A Powerless Acoustic Sensor System (PASS) for Remote and Long-Term Monitoring of Conditions of Used Nuclear Fuel inside Dry-Storage Casks (Final Report)
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A team of scientists from the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, has assembled a remote-controlled robot to field a few sodium iodide scintillators of different size and shape 18″ above ground for measurement of ground deposition of gamma-emitting particles after an explosion of a radiological dispersal device. This system uses a high-precision differential GPS device with submeter accuracy for radiation mapping. The system is most useful in characterizing large-area contamination and detecting gamma radioactivity in invisible, submicron particulate debris deposited on the ground at surface level or embedded in subsurface up to 3″ deep. The system was assembled as part of a larger effort to integrate advanced radiological detection devices into autonomous or remote-controlled robotic systems to eliminate or minimize the need for emergency responders to enter areas that pose significant health and safety risks to humans following a major radiological incident or accident. Research into autonomous algorithms is required to develop automated robotic systems for radiological survey and characterization activities in highly contaminated areas. The scope of this project also includes developing communications pathways and supporting infrastructure capabilities for different types of robotic technologies. The expected result is an advanced autonomous robotic system with integrated radiation detection electronics that allows emergency response personnel to view data remotely and in real time for radiological emergency response and consequence management purposes.
Significant cleanup has been accomplished on the Oak Ridge (OR) site since it was placed on the National Priorities List (NPL) in 1989, and a final evaluation of Zone 1 at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1988 (CERCLA) has been initiated. The Oak Ridge Environmental Information System (OREIS) is the database for storing OR site environmental characterization and monitoring data. Consideration of a final decision under CERCLA prompted several enhancements to OREIS that were designed to provide future users a clear picture of remediation progression across the OR site. The enhancements to OREIS are ongoing and fall into four categories: Geographic Information System Interface; Document Association; Remediation Status; Geo-spatial Data (authors)
At the United States Army's test sites, fired penetrators made of Depleted Uranium (DU) have been buried under ground and become hazardous waste. Previously, we developed techniques for detecting buried radioactive targets. We also developed approaches for locating buried paramagnetic metal objects by utilizing the electromagnetic induction (EMI) sensor data. In this paper, we apply data fusion techniques to combine results from both the radiation detection and the EMI detection, so that we can further distinguish among DU penetrators, DU oxide, and non- DU metal debris. We develop a two-step fusion approach for the task, and test it with survey data collected on simulation targets. In this work, we explored radiation and EMI data fusion for detecting DU, oxides, and non-DU metals. We developed a two-step fusion approach based on majority voting and a set of decision rules. With this approach, we fuse results from radiation detection based on the RX algorithm and EMI detection based on a 3-step analysis. Our fusion approach has been tested successfully with data collected on simulation targets. In the future, we will need to further verify the effectiveness of this fusion approach with field data. (authors)
In December 2013, Cabrera Services (Cabrera) executed transition of the FUSRAP Maywood Superfund Site remediation project operations, including an on-site accredited environmental lab, from a large business that had established technology infrastructure in place for over a decade which required updating to support the expected remediation scope and client needs. As of November 2015, Cabrera has shipped over 116,000 yd{sup 3} of contaminated soil to disposal facilities. During the transition, the USACE FUSRAP Maywood Laboratory (UFML) continued to support project operations, providing the expected timely and reliable results and maintaining their New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection certification for all parameters of concern, while having to cope with new challenges and additional tasks having the potential to disrupt the laboratory's ability to support project operations. This case study examines the challenges with maintaining a certified radiochemistry laboratory and an aggressive remediation schedule during a period of prime contractor transition which included a complete IT infrastructure overhaul, and conversion of the existing Microsoft Access laboratory database and project Electronic Data Management System (EDMS) to a customized commercial solution. Challenges: I. Procurement of a new database subcontractor and working closely with them to achieve the following: a. Migration of all environmental (including radiological, chemical, and quality control), health and safety, and spatial data as well as reports, queries, and analytical instrument software processes from a MS Access data management system to a SQL server system; and b. Verification that the functionality and data integrity of the databases remained intact. II. The onsite laboratory was changed over to a new onsite network and the following tasks were completed with little or no interruption to site operations by January 10, 2014: i. Installation of new instrument personal computers (PCs) and making them fully operational; ii. Configuration of the lab domain and server to host the LIMS (replaced all servers/domain/workstations with Windows 7 and Server 2012 machines). iii. Networking of the laboratory building into the rest of the project site via fiber optic cabling across the site. iv. Upgrade of the wide area network (WAN) data connection to high-speed Fiber Optic service; v. Upgrade of the telephones into voice over internet protocol (VOIP) phones. vi. Splitting of the database into front ends and a centralized back-end hosted on the new server to allow simultaneous access for fixes and improvements. III. Phone service interruption; phone systems were operational by January 10, 2014. Additional Tasks: I. Revision of the USACE FUSRAP Maywood Laboratory (UFML) Quality Systems Manual Rev. 1 Submitted 01/16/14; II. Writing of the Uniform Federal Policy Quality Assurance Project Plan Rev. 1 (UFP-QAPP) submitted 1/21/14. This document replaced the prior project data quality plan, the Chemical Data Quality Management Plan. III. Support of USACE communications to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) on lab management and personnel transition to Cabrera. This work was important since it ensured a smooth transition and shows how critical project records infrastructure such as databases, can be upgraded with minimal interruption of project support. Such work may provide benefit to other similar projects, especially long term projects where database infrastructure upgrades may be beneficial in terms of improved efficiencies in data recording and transfer, and improved security in data storage. (authors)
It is demanded to find key issues and critical paths for verifying and monitoring a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage with a purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapon. However, unfortunately there are no reliable methods to verify the containment in a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage. Therefore, research and development (R and D) has been continuously required to develop new and alternative technologies for searching and verifying undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and facilities. Therefore, the present authors have developed a new safeguards technique of passively scanning a spent fuel cask or storage using pressurized He-4 scintillation neutron detectors. A new approach is to quickly verify content in a spent nuclear fuel cask or presence of all special nuclear materials in unknown packages by comparing experimental and computational results. For that, the present authors have developed a new algorithm and user-interface coupled ORIGEN-ARP and MCNP codes, and the prototype safeguards apparatus employing the array of He-4 fast neutron detectors has been designed, built, and tested. The feasibility test of this new apparatus has been performed with Cf-252 neutron sources and the laboratory scale model cask, minimized by a factor of ten compared to the actual dimension of a KN-21 cask. This technique has several advantages over current methods based on neutron and gamma detection; (1) incident neutron energy information is preserved, (2) disturbance of gamma-ray is excellently rejected (discriminated), and (3) much higher neutron counts and operational cost and space-effectiveness are expected since no moderator is required for fast neutrons. The final goal of this study will (1) conduct a prototype instrument and employ it to monitor a nuclear spent fuel cask or storage at a commercial nuclear power reactor facilities, (2) use spectral-specific measurement data to show proof of concept for measurable data successfully converted to quantifiable signatures, such as diversion/removal of fuel, and maintenance of fuel and cask integrity of fuel, and (3) develop a cask imaging capability. (authors)
The U.S. Department of Energy Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Calendar 2023 presents the results of analyses of occupational radiation exposures at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) operations, during calendar year 2023. This report includes occupational radiation exposure data for over 80,000 DOE Federal employees, contractors, and subcontractors as well as members of the public who have worked in or entered controlled areas monitored for exposure to radiation. DOE publishes this annual report to provide DOE Management, Program Offices, workers, health physicists, and other stakeholders an evaluation of DOE-wide performance regarding compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection (10 CFR 835) radiation exposure limits and adherence to as low as reasonably achievable principles. This report provides a discussion regarding radiation protection and exposure reporting requirements. It also includes calendar year (CY) 2023 information and analyses regarding aggregate, individual, site, DOE Program, transient individuals’ dose, as well as a historical review of DOE exposure data. DOE continues to be diligent in protecting its workers and the public from exposure to radiation from DOE operations as illustrated by the results contained in this report.
Many radioactive materials within the nuclear fuel cycle present a significant hazard. Such materials include spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, legacy waste and other nuclear materials that have no current outlet than storage. These materials are often held in long-term storage as an interim stage within their lifecycle. Lifecycles can include reuse or disposal. Safety and security of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) interim storage installations are very important, due to a great concentration of fission products, actinides and activation products. Stress corrosion cracking of interim storage containers has been identified as a high priority data gap by the Department of Energy. However, little has been done with regards to the canister weld material properties and their impact on stress corrosion, until recently from Sandia National Laboratory canister mockup program. Furthermore, because no post-weld heat treatment was required, the associated high tensile residual stress within these canister welds can drive the initiation and growth of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) cracks. In this work, we carried out in-situ neutron residual stress mapping on a weld plate sectioned from Sandia mock-up canister wall. Significant residual stress profiles were identified from the received longitudinal weld sample. The details of the weldment residual stress program development at ORNL are presented in this progress report. The generated residual stress profile from neutron diffraction technique is similar to that of Sandia residual stress data obtained from the deep hole drilling approach.
As part of decommissioning a former nuclear fuel manufacturing site, one of the crucial final steps is to conduct Final Status Surveys (FSS) in order to demonstrate compliance with the release criteria. At this decommissioning site, the area for FSS was about 100 hectares (248 acres) and included varying terrain, wooded areas, ponds, excavations, buildings and a brook. The challenges in performing the FSS included determining location, identifying FSS units, logging gamma walkover survey data, determining sample locations, managing water in excavations, and diverting water in the brook. The approaches taken to overcome these challenges will be presented in the paper. The paper will present and discuss lessons learned that will aid others in the FSS process. (authors)
Development of a standardized canister system represents an opportunity to develop an integrated approach to addressing storage, transportation, and disposal issues in the waste management system. However, regardless of timing and method, deployment of such a system would have the potential to cause significant system-wide impacts. This evaluation expands upon previous standardized-canister system evaluations and compares continued loading of dual-purpose canisters (i.e., the status quo) with loading of standardized canister systems in the near term, that is, before repository requirements are known and/or before operating reactors shut down. This evaluation quantitatively compares order-of-magnitude costs and logistics for different standardization scenarios with those of status quo scenarios, provides insight into quantifiable impacts of loading standardized canister systems in the near term, tests system-level analysis tools and associated input, and identifies scenarios for further analysis. This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract (10 CFR Part 961). As work on assessing standardized canister system scenarios has progressed, new data for at-reactor and interim storage facility (ISF) operations have been collected and/or generated to provide more realism at the system level, and past scenarios were re-evaluated with this new information. In addition, new scenarios were developed and analyzed that focused on (1) bare fuel transported from reactors to an ISF in re-usable bare fuel casks and deferring deployment of a standardized canister system to the ISF, (2) alternative acceptance strategies based on conclusions from previous systems architecture studies, and (3) the impacts of having to accommodate spent fuel in differently sized canisters for different potential repository geologies. Results of this evaluation indicate that shifting the loading of standardized canisters from the reactor to the ISF does not result in a significant change in total system cost. Results also show that some alternative acceptance strategies could reduce the number of years that spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stays on-site at reactors for cases involving standardized canisters (consistent with previous results that looked at dual-purpose canisters). Finally, incorporating the new at-reactor loading data of small standardized canisters shows a significant system-wide cost reduction when compared to previous estimates of at-reactor loading of small canisters. (authors)
A complex structural analysis of nuclear export protein NS2 (NEP) of influenza virus A has been performed using bioinformatics predictive methods and small-angle X-ray scattering data. The behavior of NEP molecules in a solution (their aggregation, oligomerization, and dissociation, depending on the buffer composition) has been investigated. It was shown that stable associates are formed even in a conventional aqueous salt solution at physiological рН value. For the first time we have managed to get NEP dimers in solution, to analyze their structure, and to compare the models obtained using the method of the molecular tectonics with the spatial protein structure predicted by us using the bioinformatics methods. The results of the study provide a new insight into the structural features of nuclear export protein NS2 (NEP) of the influenza virus A, which is very important for viral infection development.
Model Evaluation Well ER-5-5 was drilled for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office in support of Nevada Environmental Management Operations at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly known as the Nevada Test Site). The well was drilled in July and August 2012 as part of a model evaluation well program in the Frenchman Flat area of Nye County, Nevada. The primary purpose of the well was to provide detailed geologic, hydrogeologic, chemical, and radiological data that can be used to test and build confidence in the applicability of the Frenchman Flat Corrective Action Unit flow and transport models for their intended purpose. In particular, this well was designed to obtain data to evaluate the uncertainty in model forecasts of contaminant migration from the upgradient underground nuclear test MILK SHAKE, conducted in Emplacement Hole U-5k in 1968, which were considered to be uncertain due to the unknown extent of a basalt lava-flow aquifer present in this area. Well ER-5-5 is expected to provide information to refine the Phase II Frenchman Flat hydrostratigraphic framework model, if necessary, as well as to support future groundwater flow and transport modeling. The 31.1-centimeter (cm) diameter hole was drilled to a total depth of 331.3 meters (m). The completion string, set at the depth of 317.2 m, consists of 16.8-cm stainless-steel casing hanging from 19.4-cm carbon-steel casing. The 16.8-cm stainless-steel casing has one slotted interval open to the basalt lava-flow aquifer and limited intervals of the overlying and underlying alluvial aquifer. A piezometer string was also installed in the annulus between the completion string and the borehole wall. The piezometer is composed of 7.3-cm stainless-steel tubing suspended from 6.0-cm carbon-steel tubing. The piezometer string was landed at 319.2 m, to monitor the basalt lava-flow aquifer. Data collected during and shortly after hole construction include composite drill cuttings samples collected every 3.0 m, various geophysical logs, preliminary water quality measurements, and water-level measurements. The well penetrated 331.3 m of Quaternary–Tertiary alluvium, including an intercalated layer of saturated basalt lava rubble. No well development or hydrologic testing was conducted in this well immediately after completion; however, a preliminary water level was measured in the piezometer string at the depth of 283.4 m on September 25, 2012. No tritium above the minimum detection limit of the field instruments was detected in this hole. Future well development, sampling, and hydrologic testing planned for this well will provide more accurate hydrologic information for this site. The stratigraphy, general lithology, and water level were as expected, though the expected basalt lava-flow aquifer is basalt rubble and not the dense, fractured lava as modeled. The lack of tritium transport is likely due to the difference in hydraulic properties of the basalt lava-flow rubble encountered in the well, compared to those of the fractured aquifer used in the flow and transport models.
The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a comprehensive bicoastal radiological and nuclear emergency response to United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. A major part of the support is to provide systematic radiological search for lost or stolen sources, Radiological search is a core competency of the NNSS with its origin dating back to nuclear weapons test era. Search operations from multiple platforms is the common thread among the various NNSS assets, which include Aerial Measuring System (AMS), Maritime Support Team (MST), National Capitol Response (NCR), National Search Team (NST) and Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). Information collected and analyzed during search operations add to the actionable intelligence for the law enforcement agencies and provide valuable guidance for the tactical resolution of a nuclear or radiological crisis. Search is an intelligence and situational awareness driven operation and most often called upon during a radiological emergency, however it can be brought into play to thwart a potential threat by providing monitoring and surveillance support. The Office of Nuclear Incident Response (NA-84) serves as the technical leader in responding to and resolving nuclear and radiological threats worldwide and integrates its efforts with other NNSA stakeholders (e.g., NNSA office of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation NA-22). The response includes expertise in the areas of radiological search, render safe, and consequence management. This article will discuss the methodologies, tools, procedures, and techniques to extract maximum radiological characterization information (isotopic composition, activities for individual isotopes, threat assessment etc.) from field monitoring or Search operation data.
In 2014, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology Innovation initiated the Nuclear Energy (NE)–Infrastructure Management Project by tasking the Nuclear Science User Facilities, formerly the Advanced Test Reactor National Scientific User Facility, to create a searchable and interactive database of all pertinent NE-supported and -related infrastructure. This database, known as the Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Database (NEID), is used for analyses to establish needs, redundancies, efficiencies, distributions, etc., to best understand the utility of NE’s infrastructure and inform the content of infrastructure calls. The Nuclear Science User Facilities developed the database by utilizing data and policy direction from a variety of reports from the U.S. Department of Energy, the National Research Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and various other federal and civilian resources. The NEID currently contains data on 802 research and development instruments housed in 377 facilities at 84 institutions in the United States and abroad. The effort to maintain and expand the database is ongoing. Detailed information on many facilities must be gathered from associated institutions and added to complete the database. The data must be validated and kept current to capture facility and instrumentation status as well as to cover new acquisitions and retirements. This document provides a short tutorial on the navigation of the NEID web portal at NSUF-Infrastructure.INL.gov.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) have developed sorption database named as L-SCIE (LLNL Surface Complexation/Ion Exchange). This framework (L-SCIE) includes not only a community database of sorption data but also a fitting workflow to produce optimized surface complexation reaction constants. Through this fellowship program we have updated the L-SCIE database for selenium (Se) sorption and potentiometric titration data of iron oxides. In addition, the relevant surface complexation models (SCMs) have been updated and details in model construction are given in the following section.
About 50 million gallons of high-level mixed waste is currently stored in underground tanks at The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site in the State of Washington. The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will provide DOE’s Office of River Protection (ORP) with a means of treating this waste by vitrification for subsequent disposal. The tank waste will be separated into low- and high-activity waste fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High Level Waste (IHLW) products. The ILAW product will be disposed in an engineered facility – the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) – on the Hanford site, while the IHLW product is designed for deep geological disposal in a national facility for high level nuclear waste. The ILAW and IHLW products must meet a variety of requirements with respect to protection of the environment before they can be accepted for disposal. The objective of the work described in this report is to perform testing, data collection, and analyses for the ILAW glass product for subsequent use in the performance assessment (PA) of the IDF to assess potential environmental risks associated with long-term storage.
SAND2021-15055 O Limbo provides a programmatic interface for accessing computer vision training data. It is organized in the Limbo format. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.
SAND2021-15065 O This release contains Python code for two distribution system model calibration algorithms as well as some sample data and documentation for the algorithms and code. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.