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Stakeholder Transportation Scorecard: Reviewing Nevada's Recommendations for Enhancing the Safety and Security of Nuclear Waste Shipments - 13518

As a primary stakeholder in the Yucca Mountain program, the state of Nevada has spent three decades examining and considering national policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transportation. During this time, Nevada has identified 10 issues it believes are critical to ensuring the safety and security of any spent nuclear fuel transportation program, and achieving public acceptance. These recommendations are: 1) Ship the oldest fuel first; 2) Ship mostly by rail; 3) Use dual-purpose (transportable storage) casks; 4) Use dedicated trains for rail shipments; 5) Implement a full-scale cask testing program; 6) Utilize a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process for the selection of a new rail spur to the proposed repository site; 7) Implement the Western Interstate Energy Board (WIEB) 'straw man' process for route selection; 8) Implement Section 180C assistance to affected States, Tribes and localities through rulemaking; 9) Adopt safety and security regulatory enhancements proposed states; and 10) Address stakeholder concerns about terrorism and sabotage. This paper describes Nevada's proposals in detail and examines their current status. The paper describes the various forums and methods by which Nevada has presented its arguments and sought to influence national policy. As of 2012, most of Nevada's recommendations have been adopted in one form or another, although not yet implemented. If implemented in a future nuclear waste program, the State of Nevada believes these recommendations would form the basis for a successful national transportation plan for shipments to a geologic repository and/or centralized interim storage facility. (authors)

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Safer Transportation and Disposal of Remote Handled Transuranic Waste - 12033

Since disposal of remote handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) began in 2007, the Department of Energy (DOE) has had difficulty meeting the plans and schedule for disposing this waste. PECOS Management Services, Inc. (PECOS) assessed the feasibility of proposed alternate RH-TRU mixed waste containerisation concepts that would enhance the transportation rate of RH-TRU waste to WIPP and increase the utilization of available WIPP space capacity for RH-TRU waste disposal by either replacing or augmenting current and proposed disposal methods. In addition engineering and operational analyses were conducted that addressed concerns regarding criticality, heat release, and worker exposure to radiation. The results of the analyses showed that the concept, development, and use of a concrete pipe based design for an RH-TRU waste shipping and disposal container could be potentially advantageous for disposing a substantial quantity of RHTRU waste at WIPP in the same manner as contact-handled RH waste. Additionally, this new disposal method would eliminate the hazard associated with repackaging this waste in other containers without the requirement for NRC approval for a new shipping container. (authors)

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Full-Scale Cask Testing and Public Acceptance of Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments - 12254

Full-scale physical testing of spent fuel shipping casks has been proposed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 2006 report on spent nuclear fuel transportation, and by the Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future 2011 draft report. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2005 proposed full-scale testing of a rail cask, and considered 'regulatory limits' testing of both rail and truck casks (SRM SECY-05-0051). The recent U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) cancellation of the Yucca Mountain project, NRC evaluation of extended spent fuel storage (possibly beyond 60-120 years) before transportation, nuclear industry adoption of very large dual-purpose canisters for spent fuel storage and transport, and the deliberations of the BRC, will fundamentally change assumptions about the future spent fuel transportation system, and reopen the debate over shipping cask performance in severe accidents and acts of sabotage. This paper examines possible approaches to full-scale testing for enhancing public confidence in risk analyses, perception of risk, and acceptance of spent fuel shipments. The paper reviews the literature on public perception of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste transportation risks. We review and summarize opinion surveys sponsored by the State of Nevada over the past two decades, which show consistent patterns of concern among Nevada residents about health and safety impacts, and socioeconomic impacts such as reduced property values along likely transportation routes. We also review and summarize the large body of public opinion survey research on transportation concerns at regional and national levels. The paper reviews three past cask testing programs, the way in which these cask testing program results were portrayed in films and videos, and examines public and official responses to these three programs: the 1970's impact and fire testing of spent fuel truck casks at Sandia National Laboratories, the 1980's regulatory and demonstration testing of MAGNOX fuel flasks in the United Kingdom (the CEGB 'Operation Smash Hit' tests), and the 1980's regulatory drop and fire tests conducted on the TRUPACT II containers used for transuranic waste shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. The primary focus of the paper is a detailed evaluation of the cask testing programs proposed by the NRC in its decision implementing staff recommendations based on the Package Performance Study, and by the State of Nevada recommendations based on previous work by Audin, Resnikoff, Dilger, Halstead, and Greiner. The NRC approach is based on demonstration impact testing (locomotive strike) of a large rail cask, either the TAD cask proposed by DOE for spent fuel shipments to Yucca Mountain, or a similar currently licensed dual-purpose cask. The NRC program might also be expanded to include fire testing of a legal-weight truck cask. The Nevada approach calls for a minimum of two tests: regulatory testing (impact, fire, puncture, immersion) of a rail cask, and extra-regulatory fire testing of a legal-weight truck cask, based on the cask performance modeling work by Greiner. The paper concludes with a discussion of key procedural elements - test costs and funding sources, development of testing protocols, selection of testing facilities, and test peer review - and various methods of communicating the test results to a broad range of stakeholder audiences. (authors)

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Packaging, Transportation and Recycling of NPP Condenser Modules - 12262

Perma-Fix was awarded contract from Energy Northwest for the packaging, transportation and disposition of the condenser modules, water boxes and miscellaneous metal, combustibles and water generated during the 2011 condenser replacement outage at the Columbia Generating Station. The work scope was to package the water boxes and condenser modules as they were removed from the facility and transfer them to the Perma-Fix Northwest facility for processing, recycle of metals and disposition. The condenser components were oversized and overweight (the condenser modules weighed ∼102,058 kg [225,000 lb]) which required special equipment for loading and transport. Additional debris waste was packaged in inter-modals and IP-1 boxes for transport. A waste management plan was developed to minimize the generation of virtually any waste requiring landfill disposal. The Perma-Fix Northwest facility was modified to accommodate the ∼15 m [50-ft] long condenser modules and equipment was designed and manufactured to complete the disassembly, decontamination and release survey. The condenser modules are currently undergoing processing for free release to a local metal recycler. Over three millions pounds of metal will be recycled and over 95% of the waste generated during this outage will not require land disposal. There were several elements of this project that needed to be addressed during the preparation for this outage and the subsequent packaging, transportation and processing. - Staffing the project to support 24/7 generation of large components and other wastes. - The design and manufacture of the soft-sided shipping containers for the condenser modules that measured ∼15 m X 4 m X 3 m [50 ft X 13 ft X 10 ft] and weighed ∼102,058 kg [225,000 lbs] - Developing a methodology for loading the modules into the shipping containers. - Obtaining a transport vehicle for the modules. - Designing and modifying the processing facility. - Movement of the modules at the processing facility. If any of these issues were not adequately resolved prior to the start of the outage, costly delays would result and the re-start of the power plant could be impacted. The main focus of this project was to find successful methods for keeping this material out of the landfills and preserving the natural resources. In addition, this operation provided a significant cost savings to the public utility by minimizing landfill disposal. The onsite portion of the project has been completed without impact to the overall outage schedule. By the date of presentation, the majority of the waste from the condenser replacement project will have been processed and recycled. The goals for this project included helping Energy Northwest maintain the outage schedule, package and characterize waste compliantly, perform transportation activities in compliance with 49CFR (Ref-1), and minimize the waste disposal volume. During this condenser replacement project, over three millions pounds of waste was generated, packaged, characterized and transported without injury or incident. It is anticipated that 95% of the waste generated during this project will not require landfill disposal. All of the waste is scheduled to be processed, decontaminated and recycled by June of 2012. (authors)

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Prairie Island Nuclear Station Spent Filter Processing for Direct Disposal - 12333

This paper will discuss WMG's filter processing experience within the commercial nuclear power industry, specifically recent experience processing high activity spent filters generated by Xcel Energy's Prairie Island Nuclear Station (Prairie Island), located in Welch, MN. WMG processed for disposal eighty-four 55-gallon drums filled with varying types of high activity spent filters. The scope of work involved characterization, packaging plan development, transport to the WMG's Off-Site Processing location, shredding the filter contents of each drum, cement solidifying the shredded filter material, and finally shipping the solidified container of shredded filter material to Clive, Utah where the container was presented to EnergySolutions Disposal site for disposal in their Containerised Waste Facility. This sequence of events presented in this paper took place a total of nine (9) times over a period of four weeks. All 1294 filters were successfully solidified into nine (9) -WMG 142 steel liners, and each was successfully disposed of as Class A Waste at EnergySolutions Disposal Site in Clive, Utah. Prairie Island's waste material was unique in that all its filters were packaged in 55-gallon drums; and since the station packaged its filters in drums it was much easier to develop packaging plans for such a large volume of legacy filters. For this author, having over 20-years of waste management experiences, storing and shipping waste material in 55-gallon drums is not immediately thought of as a highly efficient method of managing its waste material. However, Prairie Island's use of 55-gallon drums to store and package its filters provided a significant advantage. Drums could be mixed and matched to provide the most efficient processing method while still meeting the Waste Class A limits required for disposal. (author)

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Low Level and Transuranic Waste Segregation and Low Level Waste Characterization at the 200 Area of the Hanford Site - 12424

This paper describes the waste measurement and waste characterization activities carried out by ANTECH Corporation (ANTECH) and CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) at the 200 Area of the Hanford Site under Contracts No. 22394 and No. 40245 for the US Department of Energy (DOE). These include Low Level Waste (LLW) and Transuranic (TRU) Waste segregation and LLW characterization for both 55-gallon (200-litre) drums with gross weight up to 454 kg and 85-gallon over-pack drums. In order to achieve efficient and effective waste drum segregation and assay, ANTECH deployed an automated Gamma Mobile Assay Laboratory (G-MAL) at the trench face in both 200 Area West and East. The unit consists of a modified 40 foot ISO shipping container with an automatic flow through roller conveyor system with internal drum weigh scale, four measurement and drum rotation positions, and four high efficiency high purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors with both detector and shadow shields. The unit performs multiple far-field measurements and is able to segregate drums at levels well below 100 nCi/g. The system is sufficiently sensitive that drums, which are classified as LLW, are characterized at measurement levels that meet the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). With measurement times of between 20 and 30 minutes the unit can classify and characterize over 40 drums in an 8-hour shift. The system is well characterized with documented calibrations, lower limits of detection (LLD) and total measurement uncertainty. The calibrations are confirmed and verified using nationally traceable standards in keeping with the CHPRC measurement requirements. The performance of the system has been confirmed and validated throughout the measurement process by independent CHPRC personnel using traceable standards. All of the measurement and maintenance work has been conducted during the period under a Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) compliant with the applicable criteria of NQA-1 (2000). This includes not only the calibrations and measurements but also the data analysis activities of the ANTECH Subject Matter Experts (SME) and ANTECH support and maintenance activities as well as the activities of CHPRC staff who recover, transport and load waste drums and disposition measured and characterized drums. The overall processes of drum recovery and analysis are described in the paper. Specific spectral data is presented which illustrates the segregation, sentencing and assay process for different types of drums with different radionuclide profiles. The process of identifying and quantifying a wide range of non-TRU radionuclide isotopes is explained and illustrated with spectral examples. The difficulties associated with the measurement of drums with a high gamma ray background, usually arising from high levels of Cs-137 are considered. These drums, which would normally be declared indeterminate and treated as TRU, are addressed under contract No. 40245 by the deployment of the ANTECH Neutron Mobile Assay Laboratory. This is an Active-Passive neutron assay system housed in a modified ISO shipping container. The unit is designed for the measurement and assay of both drums and crates (including B-25 boxes and SWB containers) and will quantify the content of both plutonium and uranium. The neutron system has been employed to perform further evaluation on indeterminate drums to classify them to either LLW or TRU. The experiences of both gamma ray and neutron system operation in different conditions are described; as are the issues of throughput, drum handling and system maintenance. All of these are considered in the overriding context of safe drum handling and safe assay system operation. (authors)

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The Direct Path To WIPP - 12471

Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM), designated as a small quantity site (SQS) by the National TRU Program (NTP), generated contact-handled (CH) and remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste primarily from the decontamination and clean-out of glove boxes at the Hot Cell Facility (HCF) at Technical Area (TA) V. All of the waste required repackaging, with the CH TRU waste being repackaged from late 2007 through 2011. Three shipments of CH were completed in October 2011, which de-inventoried SNL/NM's legacy TRU waste. In FY11, RH TRU waste was repackaged at the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) located in TAV with the support of the Central Characterization Project (CCP). The waste was originally packaged in SNL/NM fabricated casks, cement or lead-lined 55-gallon drums, or 30-gallon drums. The AHCF is a small hot cell, with access only through a roof port which presented challenges for inserting and removing waste from the hot cell. The CCP provided visual examination operators (VEOs) to observe and document each waste item repackaged, removal of prohibited items, and radiological sampling. Dose-to-Curie measurements were calculated by CCP after a radiological report was prepared using scaling factors determined by the analysis of swipe samples. Finally, headspace gas samples were taken and sent to the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) for analysis. Despite the challenges, the RH waste is on track to be shipped to WIPP in early FY12. The processes used and procedures developed to conduct the repackaging operations, the issues identified and mitigated were challenging but the cooperation between SNL/NM and the Central Characterization Program (CCP) enabled SNL/NM to complete the repackaging and support the characterization and shipment. An inventory list, identification of the campaigns, discussion of the challenges and mitigations, and the final loading of the RH 72-B casks at TA-V for direct shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) will be discussed. Lessons learned from the RH campaigns are: - Some containers that were originally identified as HC-3 have been re-evaluated and became < HC-3 due to the conservative estimates made by the original generators - Operators at the AHCF were not accustomed to the detail required by the VE operators. However, they worked well together and the repackaging was completed ahead of schedule. - The AK was not always accurate as was demonstrated by the solid waste found in the drum during the first visit by EPA. That waste has since been determined to be low-level. - Two drums originally thought to be RH turned out to be CH and arrangement for RTR had to be made quickly. - Six of the original RH repacked drums became low level. - Lessons learned from the CH campaigns were helpful in avoiding many issues. The RH repackaging effort has been a success due to the expertise of the AHCF operators, supervisor, and manager, the conscientious attention to detail of the CCP VE operators, the experience of the CCP DTC and headspace gas sampling staff, and the guidance and support from CCP and CBFO. Sometimes schedules had to be adjusted, processes updated, and issues discussed, but the communication between CCP and SNL/NM was good. SNL/NM hopes to have the legacy RH TRU waste shipped off-site by early 2012. (authors)

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Fukushima Nuclear Crisis Recovery: A Modular Water Treatment System Deployed in Seven Weeks - 12489

On March 11, 2011, the magnitude 9.0 Great East Japan earthquake, Tohoku, hit off the Fukushima coast of Japan. This was one of the most powerful earthquakes in recorded history and the most powerful one known to have hit Japan. The ensuing tsunami devastated a huge area resulting in some 25,000 persons confirmed dead or missing. The perfect storm was complete when the tsunami then found the four reactor, Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Station directly in its destructive path. While recovery systems admirably survived the powerful earthquake, the seawater from the tsunami knocked the emergency cooling systems out and did extensive damage to the plant and site. Subsequent hydrogen generation caused explosions which extended this damage to a new level and further flooded the buildings with highly contaminated water. Some 2 million people were evacuated from a fifty mile radius of the area and evaluation and cleanup began. Teams were assembled in Tokyo the first week of April to lay out potential plans for the immediate treatment of some 63 million gallons (a number which later exceeded 110 million gallons) of highly contaminated water to avoid overflow from the buildings as well as supply the desperately needed clean cooling water for the reactors. A system had to be deployed with a very brief cold shake down and hot startup before the rainy season started in early June. Joined by team members Toshiba (oil removal system), AREVA (chemical precipitation system) and Hitachi-GE (RO system), Kurion (cesium removal system following the oil separator) proposed, designed, fabricated, delivered and started up a one of a kind treatment skid and over 100 metric tons of specially engineered and modified Ion Specific Media (ISM) customized for this very challenging seawater/oil application, all in seven weeks. After a very short cold shake down, the system went into operation on June 17, 2011 on actual waste waters far exceeding 1 million Bq/mL in cesium and many other isotopes. One must remember that, in addition to attempting to do isotope removal in the competition of seawater (as high as 18,000 ppm sodium due to concentration), some 350,000 gallons of turbine oil was dispersed into the flooded buildings as well. The proposed system consisted of a 4 guard vessel skid for the oil and debris, 4 skids containing 16 cesium towers in a lead-lag layout with removable vessels (sent to an interim storage facility), and a 4 polishing vessel skid for iodine removal and trace cesium levels. At a flow rate of at least 220 gallons per minute, the system has routinely removed over 99% of the cesium, the main component of the activity, since going on line. To date, some 50% of the original activity has been removed and stabilized and cold shutdown of the plant was announced on December 10, 2011. In March and April alone, 10 cubic feet of Engineered Herschelite was shipped to Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant, NPP, to support the April 1, 2011 outage cleanup; 400 cubic feet was shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for strontium (Sr-90) ground water remediation; and 6000 cubic feet (100 metric tons, MT, or 220,400 pounds) was readied for the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station with an additional 100 MT on standby for replacement vessels. This experience and accelerated media production in the U.S. bore direct application to what was to soon be used in Fukushima. How such a sophisticated and totally unique system and huge amount of media could be deployable in such a challenging and changing matrix, and in only seven weeks, is outlined in this paper as well as the system and operation itself. As demonstrated herein, all ten major steps leading up to the readiness and acceptance of a modular emergency technology recovery system were met and in a very short period of time, thus utilizing three decades of experience to produce and deliver such a system literally in seven weeks: - EPRI - U.S. Testing and Experience Leading to Introduction to EPRI - Japan and Subsequently TEPCO Emergency Meetings - Three Mile Island (TMI) Media and Vitrification Experience by PNNL - Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Media Experience (including long term Cs removal) - DOE Low Active Waste (LAW) and High Level Waste (HLW) in High Salt and pH Conditions Media and Vitrification Experience - National Laboratory (e.g. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL) Ground Water Media Experience - Gulf Oil Spill Media Experience in Seawater - All Media Had to be Fully Tested at High Rad Levels in Seawater and Oil Before Arriving in Japan - Final Waste Form and Disposal Experience (e.g., vitrification) - 100 Metric Tons (6000 cubic feet or 220,400 pounds) of Media had to be Immediately Available with the same amount in production as replacement media. [To date, for 2011, 400 MT of media have been prepared for Japan alone.] - Remote Operation, Modular Water Treatment Equipment Design and Fabrication in both Commercial NPP and DOE Canyon Operations. (authors)

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Teaching Old Packaging New Tricks - 12593

Waste disposition campaigns have been an industry and government focus area since the mid- 1970's. With increased focus on this issue, and a lot of hard work, most waste packaging and transportation issues have been addressed. The material has been successfully shipped and dis-positioned. DOE has successfully de-inventoried materials from multiple sites to meet material consolidation, footprint reduction, nonproliferation, and regulatory obligations with cost savings from reduced maintenance and regulatory compliance. There has been a wide range of certified shipping packagings for the transportation of hazardous materials to meet most of the waste needs. The remaining materials are problematic, generally low volume, and do not meet the certified content of the existing inventory of packaging. Designing, testing and certifying new packaging designs can be a long and expensive process and for small volumes of material it is cost prohibitive. One very cost effective option is to lease and use a certified packaging to overpack waste containers. There are many robust certified packagings available with the capability to envelope the waste content. The capability to use inner containers, inside the current fleet of certified casks or packaging, to address specific content problems of additional shielding (e.g., U-233) or containment (e.g., sodium bonded nuclear material) has successfully expanded the capability for timely cost effective shipment of unique contents. This option has been used successfully in the NAC-LWT, T-3 and other packagings. (authors)

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Drying Model for Fukushima Fuel Debris - 17489

The FATE{sup TM} code is a well-established software tool for simulation of processing, shipping, and interim storage of damaged spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that was used for process design and safety analysis for the Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (SNFP). This paper describes new model developments that allow FATE to be used for simulation of drying of damaged LWR fuel and, in particular, for simulation of processing, shipping, and interim storage of Fukushima fuel debris. The model is capable of quantifying important tradeoffs in the debris chunk size, process conditions such as temperature and pressure, container size, etc. to optimize process design. The model is also capable of demonstrating proof-of-dryness and to demonstrate the link between observed quantities such as pressure and the amount of residual water. (authors)

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The Off-Site Source Recovery Program Capabilities in Recovering Transuranic Sealed Sources - 17599

Over the past 16 years, the mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) has been recovering disused radioactive sealed sources in the interest of national security, public health and safety. This program, which is sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Material Security's Office of Radiological Security, is managed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory and has recovered sources worldwide. To date, OSRP has recovered more than 38,000 sources from over 1,300 locations worldwide. Since its inception, OSRP has grown from recovering only sealed sources containing one transuranic (TRU) isotope, Pu-239, in the early days of the program, to recovering sealed sources containing several other TRU and non-TRU isotopes. Primarily, OSRP's mission includes Pu-238, Pu-239, Am-241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Sr-90, Cs-137, Co-60, Ir-192 and Ra-226 sources that are US-origin, defense related and not commercially disposable. Over the lifetime of this program the types of recoveries performed have expanded from a single site to multi-site round-up recoveries. An additional approach, referred to as self-ship recoveries, is also used in cases where only a few sources may be present at a licensee's site. In these situations, the licensee ships their source(s) to an OSRP staging facility for ultimate consolidation and disposal. OSRP recovers sources from many types of licensees, with the majority of sources being removed from industry, universities and hospitals. These include sealed sources used in industrial radiological devices like moisture-density gauges and thickness gauges, medical devices such as blood irradiators and radiotherapy devices and sealed sources from nuclear power plants, among others. The recovery and management of sealed sources is a complex process covering multidisciplinary areas, including source construction, characteristics of the radioactive material, source packaging and transportation per DOT regulations, safe and secure storage, and final disposition per waste acceptance criteria of repository sites. (authors)

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Demolition of the K-27 Building at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) - 17423

On February 8, 2016, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) initiated the demolition of the East Tennessee Technology Park's (ETTP's) final gaseous diffusion building in DOE's Oak Ridge Environmental Management program. Building K-27 was a 35,582 m{sup 2} (383,000 ft{sup 2}) gaseous diffusion building that contained approximately 92,903 m{sup 2} (1 million ft{sup 2}) of floor space. It was one of five gaseous diffusion buildings at the site, formerly known as the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The actual demolition of this facility took approximately seven months to complete; however, planning and preparation took more than three years. The deactivation process was a critical element in preparing the building for demolition. UCOR's K-27 deactivation activities began in April 2012 with the installation of safe walking paths and fall protection systems to allow safe work access. Next, all mechanical and electrical systems associated with the facility were shut down and isolated, a process known as 'cold and dark.' More than 19.3 km (12 mi) of process piping and components were marked and measured. Additionally, workers performed nondestructive assay (NDA) and vent-purge-and-drain activities and applied foam to piping and components as needed [1]. Based on characterization results, approximately 4.8 km (3 mi) of process piping, and 372 converters and compressors were removed and shipped offsite prior to demolition. Lower-hazard materials and equipment were demolished with the building structure and transported to onsite disposal facilities. Upfront waste characterization and ongoing monitoring were key to the successful disposal of demolition debris at onsite facilities. Due to process improvements in waste loading recommended by work crews, the project achieved a 50 percent improvement in the daily hauling rate during the 9,000-truckload shipping campaign. Crews worked in high-risk, high-hazard conditions and were exposed to radiological and chemical contaminants, extreme temperatures, and deteriorating infrastructure. However, the hazard controls that were put in place, based on the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) walk-downs and hazard determination, made the effort manageable. The overall safety performance during demolition of the facility was excellent, with no significant injuries, and exceeded industry standards and DOE target levels. Outstanding safety performance was a testament to the dedication of the workforce, given the significant hazards presented by the demolition of the Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility. Another key element to the success of the K-27 demolition was the support and approval of all stakeholders involved in this effort, including DOE, the surrounding communities, the State of Tennessee, the UCOR management team, and, most importantly, the workforce that performed this highly hazardous work. This $52 million demolition project was completed ahead of schedule with no significant injuries and in compliance with all DOE orders, site procedures, and environmental controls. (authors)

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The transportation factor in site evaluations for spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal facilities - 15460

New facility siting studies will be necessary to fulfill the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future 2012 recommendation to develop consolidated interim storage (CIS) for spent nuclear fuel in the next decade. Future site evaluations for used nuclear fuel (UNF) storage and disposal facilities must address transportation requirements, especially access to mainline railroads, early in the site selection process. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 2013 proposed a strategy for managing spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the BRC recommendations by establishing a pilot interim storage facility by 2021 and a consolidated interim storage facility by 2025. The authors demonstrate that currently available geographic information systems and already adopted siting criteria (defining favorable and unfavorable conditions) allow the identification of the transportation portion of a storage facility siting process to begin without delay. Ready access to the mainline rail system is absolutely critical since existing rail access, or easily constructed access, is a highly favorable condition for successful siting. Despite widespread rail abandonments over the past three decades, vast areas of the United States retain mainline rail service or could connect to existing mainlines by building new rail spurs of less than 25-50 miles. This precondition for transportation planning is critical. Planners need to start with the beginning - availability of rail transportation to and from the interim storage facility/facilities. A second step in transportation screening would be to evaluate those potential site locations within 50 miles of existing mainline railroads using other appropriate variables. This effort could begin with the application of the 1984 repository siting guidelines for transportation (10 CFR 960.5-2-7)[1]. Repository surface facilities have essentially the same transportation requirements as storage facilities. The guidelines in 10 CFR 960 provide a readily available template for evaluating sites based on transportation risks, impacts and costs. Initial site screening, after considering proximity to mainline railroads as the precursory step, should evaluate: 1) proximity to highly populated areas; 2) proximity to interstate highways; 3) proximity to environmentally sensitive areas and lands protected by federal, state, or tribal governments; and 4) proximity to military installations, hazardous materials facilities, or other facilities that might impact transportation safety and security.Several challenges exist which prevent effective transportation planning. The diversity of canister and cask types and SNF characteristics and conditions, the increasingly limited rail access at the shipping sites and the ease with which public attention can be marshalled against a waste management program, all suggest that future efforts need to identify potential storage sites that reduce transportation impacts and costs by reducing near-site transportation construction and reduce total system transportation impacts. This can most easily be accomplished by reducing shipping distances in a process that is easily defined and implemented. The paper concludes that the DOE should develop a site screening and evaluation program with transportation as a central consideration. (authors)

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Managing TRU waste processing and storage issues/challenges - 15487

Operational events at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility resulted in suspension of disposal operations and waste shipments to WIPP creating significant challenges for the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The Oak Ridge Transuranic (TRU) Waste Program which was poised to re-start shipping after a 2.5 year suspension of the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) certification activities which resulted in on-site accumulation of the highest activity contact handled (CH) TRU waste containers. As a result, Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) is nearing its physical storage capacity for CH waste and has already reached storage capacity limits for remote handled (RH) TRU waste. The TWPC storage capacity for RH-TRU waste is very limited and dependent on real time shipping support to continue RH waste processing activities in the facilities Hot Cell. Additionally, changes in dispersion modeling (i.e., dry deposition factor changes) used in the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) present Material at Risk (MAR) management challenges to effectively manage off-site dose consequences. These facts necessitated the identification of alternative waste storage options for both CH and RH waste to continue waste processing operations at TWPC. (authors)

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Environmental Restoration of Diesel-Range Organics from Project Chariot, Cape Thompson, Alaska - 16147

Cape Thompson, Alaska, is located approximately 120 miles north of Kotzebue, Alaska, within the Ogotoruk Creek valley. The remote Alaskan location is also home to the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Project Chariot study area. Project Chariot was part of the Plowshare Program, created in 1957 by the AEC to study peaceful uses for atomic energy. Project Chariot began in 1958 when a scientific field team chose Cape Thompson as a potential site to excavate a harbor using a series of nuclear explosions. Between 1959 and 1962, AEC was responsible for over 40 pretest bio-environmental and geotechnical studies of the Cape Thompson area. Strong public opposition to the tests developed, which caused the project to be cancelled with no nuclear explosions ever conducted at the site. In the early 1960's, several deep boreholes were drilled to obtain subsurface, temperature, and high-explosive testing data. Refrigerated diesel was used as a drilling fluid to keep the boreholes open so that thermistors could measure subsurface temperatures. The test boreholes were named Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, and X-1. In the summer of 2014, the US Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management (LM) completed the remediation of remnant diesel at these sites. Prior to the 2014 remediation activities, LM conducted two separate characterization field studies to determine the nature and extent of the contamination from the 1960's drilling activities. In 2013, LM developed a remediation plan that was submitted and approved by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC). The 2014 Project Chariot remediation had some unique logistical challenges and historic issues with stakeholders to overcome. Many of the historic issues centered on previous AEC scientific actions and a general mistrust of the government by the local stakeholders. Prior to and during the 2014 remediation work, an outreach campaign was implemented to discuss prior activities at the site and include stakeholders from Point Hope, Alaska, in the remediation-planning process. The remoteness of the region also provided unique logistical challenges. Because of the short field season, LM initiated several subcontracts over a year in advance. The field camp, heavy equipment, and soil storage containers were shipped by barge to the site. Personnel, food, and small materials were flown in by bush plane from Kotzebue, Alaska. Previous site characterization had identified diesel-range organics (DROs) as the primary contaminant. The cleanup levels for the site were provided by the Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) for the Arctic Zone region. The AAC cleanup level for DROs on gravel pads is 500 mg/kg and 12,500 mg/kg tundra in the arctic-zone region. To help determine the extent and direct soil excavation in the field, photoionization detectors (PIDs) were used for field screening. While the PID results provided rough limits for excavation, laboratory confirmation sampling was required to provide actual excavation guidance. All excavation locations remained open until laboratory results met AAC criteria and ADEC approved closure. The laboratory sample protocol required the bush plane to pick up samples almost daily and transfer them to Anchorage for analysis. In order to meet holding time requirements, all laboratory samples were analyzed on an expedited basis. Analytical results and ADEC approval notifications were e-mailed back to the site via satellite connection. A total of 202 laboratory analyses were needed to complete the remediation effort. At each location (Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, and X-1), the boreholes were plugged and abandoned in accordance with ADEC regulations. Contaminated soil was excavated, and the material was placed in super-sacks and hauled to connex boxes located near the sea shore. Approximately 786 tons of material was removed and shipped by barge to the Columbia Ridge Landfill in Arlington, Oregon, for disposal. The well casings were cut and sealed below ground surface. Each location was graded to its original contours and reclaimed with native vegetation, and a geodetic survey was conducted. Tours with leaders of the Village of Point Hope and the land owner (Arctic Slope Regional Corporation) were conducted prior to the final demobilization. All remediation equipment and camp facilities were removed at the completion of the project. (authors)

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Developments that are making the Versa-Pac Indeed More Versatile (and More Useful to Industry) - 16267

Daher-TLI acquired the assets and employees of Century Industries, a radioactive material packaging manufacturing facility, in 2013. Included in that acquisition was the Versa-Pac Shipping Package. The Versa-Pac is an NRC licensed Type AF packaging (Certificate of Compliance no. USA/9342/AF-96) and was originally designed as a replacement for standard 7A drum-type transportation packaging. It can be used directly or in conjunction with pails, drums or inserts that can be manufactured to accommodate a variety of smaller containers and vessels. The Versa-Pac comes in two sizes, the VP-55 (i.e., 55-gallon drum version) and VP-110 (i.e., 110-gallon drum version). It features a patented design concept in combination with the drum exterior to provide enhanced structural protection to payloads under Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC), per 10CFR71.71 and 10CFR71.73 respectively. Since its introduction in 2010, the Versa-Pac has been utilized mainly as a one-time use package for disposing of radioactive waste. The package is also designed as a reusable package for transporting front-end materials. Discussions with current and prospective clients have resulted in numerous improvements, accomplished and planned, to the package's payload capability through additional engineering analyses and actual design modifications. Revision 10 to the NRC Certificate of Compliance, dated August 6, 2015, introduces an enrichment-loading table that allows shipping larger quantities of U-235 for enrichments less than 100 wt.%. It also authorizes shipment of natural thorium. Other planned and proposed improvements include provisions to transport UF{sub 6} in 1S, 2S, and 5B cylinders, design changes that further increases the amount of U-235 at enrichments less than 100 wt.%, increasing the capacity of the VP-110, developing a lighter 30-gallon version, the VP-30, and introducing content limits specific to uranium-oxides in multiple forms. This paper traces the engineering and design efforts involved in expanding the Versa-Pac's versatility. (authors)

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Survey and Remediation Project at the DOE Bannister Site - 16280

The Department of Energy Kansas City office has operated the Bannister site with a variety of contractors since the late 1940's. This facility has had a number of missions, some of which included using natural and depleted uranium. In order to prepare for the demolition of the site, ANTECH was contracted to perform radiometric surveys of the areas where these uranium operations took place. In the process of performing these surveys, areas with low levels of fixed radioactive contamination were identified; ANTECH then remediated these areas using a variety of techniques. In all areas surveyed, the only radioactive contaminant of interest was uranium and members of its decay chain. In no cases were other radionuclides found. The detection equipment used for the surveys included a Ludlum model 239- 1F Floor Monitor, a Ludlum 2360 Alpha Beta Data Logger Scaler/Ratemeter, and an ORTEC IDM-200-V High Purity Germanium Detector. The Ludlum instruments were used for bulk surveys and the ORTEC instrument was used to determine an accurate radioactive background spectra and subsequent spectra for areas where radioactive contamination was identified. Contamination was located on concrete floors and columns, cinder block walls, steel beams, inside ductwork and in floor drain piping. After these areas were identified, a number of methods were used to remove the contamination for disposal including scabbling, core drilling and wholesale removal. Extensive use of Pentek scabbling equipment on the concrete sections proved to be very effective at removing the contaminated layer. Upon completion, the waste materials were consolidated and packaged in a strong tight sea land container and shipped to the Energy Solutions waste facility in Utah. The completed work at the Bannister site serves as an example and demonstration of an effective and comprehensive decommissioning project. It involved the integration of a variety of decommissioning activities all executed and managed by a single contractor. These included radiometric measurement surveying using a variety of detection technologies to identify and locate uranium contamination, decontamination and removal of low level radioactive waste including some deconstruction activities and finally the management of low level radioactive waste including packaging, consignment and shipping of waste to a remediation site. The effective and efficient identification and removal of radioactive contamination at the Bannister site has contributed to the overall goal of returning the site to unrestricted use. (authors)

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Calibration of a Passive Neutron Counter with {sup 242}Pu Standards - 16450

At the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 facility, a large quantity of Heat Source (HS) and MT42 (primarily {sup 242}Pu) has been designated for disposal as TRU waste. The waste, to be packaged in either 55 gal drums or Pipe Overpack Containers (POCs), is scheduled to be assayed with the TA 55 HENC 3 system. The system is owned and operated by the Nuclear Waste Partnership (NWP) under a contract with the Carlsbad DoE field office. The HENC 3 is a combined passive neutron/gamma assay system. The neutron component of the system was previously calibrated up to 21.9 g of {sup 240}Pu effective. This corresponds to approximately 9 g of typical HS plutonium and 13 g of MT42 waste. In order to reduce packaging efforts and radiation dose for waste handling personnel, LANL has requested an increase in the HENC 3 calibration limit to approximate the maximum allowable shipping and storage limits for TRU waste. To increase the limits, NWP has obtained the use of well characterized MT42 source materials. The sources, developed and owned by LANL, range from to 5 g to 200 g of plutonium enriched to 86.6% {sup 242}Pu. Using these sources in combination, multiple measurements were performed with both 55-gal drums and POCs to determine their suitability for extending the neutron calibration range of the system. The results of the measurements were (1) compared to the existing calibration for consistency and (2) used to extend the calibration range to 307 g of {sup 240}Pu effective. This report will discuss the elements of the neutron component of the HENC 3 system, the calibration extension effort, problems encountered, and the results of the measurements. As a result of the extension, HS and MT42 materials can be assayed in 55-gal drums and POCs up to their allowable shipping limits. (authors)

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