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Central Solenoid Insert Technical Specification

The US ITER Project Office (USIPO) is responsible for the ITER central solenoid (CS) contribution to the ITER project. The Central Solenoid Insert (CSI) project will allow ITER validation the appropriate lengths of the conductors to be used in the full-scale CS coils under relevant conditions. The ITER Program plans to build and test a CSI to verify the performance of the CS conductor. The CSI is a one-layer solenoid with an inner diameter of 1.48 m and a height of 4.45 m between electric terminal ends. The coil weight with the terminals is approximately 820 kg without insulation. The major goal of the CSI is to measure the temperature margin of the CS under the ITER direct current (DC) operating conditions, including determining sensitivity to load cycles. Performance of the joints, ramp rate sensitivity, and stability against thermal or electromagnetic disturbances, electrical insulation, losses, and instrumentation are addressed separately and therefore are not major goals in this project. However, losses and joint performance will be tested during the CSI testing campaign. The USIPO will build the CSI that will be tested at the Central Solenoid Model Coil (CSMC) Test Facility at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Naka, Japan. The industrial vendors (the Suppliers) will report to the USIPO (the Company). All approvals to proceed will be issued by the Company, which in some cases, as specified in this document, will also require the approval of the ITER Organization. Responsibilities and obligations will be covered by respective contracts between the USIPO, called Company interchangeably, and the industrial Prime Contractors, called Suppliers. Different stages of work may be performed by more than one Prime Contractor, as described in this specification. Technical requirements of the contract between the Company and the Prime Contractor will be covered by the Fabrication Specifications developed by the Prime Contractor based on this document and approved by the Company and ITER. The Fabrication Specifications may reflect some national requirements and regulations that are not fully provided here. This document presents the ITER CSI specifications.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Improving Transparency in the Reporting of Safeguards Implementation: FY11 Update

In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data and available for viewing at http://safeguardsportal.pnnl.gov.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

REPORTABLE RADIONUCLIDES IN DWPF SLUDGE BATCH 7A (MACROBATCH 8)

The Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) 1.2 require that the waste producer 'shall report the curie inventory of radionuclides that have half-lives longer than 10 years and that are, or will be, present in concentrations greater than 0.05 percent of the total inventory for each waste type indexed to the years 2015 and 3115.' As part of the strategy to meet WAPS 1.2, the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) will report for each waste type all radionuclides that have half-lives longer than 10 years and contribute greater than 0.01 percent of the total curie inventory from the time of production through the 1100 year period from 2015 through 3115. The initial list of radionuclides to be reported is based on the design-basis glass identified in the Waste Form Compliance Plan (WCP) and Waste Form Qualification Report. However, it is required that the list be expanded if other radionuclides with half-lives greater than 10 years are identified that meet the 'greater than 0.01% of the curie inventory' criterion. Specification 1.6 of the WAPS, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Reporting for High Level Waste (HLW), requires that the ratio by weights of the following uranium and plutonium isotopes be reported: U-233, U-234, U-235, U-236, and U-238; and Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, and Pu-242. Therefore, the complete list of reportable radionuclides must also include these sets of U and Pu isotopes - and the U and Pu isotopic mass distributions must be identified. The DWPF receives HLW sludge slurry from Savannah River Site (SRS) Tank 40. For Sludge Batch 7a (SB7a), the waste in Tank 40 contained a blend of the heel from Sludge Batch 6 (SB6) and the Sludge Batch 7 (SB7) material transferred to Tank 40 from Tank 51. This sludge blend is also referred to as Macrobatch 8. Laboratory analyses of a Tank 40 sludge sample were performed to quantify the concentrations of pertinent radionuclides in the SB7a waste. Subsequently, radiological decay and in-growth were calculated over the time period from 2015 to 3115. This provided a basis for characterizing the radionuclide content of SB7a over time and for identifying the 'reportable radionuclides.' Details of the characterization methodology and the analytical results are the focus of this report. This work was performed at the request of the Waste Solidification Engineering Department of Savannah River Remediation, initiated via Technical Task Request (TTR) HLW-DWPF-TTR-2010-0031. A minor revision in the reporting requirements was requested via a subsequent email communication. The work was conducted in accordance with the protocols identified in Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan SRNL-RP-2010-01218 and Analytical Study Plan SRNL-RP-2010-01219. All of the raw data related to this scope have been recorded in laboratory notebook SRNL-NB-2011-00061. The overall goal of this task was to characterize the radionuclide content of the SB7a waste sufficiently to meet the WAPS and DWPF reporting requirements. The specific objectives were: (1) Quantify the current concentrations of all radionuclides impacting (or potentially-impacting) the total curie content between calendar years 2011 and 3115. Also quantify the current concentrations of other radionuclides specifically requested in the TTR or required by the WAPS. (2) Calculate future concentrations of decayed and in-grown radionuclides impacting the total curie content between calendar years 2015 and 3115; (3) Identify as 'reportable' all radionuclides contributing {ge} 0.01% of the total curie content from 2015 to 3115 and having half-lives {ge} 10 years.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Independent Confirmatory Survey Summary and Results for the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 1 Newport, Michigan (Final Report No. 2)

The Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 1 (Fermi 1) was a fast breeder reactor design that was cooled by sodium and operated at essentially atmospheric pressure. On May 10, 1963, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) granted an operating license, DPR-9, to the Power Reactor Development Company (PRDC), a consortium specifically formed to own and operate a nuclear reactor at the Fermi 1 site. The reactor was designed for a maximum capability of 430 megawatts (MW); however, the maximum reactor power with the first core loading (Core A) was 200 MW. The primary system was filled with sodium in December 1960 and criticality was achieved in August 1963.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Independent Confirmatory Survey Summary and Results for the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 1, Newport, Michigan (Final Report No. 2)

The Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 1 (Fermi 1) was a fast breeder reactor design that was cooled by sodium and operated at essentially atmospheric pressure. On May 10, 1963, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) granted an operating license, DPR-9, to the Power Reactor Development Company (PRDC), a consortium specifically formed to own and operate a nuclear reactor at the Fermi 1 site. The reactor was designed for a maximum capability of 430 megawatts (MW); however, the maximum reactor power with the first core loading (Core A) was 200 MW. The primary system was filled with sodium in December 1960 and criticality was achieved in August 1963. The reactor was tested at low power during the first couple years of operation. Power ascension testing above 1 MW commenced in December 1965 immediately following the receipt of a high-power operating license. In October 1966 during power ascension, zirconium plates at the bottom of the reactor vessel became loose and blocked sodium coolant flow to some fuel subassemblies. Two subassemblies started to melt and the reactor was manually shut down. No abnormal releases to the environment occurred. Forty-two months later after the cause had been determined, cleanup completed, and the fuel replaced, Fermi 1 was restarted. However, in November 1972, PRDC made the decision to decommission Fermi 1 as the core was approaching its burn-up limit. The fuel and blanket subassemblies were shipped off-site in 1973. Following that, the secondary sodium system was drained and sent off-site. The radioactive primary sodium was stored on-site in storage tanks and 55 gallon (gal) drums until it was shipped off-site in 1984. The initial decommissioning of Fermi 1 was completed in 1975. Effective January 23, 1976, DPR-9 was transferred to the Detroit Edison Company (DTE) as a 'possession only' license (DTE 2010a). This report details the confirmatory activities performed during the second Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) site visit to Fermi 1 in November 2010. The survey was strategically planned during a Unit 2 (Fermi 2) outage to take advantage of decreased radiation levels that were observed and attributed to Fermi 2 from the operating unit during the first site visit. However, during the second visit there were elevated radiation levels observed and attributed to the partially dismantled Fermi 1 reactor vessel and a waste storage box located on the 3rd floor of the Fermi 1 Turbine Building. Confirmatory surveys (unshielded) performed directly in the line of sight of these areas were affected. The objective of the confirmatory survey was to verify that the final radiological conditions were accurately and adequately described in Final Status Survey (FSS) documentation, relative to the established release criteria. This objective was achieved by performing document reviews, as well as independent measurements and sampling. Specifically, documentation of the planning, implementation, and results of the FSS were evaluated; side-by-side FSS measurement and source comparisons were performed; site areas were evaluated relative to appropriate FSS classification; and areas were assessed for residual, undocumented contamination.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Design-Basis Flood Estimation for Site Characterization at Nuclear Power Plants in the United States of America

The purpose of this document is to describe approaches and methods for estimation of the design-basis flood at nuclear power plant sites. Chapter 1 defines the design-basis flood and lists the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) regulations that require estimation of the design-basis flood. For comparison, the design-basis flood estimation methods used by other Federal agencies are also described. A brief discussion of the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency for estimation of the design-basis floods in its member States is also included.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Measuring Safeguards Culture

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Procedure for Determination of Degradation Acceptance Criteria for Structures and Passive Components in Nuclear Power Plants

The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been collaborating with Brookhaven National Laboratory since 2007 to develop a realistic seismic risk evaluation system which includes the consideration of aging of structures and components in nuclear power plants (NPPs). This collaboration program aims at providing technical support to a five-year KAERI research project, which includes three specific areas that are essential to seismic probabilistic risk assessment: (1) probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, (2) seismic fragility analysis including the effects of aging, and (3) a plant seismic risk analysis. The understanding and assessment of age-related degradations of structures, systems, and components and their impact on plant safety is the major goal of this KAERI-BNL collaboration. Four annual reports have been published before this report as a result of the collaboration research.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Conceptual Ideas for New Nondestructive UF 6 Cylinder Assay Techniques

Nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements of uranium cylinders play an important role in helping the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard uranium enrichment plants. Traditionally, these measurements have consisted of a scale or load cell to determine the mass of UF{sub 6} in the cylinder combined with a gamma-ray measurement of the 186 keV peak from 235 U to determine enrichment. More recently, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have developed systems that exploit the passive neutron signal from UF 6 to determine uranium mass and/or enrichment. These include the Uranium Cylinder Assay System (UCAS), the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM), and the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA). The purpose of this report is to provide the IAEA with new ideas on technologies that may or may not be under active development but could be useful for UF 6 cylinder assay.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

HTR-PROTEUS Pebble Bed Experimental Program Cores 1, 1A, 2, and 3: Hexagonal Close Packing with a 1:2 Moderator-to-Fuel Pebble Ratio

In its deployment as a pebble bed reactor (PBR) critical facility from 1992 to 1996, the PROTEUS facility was designated as HTR-PROTEUS. This experimental program was performed as part of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on the Validation of Safety Related Physics Calculations for Low Enriched HTGRs. Within this project, critical experiments were conducted for graphite moderated LEU systems to determine core reactivity, flux and power profiles, reaction-rate ratios, the worth of control rods, both in-core and reflector based, the worth of burnable poisons, kinetic parameters, and the effects of moisture ingress on these parameters. Four benchmark experiments were evaluated in this report: Cores 1, 1A, 2, and 3. These core configurations represent the hexagonal close packing (HCP) configurations of the HTR-PROTEUS experiment with a moderator-to-fuel pebble ratio of 1:2. Core 1 represents the only configuration utilizing ZEBRA control rods. Cores 1A, 2, and 3 use withdrawable, hollow, stainless steel control rods. Cores 1 and 1A are similar except for the use of different control rods; Core 1A also has one less layer of pebbles (21 layers instead of 22). Core 2 retains the first 16 layers of pebbles from Cores 1 and 1A and has 16 layers of moderator pebbles stacked above the fueled layers. Core 3 retains the first 17 layers of pebbles but has polyethylene rods inserted between pebbles to simulate water ingress. The additional partial pebble layer (layer 18) for Core 3 was not included as it was used for core operations and not the reported critical configuration. Cores 1, 1A, 2, and 3 were determined to be acceptable benchmark experiments.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Enrichment Assay Methods Development for the Integrated Cylinder Verification System

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF 6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility's entire product-cylinder inventory. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing a concept to automate the verification of enrichment plant cylinders to enable 100 percent product-cylinder verification and potentially, mass-balance calculations on the facility as a whole (by also measuring feed and tails cylinders). The Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) could be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. The three main objectives of this FY09 project are summarized here and described in more detail in the report: (1) Develop a preliminary design for a prototype NDA system, (2) Refine PNNL's MCNP models of the NDA system, and (3) Procure and test key pulse-processing components. Progress against these tasks to date, and next steps, are discussed.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Application of the BISON Fuel Performance Code to the FUMEX-III Coordinated Research Project

INL recently participated in FUMEX-III, an International Atomic Energy Agency sponsored fuel modeling Coordinated Research Project. A main purpose of FUMEX-III is to compare code predictions to reliable experimental data. During the same time period, the INL initiated development of a new multidimensional (2D and 3D) multiphysics nuclear fuel performance code called BISON. Interactions with international fuel modeling researchers via FUMEX-III played a significant and important role in the BISON evolution, particularly influencing the selection of material and behavioral models which are now included in the code. BISON's ability to model integral fuel rod behavior did not mature until 2011, thus the only FUMEX-III case considered was the Riso3-GE7 experiment, which includes measurements of rod outer diameter following pellet clad mechanical interaction (PCMI) resulting from a power ramp late in fuel life. BISON comparisons to the Riso3-GE7 final rod diameter measurements are quite reasonable. The INL is very interested in participation in the next Fuel Modeling Coordinated Research Project and would like to see the project initiated as soon as possible.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Calibration and Characterization of the Small Sample Calorimeter

An early component of the Joint Fuel Cycle Study (JFCS) between the United States and the Republic of Korea is a test of gram scale electrochemical recycling of spent fuel which is to be performed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Included in this test is the development of Nondestructive Assay (NDA) technologies that would be applicable for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards of the electrochemical recycling process. Of upmost importance to safeguarding the fuel cycle associated with the electrochemical recycling process is the ability to safeguard the U/TRU ingots that will be produced in the process. For the gram scale test, the ingots that will be produced will have an expected thermal power of approximately 130 mW. To ascertain how well the calorimetric assay NDA technique can perform in assaying these ingots, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has characterized and calibrated a small solid-state calorimeter called the Small Sample Calorimeter (SSC3) to perform these measurements at LANL. To calibrate and characterize the SSC3, a series of measurements were performed using certified 238 Pu heat standards whose power output is traceable back to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) electrical standards. The results of these measurements helped establish both the calibration of the calorimeter as well as the expected performance of the calorimeter in terms of its accuracy and precision as a function of thermal power of the item that is being measured. In this report, we will describe the measurements that were performed and provide a discussion of the results of these measurements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Proceedings of the Inaugural Meeting of the International Forum for Reactor Aging Management (IFRAM)

In almost all countries with nuclear power plants (NPPs), regulatory authorities and the nuclear industry are looking at some form of extended operating periods. To support life extension activities it is necessary to ensure the continued safety and reliability of system, structures, and components, and the component materials. Internationally, a variety of individual national and international activities have been initiated including Plant Life Management through the International Atomic Energy Agency, Electric Power Research Institute’s Long Term Operation program, and various national programs in managing materials degradation and related topics. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) engaged the international community in workshops in 2005-2006 to identify research needs and to collect information in an expert panel report on Proactive Management of Materials Degradation (PMMD), which was reported in NUREG/CR-6923. These results are also available via an Information Tool on the internet at http://pmmd.pnl.gov. This information builds on the extensive compilations known as the GALL Report (Generic Aging Lessons Learned, NUREG-1801, Vols. 1 and 2). Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) recently issued a report on the review of various international activities in PMMD (PNNL-17779). There have also been initiatives by Electricite de France, Tokyo Electric Power Company, EPRI, and others to establish a "Materials Aging Institute." Within the materials degradation research community there are also networks and technical meetings focused on some elements of PMMD. In spite of all these efforts, there is currently no forum to bring together these diverse activities and provide coordinated information exchange and prioritization of materials aging management/PMMD topics. It is believed that the International Forum for Reactor Aging Management (IFRAM) would be a good way to achieve this goal and help develop new approaches for ensuring continued safe operation in existing and future nuclear power plants. To begin addressing this need, NRC has established a Proactive Management of Materials Degradation Program for managing in-service degradation of metallic components in aging NPPs. The NRC is seeking to facilitate the establishment of IFRAM as a network of international experts who would exchange information on operating experience, best practices, and emerging knowledge. These experts would be willing to work jointly and leverage the separate efforts of existing national programs into a unified approach to enable the potential for the safe and economic life extension of NPPs. A proposal for establishing IFRAM was developed and presented at Engagement workshops in Seoul, Korea (October 2009) and Petten, The Netherlands (May 2010). Participants in both groups demonstrated strong interest in the establishment of IFRAM. Therefore the Global Steering Committee was formed to plan and carry out the start-up of IFRAM in 2011. This group finalized the documents for IFRAM and organized the kick-off meeting. This document records the contents of the inaugural meeting of IFRAM, which was held August 4-5, 2011, at the Cheyenne Mountain Resort in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Representatives from Asia, Europe, and the United States met to share information on reactor aging management and make plans for the future. Professor Tetsuo Shoji was elected chairperson of the Leadership Council. This kick-off event transformed the dream of an international forum into a reality. IFRAM has begun to achieve its mission.

Reactor Aging Management↗

Automated UF 6 Cylinder Enrichment Assay: Status of the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA) Project: POTAS Phase II

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) intends to automate the UF 6 cylinder nondestructive assay (NDA) verification currently performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at enrichment plants. PNNL is proposing the installation of a portal monitor at a key measurement point to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the data along with operator inputs in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until inspector arrival. This report summarizes the status of the research and development of an enrichment assay methodology supporting the cylinder verification concept. The enrichment assay approach exploits a hybrid of two passively-detected ionizing-radiation signatures: the traditional enrichment meter signature (186-keV photon peak area) and a non-traditional signature, manifested in the high-energy (3 to 8 MeV) gamma-ray continuum, generated by neutron emission from UF 6 . PNNL has designed, fabricated, and field-tested several prototype assay sensor packages in an effort to demonstrate proof-of-principle for the hybrid assay approach, quantify the expected assay precision for various categories of cylinder contents, and assess the potential for unsupervised deployment of the technology in a portal-monitor form factor. We refer to recent sensor-package prototypes as the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA). The report provides an overview of the assay signatures and summarizes the results of several HEVA field measurement campaigns on populations of Type 30B UF 6 cylinders containing low-enriched uranium (LEU), natural uranium (NU), and depleted uranium (DU). Approaches to performance optimization of the assay technique via radiation transport modeling are briefly described, as are spectroscopic and data-analysis algorithms.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

Bari, Robert A.↗

Safeguards by Design (SBD): Safeguards Guidance for Research Reactors and Critical Assemblies

This document is part of a series of guidance documents developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international safeguards by design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) avoid costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save both industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or the Agency) time, money, and resources—a mutually beneficial, win-win endeavor. The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards, the safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance as a basis for IAEA safeguards is the international safeguards agreement between a country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Energy Planning, Policy, & Economy(29)↗