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At least 1,009 records · Page 56

Design of a Large 5 T Superconducting Magnet for Polarized Target for JLAB Hall B 12 GeV Upgrade Clas12 Detector

Hall B at Jefferson Laboratory (JLAB) will need a 5 T, 78 cm bore polarized target magnet with a field uniformity of {Delta}B/B{sub 0} <; 10{sup -4} in a useful cylinder of the dimensions 0.04 m long x 0.02 m in diameter. The large magnet is designed with a superconducting coil that provides the solenoid with nearly perfect self shielding in order to reduce the fringe field at nearby photo multiplier tubes (PMTs) to less than 3.5 mT. Because the solenoid is also very close to the Clas12 Torus, the nearly perfect shielding provided by the self shielded solenoid greatly reduces force, field, and torque interactions with the six-coil Torus magnet. The solenoid coil consists of 18 coil modules which are made of coils mounted in aluminum plate discs. Each coil module consists of dual double pancake coils with main coils and shield coil partitioned into separate winding cavities in the aluminum plate discs to distribute and reduce radial hoop load and radial coil forces. Each coil module is effectively an enclosed aluminum box and this serves to partition the axial load and thus reduces coil axial forces. Since overall coil forces within each coil module are reduced, this will greatly reduce the number coil training quenches. This is a very important consideration for this solenoid coil because the coil cooling is adiabatic, using in-direct conduction cooling by 4.5 K supercritical helium, which will provide only a relatively small temperature stability margin. Super critical helium is used as per JLAB specification. Detail design of the coil structure, coil assembly, cold mass, and cryogenic control will be presented. The magnet protection system shall be capable of the following features: (1) quench and fault detection, (2) fast discharge of the magnet, (3) limit fault voltages to safe values, (4) monitor interlock signals to prevent unsafe operation, and (5) provide control logic necessary for safe operation of the solenoid. The instrument systems shall be capable of the following features: (1) monitors and display temperatures within the solenoid magnet, (2) measure loads or stress on the magnet suspension, (3) monitor voltages within the solenoid magnet and charging bus, (4) monitor pressures and (5) use data logging system to save all sensor data. These systems will be described and a quench analysis presented.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Distributed Control of Inverter-Interfaced Microgrids Based on Consensus Algorithm with Improved Transient Performance

Conventional control solutions of the inverter-interfaced microgrids are usually designed based on models with fully decoupled subsystems. The negligence of the strong coupling due to power lines impedance leads to large transient line currents, which might trigger false protection. Besides, the droop-based control methods unnecessarily introduce system frequency and voltage deviations. To overcome these issues, a novel distributed control scheme is proposed for the inverter-interfaced microgrids in this study. The objective of the primary control is to regulate the bus voltages and frequency while suppressing the transient line currents. The objective of secondary control is to maintain fair load sharing. Both primary control and secondary control are distributed and subsystems or control agents only require measurements from local and neighboring subsystems. The detailed control problem formulation, control design and stability analysis are presented in the paper. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed control solution is evaluated through extensive simulations based on both simplified and detailed models.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Review on Protection Challenges on Transmission Lines Connected to Inverter Based Resources

The increased penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs) connected to transmission grids is challenging how traditional electric power systems operate. Such systems were originally designed based on the dominant presence of synchronous generators. Some main challenges include the increased concerns about system stability due to the reduced system inertia caused by IBRs and the reduced protection reliability caused by the non-deterministic fault current response of IBRs. The protection relays’ algorithms have been designed and validated based on well-known fault current characteristics of synchronous generations, while the short-circuit responses of IBRs heavily depend on their vendor-specific control schemes, which are mainly set to protect inverter semiconductor switches and DC components. The magnitude of short current that IBRs contribute is typically between 1.1–1.5 times the rated current that may behave unstably and incoherently with the voltages. The control scheme of the IBRs also controls the active (P) and reactive (Q) support during system voltage sag and swell conditions. These characteristics challenge not only protective relay schemes but also existing short-circuit software tools to correctly model IBRs for fault studies and protection coordination analyses. Utilities, university researchers, research institutes, and relay manufacturers have performed studies to investigate different aspects of high IBR penetration. Almost all studies support 1) creating international and national standards to regulate the IBRs, 2) revising engineering tools to address shortcomings, and 3) adjusting the protective relay settings to resolve protection problems. This paper summarizes the studies and research conducted in recent years to quantify the impact of IBR penetration on transmission line protection and to identify potential solutions to improve the dependability and reliability of grid protection systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

A review on protection challenges of Transmission Lines connected to Inverter Based Resources

The increased penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs) connected to transmission grids is challenging how traditional electric power systems operate. Such systems were originally designed based on the dominant presence of synchronous generators. Some main challenges include the increased concerns about system stability due to the reduced system inertia caused by IBRs and the reduced protection reliability caused by the non-deterministic fault current response of IBRs. The protection relays’ algorithms have been designed and validated based on well-known fault current characteristics of synchronous generations, while the short-circuit responses of IBRs heavily depend on their vendor-specific control schemes, which are mainly set to protect inverter semiconductor switches and DC components. The magnitude of short current that IBRs contribute is typically between 1.1–1.5 times the rated current that may behave unstably and incoherently with the voltages. The control scheme of the IBRs also controls the active (P) and reactive (Q) support during system voltage sag and swell conditions. These characteristics challenge not only protective relay schemes but also existing short-circuit software tools to correctly model IBRs for fault studies and protection coordination analyses.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

A Review on Protection Challenges of Transmission Lines Connected to Inverter-Based Resources

The increased penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs) connected to transmission grids is challenging how traditional electric power systems operate. Such systems were originally designed based on the dominant presence of synchronous generators. Some main challenges include the increased concerns about system stability due to the reduced system inertia caused by IBRs and the reduced protection reliability caused by the non-deterministic fault current response of IBRs. The protection relays’ algorithms have been designed and validated based on well-known fault current characteristics of synchronous generations, while the short-circuit responses of IBRs heavily depend on their vendor-specific control schemes, which are mainly set to protect inverter semiconductor switches and DC components. The magnitude of short current that IBRs contribute is typically between 1.1–1.5 times the rated current that may behave unstably and incoherently with the voltages. The control scheme of the IBRs also controls the active (P) and reactive (Q) support during system voltage sag and swell conditions. These characteristics challenge not only protective relay schemes but also existing short-circuit software tools to correctly model IBRs for fault studies and protection coordination analyses

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

X-48B Flight Research Progress Overview

Program Objectives; I. Assess stability & control characteristics of a BWB class vehicle in free-flight conditions: a) Assess dynamic interaction of control surfaces; b) Assess control requirements to accommodate asymmetric thrust; c) Assess stability and controllability about each axis at a range of flight conditions II. Assess flight control algorithms designed to provide desired flight characteristics: a) Assess control surface allocation and blending; b) Assess edge of envelope protection schemes; c) Assess takeoff and landing characteristics; d) Test experimental control laws and control design methods. III. Evaluate prediction and test methods for BWB class vehicles: a) Correlate flight measurements with ground-based predictions and measurements.

Risch, Tim↗

SU-F-T-234: Quality Improvements in the Electronic Medical Record of Patients Treated with High Dose-Rate Brachytherapy

Purpose: To improve workflow efficiency and patient safety by assessing the quality control documentation for HDR brachytherapy within our Electronic Medical Record System (Mosaiq). Methods: A list of parameters based on NRC regulations, our quality management program (QMP), recommendations of the ACR and the American Brachytherapy Society, and HDR treatment planning risks identified in our previous FMEA study was made. Next, the parameter entries were classified according to the type of data input—manual, electronic, or both. Manual entry included the electronic Brachytherapy Treatment Record (BTR) and pre-treatment Mosaiq Assessments list. Oncentra Treatment Reports (OTR) from the Oncentra Treatment Control System constituted the electronic data. The OTR includes a Pre-treatment Report for each fraction, and a Treatment Summary Report at the completion of treatment. Each entry was then examined for appropriateness and completeness of data; adjustments and additions as necessary were then made. Results: Ten out of twenty-one recorded treatment parameters were identified to be documented within both the BTR and OTR. Of these ten redundancies, eight were changed from recorded values to a simple checklist in the BTR to avoid recording errors. The other redundancies were kept in both documents due to their value to ensuring patient safety. An edit was made to the current BTR quality assessment; this change revises the definition of a medical event in accordance with ODH Regulation 3701:1-58-101. One addition was made to the current QMP documents regarding HDR. This addition requires a physician to be present through the duration of HDR treatment in accordance with ODH Regulation 3701:1-58-59; Paragraph (F); Section (2); Subsection (a). Conclusion: Careful examination of HDR documentation that originates from different sources can help to improve the accuracy and reliability of the documents. In addition, there may be a small improvement in efficiency due to elimination of unnecessary redundancies.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Photovoltaic stand-alone modular systems, phase 2

The final hardware and system qualification phase of a two part stand-alone photovoltaic (PV) system development is covered. The final design incorporated modular, power blocks capable of expanding incrementally from 320 watts to twenty kilowatts (PK). The basic power unit (PU) was nominally rated 1.28 kWp. The controls units, power collection buses and main lugs, electrical protection subsystems, power switching, and load management circuits are housed in a common control enclosure. Photo-voltaic modules are electrically connected in a horizontal daisy-chain method via Amp Solarlok plugs mating with compatible connectors installed on the back side of each photovoltaic module. A pair of channel rails accommodate the mounting of the modules into a frameless panel support structure. Foundations are of a unique planter (tub-like) configuration to allow for world-wide deployment without restriction as to types of soil. One battery string capable of supplying approximately 240 ampere hours nominal of carryover power is specified for each basic power unit. Load prioritization and shedding circuits are included to protect critical loads and selectively shed and defer lower priority or noncritical power demands. The baseline system, operating at approximately 2 1/2 PUs (3.2 kW pk.) was installed and deployed. Qualification was successfully complete in March 1983; since that time, the demonstration system has logged approximately 3000 hours of continuous operation under load without major incident.

Naff, G. J.↗

Protective effects of SGLT2 inhibitor luseogliflozin on pancreatic β-cells in obese type 2 diabetic db/db mice

It is well known that Sodium-Glucose Co-transporter 2 (SGLT2) inhibitors, new hypoglycemic agents, improve glycemic control by increasing urine glucose excretion, but it remained unclear how they exert protective effects on pancreatic β-cells. In this study, we examined the effects of SGLT2 inhibitor luseogliflozin on β-cell function and mass using obese type 2 diabetic db/db mice. Ten-week-old male diabetic db/db mice were treated with luseogliflozin 0.0025% or 0.01% in chow (Luse 0.0025% or Luse 0.01%) or vehicle (control) for 4 weeks. Urinary glucose excretion was increased in Luse groups (0.0025% and 0.01%) compared to control mice 3 days after the intervention. Fasting blood glucose levels were significantly lower in mice treated with Luse compared to control mice. Fasting serum insulin concentrations were significantly higher in mice treated with Luse compared to control mice. Triglyceride levels tended to be lower in Luse groups compared to control mice. In immunohistochemical study using pancreas tissues, β-cell mass was larger in Luse groups compared to control group which was due to the increase of β-cell proliferation and decrease of β-cell apoptosis. Furthermore, in gene analysis using isolated islets, insulin 1, insulin 2, MafA, PDX-1 and GLUT2 gene expression levels were significantly higher in Luse groups compared to control group. In contrast, expression levels of fibrosis-related gene such as TGFβ, fibronectin, collagen I and collagen III were significantly lower in Luse groups. In conclusion, SGLT2 inhibitor luseogliflozin ameliorates glycemic control and thus exerts protective effects on pancreatic β-cell mass and function. - Highlights: • SGLT2 inhibitor luseogliflozin ameliorates glycemic control in db/db mice. • Luseogliflozin increases β-cell proliferation and decreases β-cell apoptosis. • Luseogliflozin preserves various β-cell-specific gene expression. • Luseogliflozin decreases various fibrosis-related factors in db/db mice.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Implications of the 2015 and 2016 Ukrainian electric grid cyber attacks to nuclear power plants - 113

Nuclear plants can be vulnerable from electric grid cyber attacks. In December 2015 and December 2016, cyber attackers attacked the Ukrainian electric grid and 'turned off the lights' by opening substation protective relays. The 2015 cyber attacks targeted electric distribution systems and the 2016 cyber attacks targeted electric transmission systems. In order to accomplish the attacks, the cyber attackers compromised field control system devices to inject malware and then open protective relays in substations. There are some very significant implications to nuclear plant operations from hacking the substations and switchyard breakers that serve nuclear plants. The nuclear plant operational concerns are compromising protective relays to prevent relay protection that would result in damage to large electric equipment; spurious actuation of protective relays causing loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) conditions; and the closing and then reopening of protective relays out-of-phase with the grid causing the Aurora vulnerability damaging generators, Alternating Current (AC) motors, and transformers. All of these protective relay conditions have already occurred in actual or test conditions. The common thread to these scenarios are that switchyard and substation protective relays are out-of-scope of existing nuclear cyber security regulations yet, when compromised, have demonstrated impacts to nuclear plant operations and challenged safety systems. There is one other issue about an attack originating from a protective relay. That is, it would be irrelevant whether the nuclear plant system that would be impacted would have analog or digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems because the impact is upstream of the I and C. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

IL-12Rβ2 is critical for survival of primary Francisella tularensis LVS infection

Abstract IL-12Rβ2 is critical in parenteral and mucosal host resistance to primary Francisella tularensis LVS infection, and controls liver damage. Using a panel of vaccines that provided different degrees of protection, we previously identified the IL-12 receptor subunit β2 as a mediator, whose relative expression correlated with strength of protection against secondary lethal challenge of vaccinated mice with an intracellular bacterium, the LVS of Francisella tularensis. The present study therefore tested the hypothesis that IL-12Rβ2 is an important mediator in resistance to LVS by directly examining its role during infections. IL-12Rβ2 KO mice were highly susceptible to LVS primary infection, administered i.d. or i.n. The LD50 of LVS infection of KO mice were 2 logs lower than those of WT mice, regardless of route. Five days after infection with LVS, bacterial organ burdens were significantly higher in IL-12Rβ2 KO mice. IL-12Rβ2 KO mice infected with lethal doses of LVS had more severe liver pathology, including significant increases in the liver enzymes ALT and AST. Despite decreased levels of IFN-γ, LVS-vaccinated IL-12Rβ2 KO mice survived large lethal LVS secondary challenge. Consistent with in vivo protection, in vitro intramacrophage LVS growth was well-controlled in cocultures containing WT or IL-12Rβ2 KO LVS-immune splenocytes. Thus, survival of secondary LVS challenge was not strictly dependent on IL-12Rβ2. However, IL-12Rβ2 is important in parenteral and mucosal host resistance to primary LVS infection and in the ability of WT mice to clear LVS infection and serves to restrict liver damage.

Melillo, Amanda A.↗

Risk Assessment Using the Three Dimensions of Probability (Likelihood), Severity, and Level of Control

Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional representation of the results determined by relative likelihood and severity of the residual risk. These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event. A three-dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the Level of Control. The elements of the Z-axis are modifications of the Hazard Elimination and Control steps (also known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence). These steps are: 1. Eliminate risk through design. 2. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials. 3. Install safety devices. 4. Install caution and warning devices. 5. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures and training.) 6. Provide protective clothing and equipment. When added to the twodimensional models, the level of control adds a visual representation of the risk associated with the hazardous condition, creating a tall-pole for the least-well-controlled failure while establishing the relative likelihood and severity of all causes and effects for an identified hazard. Computer modeling of the analytical results, using spreadsheets and threedimensional charting gives a visual confirmation of the relationship between causes and their controls

Watson, Clifford↗

Optimal Distribution System Voltage Regulation using State Estimation and DER Grid-Support Functions

Increasing solar energy penetrations may create challenges for distribution system operations because production variability can lead to large voltage deviations or protection system miscoordination. Instituting advanced management systems on distribution systems is one promising method for combating these challenges by intelligently controlling distribution assets to regulate voltage and ensure protection safety margins. While it is generally not the case today, greater deployment of power system sensors and interoperable distributed energy resources (DER)e.g., photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems (ESS), electric vehicles (EVs)will enable situational awareness, control, and optimization of distribution systems. In this work, a control system was created which measures power system parameters to estimate the status of a feeder, forecasts the distribution state over a short-term horizon, and issues optimal set point commands to distribution-connected equipment to regulate voltage and protect the system. This two-year project integrated multiple research innovations into a management system designed to safely allow PV penetrations of 50% or greater. The integrated software was demonstrated through extensive real-time (RT) and power hardware-in-the-loop studies and a field demonstration on a live power system with a 684 kVA PV system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Graded approach for assessing digital system failure susceptibilities - 305

Owner/operators of nuclear plants must be able to identify and assess susceptibilities to digital system failures and unintended behaviors that could lead to plant system malfunctions, including common-cause failures (CCFs) of multiple controlled components that may impact overall plant safety. Nuclear plant designers and regulators often assess and manage potential failure modes by assuming the failure occurs and showing by analysis that the results are acceptable. In 2016 EPRI published a guideline on Methods for Assuring Safety and Dependability when Applying Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems (EPRI 3002005326), which takes a more holistic approach that considers digital system failure modes from the perspective of their impact on plant risk and includes a graded approach based on safety significance. This paper describes that graded approach. The methodology in EPRI 3002005326 systematically identifies potential I and C vulnerabilities that could lead to significant malfunctions of controlled components and systems, including common-cause failures (CCF), and discusses in detail methods to protect against them. It considers both preventive measures that reduce the likelihood of failures, and plant systems and features that mitigate the effects of component failures and misbehaviors. Coping analysis is then performed as appropriate to provide additional assurance of protection. The safety significance based graded approach is an important feature in that it can help users focus attention on overall plant safety, including potentially risk-significant scenarios that might not be considered in traditional safety analyses. The purpose is to help the user ensure that modifications to the I and C that could potentially be safety significant are treated appropriately and at the same time not waste valuable resources on excessive protection against changes that have little or no impact on safety. The graded approach allows the design engineer to tailor the rigor of the preventive, limiting, and mitigative measures commensurately with the effects the I and C modification has on overall plant safety. The graded approach focuses on safety significance impact, which is effectively a qualitative measure of the potential change in safety (or risk) caused by a proposed I and C modification, as compared to the I and C that is being replaced. Safety significance impact should not be confused with importance to safety or risk significance. It is possible that an upgrade to safety-related and/or risk-significant I and C systems may have little or no safety significant impact and vice versa. The approach considers three factors that influence the impact on safety significance of a proposed I and C modification: context, likelihood of failure, and consequences of failure. The most significant of the three factors is context - what the I and C is connected to, both directly and indirectly, including its potential effects on plant systems that respond to transients or accidents. The graded approach is particularly helpful in assessing potential CCFs resulting from digital I and C failures, and shows why the most problematic CCFs will be those that can affect multiple plant systems. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A Multifunctional Coating for Autonomous Corrosion Control

Nearly all metals and their alloys are subject to corrosion that causes them to lose their structural integrity or other critical functionality. Protective coatings are the most commonly used method of corrosion control. However, progressively stricter environmental regulations have resulted in the ban of many commercially available corrosion protective coatings due to the harmful effects of their solvents or corrosion inhibitors. This work concerns the development of a multifunctional smart coating for the autonomous control of corrosion. This coating is being developed to have the inherent ability to detect the chemical changes associated with the onset of corrosion and respond autonomously to indicate it and control it. The multi-functionality of the coating is based on microencapsulation technology specifically designed for corrosion control applications. This design has, in addition to all the advantages of existing microcapsulation designs, the corrosion controlled release function that triggers the delivery of corrosion indicators and inhibitors on demand, only when and where needed. Microencapsulation of self-healing agents for autonomous repair of mechanical damage to the coating is also being pursued. Corrosion indicators, corrosion inhibitors, as well as self-healing agents, have been encapsulated and dispersed into several paint systems to test the corrosion detection, inhibition, and self-healing properties of the coating. Key words: Corrosion, coating, autonomous corrosion control, corrosion indication, corrosion inhibition, self-healing coating, smart coating, multifunctional coating, microencapsulation.

Calle, Luz M.↗

Mars vehicle TCS and aerobrake TPS

General design approach, some problems and technology needs for a Mars vehicle manned module Thermal Control System (TCS) and aerobrake Thermal Protection System (TPS) are discussed. The design approach of the TCS will be similar to that of the space station. Mars atmospheric dust storms are identified as an unknown that will impact the design of the Mars landing vehicle and base facility. New technology may be needed for thermal control surfaces to functionally survive the dust storms. The TPS for the Mars aerocapture vehicle will be subject to marginal stagnation heating rates for conjunction class missions and very high heating rates for opposition class missions. New technology TPS materials or an ablative heat shield will be required for the high stagnation heating rate trajectories. No significantly new technology is needed for the manned modules that do not descent to the Mars surface.

Comer, G.↗