, DER management, and operational technology security. As subcontractor to Iowa State University on the CyDERMS Center, Argonne analyzed the relevant standards and training landscape, translated the resulting gaps into a twelve-objective competency framework across distribution-operator and graduate-analyst role tracks, and built a containerized training lab using a ∼400-bus composite grid model behind a realistically simulated Modbus TCP SCADA stack. The analysis isolates the balance-of-plant / energy-management-system (BOP/EMS) boundary as the critical jurisdictional seam where, as of March 2026, neither NRC nor NERC CIP cleanly claims cybersecurity responsibility for distribution-connected SMRs. The framework maps each objective across NIST CSF 2.0, ISA/IEC 62443, NIST NICE Task–Knowledge–Skill statements, and NRC RG 5.71 awareness-and-training controls. The training lab implements operator-recognition assessment scenarios spanning grid-side disturbances and telemetry-layer anomalies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2010

OrigenArp Primer: How to Perform Isotopic Depletion and Decay Calculations with SCALE/ORIGEN

The SCALE (Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation) computer software system developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory is widely used and accepted around the world for nuclear analyses. ORIGEN-ARP is a SCALE isotopic depletion and decay analysis sequence used to perform point-depletion calculations with the well-known ORIGEN-S code using problem-dependent cross sections. Problem-dependent cross-section libraries are generated using the ARP (Automatic Rapid Processing) module using an interpolation algorithm that operates on pre-generated libraries created for a range of fuel properties and operating conditions. Methods are provided in SCALE to generate these libraries using one-, two-, and three-dimensional transport codes. The interpolation of cross sections for uranium-based fuels may be performed for the variables burnup, enrichment, and water density. An option is also available to interpolate cross sections for mixed-oxide (MOX) fuels using the variables burnup, plutonium content, plutonium isotopic vector, and water moderator density. This primer is designed to help a new user understand and use ORIGEN-ARP with the OrigenArp Windows graphical user interface in SCALE. It assumes that the user has a college education in a technical field. There is no assumption of familiarity with nuclear depletion codes in general or with SCALE/ORIGEN-ARP in particular. The primer is based on SCALE 6 but should be applicable to earlier or later versions of SCALE. Information is included to help new users, along with several sample problems that walk the user through the different input forms and menus and illustrate the basic features. References to related documentation are provided. The primer provides a starting point for the nuclear analyst who uses SCALE/ORIGEN-ARP. Complete descriptions are provided in the SCALE documentation. Although the primer is self-contained, it is intended as a companion volume to the SCALE documentation. The SCALE Manual is provided on the SCALE installation DVD.

Bowman, Stephen M↗
DOE OSTI2021

Improving Detection of Disease Re-emergence Using a Web-Based Tool (RED Alert): Design and Case Analysis Study

Background: Currently, the identification of infectious disease re-emergence is performed without describing specific quantitative criteria that can be used to identify re-emergence events consistently. This practice may lead to ineffective mitigation. In addition, identification of factors contributing to local disease re-emergence and assessment of global disease re-emergence require access to data about disease incidence and a large number of factors at the local level for the entire world. This paper presents Re-emerging Disease Alert (RED Alert), a web-based tool designed to help public health officials detect and understand infectious disease re-emergence. Objective: Our objective is to bring together a variety of disease-related data and analytics needed to help public health analysts answer the following 3 primary questions for detecting and understanding disease re-emergence: Is there a potential disease re-emergence at the local (country) level? What are the potential contributing factors for this re-emergence? Is there a potential for global re-emergence? Methods: We collected and cleaned disease-related data (eg, case counts, vaccination rates, and indicators related to disease transmission) from several data sources including the World Health Organization (WHO), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), World Bank, and Gideon. We combined these data with machine learning and visual analytics into a tool called RED Alert to detect re-emergence for the following 4 diseases: measles, cholera, dengue, and yellow fever. We evaluated the performance of the machine learning models for re-emergence detection and reviewed the output of the tool through a number of case studies. Results: Our supervised learning models were able to identify 82%-90% of the local re-emergence events, although with 18%-31% (except 46% for dengue) false positives. This is consistent with our goal of identifying all possible re-emergences while allowing some false positives. The review of the web-based tool through case studies showed that local re-emergence detection was possible and that the tool provided actionable information about potential factors contributing to the local disease re-emergence and trends in global disease re-emergence. Conclusions: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first tool that focuses specifically on disease re-emergence and addresses the important challenges mentioned above.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

Probability of Future Observations Exceeding One-Sided, Normal, Upper Tolerance Limits

Normal tolerance limits are frequently used in dynamic environments specifications of aerospace systems as a method to account for aleatory variability in the environments. Upper tolerance limits, when used in this way, are computed from records of the environment and used to enforce conservatism in the specification by describing upper extreme values the environment may take in the future. Components and systems are designed to withstand these extreme loads to ensure they do not fail under normal use conditions. The degree of conservatism in the upper tolerance limits is controlled by specifying the coverage and confidence level (usually written in “coverage/confidence” form). Moreover, in high-consequence systems it is common to specify tolerance limits at 95% or 99% coverage and confidence at the 50% or 90% level. Despite the ubiquity of upper tolerance limits in the aerospace community, analysts and decision-makers frequently misinterpret their meaning. The misinterpretation extends into the standards that govern much of the acceptance and qualification of commercial and government aerospace systems. As a result, the risk of a future observation of the environment exceeding the upper tolerance limit is sometimes significantly underestimated by decision makers. This note explains the meaning of upper tolerance limits and a related measure, the upper prediction limit. So, the objective of this work is to clarify the probability of exceeding these limits in flight so that decision-makers can better understand the risk associated with exceeding design and test levels during flight and balance the cost of design and development with that of mission failure.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Automated shaker placement and regularized input estimation for MIMO testing.

Multi-input, multi-output (MIMO) testing is used in component qualification to reproduce operational responses in the laboratory. It is often preferred to single-input and base-shake testing because of the potential for equivalent or better tests using smaller actuators and shorter test suites. Given a target response, two key steps in MIMO test design are selecting actuator locations and solving for input loads. Actuator locations are often manually selected using expert judgment. If an automatic method is used, locations are usually determined by simulating the vibration control problem and minimizing a combination of the input energy and control residuals. To select a configuration, the relative importance of input energy and residuals must be specified. Specifying relative weights is, in general, a manual and subjective process. This paper develops an objective function that compares actuator configurations based on control accuracy and required input energy without any manual parameter tuning. The objective function uses an optimally selected tradeoff parameter for each candidate configuration. To choose actuator locations using the new objective function, a pivoting algorithm for integer programming problems is developed. Starting with an initial configuration (such as the one generated by a greedy algorithm), the pivoting algorithm guarantees an objective function decrease in each iteration until convergence is reached. In a simulation featuring a structure excited by a diffuse acoustic field, electrodynamic shaker locations and regularized inputs are solved for without any analyst-specified parameters. Simulations are performed in MIMO configurations where the number of target responses is less than, equal to, and greater than the number of actuators.

Multi-input multi-output↗
DOE OSTI2024

2024 Standard Scenarios: A U.S. Electricity Sector Outlook

This data corresponds to the 2024 Standard Scenarios report, which contains a suite of forward-looking scenarios of the possible evolution of the U.S. electricity sector through 2050. These files contain modeled projections of the future. Although we strive to capture relevant phenomena as comprehensively as possible, the models used to create this data are unavoidably imperfect, and the future is highly uncertain. Consequentially, this data should not be the sole basis for making decisions. In addition to drawing from multiple scenarios within this set, we encourage analysts to also draw on projections from other sources, to benefit from diverse analytical frameworks and perspectives when forming their conclusions about the future of the power sector. For further discussions about the limitations of the models underlying this data, see section 1.4 of the "ReEDS Documentation" linked below. For scenario descriptions, input assumptions, and metric definitions for the data in these files, see the "2024 Standard Scenarios Report" linked below.

2050↗
DOE OSTI2021

Artificial Judgement Assistance from teXt (AJAX): Applying Open Domain Question Answering to Nuclear Non-proliferation Analysis

Nuclear non-proliferation analysis is complex and subjective, as the data is sparse, and examples are rare and diverse. While analysing non-proliferation data, it is often desired that the findings be completely auditable such that any claim or assertion can be sourced directly to the reference material from which it was derived. Currently this is accomplished by analysts thoroughly documenting underlying assumptions and clearly referencing details to source documents. This is a labour-intensive and time-consuming process that can be difficult to scale with geometrically increasing quantities of data. In this work, we describe an approach to leverage bi-directional language models for nuclear non-proliferation analysis. It has been shown recently that these models not only capture language syntax but also some of the relational knowledge present in the training data. We have devised a unique Salt and Pepper strategy for testing the knowledge present in the language models, while also introducing auditability function in our pipeline. We demonstrate that fine-tuning the bi-directional language models on domain specific corpus improves their ability to answer domain-specific factoid questions. Our hope is that the results presented in this paper will further the natural language processing (NLP) field by introducing the ability to audit the answers provided by the language models to bring forward the source of said knowledge.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗