Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Nuclear”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,009 records · Page 56
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2013

The Regulatory Challenges of Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants in Korea - 13101

As of 2012, 23 units of nuclear power plants are in operation, but there is no experience of permanent shutdown and decommissioning of nuclear power plant in Korea. It is realized that, since late 1990's, improvement of the regulatory framework for decommissioning has been emphasized constantly from the point of view of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s safety standards. And it is known that now IAEA prepare the safety requirement on decommissioning of facilities, its title is the Safe Decommissioning of Facilities, General Safety Requirement Part 6. According to the result of IAEA's Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Korea in 2011, it was recommended that the regulatory framework for decommissioning should require decommissioning plans for nuclear installations to be constructed and operated and these plans should be updated periodically. In addition, after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in March of 2011, preparedness for early decommissioning caused by an unexpected severe accident became also important issues and concerns. In this respect, it is acknowledged that the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Korea need to be improved. First of all, we identify the current status and relevant issues of regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear power plants compared to the IAEA's safety standards in order to achieve our goal. And then the plan is to be established for improvement of regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear power plants in Korea. After dealing with it, it is expected that the revised regulatory framework for decommissioning could enhance the safety regime on the decommissioning of nuclear power plants in Korea in light of international standards. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Implementation of Arizona's nuclear future 153192.doc10 - 15319

The Arizona Energy Education Fund (AEEF), now a 501(c) (3) non-profit entity, is an assembly of stakeholders from the private sector, government, education and energy industries dedicated to supporting K-12 (kindergarten through 12. grade), community colleges and universities through an enhanced program of smart nuclear generator expansion, isotope production, testing of breeder reactor power plants, recycling spent nuclear fuel in power generation facilities, and nuclear fuel cycle support. AEEF priorities are to collaborate with stakeholders in Arizona to develop safe plans that will make Arizona the most nuclear friendly state benefiting all stakeholders. Long-term plans include promoting: - education of K-12 students as well as the general Arizona population so that they fully understand the benefits and safe use of nuclear power; - reliable supply of medical and industrial radioisotopes; - Arizona as host of new reactor concepts which are being developed and demonstrated; - development of nuclear engineering programs in Arizona universities to drive the development of the next generation of nuclear power plants; and - supply of nuclear-generated electricity to California and Sonora, Mexico to power desalinisation plants in exchange for Colorado River water currently allocated to California and Sonora. The development described will generate significant long-term employment for Arizona while delivering a critical service to the nation. Arizona's location advantages include the lack of significant seismic activity, hurricanes, tsunamis, floods or frigid weather. Interstate highways and railroads are well developed and provide good, all-weather access to many potential development sites. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Integrated Modeling and Monitoring Technologies for Environmental Resiliency in Nuclear Energy

Environmental concerns pose the biggest challenge for the development of the nuclear energy industry, often preventing or limiting the construction of new plants and radioactive waste disposal facilities. There are currently numerous sites in the world at which surface and groundwater are contaminated by nuclear weapon production and testing, as well as due to nuclear power plant accidents. Many of those sites remain unused or inhabited primarily due to public concern. Improving scientific and technical capabilities to develop environmental resiliency is critical not only to address existing contamination, but also to build public confidence and support for nuclear energy. One of the obstacles in remediation is to tackle a large volume of contaminated soil and groundwater with relatively low concentrations. Although many contaminant removal technologies have developed (e.g., pump-and-treat systems), they are often expensive and not cost-effective for low-concentration radionuclide contamination. Although soil removal is often the most effective, it produces a large amount of waste that has to be stored securely for a long period of time or treated at the special treatment facilities. Transporting a large amount of waste may also produce greenhouse gases and disrupt local communities. Recently, the concept of 'sustainable remediation' has been proposed to improve a remediation system as a whole, including the consideration of cost effectiveness, reduction of greenhouse emission, waste production and energy usage. Rather than just focusing on removing contaminants, the sustainable remediation highlights the use of passive remediation technologies to immobilize radionuclides along with the application of monitored natural attenuation and longer institutional control. However, such passive technologies and monitored natural attenuation require the increased burden of proof to ensure that those immobilized contaminants would not compromise the long-term public health. Although contaminant transport modeling and risk assessments are always performed, they sometimes fail due to the lack of understanding the contaminant transport proposes at the time of the risk assessment or due to some unexpected processes. Monitoring technologies are critical to ensure the long-term stability of such remediated sites, and also to address the public concerns. Recent advances in in situ sensor technologies and spatially-extensive mapping technologies (such as unmanned aerial vehicles, airborne mapping, geophysics) have improved monitoring of contamination over space and time. In addition to new sensing devices, data management and data analytics technologies have been expanded to manage and process large spatial and temporal datasets. Such technologies can be used to reduce monitoring cost significantly, and to facilitate long-term monitoring. In this study, we demonstrate our data analytics technologies for two nuclear-related contaminated sites: (1) air dose rate monitoring in Fukushima prefecture, and (2) groundwater monitoring at the Savannah River Site F-Area. We are developing the spatial and temporal data integration methodologies to integrate various spatially extensive data and time-series data for improving long-term monitoring. Such monitoring technologies and experiences at the existing contaminated sites can be transferred to build a better monitoring system for nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storages.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Informing nuclear physics via machine learning methods with differential and integral experiments

Information from differential nuclear-physics experiments and theory is often too uncertain to accurately define nuclear-physics observables such as cross sections or energy spectra. Integral experimental data, representing the applications of these observables, are often more precise but depend simultaneously on too many of them to unambiguously identify issues in the observable with human expert analysis alone. Here, we explore how we can leverage physics knowledge gained from differential experimental data, nuclear theory, integral experiments, and neutron-transport calculations to better understand nuclear-physics observables in the context of the application area represented by integral experiments. We support this task with machine-learning methods to discern trends in a large amount of convoluted data. Differential and integral information was used in an analysis augmented by the random forest and the Shapley additive explanations metric. We chose as an application area one that is represented by criticality measurements and pulsed-sphere neutron-leakage spectra. We show one representative example ( 241 Pu fission observables) where the combination of differential and integral information allowed to resolve issues in data representing these observables. As a starting point, the machine learning (ML) algorithms highlighted several observables as leading potentially to bias in simulating integral experiments. Differential information, paired with sensitivity to integral quantities, allowed us then to pinpoint one specific observable ( 241 Pu fission cross section) as the main driver of bias. The comparison to integral experiments, on the other hand, allowed us to indicate a likely reliable experiment among several discrepant ones for this observables. In other cases (e.g., 239 Pu observables), we were not able to resolve the confounding introduced by integral experiments but instead highlighted the need for targeted new experiments and theory developments to better constrain the nuclear-physics space for the application area represented by integral experiments. We were able to combine information from differential experimental data, nuclear-physics theory, integral experiments, and neutron-transport simulations of the latter experiments with the help of the random forest algorithm and expert judgment. This combination of knowledge allows to improve our description of nuclear-physics observables as applied to a particular application area.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI1993

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1989

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 1, January-March 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 International Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety: NUCSAFE 88 by A. P. Malinauskas and J. G. Pruett; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 18 Chernobyl Today: State of Research by A. Yu. Gagarinskii; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 23 Problems Associated with Routine In-Plant Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Systems at U.S. Light-Water Reactors by Barry G. Wahlig, David M. Walker, Mahmoud R. Ghavi, and John M. Palms; DESIGN FEATURES: 34 Twentieth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning Conference by R. R. Bellamy, D. W. Moeller, and M. W. First, 46 Design Options for the Core Support Structure for Liquid-Metal-Cooled Reactor Plants by J. P. Burelbach, W. J. Kann, J. G. Saiveau, and R. W. Seidensticker; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 53 The Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident by L. V. Konstantinov and A. J. González; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 70 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 80 Fuel Performance Annual Report for 1986 by W. J. Bailey, 103 Safety Considerations Related to 12-Hour Shift Schedules by S. Gould, 105 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 108 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 130 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 140 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 145 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 153 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 69 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 79 International Seminar on Fission Product Transport Processes in Reactor Accidents, 129 Harvard School of Public Health Offers Short Courses, 152 MIT Offers Summer Short Courses on Reactor Safety and Nodal Analysis, 152 Seminar on Use of PCs in Probabilistic Safety Analysis, 157 The Authors, 160 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 29.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Overview of the OECD-NEA Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Cooperation (WPEC)

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Cooperation (WPEC) was established in 1989 to facilitate collaboration in nuclear data activities. Over its thirty year history, different Subgroups have been created to address topics in nearly every aspect of nuclear data, including: experimental measurements, evaluation, validation, model development, quality assurance of databases and the development of software tools. WPEC has recently completed activities on fission yield evaluation, the general nuclear database structure (GNDS) to replace the ENDF-6 format, methods to provide feedback to evaluation, studies of specific capture cross sections, new methods in thermal scattering kernel evaluation and the Collaborative International Evaluated Library Organisation (CIELO) Pilot Project. Ongoing activities in GNDS application programming interface (API) development, methods for covariance evaluation and quality assurance in nuclear data validation using the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) database are complemented by the work of two Expert Groups that oversee the High-Priority Request List (HPRL) for Nuclear Data and the continuous development of the GNDS. New activities on the use of integral experiments for nuclear data validation and adjustment, as well as the use of the Shielding Integral Benchmark Archive and Database (SINBAD) for validation have begun and will be coordinated alongside future Subgroups. After three decades we will review the status of WPEC, how it integrates other collections and activities organised by the NEA and how it dovetails with the initiatives of the IAEA and other bodies to effectively coordinate international activities in nuclear data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Book Review: Monitoring compliance with the comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Contributions by the German national data centre edited by Christoph Pilger, Lars Ceranna and Christian Bönnemann

For decades, the nuclear weapons capability of different countries was tracked in part via the interpretation of signals from more than 2000 nuclear test explosions that were conducted in programs of weapons development. The first such explosion took place in July 1945 (in New Mexico, USA, prior to the use of nuclear weapons in World War 2 against Japan). The last nuclear test, prior to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) becoming open for signature in September 1996, was in July 1996 (in China). This treaty, which took nearly forty years to negotiate, has been signed by 184 states as of December 2018, but a few key additional signatures and ratifications are still needed before nuclear tests are banned under international law. The evidence that a nuclear test explosion has occurred can come from electromagnetic, seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasonic waves; and from unusual radionuclides— which can be present in particulate matter and/or as noble gases. Of course there is a vast infrastructure associated with military programs of nuclear weapons development in a limited number of countries. Less well-known, is the existence of a large infrastructure involving national and international efforts to monitor for the possible occurrence of nuclear test explosions, and thus to support CTBT verification. This book does a very good job of explaining much of that work, as it is conducted in practice by a western nation with sophisticated facilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Fresh look at the nuclear transparency using the generalized parton distributions

Color transparency (CT) is a fundamental phenomenon in QCD in which hadrons produced in high-energy exclusive processes traverse nuclear matter with minimal interactions. Nuclear transparency, which quantifies this attenuation suppression, is a quantity with high sensitivity to CT effects and provides critical insights into QCD dynamics in nuclear environments. In this study, we revisit nuclear transparency using the framework of generalized parton distributions (GPDs). By constructing nuclear GPDs (nGPDs) through the incorporation of nuclear parton distribution functions, we calculate the nuclear transparency 𝑇⁡(𝑄 2 ) for the carbon nucleus as a function of momentum transfer 𝑄 2 considering various definitions and compare the results obtained with available experimental data. Our finding highlights the importance of choosing a physically motivated definition of nuclear transparency. Moreover, we emphasize that a more reliable determination of nGPDs requires a dedicated global analysis incorporating nuclear data. Such an approach is essential for improving the theoretical understanding of CT and for achieving consistency with experimental observations in the high-𝑄 2 regime.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Proliferation Persuasion. Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology

Why do states wait for prolonged periods of time with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Only a handful of countries have ever acquired the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Yet the enduring trend over the last five decades is for these states to delay or forgo exercising the nuclear weapons option provided by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. I show that states pause at this threshold stage because they use nuclear technology to bargain for concessions from both allies and adversaries. But when does nuclear latency offer bargaining benefits? My central argument is that challengers must surmount a dilemma to make coercive diplomacy work: the more they threaten to proliferate, the harder it becomes to reassure others that compliance will be rewarded with nuclear restraint. I identify a range of mechanisms able to solve this credibility problem, from arms control over breakout capacity to third party mediation and confidence building measures. Since each step towards the bomb raises the costs of implementing these policies, a state hits a sweet spot when it first acquires enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR) technology. Subsequent increases in proliferation capability generate diminishing returns at the bargaining table for two reasons: the state must go to greater lengths to make a credible nonproliferation promise, and nuclear programs exhibit considerable path dependency as they mature over time. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about power in world politics, less nuclear latency thereby yields more coercive threat advantages. I marshal new primary source evidence from archives and interviews to identify episodes in the historical record when states made clear decisions to use ENR technology as a bargaining chip, and employ this theory of proliferation persuasion to explain how Japan, North Korea, and Iran succeeded and failed to barter concessions from the United States. By clarifying when countries are able to leverage steps towards the bomb for international political gain, my work advances our understanding of proliferation and coercive diplomacy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

Hydrothermal Alteration of Glass from Underground Nuclear Tests: Formation and Transport of Pu-clay Colloids at the Nevada National Security Site

The testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), has led to the deposition of substantial quantities of plutonium into the environment. Approximately 2.8 metric tons (3.1×10 4 TBq) of Pu were deposited in the NNSS subsurface as a result of underground nuclear testing. While 3 H is the most abundant anthropogenic radionuclide deposited in the NNSS subsurface (4.7×10 6 TBq), plutonium is the most abundant from a molar standpoint. The only radioactive elements in greater molar abundance are the naturally occurring K, Th, and U isotopes. 239 Pu and 240 Pu represent the majority of alpha-emitting Pu isotopes. The extreme temperatures associated with underground nuclear tests and the refractory nature of Pu results in most of the Pu (98%) being sequestered in melted rock, referred to as nuclear melt glass (Iaea, 1998). As a result, Pu release to groundwater is controlled, in large part, by the leaching (or dissolution) of nuclear melt glass over time. The factors affecting glass dissolution rates have been studied extensively. The dissolution of Pu-containing borosilicate nuclear waste glasses at 90ºC has been shown to lead to the formation of dioctahedral smectite colloids. Colloid-facilitated transport of Pu at the NNSS has been observed. Recent groundwater samples collected from a number of contaminated wells have yielded a wide range of Pu concentrations from 0.00022 to 2.0 Bq/L. While Pu concentrations tend to fall below the Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for drinking water (0.56 Bq/L), we do not yet understand what factors limit the Pu concentration or its transport behavior. To quantify the upper limit of Pu concentrations produced as a result of melt glass dissolution and determine the nature of colloids and Pu associations, we performed a 3 year nuclear melt glass dissolution experiment across a range of temperatures (25-200 °C) that represent hydrothermal conditions representative of the underground nuclear test cavities (when groundwater has re-saturated the nuclear melt glass and glass dissolution occurs). Colloid loads and Pu concentrations were monitored along with the mineralogy of both the colloids and the secondary mineral phases. The intent was to establish an upper limit for Pu concentrations at the NNSS, provide context regarding the Pu concentrations observed at the NNSS to date and the Pu concentrations that may be observed in the future. The results provide a conceptual model for the risks posed by Pu migration at the NNSS.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2019

Final Report for the Workshop for Applied Nuclear Data Activities

The Workshop for Applied Nuclear Data Activities (WANDA) was held at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University from 22 to 25 January 2019. The purpose of WANDA was to bring subject matter experts from the national laboratories, universities and industry together with government program managers and their advisors to develop collaborative plans of action (e.g., roadmaps ) to address outstanding issues in nuclear data that effect applications ranging from nuclear energy to national security and nonproliferation to isotope production. WANDA was the latest in a series of collaborative, cross-programmatic workshops focused on nuclear data needs for applications that started in 2015 with the Nuclear Data Needs and Capabilities for Applications Workshop (NDNCA) and continuing with the Nuclear Data Roadmapping Enhancement Workshop (NDREW) in 2018 focused on nuclear data needs for applications. NDREW and WANDA played an important role in providing guidance for the recently created Nuclear Data Interagency Working Group (NDIAWG) comprised of program managers from a panoply government agencies. The NDIAWG issued two Funding Opportunity Announcements (FOA) in FY2017 and FY2018 which are supporting collaborative efforts to address high-priority nuclear data needs.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Key Nuclear Data Impacting Reactivity in Advanced Reactors

Advanced reactor concepts currently being developed throughout the industry are significantly different from light water reactor (LWR) designs with respect to geometry, materials, and operating conditions, and consequently, with respect to their reactor physics behavior. Given the limited operating experience with non-LWRs, the accurate simulation of reactor physics and the quantification of associated uncertainties are critical for ensuring that advanced reactor concepts operate within the appropriate safety margins. Nuclear data are a major source of input uncertainties in reactor physics analysis. As part of an ongoing project at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the effects of nuclear data uncertainties on key figures of merit associated with advanced reactor safety are being assessed for selected advanced reactor technologies. Key nuclear data relevant for reactor safety analysis for each selected advanced reactor technology were identified, and their impact on important key figures of merit was assessed. Available advanced reactor specifications were reviewed, results from studies performed at ORNL and other research institutions were consulted, and available evaluated nuclear data libraries were analyzed. This report summarizes the key nuclear data for nuclides in the fuel, as well as other significant data, including scattering and neutron capture in various materials for the moderator, coolant, and structure of the considered advanced reactors. For the considered advanced reactors that use low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, results from LWR studies provided insight into relevant nuclear data given the lack of available studies specifically addressing these new systems. The major nominal missing data that were identified consist of thermal scattering data and 135m Xe cross section data for molten salt reactor (MSR) analysis. The identified major gaps with respect to nuclear data uncertainties are missing uncertainties of thermal scattering data for high temperature gas-cooled reactors and moderated MSR systems, and incomplete uncertainties on angular distributions in particular for fast spectrum systems, such as sodiumcooled fast reactors, fast molten salt reactors, and heat pipe reactors. Furthermore, it was found that special attention should be paid to cross section and uncertainty differences between different evaluated nuclear data library releases, because significant differences in nuclear data that can lead to major differences in reactivity calculations were found, even for well-known nuclides.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Factors Impacting Nuclear Energy Share in U.S. Energy Markets

The purpose of this report is to collate information and findings from recent studies conducted by national and international bodies/institutes to identify approaches for maintaining/enhancing the role of nuclear energy in the current and future energy mix of the United States. This report shows how nuclear generation grew quickly to provide 20% of U.S. electricity, sustaining that level for three decades without the benefit of new construction, but is now projected to decline going forward. Nuclear construction costs in the U.S. spiraled out of control, ending construction for two decades and the recent resumption of construction has continued the pattern of schedule delays and cost overruns. However, nuclear operations exhibited strong learning, achieving and sustaining the highest capacity factor of any electricity generation technology and license extensions and uprates have sustained nuclear market share. The share of nuclear energy in the U.S. electricity market is projected to decline by ~1/3rd over the next 30 years The report provides an overview of how the markets work in theory and in practice. It indicates how market deregulation and clean energy policies have created conditions where nuclear plants are being retired for economic rather than technical reasons. The report also shows how many of the markets do not in practice have free competition but instead have outcomes that are being determined more and more by policy instead of market forces. While electricity costs from existing nuclear plants are low, electricity from new builds is projected to be too expensive to be competitive head-to-head with natural gas, even for nth-of-a-kind costs. Wind and solar energy have enjoyed an extended period of sustained subsidy. This protected environment has resulted in a sustained reduction in plant level costs to the point that some of these Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) technologies are becoming competitive even if their direct subsidies are removed. But plant level costs underestimate total VRE costs which include a number of system-level externalities. The incremental system value of additional VRE capacity was shown to decline as market share increases, with solar value declining more quickly than wind. The report closes with examination of a possible future for nuclear generation as part of deep decarbonization of the electricity sector. This approach avoids direct competition with natural gas. The two options for achieving 100% decarbonization are to use only renewables or to use all zero emissions technologies, and the report shows the second approach is much less expensive than the first.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

White Paper On Nuclear Structure Reactions and Astrophysics

In preparation for the 2023 NSAC Long Range Plan (LRP), the DNP Town Meeting on Nuclear Structure, Reactions, and Astrophysics was held at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) on Nov 14-16, 2022. The town meeting brought together 578 members of the low-energy nuclear science community, including 216 in-person attendees and 362 remote participants coming from US national laboratories, a wide range of US universities and other research institutions and universities abroad. Participants met in five topic-oriented and seven cross-cutting and intersecting working groups to discuss progress since the 2015 LRP and identify compelling science opportunities and the resources needed to realize them. These considerations were used during the Town Meeting to determine a set of resolutions outlining the highest priorities for our subfield. The full text of the resolutions endorsed by unanimous consent by the low-energy nuclear science community at the Town Meeting is presented at the end of this executive summary. The reports from all working groups that met during the Town Meeting are included as Secs. 1 to 11 of this Whitepaper. The intellectual challenges for nuclear structure, reactions and astrophysics can be captured in the following questions: What is the nature of the nuclear force that binds protons and neutrons into stable nuclei and rare isotopes, and how do the rich phenomena of nuclear structure and reactions emerge? How do single-nucleon, cluster, and collective degrees of freedom coexist and evolve with increasing proton-neutron imbalance and excitation energies? What are the limits of nuclear existence, and what features arise near and beyond these limits? What are the astrophysical origins of the elements and how did the associated chemical evolution proceed? How do stars evolve, and what nuclear signatures do they leave behind? What is the nature of neutron stars and dense matter? How can the knowledge and technological progress provided by nuclear science best be used to benefit society?

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

In-Situ Monitoring Assisted Large-Scale Additive Manufacturing of Mild Steel and 316L Alloys for Nuclear Application

The Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) Program is aimed at developing cross-cutting technologies in support of a broad range of nuclear reactor parts, and to maintain U.S. leadership in materials and manufacturing technologies for nuclear energy applications. The overarching vision of the AMMT program is to accelerate the development, qualification, demonstration and deployment of advanced materials and manufacturing technologies to enable reliable and economical nuclear energy. One of its three goals is to target big challenges and game-changing technologies, to realize the mission and vision of AMMT program. Based on this context, this multi-year work package focuses on understanding the current state of large-scale additive manufacturing (AM) technology for the deposition of 316L stainless steel materials for final components and mild steel for use in nuclear manufacturing processes. The targeted AM modality is directed energy deposition (DED), capable of fabricating components on the size scale of meters including valves, pumps, impellers. etc. that are challenging or difficult to source, especially when developing new systems or replacing obsolete components. Accordingly, the current writeup aims at providing a baseline literature survey on structure-property relationships in mild steel and 316L alloys. Also, information on preliminary trials to date involving these two alloys show tremendous potential of printing parts having complex geometry and thin- walled structures, such as nuclear valve and Hot isostatic Press (HIP) can, using wire based (Wire Arc Additive Manufacturing and Hybrid Additive Manufacturing) as well as blown powder DED machines. All of this is aimed towards (i) demonstrating the ability to fabricate large components for pressure boundary applications relevant to the nuclear community and nuclear manufacturing technology, and (ii) understanding the effect of different manufacturing technology on AM can production and post HIPed material for nuclear applications. Another target of this writeup is to compile various in-situ monitoring tools that have been incorporated for different DED AM modalities, in order to understand process variability during the entire fabrication process. This can be correlated with processing-structure-property response surfaces and would add confidence around process quality verification and ultimately component certification for nuclear applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation

The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2026

Utilizing Time Reversal Ultrasonics to Detect the Removal of Nuclear Materials from Geological Repositories (FY26 Mid-Year)

Detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal from storage environments, such as geological repositories, is a critical safeguards task essential to ensuring the integrity and non-diversion of nuclear materials. However, this process is fraught with significant technical challenges. Storage configurations often involve tightly packed nuclear material containers or obstructed environments, making detection of removal events exceedingly difficult. Optical surveillance cameras, which are commonly used for monitoring, suffer from substantial limitations, including restricted coverage, reliance on line-of-sight measurements, and vulnerability to environmental conditions in certain storage scenarios. As the global inventory of monitored nuclear materials increases and storage configurations become more complex— such as deep geological repositories, inaccessible storage vaults, and tightly packed containers—there is an urgent need for innovative detection technologies that can reliably identify unauthorized diversion events in these challenging environments. The challenge of detecting nuclear material removal in complex storage environments is both significant and urgent. Preventing unauthorized access, diversion, or tampering with nuclear materials is a cornerstone of global nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation efforts. Current detection methods are increasingly inadequate as storage configurations become more intricate and inaccessible. The limitations of existing technologies—such as their inability to detect changes behind obstructions, reliance on costly and labor-intensive processes, and vulnerability to environmental conditions—pose risks to the effectiveness of safeguards systems. Addressing this challenge is critical to maintaining international trust in nuclear safeguards frameworks and ensuring compliance with nonproliferation agreements. Our project builds on the proven concept of TRU technology that can address this unmet need. TRU has demonstrated exceptional spatial sensitivity and change detection capabilities in complex non-line-ofsight environments, making it uniquely suited for detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal in challenging storage configurations. Unlike optical methods, TRU is not limited by line-of-sight constraints or environmental conditions, enabling reliable detection of subtle alterations even behind obstructions. By leveraging TRU’s ability to identify removal or tampering events, we aim to develop a robust detection system that enhances safeguards in geological repositories, storage vaults, and other complex environments.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗