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Preliminary Reporting of Thermophysical Property Measurements for the Ghareb Formation

Accurate knowledge of thermophysical properties of rock is vital to develop meaningful models of high level nuclear waste emplacement scenarios. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission is considering storing high level nuclear waste in the Ghareb formation, a porous kerogen bearing chalk. Sandia is supporting this effort with an evolving lab- based geomechanics testing program. We have completed measurements of thermal properties up to 275C and room temperature hydrostatic compaction measurements. We report thermal conductivity, thermal diffusivity, specific heat, and mass loss from our thermal measurements, and we report bulk moduli and porosity loss from our compaction measurements. These values are crucial for the numerical models to simulate heat transfer and formation compressibility around a heat generating repository.

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High-Burnup Demonstration: Thermal Modeling of TN-32B Vacuum Drying and ISFSI Transients

This report describes thermal modeling done for the High-Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project that is being performed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology research and development program. The purpose of this project is to investigate the performance of high-burnup spent nuclear fuel in dry storage. Part of this project is a demonstration test being performed with a storage module in the North Anna Nuclear Power Station’s Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The storage module selected for this demonstration is an Orano TN-32B High-Burnup cask which has been loaded with fuel assemblies from the North Anna spent fuel pool.

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Performance Assessment Program for the Savannah River Site Liquid Waste Facilities - 13610

The Liquid Waste facilities at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) are operated by Liquid Waste Operations contractor Savannah River Remediation LLC (SRR). A separate Performance Assessment (PA) is prepared to support disposal operations at the Saltstone Disposal Facility and closure evaluations for the two liquid waste tank farm facilities at SRS, F-Tank Farm and H-Tank Farm. A PA provides the technical basis and results to be used in subsequent documents to demonstrate compliance with the pertinent requirements identified in operations and closure regulatory guidance. The Saltstone Disposal Facility is subject to a State of South Carolina industrial solid waste landfill permit and the tank farms are subject to a state industrial waste water permit. The three Liquid Waste facilities are also subject to a Federal Facility Agreement approved by the State, DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Due to the regulatory structure, a PA is a key technical document reviewed by the DOE, the State of South Carolina and the EPA. As the waste material disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility and the residual material in the closed tank farms is also subject to reclassification prior to closure via a waste determination pursuant to Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is also a reviewing agency for the PAs. Pursuant to the Act, the NRC also has a continuing role to monitor disposal actions to assess compliance with stated performance objectives. The Liquid Waste PA program at SRS represents a continual process over the life of the disposal and closure operations. When the need for a PA or PA revision is identified, the first step is to develop a conceptual model to best represent the facility conditions. The conceptual model will include physical dimensions of the closed system, both the engineered and natural system, and modeling input parameters associated with the modeled features, both initial values (at the time of facility closure) and degradation rates/values. During the development of the PA, evaluations are conducted to reflect not only the results associated with the best available information at the time but also to evaluate potential uncertainties and sensitivities associated with the modeled system. While the PA will reflect the modeled system results from the best available information, it will also identify areas for future work to reduce overall PA uncertainties moving forward. DOE requires a PA Maintenance Program such that work continues to reduce model uncertainties, thus bolstering confidence in PA results that support regulatory decisions. This maintenance work may include new Research and Development activities or modeling as informed by previous PA results and other new information that becomes available. As new information becomes available, it is evaluated against previous PAs and appropriate actions are taken to ensure continued confidence in the regulatory decisions. Therefore, the PA program is a continual process that is not just the development of a PA but seeks to incorporate new information to reduce overall model uncertainty and provide continuing confidence in regulatory decisions. (author)

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Sociological survey in a municipality with a high level separate collection programme in an area of historic unpopularity

Highlights: • Behaviours, opinions and knowledge of citizens on MSW management were investigated. • The knowledge level was better than that of nearby university students and citizens. • The higher the education level, the greater the level of knowledge was. • The local authority showed a leading role in terms of waste management. • Trust is the key to any social program success including waste management programs. - Abstract: Behaviours, opinions and knowledge of citizens on MSW and separate collection were investigated in the city of Mercato San Severino (about 22,000 people), in the Campania region of Southern Italy that is an area suffering from a serious solid waste emergency that has lasted over 17 years due to the absence of treatment facilities. The image of heaps of rubbish in the streets of Naples and other nearby cities is only one side of the coin. Mercato San Severino has adopted an effective kerbside collection system since 2001 and a pay-as-you-throw program during 2005, guaranteeing more than the minimum level of recycling required by the Italian legislation. Structured questionnaires were administered to a sample of 500 people in 2010. Chi-square tests of independence were applied to state whether the differences were statistically significant (5%). About 90% of the sample stated that the success of the separate collection program was due to either the citizens and local authority or only the local authority, highlighting the leading role of the local authority and confirming that trust is the key to any social program success. The registered level of knowledge was better than that of nearby university students and citizens. The higher the education level, the greater the level of knowledge was.

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GrayQb TM Single-Faced Version 2 (SF2) Open Environment Test Report (Rev. 1)

This report details the design upgrades incorporated into the new version of the GrayQb TM SF2 device and the characterization testing of this upgraded device. Results from controlled characterization testing in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) R&D Engineering Imaging and Radiation Lab (IRL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS) Health Physics Instrument Calibration Laboratory (HPICL) is presented, as well as results from the open environment field testing performed in the E-Area Low Level Waste Storage Area. Resultant images presented in this report were generated using the SRNL developed Radiation Analyzer (RAzer TM ) software program which overlays the radiation contour images onto the visual image of the location being surveyed.

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Hanford Tank Waste Disposition Integrated Flowsheet: Corrosion Specification Development Final Report

The Savannah River National Laboratory has developed a corrosion model to facilitate implementation of Hanford’s Direct Feed Low Activity Waste flowsheet. The focus was specifically on secondary effluent waste stream compositions from the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant’s melter off-gas treatment system returned to the Hanford Tank Farms (return stream.) The return stream compositions were predicted to contain components at relative concentrations that are significantly more corrosive toward the carbon steel waste tanks, specifically halide and sulfate anions, than the current waste compositions in the tank farms. Electrochemical tests were performed, utilizing a statistically designed matrix, to determine the corrosion chemistry limits that will mitigate pitting in the return stream. The current corrosion chemistry specifications for the Hanford Tank Farms do not mitigate for the halide concentrations that will be expected in the return stream. The model requires a 10:1 nitrite to total halide ratio, for stream compositions at a minimum of pH 10 and a maximum temperature of 40°C. The final specification may use other corrosion data that is being generated for the DST chemistry control limits to delineate between the effect of fluoride and chloride. This test program has employed statistically designed test matrices and electrochemical test methods to validate the corrosion model specifically at boundary regions to optimize corrosion control specifications.

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Updated Stormwater Management Program Plan: For coverage under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System Permit for stormwater discharges within the Middle Rio Grande Watershed (v.3)

The SWMPP describes the best management practices (BMPs) employed at SNL, measurable goals, and anticipated implementation dates for compliance with the Permit requirements to ensure that stormwater discharges from the SNL MS4 do not contribute pollutants to Waters of the United States (WOTUS), namely the Tijeras Arroyo and the Rio Grande. The SWMPP is updated annually, and as necessary, to include new information and/or document the development, implementation and assessment of program elements, as required in Part III.B of the Permit. Version 3 of the SWMPP documents compliance activities and program elements developed and implemented between July 1, 2016 and June 30, 2017; it is required to be submitted on or before December 1, 2017.

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SLOPE STABILITY EVALUATION AND EQUIPMENT SETBACK DISTANCES FOR BURIAL GROUND EXCAVATIONS

After 1970 Transuranic (TRU) and suspect TRU waste was buried in the ground with the intention that at some later date the waste would be retrieved and processed into a configuration for long term storage. To retrieve this waste the soil must be removed (excavated). Sloping the bank of the excavation is the method used to keep the excavation from collapsing and to provide protection for workers retrieving the waste. The purpose of this paper is to document the minimum distance (setback) that equipment must stay from the edge of the excavation to maintain a stable slope. This evaluation examines the equipment setback distance by dividing the equipment into two categories, (1) equipment used for excavation and (2) equipment used for retrieval. The section on excavation equipment will also discuss techniques used for excavation including the process of benching. Calculations 122633-C-004, 'Slope Stability Analysis' (Attachment A), and 300013-C-001, 'Crane Stability Analysis' (Attachment B), have been prepared to support this evaluation. As shown in the calculations the soil has the following properties: Unit weight 110 pounds per cubic foot; and Friction Angle (natural angle of repose) 38{sup o} or 1.28 horizontal to 1 vertical. Setback distances are measured from the top edge of the slope to the wheels/tracks of the vehicles and heavy equipment being utilized. The computer program utilized in the calculation uses the center of the wheel or track load for the analysis and this difference is accounted for in this evaluation.

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PILOT-SCALE TEST RESULTS OF A THIN FILM EVAPORATOR SYSTEM FOR MANAGEMENT OF LIQUID HIGH-LEVEL WASTES AT THE HANFORD SITE WASHINGTON USA -11364

A modular, transportable evaporator system, using thin film evaporative technology, is planned for deployment at the Hanford radioactive waste storage tank complex. This technology, herein referred to as a wiped film evaporator (WFE), will be located at grade level above an underground storage tank to receive pumped liquids, concentrate the liquid stream from 1.1 specific gravity to approximately 1.4 and then return the concentrated solution back into the tank. Water is removed by evaporation at an internal heated drum surface exposed to high vacuum. The condensed water stream will be shipped to the site effluent treatment facility for final disposal. This operation provides significant risk mitigation to failure of the aging 242-A Evaporator facility; the only operating evaporative system at Hanford maximizing waste storage. This technology is being implemented through a development and deployment project by the tank farm operating contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), for the Office of River Protection/Department of Energy (ORPIDOE), through Columbia Energy and Environmental Services, Inc. (Columbia Energy). The project will finalize technology maturity and install a system at one of the double-shell tank farms. This paper summarizes results of a pilot-scale test program conducted during calendar year 2010 as part of the ongoing technology maturation development scope for the WFE.

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Repository Performance Confirmation - 12119

Repository performance confirmation links the technical bases of repository science and societal acceptance. Among the countless aspects of monitoring, performance confirmation holds a special place, involving distinct activities combining technical and social significance in radioactive waste management. Discussion is divided into four themes: 1. A distinction is drawn between performance confirmation monitoring and other testing and monitoring objectives, 2. A case study illustrates confirmation activities integrated within a long-term testing and monitoring strategy for Yucca Mountain, 3. A case study reviews compliance monitoring developed and implemented for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, and 4. An approach for developing, evaluating and implementing the next generation of performance confirmation monitoring is presented. International interest in repository monitoring is exhibited by the European Commission Seventh Framework Programme 'Monitoring Developments for Safe Repository Operation and Staged Closure' (MoDeRn) Project. The MoDeRn partners are considering the role of monitoring in a phased approach to the geological disposal of radioactive waste. As repository plans advance in different countries, the need to consider monitoring strategies within a controlled framework has become more apparent. The MoDeRn project pulls together technical and societal experts to assimilate a common understanding of a process that could be followed to develop a monitoring program. Experience from two repository programs in the United States sheds light on how performance confirmation has been executed. Lessons learned can help the next generation of performance confirmation. (author)

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Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.6.

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Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.4.

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SCALE Validation Experience Using an Expanded Isotopic Assay Database for Spent Nuclear Fuel

The availability of measured isotopic assay data to validate computer code predictions of spent fuel compositions applied in burnup-credit criticality calculations is an essential component for bias and uncertainty determination in safety and licensing analyses. In recent years, as many countries move closer to implementing or expanding the use of burnup credit in criticality safety for licensing, there has been growing interest in acquiring additional high-quality assay data. The well-known open sources of assay data are viewed as potentially limiting for validating depletion calculations for burnup credit due to the relatively small number of isotopes measured (primarily actinides with relatively few fission products), sometimes large measurement uncertainties, incomplete documentation, and the limited burnup and enrichment range of the fuel samples. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) recently initiated an extensive isotopic validation study that includes most of the public data archived in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) electronic database, SFCOMPO, and new datasets obtained through participation in commercial experimental programs. To date, ORNL has analyzed approximately 120 different spent fuel samples from pressurized-water reactors that span a wide enrichment and burnup range and represent a broad class of assembly designs. The validation studies, completed using SCALE 5.1, are being used to support a technical basis for expanded implementation of burnup credit for spent fuel storage facilities, and other spent fuel analyses including radiation source term, dose assessment, decay heat, and waste repository safety analyses. This paper summarizes the isotopic assay data selected for this study, presents validation results obtained with SCALE 5.1, and discusses some of the challenges and experience associated with evaluating the results. Preliminary results obtained using SCALE 6 and ENDF/B-VII cross sections libraries are also briefly summarized. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been performing spent-fuel isotopic validation studies using the depletion analysis methods in the SCALE [1] code system for the past 20 years. These studies involve comparisons of calculated inventories against measured isotopic composition data obtained from destructive radiochemical analysis of commercial spent nuclear fuel samples. The results of these benchmark studies are used to quantify the bias and uncertainties associated with isotopic calculations and ultimately determine appropriate margins for uncertainty that can be applied in safety-related analyses such as burnup credit in criticality calculations, decay heat analysis, and source terms. Previous studies using several versions of SCALE and nuclear data libraries have been published in multiple validation reports [2-6] that evaluate selected experimental data obtained largely from public sources. A study was recently initiated at ORNL with the objectives of updating and expanding the validation calculations using a comprehensive database of experimental isotopic assay data that includes isotopic composition data obtained from both publicly available sources and international commercial programs. As part of the study, an extensive isotopic database of nearly 120 measured spent fuel samples with an expanded range of initial enrichments and burnup values compared to previously analyzed data was reviewed and analyzed. The calculations were performed using two-dimensional (2-D) assembly models and a consistent set of modeling assumptions using the SCALE 5.1 code system and ENDF/B-V 44-group cross section library. As part of the current study, detailed benchmark modeling information and measurement data are being documented in a format that is readily usable for validating depletion and decay codes. The work is being extended to include analysis results using SCALE 6 and the ENDF/B-VII 238-group cross section library. This paper describes the isotopic composition data evaluated in this study and highlights the preliminary findings to date.

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There is Nothing Here for You: Passive Institutional Controls and Preemptive Resource Exploitation - 16197

The Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is required by Title 40 CFR Part 191.14(c) and Title 40 CFR Part 194.43 to develop a Passive Institutional Controls (PICs) program to prevent the likelihood for future human intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The purpose of this paper is to explore how the exploitation of resources under nuclear waste repositories as a part of PICs could reduce the risk of future human intrusion. The WIPP, located in the northern Permian Basin near Carlsbad, New Mexico, is a geologic repository for the permanent isolation of defense-related transuranic waste. In 1995, a series of geophysical surveys by the New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources estimated the total hydrocarbon reserves underneath the WIPP, which included a 16-section area plus a one mile buffer. Since that time the Delaware Basin well database has been maintained to closely monitor hydrocarbon extraction activities. The database was used in compiling relevant oil and gas extraction data retrieved from The New Mexico Oil Conservation Division. The volume of hydrocarbons extracted from 1995 to the present suggests that if current extraction growth trends continue (as historic market and production data indicate they will), all known crude oil reserves under the WIPP, obtainable through current extraction technology, will be depleted within approximately 10 years, i.e., by 2026. This is well before the anticipated WIPP closure and start of the Active Institutional Controls (AICs) program called for in 40 CFR Part 194.41(b). In addition, gas resources, although more difficult to forecast, are not expected to last beyond 2137. Title 40 CFR 194.33 states, 'Inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for resources... is the most severe human intrusion scenario'. This human intrusion scenario is the feature, event, and process (FEP) that performance assessment (PA) has identified as having the most significant impact on radionuclide releases during the 10,000 year regulatory period for the WIPP. Title 40 CFR 194.43 requires a PICs program which contains '... [records] in the international archives that would likely be consulted by individuals in search of unexploited resources'. Due to political, social, and economic motivators for resource exploration and exploitation, the potential future absence of hydrocarbon resources under the WIPP is important in deterring possible human intrusion. To minimize the risk of future human intrusion, it may be necessary to consider actively removing as many of the exploitable hydrocarbon resources under and around a nuclear waste repository as is practicable before the end of the period of AICs (i.e., 100 years after closure of the repository). Additionally, communicating the absence of hydrocarbon resources under a nuclear repository should take a prominent role in any PICs program. Due to its high-cost nature, exploratory drilling of any kind currently involves cost/benefit analysis. If in the future the economic realities of resource exploration remain similar to today, and future oil companies know the resources for a particular area have already been heavily exploited, hypothetically, they would become less motivated to drill in that area. They would instead opt to explore an area with better prospects. It is important then that the remaining hydrocarbon reserves be clearly stated and prominently displayed. In essence we should communicate the message, loud and clear, 'There is nothing here for you'. (authors)

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Status Update on IAEA MODARIA II Working Group 1 (Assessment and Decision Making) - 19391

During WM2018, the work being done under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Programme (https://wwwns.iaea.org/projects/modaria/modaria2.asp?s=8 and l=129) was introduced. The Programme comprises seven working groups covering a wide range of topics. Amongst them, Working Group 1 (WG1) is focused on dose assessment and decision aiding tools to address existing exposure situations due to past practices involving naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and nuclear legacy sites. Specifically, this covers the development of methods and toolsets for risk-informed decision-making for such complex sites, and includes practical demonstration of decision-making processes and tools through case studies. During 2018 WG1 participants met twice to discuss the status and plans of work being conducted by the WG. The group held its Second Interim Meeting from 7 to 11 May 2018 at the Jozef Stefan Institute (JSI) in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The objectives of the meeting were to: (1) Discuss the status of WG1 work; (2) Start preparation of the interim draft version of the MODARIA II WG1 Report (herein referred to as the 'Interim Report'); (3) Review the progress of planned data analyses, model-model comparisons, and model-data comparisons being conducted through case studies for the Tessenderlo Chemie Site in Belgium, the Zapadnoe Uranium Mill Tailings Site in Ukraine, and a Former Tin Processing Facility Site in Brazil; (4) Discuss calculations conducted for a NORM Site in China for potential addition to the WG1 case studies; (5) Report on progress on topical studies and other assignments performed to support the preparation of several sections of the Interim Report; and (6) Discuss plans for incorporating some preliminary case studies considered by MODARIA I WG1 and MODARIA I WG3. During the meeting in Slovenia, WG1 participants also visited the Zirovski vrh (RZV) Uranium Mine and Mill Tailings Site near Ljubljana. From 22 to 25 October 2018, WG1 members also participated in the MODARIA II Third Technical Meeting in Vienna, Austria. The meeting facilitated analysis of the progress made so far by the seven working groups, as well as exploration of the dissemination of the results of the MODARIA II Programme through publication in scientific journals dealing with the various subject areas covered by the Programme. WG1 participants focused on the preparation of its Interim Report, and engaged in technical exchanges with the IAEA Le Trench Project on characterization, assessment, remediation and management of buried waste at legacy trench sites, as well as the To Enhance uncertainties Reduction and stakeholders Involvement Towards integrated and graded Risk management of humans and wildlife In long-lasting radiological Exposure Situations (TERRITORIES) project (https://territories.eu/). Currently, WG1 is in the process of preparing a draft report to document the results of its various case studies and special topics, and is preparing for the final Interim Meeting in May 2019 and the final Technical Meeting in October 2019, before the conclusion of the MODARIA II Program at the end of 2019. This paper will provide a status update of these activities, along with preliminary information on the WG1 report, including potential recommendations for future activities. (authors)

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Surveillance Report on SAVY 4000 and Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers for Fiscal Year 2018

A Surveillance Program is in place to assess how nuclear material storage containers at LANL are aging in-service. This program is guided by the LANL Surveillance Plan [1] which is required by DOE M441.1-1 requirements, and is modified as necessary to ensure that any issues identified during surveillance or laboratory studies are examined in future surveillances, and that any lifetime implications are taken into account. Under the plan, overall container integrity is evaluated (visual inspections and photographs), and helium leakage rate, O-ring durometer and compression set, and filter performance are measured. The containers for surveillance are chosen annually based on the previous surveillance program results and observations. The surveillance plan targets items believed to provide the greatest challenge to the SAVY-4000 container integrity.

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Nye County Nevada Perspectives on the State of the Yucca Mountain Project - 12388

Responding to the Department of Energy decision to try to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application and the Administration actions to close down the Yucca Mountain project, Nye County undertook a number of activities to articulate its support for continuing the Yucca Mountain project. The activities included responding to inquiries from federal agencies, including investigations undertaken by the Government Accountability Office addressing other potential uses for the Yucca Mountain site, responding to a Draft Environmental Impact Statement on the possible use of Yucca Mountain for disposal of Greater than Class C wastes, testifying in hearings, and interacting with the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. The paper summarizes Nye County's position on the Yucca Mountain repository, Nye County's perspectives on the various activities that were developed and considered by the Government Accountability Office, Nye County's concerns with the use of the Nevada National Security Site for Disposal of Greater than Class C Low-Level Radioactive Wastes, testimony of Nye County officials expressing local community support for the Yucca Mountain project, and Nye County's perspectives on recommendations provided by the Blue Ribbon Commission to move the nation's high-level radioactive waste disposal programs forward without consideration of the role Yucca Mountain could have served in those recommendations. Nye County believes that every effort should be made to, at a minimum, fund the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to complete the license application review. Then, if Congress does decide to change the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be valuable information available to support new policy development. This administration contends that Congressional language associated with the FY2010 and FY2011 appropriations and authorization process is sufficient evidence of its intent to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program. The appropriation process needs to be explicit that, absent explicit language to the contrary, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act stands. It also should include language that requires the Department of Energy to preserve all necessary records until the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is amended or rescinded by specific Congressional action. (authors)

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French Innovative Thermal Treatment Processes for The Management Radioactive Organic Liquid Waste - 19017

The nuclear industry as well as hospitals or some research laboratories produce Radioactive Organic Liquid Waste (ROLW) such as scintillation cocktails for medical imaging, labeled molecules for medical research or liquids from former activities. In order to be compatible with disposal facilities requirements, this waste must be inerted and stabilized in solid matrix. The route generally used is incineration in the Centraco facilities at the Marcoule site (Gard, France), ashes produced being cemented downstream. However, liquids whose chemical or radiological characteristics are not compatible with the incinerator operating rules (high level of {sup 14}C or halogen content, corrosive gas production etc.) cannot follow this path. The purpose of the MILOR project is then to propose alternative paths to treat all kinds of ROLW. Initiated in September 2017, this project has the technical objective of developing, over a four-year period, two pilot-scale mineralization processes. Two variants of complementary plasma technologies are evaluated: aerial plasma with the 'IDOHL' process and submerged plasma with the 'ELIPSE' process. Compared with other methods, thermal plasmas have unique characteristics such as rapid decomposition with high throughput, fast startup and shutdown, and high-energy delivery. The process called IDOHL consists of a process involving an induction plasma in which the liquids are directly introduced. It has been designed for organic liquids without mineral load and for treatment rates less than 0.5 l/h. This type of plasma allows the destruction of liquid organohalogens without any prior evaporation or treatment. Specific gas treatment systems have been developed to direct the gas produced to a dry or wet gas treatment system. One aim of the project is to subsequently install the process in a radioactive zone at Saclay DRF. The second called ELIPSE consists of a breakthrough process involving a submerged plasma at the heart of which organic liquids are also introduced. Current research has demonstrated that such a technique may enable the instantaneous and complete destruction of liquids with a wide variety of constituents, such as chlorine, fluorine, or phosphorus. The submersion solution offers many advantages: quenching and cleaning of combustion gases; filtering of the particles they contain; and cooling maintained for the entire process, which guarantees excellent corrosion control. An advantage of this type of design is that the gas treatment system can be reduced to a demister-condenser followed by a simple safety filter, thereby offering the additional advantage of an extremely compact treatment system. This design also allows the ELIPSE process to become by this way an embeddable process if required. The MILOR project, financed by the French State through investment program is a tripartite project bringing together Andra, in charge of radioactive waste management, the CEA in charge of leading scientific and technological researches to propose effective ways of treatment and the company A3i whose role is to ensure the subsequent industrial development. (authors)

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